Ketubot 83b — the Talmud in English

b

The case is that immediately when his fellow came to take possession of the land,

he protested

against him, and the transferor said: “I intended to transfer it to him only in order to withdraw, and withdrawal is ineffective.”

But b

the case is that his fellow was already

standing

in the field, and afterward the seller suddenly protested against him in order to annul the sale. It is reasonable according to Rav Naḥman’s opinion that

they acquired from him the body of the land itself,

and he cannot annul the sale.

Ameimar said: The halakha is: They acquired the land itself

from him.

And this is like Rav Naḥman.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar:

Is the halakha like Rav Naḥman also

with regard to one who protested, or

only

with regard to one who was standing

in the field?

What practical difference is there? In accordance with Rav Yosef’s statement.

For with regard to one who protested, the halakha is like him.

He said to him,

Ameimar:

“I have not heard it; that is to say, I do not hold this opinion.”

And in any event, the halakha is like Rav Naḥman, that the act of acquisition is effective both with regard to one who protested and with regard to one who was standing, since they acquired the body of the land itself from him.

We learned in the Mishna

—“If so, why did he write for her, etc.”

—that if she sold or gave it away, it is valid.

And the Gemara raises an objection: Behold, the wording “I have no claim or concern in your property” also implies withdrawal from all the property,

and

if so,

let her say to him

[let her, the wife, say to her husband]—

“You have withdrawn yourself from everything!”

And why did he withdraw only with regard to a sale?

The Gemara answers:

Abaye said:

The reasoning of our Mishna is that

the holder of the document has the lower hand.

That is to say: Since the husband comes to take the produce and the inheritance by virtue of the enactment of the Sages, while the wife produces against him a document of withdrawal in order to annul his power, her hand is the lower one. And if the document does not establish from what he withdrew, we reduce it to the least of what the wording of the document implies. Therefore we say that he withdrew only with regard to the case that if she sold or gave it away, it is valid.

And

we raised the difficulty: If he withdraws himself only from the least of the property,

say

[let it be said] that he withdrew himself only

from the produce

—which is the least of all of them, since he did not forfeit the body of the land, but merely withdrew from eating the produce—whereas in the case of a sale he forfeits the body of the land?

And we answer:

Abaye said—

“A small gourd today is better than a large gourd later.”

[A small gourd now is preferable to a large gourd after time has passed.] Therefore, it is preferable for the husband to forfeit the sale that will take place later than to forfeit the produce that is present now.

And we raise an objection:

And say that he withdrew himself from the inheritance

and this is the least of all of them, for perhaps she will not die during his lifetime.

And it is preferable for him to forfeit the inheritance, and not the sale, lest she sell and he also forfeit the produce from the time of the sale?

And we answer:

Abaye said—

death

[that she should die during his lifetime]

is common.

Since most of the time she is endangered in childbirth. Tosafot. But

a sale

that she should sell property belonging to her father’s house

is not common .

And

therefore, even though through a sale he will also forfeit the produce if she sells, in any event—

“When a person withdraws himself, he withdraws himself from an uncommon matter.”

But

from a common matter a person does not withdraw himself

[a person withdraws himself from uncommon matters, and not from what is common], and therefore we attribute to him withdrawal only from a sale.

Rav Ashi said—

Even though the wording “in your property” can be interpreted as referring to everything, nevertheless, since the holder of the document has the lower hand, and the word

“in your property”

has an implication of exclusion—

“in your property,” but not in their produce; “in your property,” but not after death—

therefore we exclude these from it, and his withdrawal was effective only with regard to a sale, because only this right is not excluded by the implication of the wording “in your property.” But he did not withdraw from consuming the produce or from the inheritance.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the fruit of the fruit

until he writes for her: ‘I have no claim or concern in your property, nor in their produce, nor in the produce of their produce, forever.’”

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

“These are ‘produce’”

from which Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the husband does not consume,

“and these are ‘the produce of the produce’

which Rabbi Yehuda holds that the husband consumes?

If

she brought him land, and it produced

the land

produce, these are “produce.”

The husband went and

sold

the

produce,

and purchased land with it, and it produced

the land

produce, these are “the produce of the produce.”

They raised a question before them:

The members of the academy were uncertain—according

to

the opinion of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who requires him to write “and in the produce of their produce forever”: Is

“the produce of the produce” specifically ,

and with this wording it is also sufficient to withdraw from the produce of the produce of the produce, and he need not write “forever”?

