Ketubot 84b — the Talmud in English

And

we raise an objection: Is it so that, according to

Rabbi Akiva, seizure is not effective at all?

But did we not learn above (page 80b), concerning a woman awaiting levirate marriage, that if she preceded and seized movable property, she acquired it, even though movable property is not subject to lien for the ketuba? It follows that seizure is effective. And it is not reasonable to say that the Mishna above stated its words anonymously not in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

And we answer:

Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman:

And this is when he seized during his lifetime.

That is: what is effective as seizure is specifically where she seized during the husband’s lifetime, and then she is not considered as coming to collect from the property of orphans, for she may collect only with an oath. Therefore Rabbi Akiva concedes that her seizure is effective, since there is no oath here.

But in our Mishna, which deals with a case where they seized after death, in this Rabbi Akiva holds that their seizure is not effective, since all require an oath, whereas the heirs do not require an oath.

And the Gemara returns to explain the words of Rabbi Tarfon: if he left detached produce, whoever precedes to them acquires them.

And we inquire:

And according to Rabbi Tarfon, where were they lying?

Where was that produce lying at the time of his death, such that the heirs did not acquire it, and Rabbi Tarfon said that whoever precedes acquires it?

Rav and Shmuel both said:

And this is when they were gathered and lying

that produce

in the public domain.

But

if they were lying

in a side area

(a corner at the side of the public domain, where anyone who wishes to speak quietly turns),

no.

Since a side area is not a place of abandonment, the heirs acquired them immediately at the time of their father’s death, and one who takes possession of it there is like one who takes possession in their house.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish both said:

Even

if they were lying

in a side area,

seizure is effective, since in practice they are still not actually in the heirs’ domain.

There was an incident in which a creditor seized detached produce that their father had left them, and

the judges judged in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon,

so that his seizure was effective.

And Reish Lakish returned the case from them.

He reversed the judgment, since he held that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva, that the heirs had acquired them.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said

to Reish Lakish:

You have made

the words of Rabbi Akiva

as a matter of Torah,

for you reversed the judgment so that it would accord with his words?!

It is enough for us that the halakha is like him initially; but after the judgment has been decided, one should not reverse it.

And we inquire:

Shall we say that this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree about:

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish,

one

[namely, Reish Lakish]

holds that a judge who

has

erred regarding a Mishna,

and ruled contrary to the halakha,

reverses it. And the other

[namely, Rabbi Yoḥanan]

holds that a judge who

has

erred regarding a Mishna does not reverse it.

And we reject this:

No! Everyone

holds that a judge who

has erred regarding a Mishna reverses it.

And here, this is what they disagree about: one

[namely, Rabbi Yoḥanan]

holds:

the halakha is like Rabbi Akiva against his colleague,

[that is, only where he disagrees with his colleague],

but not against his teacher.

And since Rabbi Tarfon was his teacher, the halakha is like Rabbi Tarfon.

And the other

[namely, Reish Lakish]

holds:

the halakha

is like Rabbi Akiva

even against his teacher,

and therefore Reish Lakish reversed the judgment so that it would accord with Rabbi Akiva.

And if you wish, say:

Everyone

holds:

the halakha is like Rabbi Akiva

only

against his colleague, but not against his teacher.

And here, this is what they disagree about: one

[namely, Rabbi Yoḥanan]

holds:

Rabbi Tarfon was his teacher.

And if so, the halakha is like Rabbi Tarfon.

And the other

[namely, Reish Lakish]

holds:

Rabbi Tarfon

was his colleague,

and if so, the halakha is like Rabbi Akiva.

And if you wish, say:

Everyone

holds that Rabbi Tarfon

was his colleague.

And here, this is what they disagree about: one

[namely, Reish Lakish]

holds:

“The halakha” was stated.

That is, we have received that the halakha is like Rabbi Akiva against his colleague. And if the judge erred and ruled in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon, his status is that of one who erred regarding a Mishna, and he reverses it.

And the other

[namely, Rabbi Yoḥanan]

holds:

“We incline” was stated.

