Ketubot 97a — the Talmud in English

And behold,

if he takes them as a gift

for free property, and

is his power not thereby improved,

since the right to collect his debt from the encumbered property still remains with him!?

So too here: by not specifying the purpose of her sale, she thereby improves her power, so that she can say concerning the lands sold for the ketuba: “I sold these for maintenance, whereas the ketuba is still a debt upon the orphans, and is collected from the lands of the purchasers through them.”

And now the Gemara continues to discuss the laws of collecting maintenance by a widow:

How does she sell

the widow property for her maintenance? That is to say: for maintenance for what period of time may the widow sell all at once?

Rabbi Daniel bar Rav Ketina said in the name of Rav Huna:

She sells once for twelve months,

the amount of maintenance for the coming year.

And

the

purchaser,

does not pay her all the money at once, so that if she dies, he will return the remainder of the purchase money to the heirs.

Rather,

the purchaser provides

the widow with sustenance from the money

once every thirty days.

And Rav Yehuda said:

She sells

once

every six months, and the purchaser provides her with sustenance once every thirty days.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rav Huna: She sells

once

for twelve months, and the purchaser provides her with sustenance once every thirty days.

A beraita

also

was taught in accordance with Rav Yehuda: She sells

once

for six months, and the purchaser provides her with sustenance once every thirty days.

Ameimar said: The halakha! She sells

once

for six months, and the purchaser provides her with sustenance once every thirty days.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: What

of Rav Huna? That is to say: Rav Huna said that she sells once for twelve months!?

He said to him,

Ameimar to Rav Ashi:

I have not heard

the words of Rav Huna,

that is to say: I do not hold

like him!

The members of the academy asked

the members of the academy

of Rav Sheshet:

A sale for maintenance

—a widow who sold the orphans’ lands for maintenance—

what is the law: may she return and seize

those very lands themselves

for the ketuba,

for surely these lands, which were encumbered for her ketuba and sold to purchasers, should not be different from other lands encumbered for her ketuba and sold?

The Gemara explains the sides of the uncertainty:

they raised the question

the members of the academy

concerning Rav Yosef!

For Rav Yosef said:

A widow who sells

a widow who sold the orphans’ land for a ketuba or for maintenance, and the husband’s creditor came and seized the land from the purchaser—

the liability

for the sale is

on

the property of

the orphans,

who inherited it from their father, and they compensate the purchaser, but she is not liable for the liability.

And

likewise,

a court that sells

the court that sold the orphans’ land for repayment—the

liability is upon the orphans.

Therefore, the question arises:

what

will the law be if she herself can seize from the purchasers to whom she sold, and the purchasers will return [for payment] to the orphans?

Shall we say:

since the liability is upon the orphans, she seizes

[she can seize]?

Or perhaps they can say to her,

the purchasers to the widow:

Although you did not accept general liability upon yourself

[indeed, you did not accept liability for seizure by other creditors], but

did you not certainly accept liability for yourself

[did you not accept upon yourself liability for your own seizure]!?

He said to them

Rav Sheshet:

You have taught it

this question in a beraita:

For a beraita was taught:

A widow sells

the widow

and continues

for maintenance

until

lands remain in the possession of the orphans

enough for her ketuba, and

these lands that remain in the possession of the orphans

are a support

[with a segol]

for her,

for the widow,

so that she may collect her ketuba from what remains.

Behold,

learn from it:

if

she leaves

[the widow leaves] lands in the possession of the orphans,

there is

indeed, she will be able to collect her ketuba from them.

But

if she does not leave

lands in the possession of the orphans,

not

will she again be able to collect her ketuba, because she cannot turn to the purchasers who bought the lands that she sold for maintenance, since she accepted the liability for this.

The Gemara challenges the proof:

But perhaps

I will always say to you that even if she does not leave lands in the possession of the orphans for collecting her ketuba, she can collect her ketuba from those lands that she sold for maintenance; rather, the beraita

comes to teach us good advice

to the woman, that she should not do so, so that

she not be called “the returner”

[so that everyone should not call her “the one who returns”], who sells and then returns and seizes!?

