Ketubot 84a — the Talmud in English

And we challenge:

And

for

Rav held

that anyone who stipulates against what is written in the Torah

his stipulation stands?

But it was stated

a statement in the beit-midrash:

“One who says to his fellow: “

This object is sold to you

“on the condition that you have no claim of exploitation against me,” [that is, on the condition that you cannot sue me if it becomes clear to you that I sold it to you at a price more than one-sixth above its value].

Rav said: He has a claim of exploitation against him.

Since he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah—his stipulation is void.

And Shmuel said: He has no claim of exploitation against him.

And he held that one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah in a monetary matter—his stipulation stands.

And if so, it is explained that Rav held: anyone who stipulates against what is written in the Torah—his stipulation is void .

Rather,

Rav’s intention in his words—“the halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel but not for his reason”—

“the halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel”—

who says that one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.

“But not for his reason”—

for if Rabban Shimon ben

Gamliel held

that if she

dies, he inherits her,

since the husband’s inheritance is from the Torah.

But Rav held: If she dies, he does not inherit her.

Since he held that the husband’s inheritance is rabbinic. And the Sages did not strengthen their words as they did words of the Torah.

And we challenge:

This is for his reason,

that one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void,

but it is not according to his halakha,

that if she dies he does not inherit her. Whereas Rav said the opposite—the halakha is according to him, but not for his reason?

Rather,

Rav’s intention is—

“the halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel”—

who says: If she dies, he inherits her.

“But not for his reason”—

for if Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel held—

only

in a matter from the Torah is his stipulation void, but in a rabbinic matter,

such as regarding the consumption of produce,

his stipulation stands.

But Rav held—

even in a rabbinic matter his stipulation is void.

And even the stipulation he made concerning the consumption of produce is not effective .

And we challenge:

This is according to his reason and according to his halakha, and Rav

only

adds

that even in a rabbinic matter, such as regarding the consumption of produce, he cannot stipulate?

Rather,

Rav’s intention is—

“the halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel”—

who says: If she dies, he inherits her.

“But not for his reason”—

for if Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel held—

the husband’s inheritance is from the Torah, and anyone who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his stipulation is void.

But Rav held—

the husband’s inheritance is rabbinic, and the Sages strengthened their words as words of the Torah.

And we challenge:

And

for

Rav held—

the husband’s inheritance is rabbinic? But

indeed

we learned

in tractate Bekhorot:

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: One who inherits his wife shall return the field to her family

at

the

Jubilee,

and deduct from the money for them,

And the Gemara now understood that he returns the field to them for a small amount of money .

And we considered it—

what did

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka

hold?

If he held that

the husband’s inheritance is from the Torah, why does he return

the field to them at the Jubilee, when he is a complete heir?

And if

he held that the husband’s inheritance is

rabbinic, what are the payments doing here?

Why must they pay him for returning the land to them, when by law he returns it to them at the Jubilee ?

And Rav said: In fact, he held

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka—

the husband’s inheritance is from the Torah,

and

the challenge is not difficult: if so, why does it return at the Jubilee, since he is a complete heir?

Since it concerns

a case where his wife bequeathed to him a cemetery.

And therefore, although according to the essential law he need not return it to them, nevertheless

because of family disgrace,

since it is degrading for them not to be buried with their fathers,

the Rabbis said—

let him assess the value and return it .

And what is the meaning of “and he shall deduct from the money for them”?

That is, why does he sell them the field for a small amount of money?

These payments are

the burial expenses of his wife,

which the husband is himself obligated to pay for her burial. And he deducts these payments from the price of the field for them.

And

as it was taught,

that the Sages enacted concerning one who sells a cemetery that he should return it to the family:

One who sells his grave, and his grave-road, his place of standing [that is, the place where the mourners gather after the burial],

[that is, the place where mourners gather after the burial],

and the place of his eulogy, the family members come and bury him against his will

of the purchaser,

because of family disgrace.

In any event, it is explained that Rav held—the husband’s inheritance is from the Torah, like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. If so, why did he say, “the halakha is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but not for his reason”? And we answer:

Rav

who said in the beraita cited above, “the husband’s inheritance is from the Torah,” did not say this because he held so, but only

he said it according to the reasoning of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka.

And

if

it were his own view, he would not hold

so, but would hold that the husband’s inheritance is rabbinic.

