Ketubot 97b (צז:) — the Talmud in English

Except from betrothal,

for she sells for payment of her ketubba—

what is the reason

for the Sages’ ruling that she may sell even outside a court?!

He said:

Ulla

explained

the reason for the law: An almanah may sell even for payment of her ketubba outside a court, because it is

for the sake of favor—

if it is convenient for her to collect her ketubba, men will find favor in the eyes of women and they will agree to marry them, since women know that if a ketubba becomes due to them, they will be able to collect it easily.

Rabbi Yohanan said

another reason why an almanah may collect her ketubba even without a court:

Because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court.

What is the practical difference between them—

between Ulla and Rabbi Yohanan? The Gemara explains:

There is a difference between them concerning:

A divorced woman,

whether she may sell for payment of her ketubba outside a court.

For

according to the one who says—

Ulla—

for the sake of favor,

a woman may sell for payment of her ketubba outside a court; accordingly, even a divorced woman may sell for payment of her ketubba outside a court, for:

A divorced woman also requires favor—

that is, when a woman comes to marry, she also considers the possibility of divorce and wants to be assured that she will be secure in her ketubba even in the event of divorce. If she is not assured of this, men will not find favor in her eyes and she will not agree to marry them.

But

according to the one who says—

Rabbi Yohanan—that the reason is

because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court,

this applies only to an almanah, but

he does not care

if his divorced wife is disgraced.

We learned

in the following Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan, for we learned:

“And a divorced woman may sell only in court!”

Granted, according to the one who says—

Rabbi Yohanan—that the reason is

because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court,

it is understandable that a divorced woman may not sell outside a court, because

he does not care

if she is disgraced, as explained.

But according to the one who says—

Ulla—that the reason is

for the sake of favor,

and

a divorced woman also requires favor, as explained, why may she not sell like the almanah outside a court?!

Why not?!

And we answer:

Whose opinion is this—

who is the tanna who taught the following Mishna? It is

Rabbi Shimon,

who holds in

our Mishna

that anyone who sells for payment of her ketubba may sell only in court. Thus, he does not take the consideration of favor into account, and therefore even a divorced woman may sell only in court.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this answer:

If

the following Mishna—that a divorced woman may sell only in court—

is Rabbi Shimon,

is,

this

was already

taught by him at the beginning

of our Mishna:

“A woman betrothed may not sell

outside a court,” since she sells for payment of her ketubba, and it consequently follows that the same applies to a divorced woman, who also sells only for payment of her ketubba. Why, then, was this stated again?!

And we answer: Rabbi Shimon needed to teach us that even a divorced woman may not sell for payment of her ketubba outside a court, although he had already taught this law with regard to an almanah from betrothal.

For

lest you say:

perhaps

it is an almanah from betrothal regarding whom Rabbi Shimon holds that one need not take the consideration of favor into account, since

her favor is not great—

that is, women will not be displeased that this woman has difficulty collecting her ketubba, since she had not yet experienced the affection of marital relations, and they will not therefore refrain from marrying men.

But in the case of a divorced woman, whose favor is great,

since she had already experienced the affection of marital relations,

say

that even Rabbi Shimon agrees that

she requires favor,

and she may sell even outside a court.

Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon teaches us that even a divorced woman—since she does not sell for sustenance but only for payment of her ketubba—may not sell outside a court.

We still raise a difficulty:

This too was already taught

in Rabbi Shimon’s statement in our Mishna, where he said:

“Anyone” who has no

sustenance

may sell only in court. Why was the word “anyone” stated?

What does it come to include?

Is it

not to include a divorced woman

from marriage, who also may sell only in court? If so, why did Rabbi Shimon need to repeat that a divorced woman who sells for payment of her ketubba may not sell outside a court?!

And we answer:

No,

it is not as you interpreted it—that “anyone” who has no sustenance and may sell only in court comes to include a divorced woman—for Rabbi Shimon taught this only in the following Mishna.

Rather, “anyone” stated by Rabbi Shimon in the first Mishna

comes to include

an almanah from marriage who is

divorced and not divorced

[whose status is that of a possible divorcee], who may not sell for payment of her ketubba outside a court. Since she has no sustenance and sells only for payment of her ketubba, anyone who has no sustenance may not sell outside a court. The Mishna incidentally teaches this very law: a woman who is divorced and not divorced from marriage and then became widowed has no right to sustenance, because money cannot be extracted on the basis of uncertainty.

And

this is in accordance with Rabbi Zeira!

For Rabbi Zeira said: Wherever they said, “divorced and not divorced,” the husband is obligated to provide her sustenance,

and the Mishna teaches us that it is specifically the husband who is obligated to provide her sustenance, because he prevents her from marrying another man. But once the husband dies, she no longer has a claim for sustenance against the orphans. It follows that she sells for payment of her ketubba, and therefore may sell only in court.

Come and hear

a beraita in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan:

Just as she may sell

an almanah for payment of her ketubba

outside a court,

so too,

if the almanah dies,

her heirs, the heirs of her ketubba, may sell

to collect the ketubba

outside a court.

Granted, according to the one who says—

Rabbi Yohanan—that the reason for collecting a ketubba outside a court is

because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court,

it is understandable that even her heirs may sell outside a court, because:

Just as he does not want her to be disgraced

[just as he does not want her to be disgraced in court], so too

he does not want her heirs to be disgraced

[he also does not want her heirs to suffer disgrace].