The Gemara resolves the proof:

If so—

that she can collect her ketuba even if she does not leave lands in the possession of the orphans—

let it teach: “She collects her ketuba from what remains”; what

“is a support for her”—

Learn from it: if she leaves, there is,

indeed she has support for collecting her ketuba, but

if she does not leave, there is not,

she has no support at all for collecting her ketuba.

They raised a question,

the members of the academy were uncertain:

If

a person sells

[sold] his lands, and it is known to us that he did so because he needed money to purchase a certain thing, and

in the end

the sellers retracted, so

he did not need the money

[he did not need the money]—

Do we say

the sale returns

[the sale returns and is nullified],

or does the sale not return?

?

Come and hear

a proof that the sale returns:

For there was a certain man who sold land

[he sold land]

to Rav Pappa

because

he needed money to buy oxen

[he needed money in order to buy oxen]—

In the end he did not need

the money,

and Rav Pappa returned his land to him

[Rav Pappa returned the land to its owner].

Behold, the sale returns!

The Gemara rejects this:

Rav Pappa acted beyond the strict measure of the law!

Come and hear

a proof that the sale returns:

For there was a sudden shortage

[a sudden shortage of wheat that caused prices to rise]

in Nehardea, and everyone sold his house

[all the residents of the city sold their houses] in order to buy wheat.

In the end the wheat came

an abundance of wheat arrived in Nehardea.

Rav Naḥman said to them

to the residents of Nehardea [Rav Naḥman’s city]:

The law is that the houses return to their owners,

such is the law: the houses return to their sellers; behold, “the sale returns.”

The Gemara rejects this:

There too,

that is to say: from there also there is no proof, because

the sales were mistaken sales

[it was a mistaken sale],

for it became evident that the ships were standing at the bends,

it became clear that the ships bringing the wheat were already on their way to Nehardea, but the river had risen over its banks, and the shipowners had to lead the ship along a winding route; therefore the ship was delayed on its way.

And since, had the sellers known the facts as they were, they would not have sold, it is therefore a mistaken sale; but nothing can be proved from here for a case in which the sellers retracted after these people sold their houses, or in which wheat came from another place, whose wheat had not yet been uprooted for transport at the time of the sale.

If so,

as we explained—

this is

the meaning of the discussion that took place between Rami bar Shmuel and Rav Naḥman following Rav Naḥman’s ruling,

for Rami bar Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

If so—

as you ruled concerning the nullification of the sale of the lands—

you will be causing them to stumble

the residents of Nehardea

in the future!

For if the sales are nullified, the residents of Nehardea will again find no purchasers for their lands, because the purchasers will fear that the same story may happen again and the sellers will nullify the sale.

And

he said to him,

Rav Naḥman to Rami bar Shmuel:

Is a shortage common every day

[is there a shortage in Nehardea every day], that you are concerned about similar cases in the future?

And

he said to him,

Rami bar Shmuel to Rav Naḥman:

Yes,

indeed,

a shortage in Nehardea is very common

[a shortage in Nehardea is a common occurrence]!

And this is understandable: if the sale was nullified because of ships at the bends, indeed there is reason to fear a similar story in the future, in which the sale will be nullified; but if the sale was nullified because the price changed owing to wheat that came from nearby, which had not been uprooted from its place at the time of the sale, then this is not a common occurrence, so why was Rami bar Shmuel concerned!?

And the halakha is: If he sells and does not need the money—

and if so, say the same even in our Mishna: even though she performed an acquisition, her words should not take effect, and she should collect from the purchaser!?

Rav Zeira said in the name of Rav Ḥisda:

It is not difficult,

because:

This

our Mishna

is Rabbi Meir,

who holds that a woman cannot say: “I acted only to please my husband.”

This

the Mishna in Gittin

is Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that a woman can say: “I acted only to please my husband.”

