Ketubot 97b — the Talmud in English

Except from the betrothal,

for her marriage contract she sells—

what is the reason

of the Sages, that she sells even not in court?!

He said:

Ulla explained

the reason of the law

that even for her marriage contract a widow sells not in court: it is

because of ḥina,

for if it is convenient for her to collect her marriage contract, men will find favor in the women’s eyes, to marry them, since the women know that if a marriage contract becomes due to her, she will be able to collect it easily.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said

another reason for the collection of a marriage contract by a widow even without a court:

Because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court.

What difference is there between them

between Ulla and Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara explains:

There is a difference between them:

A divorced woman,

whether she sells for her marriage contract not in court.

For

according to the one who says—

Ulla—

because of ḥina

a woman sells for her marriage contract not in court, so the divorced woman also sells for her marriage contract not in court, since:

A divorced woman also needs favor,

that is: when the woman comes to marry, she also considers the possibility of divorce, and she wants to be certain of her marriage contract even in the event of divorce; and if she is not certain of this, the men will not find favor in her eyes to marry them.

But

according to the one who says—

Rabbi Yoḥanan—that the reason is

because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court,

this applies only to a widow, but

he does not care concerning a divorced woman

that she be disgraced by her husband.

We learned

in the following Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan, for we learned:

“And a divorced woman may sell only in court!”

Granted, according to the one who says—

Rabbi Yoḥanan—that the reason is

because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court,

it is understandable that the divorced woman does not sell outside court, because

he does not care concerning a divorced woman

that she be disgraced, as was explained.

But according to the one who says—

Ulla—that the reason is

because of ḥina,

yet

a divorced woman also needs favor,

as was explained, why does she not sell like the widow, not in court?!

And we answer:

Who is this

\[who is] the tanna who taught the following Mishna?

Rabbi Shimon,

who holds in our Mishna

that

everyone who sells for her marriage contract sells only in court. Thus he does not take ḥina into consideration, and therefore even a divorced woman sells only in court.

The Gemara objects to the answer:

If

the following Mishna—“a divorced woman may sell only in court”—

Rabbi Shimon

is,

this

has already been

taught to him at the beginning

of our Mishna:

“From the betrothal she may not sell

except in court,” since she sells for her marriage contract; and it necessarily follows that the same law applies to a divorced woman, who sells only for her marriage contract, does it not?!

And we answer: Rabbi Shimon needs to teach us that even a divorced woman may not sell for her marriage contract outside court, although he already taught this law concerning a widow from the betrothal.

For

lest you say

\[perhaps you will say]:

It is a widow from the betrothal

concerning whom Rabbi Shimon holds that one should not take ḥina into consideration, since

her favor is not great,

that is: it will not be displeasing in the women’s eyes that this one has difficulty collecting her marriage contract, since she had not yet experienced the affection of intercourse; and because of this they will not refrain from marrying men.

But a divorced woman, whose favor is great,

since she had already experienced the affection of intercourse,

say

that even Rabbi Shimon agrees that

she needs favor,

and she may sell even outside court.

Therefore Rabbi Shimon teaches us that even a divorced woman—since she does not sell for maintenance but only for her marriage contract—may not sell outside court.

We still object:

This too we already learned

in Rabbi Shimon’s words in our Mishna, where he said:

“Everyone” who has no

maintenance

may sell only in court; for what does the word “everyone”

come to include?

Is it not

to include a divorced woman

from marriage, who likewise may sell only in court? If so, why does Rabbi Shimon repeat and say that a divorced woman who sells for her marriage contract may not sell outside court?!

And we answer:

No,

it is not as you explained, that “everyone” who has no maintenance and may sell only in court comes to include a divorced woman, for Rabbi Shimon taught this only in the following Mishna.

Rather, “everyone,” which Rabbi Shimon said in the first Mishna,

comes to include

a widow from marriage who is

divorced and not divorced

\[one whose divorce is uncertain], who does not sell for her marriage contract outside court, since she has no maintenance and sells only for her marriage contract; and everyone who has no maintenance may not sell outside court. The Mishna comes incidentally to teach this very law: that one who is divorced and not divorced from marriage and then becomes widowed has no maintenance, since in a case of uncertainty we do not remove money.

And

in accordance with Rabbi Zeira!

For Rabbi Zeira said: Wherever they said, “divorced and not divorced,” the husband is obligated in her maintenance,

and the Mishna teaches us that specifically the husband is obligated in her maintenance because he prevents her from marrying another; but once the husband dies, she no longer has maintenance from the orphans, and it follows that she sells for her marriage contract, and therefore may sell only in court.

Come and hear

a beraita in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan:

Just as she sells

the widow for her marriage contract

outside court,

so

if the widow dies,

her heirs, the heirs of her marriage contract, sell

to collect the marriage contract

outside court.

Granted, according to the one who says—

Rabbi Yoḥanan—that the reason for collecting a marriage contract outside court is

because a man does not want his wife to be disgraced in court,

it is understandable that her heirs too sell outside court, because:

Just as he does not want her to be disgraced

\[just as he does not want her to be disgraced in court], so too

he does not want her heirs to be disgraced

\[he also does not want the disgrace of her heirs].

But according to the one who says—

Ulla—that the reason is

because of ḥina,

there is a difficulty: Why do her heirs sell outside court? For

her heirs,

who are men and not women,

what favor is there,

since males do not care about the exertion of going to court?!

