Ketubot 83b (פג:) — the Talmud in English

In a case where, as soon as his fellow came to take possession of the land,

the grantor

protested

against him and said: “I intended to grant him nothing; I merely intended to withdraw my rights, and withdrawal of rights is ineffective.”

But in a case where

his fellow was already

standing

in the field, and afterward the seller suddenly protested against him in order to annul the sale, it is reasonable to say in accordance with Rav Naḥman that

he acquired it from the land itself,

and he cannot annul the sale.

Ameimar said: The halakha is that he acquired the land itself

from him.

And this is in accordance with Rav Naḥman.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar:

Is the halakha in accordance with Rav Naḥman even

when he protested, or

only

when he was standing

in the field?

What practical difference is there? The case of Rav Yosef.

For when he protested, the halakha is in accordance with him.

He said to him,

Ameimar:

“I have not heard it; that is, I do not hold this view.”

And in fact, the halakha is in accordance with Rav Naḥman: the kinyan is effective both when he protested and when he was standing, since he acquired the land itself from him.

We learned in the Mishna:

“If so, why did he write for her, and so on,”

which indicates that if she sold or gave it away, the transaction stands.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: The formulation “I have no claim or dealings with regard to your property” also implies relinquishment of rights to all the property,

and

if so,

she should say to him

[that is, the woman should say to her husband]:

“You have withdrawn your rights from everything!”

Why, then, did he relinquish his rights only with regard to a sale?

The Gemara answers:

Abaye said:

Our Mishna is based on the principle that

the holder of a document is at a disadvantage.

That is, since the husband comes to take the produce and the inheritance by virtue of the enactment of the Sages, while the woman produces a document of relinquishment in order to nullify his rights, she is at a disadvantage. If the document does not establish from what he relinquished his rights, we interpret it according to the more limited meaning of the document. Therefore, we say that he relinquished his rights only with regard to the case that if she sold or gave the property away, the transaction stands.

And

we raised the following difficulty: If he relinquished his rights only with regard to the least extensive category of property,

say

[let us say] that he relinquished his rights only

with regard to the produce,

which is the least extensive of all, since he did not forfeit the land itself but merely relinquished his right to consume its produce, unlike a sale, through which he forfeits the land itself?

And we answer:

Abaye said:

“A small squash now is better than a large squash later.”

[A small squash now is preferable to a large squash later.] Therefore, it is preferable for the husband to forfeit a sale that will take place later than to forfeit produce that is available now.

And we raise a difficulty:

Say that he relinquished his rights with regard to the inheritance,

which is the least extensive of all, since perhaps she will not die during his lifetime.

And it is preferable for him to forfeit the inheritance rather than the sale, lest she sell the property and he thereby also lose the produce from the time of the sale.

And we answer:

Abaye said:

“Death”

[that she should die during his lifetime]

is common.

Since she is endangered in childbirth on most occasions. Tosafot. But

a sale

in which she sells property belonging to her father’s household

is uncommon.

And

therefore, although through a sale he will also lose the produce if she sells the property, nevertheless

“when a person relinquishes his rights, he relinquishes them with regard to an uncommon matter.”

But

“with regard to a common matter, a person does not relinquish his rights”

[a person relinquishes his rights with regard to uncommon matters, but not with regard to common ones], and therefore we assume that he relinquished his rights only with regard to a sale.

Rav Ashi said:

Although the expression “your property” can be interpreted as referring to everything, nevertheless, since the holder of a document is at a disadvantage, and the word

“your property”

can serve to exclude

“but not its produce; ‘your property,’ but not after death,”

we exclude these matters. His relinquishment was effective only with regard to a sale, because only this right is not implied by the expression “your property” as something to be excluded. But he did not relinquish his rights with regard to consuming the produce or inheriting the property.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the fruit of the fruit

until he writes for her: ‘I have no claim or dealings with regard to your property, its produce, the fruit of its produce, forever.’”

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

“These are ‘produce’

with regard to which Rabbi Yehuda concedes that the husband does not consume them,

and these are the ‘fruit of the produce’

which Rabbi Yehuda maintains that the husband does consume”?

If

she brought him land, and it produced

the land

produce, this is ‘produce.’

The husband then went and

sold

the

produce,

and purchased land with it, and it produced

the land

produce, this is ‘the fruit of the produce.’

A question was raised before them:

The members of the academy were uncertain:

According

to

Rabbi Yehuda,

who requires him to write “and the fruit of its produce forever,” is

“the fruit of the produce” specifically,

and this expression alone suffices to relinquish his rights even with regard to the fruit of the fruit of the produce, so that it is unnecessary to write “forever”?

