Ketubot 84b (פד:) — the Talmud in English

And

we ask: Is it possible that, according to

Rabbi Akiva, seizure is entirely ineffective?

But did we not learn above (page 80b), with regard to a woman awaiting levirate marriage, that if she seized movable property first, she acquired it, even though movable property is not liened for the ketuba? Evidently, seizure is effective. And it is not reasonable to say that the Mishna above stated its ruling anonymously in accordance with an opinion other than that of Rabbi Akiva.

And we answer:

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said:

And this is when he seized it during the debtor’s lifetime.

That is, seizure is effective specifically when she seized the property during the husband’s lifetime. At that point she is not considered to be seeking payment from the property of orphans, which may be collected only upon taking an oath. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva concedes that her seizure is effective, since no oath is required here.

But in our Mishna, which deals with a seizure carried out after death, Rabbi Akiva holds that their seizure is ineffective, since all the claimants must take an oath, whereas the heirs need not take an oath.

The Gemara returns to explain Rabbi Tarfon’s statement: If he left detached produce, whoever takes possession of it first acquires it.

And we inquire:

And according to Rabbi Tarfon, where was it lying?

Where was that produce lying at the time of his death, such that the heirs did not acquire it, and Rabbi Tarfon said that whoever takes possession of it first acquires it?

Rav and Shmuel both said:

And this is when the produce was gathered and lying

—that produce—

in the public domain.

But

if it was lying

in a side area

—a corner at the side of the public domain, to which anyone who wishes to speak privately turns—

no, seizure is not effective.

Since a side area is not ownerless property, the heirs acquired the produce immediately at the time of their father’s death, and one who takes possession of it there is like one who takes possession of property in their home.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both said:

Even

if it was lying

in a side area,

seizure is effective, since in practice it is not yet actually in the heirs’ possession.

There was an incident in which a creditor seized detached produce that their father had left, and

the judges ruled in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon,

so that his seizure was effective.

And Reish Lakish restored the ruling from them.

He reversed the judgment, since he held that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, and that the heirs had acquired the produce.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said

to Reish Lakish:

You have made

Rabbi Akiva’s words

like a matter of Torah,

as though you had reversed the ruling to conform to his words?!

It is enough for us that the halakha is in accordance with him initially; once the judgment has been decided, it may not be reversed.

And we inquire:

Shall we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree about this:

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish,

one

—namely, Reish Lakish—

holds that a judge who

has

erred with regard to a Mishna,

and ruled contrary to the halakha,

reverses the ruling. And the other

—namely, Rabbi Yoḥanan—

holds that a judge who

has

erred with regard to a Mishna does not reverse the ruling.

And we reject this:

No; everyone

holds that a judge who

erred with regard to a Mishna reverses the ruling.

Here, they disagree about this: One

—namely, Rabbi Yoḥanan—

holds that

the halakha follows Rabbi Akiva over his colleague,

—that is, only where he disagrees with his colleague—

but not over his teacher.

Since Rabbi Tarfon was his teacher, the halakha follows Rabbi Tarfon.

And the other

—namely, Reish Lakish—

holds:

The halakha

follows Rabbi Akiva

even over his teacher,

and therefore Reish Lakish reversed the ruling so that it conformed to Rabbi Akiva.

And if you wish, say:

Everyone

holds that

the halakha follows Rabbi Akiva

only

over his colleague, but not over his teacher.

Here, they disagree about this: One

—namely, Rabbi Yoḥanan—

holds:

Rabbi Tarfon was his teacher.

And if so, the halakha follows Rabbi Tarfon.

And the other

—namely, Reish Lakish—

holds:

Rabbi Tarfon

was his colleague,

and if so, the halakha follows Rabbi Akiva.

And if you wish, say:

Everyone

holds that Rabbi Tarfon

was his colleague.

Here, they disagree about this: One

—namely, Reish Lakish—

holds:

“The halakha” was stated.

That is, we have received the tradition that the halakha follows Rabbi Akiva over his colleague. If the judge erred and ruled in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon, this is an error with regard to a Mishna, and he reverses the ruling.