Ulla translated it:

In what circumstance are we dealing?

For example, her daughter or her sister inherited her,

who are women.

Mishna:

If she sold

the widow

her marriage contract or

part of it,

she has thereby forfeited her maintenance.

And likewise if

she mortgaged

the widow

her marriage contract or

part of it,

she forfeited her maintenance.

And likewise if

she gave

the widow as a gift

her marriage contract to another, or

part of it.

Therefore, in all these manners,

she may not sell the remainder except in court,

for since she forfeited her maintenance, she necessarily now sells for her marriage contract; and our Mishna is Rabbi Shimon’s [in the preceding Mishna], who holds that a woman sells outside court only for maintenance.

And the Sages say: She sells

for her marriage contract

even four or five times,

to collect her marriage contract little by little,

and

even so

she sells

in the meantime, until she completes selling the marriage contract,

for maintenance outside court,

for selling part of the marriage contract did not cause her to forfeit her maintenance.

And she writes—

if she wishes, and it is good advice—every widow who sells for maintenance writes in the deed of sale:

“For maintenance I sold

these lands.” The reason is that since she needs to collect both for maintenance and for her marriage contract, if she does not write concerning what she sells for maintenance that she sells it for maintenance, perhaps people will say even concerning those lands that the court sold for the marriage contract that they too were sold for maintenance, and that she is a greedy woman. But once it is written on the lands sold for maintenance that they were sold for maintenance, they will understand that the other lands were sold only for the marriage contract.

And a divorced woman may not sell

for her marriage contract

except in court.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: If she sold her ketuba or part of it, etc., she may sell the remainder only in court:

The Gemara explains:

Whose view is expressed in the Mishna

, meaning: The view of which authority is represented by the first tanna of our Mishna, who holds that when she sells part of the ketuba, she forfeits her sustenance?

And we explain:

It is the view of Rabbi Shimon!

As it was taught in a beraita: If she sold

all of

her ketuba

, or if she

mortgaged

all of

her ketuba

, or if she

designated

all of

her ketuba as an apoteiki

a lien for repayment of a debt

to another

, she

no longer has a right to sustenance

, these are the words of Rabbi Meir, and this is the view of the Sages in our Mishna.

Rabbi Shimon says:

Even though she sold or mortgaged not all of her ketuba but only half of it, she forfeits her sustenance, but the remainder

she may sell only in court, and this is the view of the first tanna in our Mishna.

И это мнение первого танная нашей Мишны.

Is that to say

indeed

that Rabbi Shimon

—who holds that even if she sold only part of it, she forfeits her sustenance—

holds: “A part of the money is like all the money”

, meaning: We do not say that the portion of the ketuba debt that still remains owed by the orphans is as though the entire ketuba debt were imposed upon them, in which case she would not forfeit her sustenance.

And the Rabbis

—Rabbi Meir, who holds that she did not forfeit her sustenance—

hold: We say, “A part of the money is like all the money”

, and since part of the ketuba debt is still owed by the orphans, it is as though the entire ketuba debt were owed by them, and she did not forfeit her sustenance.

But this is difficult:

For we find the opposite stated concerning them

we have found that their views concerning this are reversed!?

As it was taught in a beraita:

It is written concerning the High Priest:

“And he shall take a woman in her virginity

” and not one who is not a virgin:

excluding a woman who has reached maturity, for

some of her

virginity

has ended, as she too is not permitted to a High Priest,

these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon deem a woman who has reached maturity fit

for a High Priest.

And it initially entered our minds that the explanation of their dispute was as follows:

Rabbi Meir holds: Since some of a mature woman’s virginity has ended, and “a part of virginity is not like all virginity,” she is disqualified from marrying a High Priest.

And Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon hold: “A part of virginity is like all virginity,” and therefore a mature woman who retains some virginity is fit to marry a High Priest.

Thus, their positions here are the opposite of their positions concerning a part of the money!?

And we answer: In fact, Rabbi Meir holds that “a part of the money is like all the money,” and also that “a part of virginity is like all virginity,” while Rabbi Shimon disagrees. However,

there

in the case of a mature woman, where Rabbi Meir disqualifies her and Rabbi Shimon deems her fit,

they dispute the interpretations of the verses

it is in the exposition of the verses that they disagree:

Rabbi Meir holds:

Had the verse stated

“virgin

” alone, it would have implied:

even a part of virginity

, for “a part of a virgin is like all of a virgin.”

But since the verse states

“her virginity

,” it implies:

until all the virginity is present

, excluding a mature woman whose part of her virginity has ended; therefore Rabbi Meir prohibits her to a High Priest.

And the verse further states:

“in her virginity

”—the additional letter bet—to teach that the verse was particular only with regard to the place of virginity, and therefore:

in the customary manner, there is no

if she engaged in intercourse in the customary manner, she is indeed disqualified from marrying a High Priest, but if she engaged in intercourse

in an unconventional manner, there is no

she is not disqualified from marrying a High Priest.

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon hold:

Had the verse stated

“virgin

” alone,

complete

—one whose virginity had not ended even in part—it would have

implied

, for “a part of virginity is not like all virginity.”

But since the verse states

“her virginity

,” it comes to teach that

even

a

part of virginity

is sufficient, and a mature woman is fit to marry a High Priest.