Mishna:

If one died and left a wife, a creditor, and heirs.

And his property did not contain land sufficient both to repay the wife’s ketuba and to repay his debt.

And he had a deposit or a loan in the hands of others.

And the creditor and the wife’s ketuba came to collect from that debt .

Rabbi Tarfon says: They shall be given

the property

to the weakest among them.

And the Gemara explains who the weakest is .

Rabbi Akiva says: We do not have compassion in judgment! Rather, they shall be given to the heirs.

Because

all of them,

that is, the creditor and the wife’s ketuba,

require an oath

in order to collect, since one who comes to collect from the property of orphans may collect only by oath. And until they swear, we do not know whether the deceased owed them anything .

And the heirs do not require an oath.

And therefore, immediately upon his death the heirs acquired them, and they are in their possession. And a wife’s ketuba and a creditor do not collect from the movable property of orphans.

And if he left

the deceased

detached produce

from the land,

Rabbi Tarfon held that

whoever comes first to them acquires them,

since seizure after death is effective . But if the heirs acquired them, they are not removed from their possession, since the movable property of orphans is not encumbered to the creditor or to the ketuba.

And if

the woman acquired

more than

her ketuba,

or

the

creditor acquired

more than his debt,

what is the law of

the surplus?

Rabbi Tarfon says: It shall be given to the weakest among them,

that is, the holder of the second document, whether the woman or the creditor, since he is in the inferior position: if the property comes into the hands of the heirs, neither the woman nor the creditor will again take it from them.

Rabbi Akiva says: We do not have compassion in judgment! Rather, it shall be given to the heirs.

Because

all of them require an oath, whereas the heirs do not require an oath.

As above .

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “If one died … and he had a deposit or a loan in the hands of others.”

And we challenge:

Why do I need it to teach “loan,”

and

why do I need it to teach “deposit”?

And we answer:

It is necessary! For if it taught

only

“loan,”

I would say only

in this case did Rabbi Tarfon say

that it should be given to the weakest among them,

because a loan is given to be spent,

and it is not present with the borrower; therefore the money is not considered to be in the possession of the orphans.

But a deposit, which is present as it is [that is, it is physically present],

[which is found intact],

perhaps he concedes to Rabbi Akiva,

that it is considered to be in the possession of the orphans, and it cannot be collected from it.

And if it taught this,

that is, only a deposit, I would say specifically

in this case did Rabbi Akiva say

that it is considered to be in the possession of the orphans, since it is present as it is,

but in that case

that is, in the case of a loan,

perhaps he concedes to Rabbi Tarfon,

since it was given to be spent, it is not in the possession of the orphans, and the debt and the ketuba can be collected from it. Therefore

it is necessary

to state both.

We learned in the Mishna, according to Rabbi Tarfon, that the property is to be given to the weakest among them. And the Gemara explains:

What is meant by “the weakest”?

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina says: To the weakest in evidence,

that is, the one whose document is later than his fellow’s, so that he cannot collect from earlier purchasers .

Rabbi Yohanan says: To the wife’s ketuba,

and she is called the weak one

because of hina,

that is, so that men will find favor in the eyes of women , and they will not hesitate to marry them lest they lose their ketuba .

And

20

a dispute

of Tannaim:

As it is taught: What is “the weakest among them”?

Rabbi Benjamin says: the weakest in the evidence,

that is, the later in the document, as above.

And it is valid. [

That is, it is valid to do this.]

Rabbi Elazar says: for a woman’s ketuba, on account of favor.

We learned in the Mishna: If

he left detached produce,

whoever is first to seize it gains it; and concerning the surplus Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disputed: according to Rabbi Tarfon, it shall be given to the weakest among them, and according to Rabbi Akiva, it shall be given to the heirs.

And

we raise an objection: According to

Rabbi Akiva, why specifically the surplus,

why did he dispute with Rabbi Tarfon only concerning the “surplus”? For

all of them too are the heirs’,

since seizure is not effective with regard to them, because the orphans have already acquired them, as above, because all of them require an oath, whereas the orphans do not require an oath?

And we answer:

Indeed so.

According to Rabbi Akiva, all of them too belong to the orphans.

And since Rabbi Tarfon said “surplus,” he likewise taught

his ruling concerning

“surplus.”