And the other

—namely, Rabbi Yoḥanan—

holds:

“We incline” was stated.

That is, we have received only that the halakha is inclined toward Rabbi Akiva’s words; but if the judgment has already been decided in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon, it is not reversed.

His relatives

—the relatives

of Rabbi Yoḥanan—

were creditors of a certain man, who died, and

the creditors seized

the heirs’

cow

that was

from

being placed in

a side area,

as repayment of their debt.

They came

to litigate

before Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said to them: You seized it properly!

This was in accordance with his position above: after the fact, if the judgment had been decided in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon, the item is not taken from the one who seized it. Here, since they had already seized it, this was considered a case after the fact, and it was not taken from them. Tosafot.

They came before Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who said to them: Go and return it!

This was in accordance with Rabbi Akiva’s view, that seizure after death is ineffective.

They returned and

came before Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said to them: What can I do? One who is my equal

—that is, a person of equal stature to me—

disagrees with me,

and I withdraw my view before him. Thus, Rabbi Yoḥanan retracted his position and conceded to Reish Lakish’s words. (Based on Tosafot Rid).

There was an incident involving

a certain herdsman of orphans,

—a herder of orphans’ animals—

whose

creditors

seized an ox

—a bull—

from him.

The creditor said:

I seized it during the debtor’s lifetime.

That is, I seized it in satisfaction of my debt while the father was still alive.

And

the

herdsman said:

He seized it after death.

His seizure is ineffective, even according to Rabbi Tarfon, since the ox was already in the orphans’ possession.

They came before Rav Naḥman, who said to him

—Rav Naḥman said to the herdsman: Do

you have witnesses

that he seized it?

He said to him,

the herdsman:

No.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

By virtue of the migo

that he could

the creditor

say, “It is purchased property in my possession,”

since we have no testimony that the ox came into his possession through robbery,

he can also say, “I seized it during the debtor’s lifetime”.

And we ask:

But

did

Reish Lakish say: Animals that wander

—that is, living creatures accustomed to move from place to place, called gudrot in the expression “sheepfolds.” Rashi—

do not establish presumptive ownership.

If one person seized them, while another has witnesses that they formerly belonged to him, the one who seized them is not believed to say, “They were purchased by me,” since there is concern that they wandered away on their own and came to him. He must produce witnesses or a document of sale.

If so, in this case as well, the creditor cannot say, “They were purchased by me,” and he again has no migo enabling him to be believed in his claim, “I seized it during the debtor’s lifetime”?

And we answer:

An ox is different, since it is entrusted to a herdsman.

Oxen do not move from place to place on their own. If one is found in his possession, he certainly acquired it, since “we do not presume a person to be a thief”.

The household of the Nasi seized an orphan’s maidservant from a side area.

The members of the Nasi’s household seized an orphan’s maidservant from a side area in payment of the orphans’ father’s debt.

Rabbi Abbahu, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi, and Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa were sitting, and Rabbi Abba was sitting with them.

They discussed this case.

He said to them,

Rabbi Abbahu said to the members of the Nasi’s household:

You seized her properly.

This was in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon’s view, that seizure after death is effective.

Rabbi Abba said to them:

Is it

because they belong to the household of the Nasi that you flatter them?!

Is it because they are from the Nasi’s household that you flatter them by issuing a ruling contrary to the halakha?!

But the judges had ruled in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon, and Reish Lakish restored the ruling from them.

As stated above. If so, the halakha follows Rabbi Akiva, that seizure after death is ineffective.

And similarly, there was an incident involving a man named

Yemar bar Ḥashu, who was owed

—was a creditor—

money by a certain man.

The man died,

—that person passed away—

and left behind a boat.

The boat was left in the river.

He said to

Yemar,

to his agent: Go and seize it for me!

Go and seize it on my behalf.

The agent went

and

seized it.

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, encountered him

—they encountered the agent—

.

They too were creditors of that man.

They said to him: You are seizing property for one creditor where this harms others,

since your seizure will reduce our share.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who seizes property for one creditor where this harms others—