Or perhaps “forever” specifically,

and if he did not write “forever,” he consumes the produce of the produce of the produce.

Or perhaps both are specifically required,

and if he does not write “from the produce of their produce forever,” he has not withdrawn from the produce of the produce of the produce?

And the Gemara analyzes:

If you should say,

the wording

“the produce of the produce” is specifically required,

and he need not write “forever,” it is difficult:

“Why do I need ‘forever’

—is not the wording “the produce of the produce” sufficient?”

And it is necessary to say that

this teaches us

that the tanna, through the wording “forever,” says that

since he wrote for her “the produce of the produce,”

it is

as though he wrote for her “forever.”

[See Rashi’s words, s.v. “this teaches us.”]

And if you should say,

the wording

“forever” is specifically required,

and he need not write “the produce of the produce,” it is difficult:

“Why do I need ‘the produce of the produce,’

—is not the wording “forever” sufficient?”

And it is necessary to say that

this teaches us

that the tanna, through the wording “the produce of the produce,” says that

even though he wrote for her

also the wording

“the produce of the produce,”

nevertheless,

if he wrote for her

also

“forever,” no!

He has withdrawn from everything. And

if not, no!

And he still consumes the produce of the produce of the produce.

And if you should say that both are specifically required,

and he must write “the produce of the produce forever” in order to withdraw from the produce of the produce of the produce, it is difficult:

“Why do I need both?”

Why did we need both wordings in order to withdraw from the produce of the produce of the produce?

And we will answer—

It is necessary! For if he wrote for her “the produce of the produce,” and did not write for her “forever,” I would say

that specifically

he does not consume the produce of the produce, but he consumes the produce of the produce of the produce. For this reason “forever” is necessary.

And if he wrote for her “forever,” and did not write for her “the produce of the produce,” I would say

“forever”

[that is, the wording “forever”]

refers to the produce!

That is to say: He does not consume this produce forever—not in this year and not in another year. But he consumes the produce of the produce.

For this reason it is necessary

to write also the wording

“the produce of the produce.”

They raised a question before them:

The members of the academy were uncertain: If

he wrote for her—

“I have no claim or concern in your property and in the produce of the produce,”

and he did not write “and in their produce,”

what is the halakha: may he consume produce?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Does he withdraw only

from the produce of the produce,

but

from the produce he did not withdraw himself. Or perhaps, he withdrew himself from everything.

And the wording “the produce of the produce” includes within it also the wording “produce.”

And we resolve it:

It is obvious that he withdrew himself from everything!

[That is, also from the produce.]

For if you say

that he withdrew only

from the produce of the produce,

but

from the produce he did not withdraw himself,

then

since he consumed the produce,

[since the husband consumed the produce],

from where is the produce of the produce?!

Rather, certainly, when he said “and in the produce of the produce,” he withdrew himself also from the produce.

And we reject this:

But according to your reasoning,

that you raised the difficulty, “Since he consumed the produce, from where is the produce of the produce?”, how will you explain

that which we learned

in our Mishna—

“Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the produce of the produce, etc.”

And why will you not also raise the difficulty here—

“Since he consumed the produce, from where is the produce of the produce?”

Rather,

certainly it is necessary to answer that our Mishna is dealing

with

a case

in which she retained

some of the produce from the woman , and the woman sold it, purchased land with it, and it produced produce, and these are called the produce of the produce [Rashi]:

And if so,

here too

it is possible to establish the uncertainty

as a case in which he retained

the husband’s right from the produce, and the husband sold it, purchased land with it, and it produced the produce of the produce; and you will never resolve it according to your argument.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says

: If she died, he inherits her, because he makes a condition contrary to what is written in the Torah.

Rav said: The halakha is like Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, but not for his reason

[and not according to his reasoning].

And the Gemara explains:

What

is Rav’s intention when he said

“The halakha is like Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel, but not for his reason”?

If you say

that his intention is to say—

“The halakha is like Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel” -

who says: If she died, he inherits her.

“But not for his reason”—

for if Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel held: “One who makes a condition concerning what is written in the Torah—his condition is invalid.”

And therefore, if she died, he inherits her, since the condition was ineffective.

But Rav holds

that one who makes a condition in a monetary matter concerning what is written in the Torah,

his condition is valid,

and by virtue of this reasoning the condition should take effect,

and

on the other hand

he holds

that

the husband’s inheritance is rabbinic, and the Sages strengthened their words more than those of the Torah,

and therefore here his condition is invalid.