That is, we have received only that we incline the halakha so that it accords with the words of Rabbi Akiva; but if the judgment has already been decided in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon, he does not reverse it.

His relatives

[his relatives]

of Rabbi Yoḥanan

were creditors to a certain man, and he died, and

seized

the creditors

an ox of the orphans

that was

l

ying in a

side area,

as payment of their debt.

They came

to litigate

before Rabbi Yoḥanan, and he said to them: You seized properly!

And this was according to his position above: after the fact, if the judgment was decided in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon, the object is not removed from the one who seized it. And here, since they had already seized it, it is considered after the fact, and it is not removed from them. Tosafot.

They came before Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, and he said to them: Go, return it!

In accordance with the view of Rabbi Akiva, that seizure after death is not effective.

They returned and

came before Rabbi Yoḥanan, and he said to them: What can I do? One who is my equal

[that is, a person equal to me]

disagrees with me,

and I set aside my opinion before him. Thus Rabbi Yoḥanan retracted and conceded the words of Reish Lakish. (Based on the Tosafot Rid).

There was an incident involving

that herdsman of orphans,

[a herder of the orphans’ animals]

that

creditors

an ox

[a bull]

from him.

The creditor said:

I seized it during his lifetime.

That is, I seized it against my debt while the father was still alive.

And

the

herdsman said:

He seized it after death.

And his seizure is not effective, even according to Rabbi Tarfon, since it was already in the orphans’ domain.

They came before Rav Naḥman, and he said to him

Rav Naḥman said to the herdsman: Do

you have witnesses

that he seized it?

He said to him

the herdsman:

No.

He said to him

Rav Naḥman:

By a migo

that he could

the creditor

say, “It is purchased property in my possession,”

since we have no testimony that the ox came into his possession through robbery,

he can also say, “I seized it during his lifetime”.

And we object:

But

did

Reish Lakish said: Animals

[that is, animals accustomed to go from place to place, and they are called gudrot, from the expression “folds of sheep.” Rashi]

do not have presumptive ownership.

And if one seized them, while another has witnesses that they formerly belonged to him, the one who seized them is not believed to say, “They are purchased property in my possession,” since there is concern that perhaps they went on their own and came to him. Until he brings witnesses or a document of sale.

And if so, even in our case, the creditor cannot say, “They are purchased property in my possession,” and he again has no migo to be believed in his claim, “I seized it during his lifetime ”?

And we answer:

An ox is different, since it is delivered to a herdsman.

And they do not go on their own from place to place. And if they are found in his possession, he certainly acquired them, since “we do not presume a person to be a thief”.

The house of the Nasi: seize the maidservant of the orphans from the side area.

[The people of the Nasi’s household seized a maidservant of the orphans from a side area on account of the debt of the orphans’ father.]

Rabbi Abbahu, Rabbi Ḥanina bar Pappi, and Rabbi Isaac Nappaḥa were sitting, and Rabbi Abba was sitting with them.

And they discussed this case.

He said to them

Rabbi Abbahu said to the people of the Nasi’s household:

You seized properly.

In accordance with Rabbi Tarfon, that seizure after death is effective.

Rabbi Abba said to them:

And is it because

they belong to the house of the Nasi that you flatter them?!

[Is it because they are from the Nasi’s household that you flatter them by ruling contrary to the halakha?!]

And the judges judged in accordance with Rabbi Tarfon, and Reish Lakish returned the case from them.

As above. And if so, the halakha is like Rabbi Akiva, that seizure after death is not effective.

And similarly, there was an incident involving a man whose name was

Yemar bar Ḥashu, who was owed

[was a creditor]

money by a certain man.

He died,

[that man died]

and left a boat.

[He left behind a boat in the river.]

Yemar said

to his agent:

Go, seize it for me!

[Go and seize it for me.]

He went

the agent, and

seized it.

Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, encountered him

[they encountered him, the agent]

.

They too were creditors to that man.

They said to him: You are one who seizes for a creditor where he harms others,

since through your seizure our share will be diminished.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who seizes for a creditor where he harms others -