Or perhaps “forever” is specifically required,

and if he did not write “forever,” he consumes the fruit of the fruit of the produce.

Or perhaps both are specifically required,

and if he does not write “the fruit of its produce forever,” he has not relinquished his rights with regard to the fruit of the fruit of the produce.

The Gemara analyzes the matter:

If you say

that the expression

“the fruit of the produce” is specifically required,

and it is unnecessary to write “forever,” the following difficulty arises:

“Why do I need ‘forever’

if the expression “the fruit of the produce” is sufficient?”

It must be said that

this teaches us

that the tanna used the expression “forever” to say that

once he wrote for her “the fruit of the produce,”

it is

considered as though he wrote for her “forever”

[see Rashi, s.v. “This teaches us”].

And if you say

that the expression

“forever” is specifically required,

and it is unnecessary to write “the fruit of the produce,” the following difficulty arises:

“Why do I need ‘the fruit of the produce’

if the expression “forever” is sufficient?”

It must be said that

this teaches us

that the tanna used the expression “the fruit of the produce” to say that

although he wrote for her

also the expression

“the fruit of the produce,”

nevertheless,

if he wrote for her

also

“forever,” no!

He has relinquished his rights with regard to everything. And

if not, no!

He still consumes the fruit of the fruit of the produce.

And if you say that both are specifically required,

and he must write “the fruit of the produce forever” in order to relinquish his rights with regard to the fruit of the fruit of the produce, the following difficulty arises:

“Why do I need both?”

Why do we require both expressions in order to relinquish his rights with regard to the fruit of the fruit of the produce?

And we answer:

Both are necessary. For if he wrote for her “the fruit of the produce,” but did not write for her “forever,” I would say

that specifically

he does not consume the fruit of the produce, but he does consume the fruit of the fruit of the produce. Therefore, “forever” is necessary.

And if he wrote for her “forever,” but did not write for her “the fruit of the produce,” I would say that

“forever”

[that is, the expression “forever”]

refers to the produce!

That is, he does not consume this produce forever—not this year and not in another year. But he does consume the fruit of the produce.

Therefore it is necessary

to write also the expression

“the fruit of the produce.”

A question was raised before them:

The members of the academy were uncertain: If

he wrote for her

“I have no claim or dealings with regard to your property or the fruit of the produce,”

but did not write “or its produce,”

may he consume the produce?

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Perhaps he relinquished his rights only

with regard to the fruit of the produce,

but

with regard to the produce he did not relinquish his rights. Or perhaps, he relinquished his rights with regard to everything.

And the expression “the fruit of the produce” includes within it the expression “produce.”

And we resolve it:

It is obvious that he relinquished his rights with regard to everything!

[That is, also with regard to the produce],

for if you say

that he relinquished his rights only

with regard to the fruit of the produce,

but

with regard to the produce he did not relinquish his rights,

then

once he consumes the produce,

[once the husband consumes the produce],

“what is the fruit of the produce”?!

Rather, certainly, when he said “or the fruit of the produce,” he also relinquished his rights with regard to the produce.

And we reject this:

“But according to your reasoning,”

you raised the difficulty, “Once he consumes the produce, from where is there fruit of the produce?” How will you explain

that which we learned

in our Mishna:

“Rabbi Yehuda says: He always consumes the fruit of the produce, and so on,”

and why will you not also raise the difficulty here:

“Once he consumes the produce, from where is there fruit of the produce?”

Rather,

it is certainly necessary to explain that our Mishna is discussing

a

case

where she retained

some of the produce, and the woman sold it, purchased land with it, and it produced produce; these are called the fruit of the produce [Rashi].

If so,

here too

it is possible to establish the uncertainty

in a case where she retained

the husband’s rights in the produce, and the husband sold it, purchased land with it, and it produced the fruit of the produce. Thus, you will never resolve your argument.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

If she dies, he inherits her, because he stipulates contrary to that which is written in the Torah.”

Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but not for his reason

[and not according to his reasoning].

The Gemara explains:

What

did Rav mean when he said

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but not for his reason”?

If you say

that he meant to say

“The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel”—

who says: If she dies, he inherits her.

“But not for his reason”—

for Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: “When one stipulates contrary to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is invalid.”

Therefore, if she dies, he inherits her, since the stipulation was ineffective.

But Rav holds

that when one stipulates in monetary matters contrary to that which is written in the Torah,

his stipulation is valid,

and based on this reasoning the stipulation should take effect.

And

on the other hand, he

holds

that

the husband’s inheritance is rabbinic, and the Sages gave their enactment greater force than a Torah law,

and therefore, in this case, his stipulation is invalid.