Ketubot 96b (צו:) — the Talmud in English

Is it the case that

the property is presumed to be in the possession of the orphans

[The property is presumed to be in the possession of the orphans, since it belongs to them],

and

if so,

the

widow must

produce proof,

as anyone who seeks to extract money from another must produce proof?

Or perhaps, the property is presumed to be in the possession of the widow,

since it was liened to her by the stipulation of the court,

and the orphans must produce proof

that they had already paid what they owed her.

Ta shma

from this

as Levi taught

an explicit beraita concerning this matter:

As for a widow, as long as she has not remarried,

after

the orphans must produce proof

that they gave her sustenance.

But if she

remarried

afterward, and she comes to claim sustenance for previous years,

she must produce proof,

because once she has married, the property is no longer in her possession.

Rabbi Shimi bar Ashi said:

This uncertainty with which Rabbi Yohanan was uncertain

is subject to a dispute between tannaim:

the tannaim disagree about this matter!

As it was taught:

A widow who sells

land in order to collect sustenance or her ketuba from it

writes

in the deed of sale:

“These

properties

I sold for sustenance, and these

properties

I sold for my ketuba; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda.”

The Gemara initially thought to explain Rabbi Yehuda’s reason as follows: He holds that specifying in the deed that she is selling the property for sustenance is beneficial to her, because if she does not specify that she is selling it for sustenance, perhaps the heirs will say: “You sold it for your ketuba,” while they had already given her the sustenance, and they will be believed. Therefore, she writes that she sold it for sustenance, and they still owe her payment of her ketuba.

And Rabbi Yosei says: She sells and writes without specification, and so

by leaving the purpose unspecified rather than specifying it,

her position is stronger

more.

The reason is—as Abaye the Elder explains it later in the sugya—that we hold: sustenance for a woman is not collected from liened property, whereas her ketuba can be collected even from liened property. Thus, when the orphans’ property is exhausted and she has no place from which to collect except liened property, it is beneficial for her to be able to claim—even though she in fact sold the property for her ketuba—that she has still not received payment of her ketuba, and that what she sold was sold for sustenance , so that she would still have a ketuba debt against the orphans, which she could collect from liened property.

Ne v tom li sostoyat raznoglasiya:

Po mneniyu Rabbi Yehudy, kotoryi govorit: “Nuzhno ukazyvat prichinu prodazhi”,

potomu chto, po ego mneniyu, eto ukazanie bolee vyгодno ей, tak kak on

schitaet:

What, is it not that they disagree about this:

According to Rabbi Yehuda, who says: She must specify,

because specifying is more beneficial to her, it is because he

holds:

The property is presumed to be in the possession of the orphans, and the widow must produce proof

that she was not paid the sustenance. Since the orphans can claim that they paid her, there is concern that she may suffer a loss, as explained.

And

if it were

Rabbi Yosei, who

holds that she need not specify, but that leaving the purpose unspecified is more beneficial to her, he would hold:

The property is presumed to be in the possession of the widow, and the orphans must produce proof, and she will always be believed to say: “I did not receive my sustenance,” and will suffer no loss.

On the contrary, it is preferable for her not to specify the purpose for which she sold the property, for the reason given by Abaye the Elder, as explained.

The Gemara rejects this:

From where

can it be established

that this is the point of disagreement between the tannaim?!

Perhaps,

in fact

everyone—both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei—holds:

The property is presumed to be in the possession of the widow, and the orphans must produce proof, and this is Rabbi Yosei’s reason: He is not concerned that she will suffer a loss by leaving the purpose unspecified.

And Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that she specifies the purpose for which she sold the property, does so not because of concern that she may suffer a loss, but

as good advice

merely,

he teaches us

that when someone sells many parcels of land, some for the ketuba and some for sustenance, she should notify and publicize that she is not selling everything for sustenance,

so that they will not call her voracious

[so that they will not call her voracious], and no one will subsequently marry her.

For if you do not say so,

that Rabbi Yehuda’s reason is good advice—

then there is a difficulty:

with regard to Rabbi Yohanan’s question,

whether they are believed to say, “We gave her the sustenance,” or not, what is the nature of this question? Surely

it could be resolved from the Mishna

below, where we learned:

A widow sells

property

for sustenance without a court, and writes: “These I sold for sustenance.”

Certainly, she writes this so that the orphans will not say: “You sold it for your ketuba, and we already paid your sustenance.” If so, there would be no basis for Rabbi Yohanan’s question, since he certainly knew this Mishna, as the Mishnayot were familiar to everyone.

Rather,

necessarily,

nothing can be inferred from the Mishna,

because

it teaches good advice.

And if so,

here too,

in the beraita, it can be said that

it teaches good advice.

The Tosafot object: what is your initial impression that she would not remain silent!? One may say that it was clear to her from the outset that the Mishna is certainly because of good advice, but the baraita does not imply good advice but rather the advantage of silence, as with Rabbi Yossi.

Alternatively,

the Gemara explains the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei differently, so that Rabbi Yohanan’s question will not be subject to a dispute between tannaim:

Everyone—

both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei—holds:

The property is presumed to be in the possession of the orphans,

and this is the reason for Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that she sells and specifies the purpose for which she sold the property, so that she will not suffer a loss with regard to her ketuba, as explained.

And this is the reason for Rabbi Yosei—

who holds that she should not specify the purpose of the sale, even though at times she will suffer a loss as a result: On the other hand, she gains by not specifying the purpose, and this gain is preferable for her. For if the reason is that she will be able to claim with regard to property sold for sustenance that she did not sell it for the ketuba, she can have witnesses observe the property sold for sustenance, and if necessary they will come and testify.

And

as

explained

Abaye the Elder

the gain she has by not specifying the purpose of the sale:

For Abaye the Elder said: Rabbi Yosei’s analogy,

who said: “And so her position is stronger” by leaving the purpose unspecified,

to what can this be compared?

To a terminally ill person who said: “Give

as a gift

two hundred zuz to so-and-so, my creditor.”

If he wishes—

the creditor wishes to take the two hundred zuz that he has from unencumbered property—

as payment of his debt,

then

he takes them

as payment of his debt, and forfeits the gift, since a gift cannot be collected from liened property.

And if

he wishes—

to take the two hundred zuz of unencumbered property that the terminally ill person left—

as a gift,

he takes them,

and collects his debt from the liened property.