For it was taught

in a beraita in which Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed about this matter:

The husband wrote

the husband

to the first

a deed of sale for one field,

but she did not sign for him

the woman did not acknowledge the husband’s sale to the purchaser and did not remove herself from collecting that land for her ketuba.

And again the husband wrote a deed for another field

to the second, and she signed for him,

the woman, and the husband died without leaving free property—

This woman

has forfeited her ketuba,

for she cannot collect it either from the first or from the second. For from the first she cannot collect it, even though she did not sign for him, since he was the first purchaser, and at the time he purchased there was still free property in the husband’s possession. He can say to the woman: “At the time I purchased, I left you a place from which to collect,” namely, from the field that was still in the husband’s possession and was free property; and then, even though the husband subsequently sold the remaining property to another, you can no longer collect from me, but only from the second field—which was free property at the time I purchased.

And she also cannot collect from the second, for she signed for him—

these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Even though she cannot collect from the first, since he left her a place from which to collect, nevertheless she can collect from the second, even though she signed for him, because

she can say: “I acted only to please my husband; what have you to do with me?”

Thus Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed over this reasoning. If so, our Mishna is Rabbi Meir, who says that she cannot say this, whereas the Mishna in Gittin is Rabbi Yehuda, who says that she can say: “I acted only to please my husband.”

The Gemara asks:

But Rabbi—

who arranged the Mishnayot—how is it possible that he

stated anonymously here

in our Mishna

in accordance with Rabbi Meir,

who says that she cannot say: “I acted only to please my husband,”

and stated anonymously there

in Gittin

in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who says that she can say: “I acted only to please my husband”!?

Rather,

Rav Pappa said,

explaining our anonymous Mishna: if she said, “I have no claim or dealings with you,” she is removed from the land, even though Rabbi himself stated anonymously in Gittin, in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, that she can say: “I acted only to please my husband”:

With what are we dealing here, in our Mishna?

With a divorced woman

who wrote to the purchaser, “I have no claim or dealings with you,”

and

our Mishna

is the words of everyone

[Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda], for since she is divorced, it is not applicable to say that she intended to act to please her husband.

Rav Ashi said,

to reconcile our anonymous Mishna with the anonymous Mishna in Gittin:

The whole of it—

that is to say: both Mishnayot—

is Rabbi Meir,

for Rabbi Meir too agrees that a woman can say: “I acted only to please my husband.” Therefore Rabbi stated anonymously in Gittin that the purchase is void, even though the purchaser also bought from the woman.

And if you say: Rabbi Meir said in the beraita, “He wrote to the first and she did not sign for him; to the second and she signed for him, she forfeited her ketuba,” and according to your words, Rabbi Meir too holds that a woman can say: “I acted only to please my husband”—it is not difficult, because:

Rabbi Meir said this only there,

in the beraita, that her removal is effective and she cannot say: “I acted only to please my husband,”

when there are two purchasers

who bought from the husband, and she did not sign for the first but did sign for the second, because

they say to her

the court:

If it is true that you acted to please him, you should have done so for the first

[if indeed you acted to please your husband, why did you not sign for the first purchaser as well]?

But with one purchaser

who she signed for,

even Rabbi Meir concedes

that she can say, “I acted to please my husband”; and this is what we learned in Gittin: “He purchased from the husband and then returned and purchased from the wife—his purchase is void.”

And our Mishna,

and our Mishna, which says that if she wrote, “I have no claim or dealings with you,” her withdrawal is effective, is also dealing—as is the beraita—with a case such as

that he wrote to her

the husband an additional piece of land

afterward

and she did not sign for him, whereas for this one she signed; for in such a case Rabbi Meir holds that she cannot say, “I acted to please my husband,” for if so, she would also have signed for the first one, as Rabbi Meir’s position is explained in the beraita.

We learned there:

One does not collect from encumbered properties

[lands that were in the possession of the borrower, were encumbered to the creditor, and were sold to purchasers]

where there are free properties

in the possession of the borrower; rather, one collects from those in the possession of the borrower—

And even

if the lands in the possession of the borrower are

inferior

and the purchaser bought the intermediate land, upon which the creditor’s principal lien rests, nevertheless the creditor collects only from the free lands in the possession of the borrower.