But according to the one who says—

Ulla—that the reason is

for the sake of favor,

there is a difficulty: Why may her heirs sell outside a court? After all,

her heirs,

who are men and not women,

what favor is there

for them? Men do not care about the trouble of appearing in court.

Ulla translated:

What circumstances are we dealing with here?

For example, when her daughter or sister inherited her,

as they are women.

Mishna:

If she sold

the almanah

her ketubba, or

part of it,

she forfeits her right to sustenance.

And likewise, if

she mortgaged

the almanah

her ketubba, or

part of it,

she forfeits her right to sustenance.

And likewise, if

she gave

the almanah

her ketubba to another as a gift, or

part of it.

Therefore, in all these cases,

she may sell the remainder only in court,

because, since she has forfeited her right to sustenance, she must now be selling for payment of her ketubba; and our Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon [in the preceding Mishna], who holds that a woman may sell outside a court only for sustenance.

And the Sages say: She may sell

for payment of her ketubba

even four or five times,

to collect her ketubba in installments.

And

even so,

she may sell

in the interim, until she finishes selling the ketubba,

for sustenance outside a court,

because selling part of the ketubba does not cause her to forfeit her right to sustenance.

And she writes—

if she wishes, and this is good advice—every almanah who sells for sustenance should write in the deed of sale:

“I sold for sustenance”

these lands. The reason is that, since she needs to collect both for sustenance and for payment of her ketubba, if she does not write on the property that she sells for sustenance that she is selling it for sustenance, people may say even about those lands that the court sold for payment of the ketubba that they too were sold for sustenance, and that she is a gluttonous woman. Once it is written on the lands sold for sustenance that they were sold for sustenance, people will understand that the other lands were sold only for payment of the ketubba.

And a divorced woman may not sell

for payment of her ketubba

except in court.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If she sold her ketuba or part of it, etc., she may sell the remainder only in court:

The Gemara explains:

Whose view is expressed in the Mishna

, meaning: The view of which authority is represented by the first tanna of our Mishna, who holds that when she sells part of the ketuba, she forfeits her sustenance?

And we explain:

It is the view of Rabbi Shimon!

As it was taught in a beraita: If she sold

all of

her ketuba

, or if she

mortgaged

all of

her ketuba

, or if she

designated

all of

her ketuba as an apoteiki

a lien for repayment of a debt

to another

, she

no longer has a right to sustenance

, these are the words of Rabbi Meir, and this is the view of the Sages in our Mishna.

Rabbi Shimon says:

Even though she sold or mortgaged not all of her ketuba but only half of it, she forfeits her sustenance, but the remainder

she may sell only in court, and this is the view of the first tanna in our Mishna.

Is that to say

indeed

that Rabbi Shimon

—who holds that even if she sold only part of it, she forfeits her sustenance—

holds: “A part of the money is like all the money”

, meaning: We do not say that the portion of the ketuba debt that still remains owed by the orphans is as though the entire ketuba debt were imposed upon them, in which case she would not forfeit her sustenance.

And the Rabbis

—Rabbi Meir, who holds that she did not forfeit her sustenance—

hold: We say, “A part of the money is like all the money”

, and since part of the ketuba debt is still owed by the orphans, it is as though the entire ketuba debt were owed by them, and she did not forfeit her sustenance.

But this is difficult:

For we find the opposite stated concerning them

we have found that their views concerning this are reversed!?

As it was taught in a beraita:

It is written concerning the High Priest:

“And he shall take a woman in her virginity

” and not one who is not a virgin:

excluding a woman who has reached maturity, for

some of her

virginity

has ended, as she too is not permitted to a High Priest,

these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon deem a woman who has reached maturity fit

for a High Priest.

And it initially entered our minds that the explanation of their dispute was as follows:

Rabbi Meir holds: Since some of a mature woman’s virginity has ended, and “a part of virginity is not like all virginity,” she is disqualified from marrying a High Priest.

And Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon hold: “A part of virginity is like all virginity,” and therefore a mature woman who retains some virginity is fit to marry a High Priest.

Thus, their positions here are the opposite of their positions concerning a part of the money!?

And we answer: In fact, Rabbi Meir holds that “a part of the money is like all the money,” and also that “a part of virginity is like all virginity,” while Rabbi Shimon disagrees. However,

there

in the case of a mature woman, where Rabbi Meir disqualifies her and Rabbi Shimon deems her fit,

they dispute the interpretations of the verses

it is in the exposition of the verses that they disagree:

Rabbi Meir holds:

Had the verse stated

“virgin

” alone, it would have implied:

even a part of virginity

, for “a part of a virgin is like all of a virgin.”

But since the verse states

“her virginity

,” it implies:

until all the virginity is present

, excluding a mature woman whose part of her virginity has ended; therefore Rabbi Meir prohibits her to a High Priest.

And the verse further states:

“in her virginity

”—the additional letter bet—to teach that the verse was particular only with regard to the place of virginity, and therefore:

in the customary manner, there is no

if she engaged in intercourse in the customary manner, she is indeed disqualified from marrying a High Priest, but if she engaged in intercourse

in an unconventional manner, there is no

she is not disqualified from marrying a High Priest.

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon hold:

Had the verse stated

“virgin

” alone,

complete

—one whose virginity had not ended even in part—it would have

implied

, for “a part of virginity is not like all virginity.”

But since the verse states

“her virginity

,” it comes to teach that

even

a

part of virginity

is sufficient, and a mature woman is fit to marry a High Priest.