And

they raised a dilemma

the members of the academy concerning this law:

A person purchased lands from the borrower and left free lands in the possession of the borrower, and

the free properties were ruined

[those free lands deteriorated], and now the creditor has nothing from which to collect except the encumbered lands in the possession of the purchasers; and the same law applies if, for any other reason, the creditor cannot collect from the free properties.

What is the law: may he seize

the creditor

from encumbered properties

in the possession of the purchaser, since there are no free properties from which to collect, or perhaps the creditor’s lien on the encumbered properties has already been removed, and he will no longer collect from them, even though he cannot collect from the free properties?

Come and hear

from the beraita mentioned above:

He wrote

the husband

to the first one

a deed of sale for one field,

and she did not sign for him

the wife, to whom that field was encumbered for her marriage settlement.

And afterward the husband wrote a deed for another field

to the second one, and she signed for him

the wife, and the husband died and left no free properties—

This woman has

forfeited her marriage settlement,

for she cannot collect either from the first one or from the second one. For from the first one she cannot collect, even though she did not sign for him, since he was the first purchaser, and at the time he purchased, there were still free properties in the possession of the husband; and he can say to the woman: “I left you—at the time I purchased—a place from which to collect,” meaning: Since at the time I purchased the land there were free properties in the possession of the borrower, and you could not collect from me, for “one does not collect from encumbered properties where there are free properties,” therefore, even though the husband sold the field to another and both fields are encumbered, you will no longer collect from me, but only from the second purchaser.

And she also does not collect from the second one, since she signed for him—

the words of Rabbi Meir.

And if it should enter your mind

that if

the free properties were ruined

in the possession of the borrower,

he seizes

the creditor

from encumbered properties

in the possession of the purchaser, then when the free properties in the possession of the second purchaser were ruined, the power of the first purchaser when the land is in the possession of the second purchaser should not be greater than his own power when the land is still free; and just as when he cannot collect from the free properties he goes back to the encumbered properties, so too he goes back to the first purchaser—

And if so, this is difficult:

Granted, she forfeited her marriage settlement from the second one

because she signed for him;

from the first one,

who possesses encumbered lands, but left a place from which she could collect—

at least, let her collect

her marriage settlement, for she cannot collect her debt from the land that had been free, since she signed for the purchaser that she would not collect from him, and she must now go back to the encumbered land in the possession of the first purchaser; why, then, did she forfeit her marriage settlement entirely?!

He said

he resolved

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak:

What does “she forfeited

her marriage settlement,” which we learned, mean? It does not mean literally that she forfeited her marriage settlement entirely—

Rather,

she forfeited

her marriage settlement from collecting it

f

rom the

second one,

since she signed for him; but from the first one she will collect, for he cannot say, “I left you a place from which to collect,” since she now cannot collect from the land that had been free.

He said

he refuted

Rava: two refutations

[questions and contradictions]

concerning this:

One: “she forfeited” implies entirely, and that she collects neither from the first one nor from the second one; and if so, we can learn that “if the free properties were ruined, he seizes from encumbered properties.”

And furthermore, it was taught

in a beraita explicitly that she does not collect even from the first one:

For it was taught:

If he borrowed from one person and sold his properties to two purchasers

one after the other,

and the creditor wrote to the second purchaser: “I have no claim or dealings with you,” he has nothing

even

against the first purchaser.

Because he can say: “I left you a place from which to collect

from him.”

Rather,

Rava rejects the proof from the two beraitot for the law that “if the free properties were ruined, he seizes from encumbered properties”:

There,

in these two beraitot, the creditors do not collect from the second one because they removed themselves from collecting from the lands in his possession;

he

the creditor or the woman—

caused his own loss with his own hands,

for they removed themselves from the second purchaser, and therefore they do not go back to the first purchaser.

Rav Yemar said to Rav Ashi:

But what is there to doubt? If the free properties were ruined, does the creditor go back to the encumbered lands?