Ketubot 80a (פ.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Abba said that they say in the study hall of Rav [

they said in Rav’s study hall ] –

even

if he ate only

shigra de-temarei [

dates clustered together ], which is not as significant as dried figs, he can no longer claim reimbursement for his expenses. [See Rashi, who offers a different explanation.]

Rav Bibi raised a dilemma:

If he ate

ḥuvtza [

waste ]

of dates, what is the law?

Is this eating sufficient for him to forfeit his expenses?

The dilemma stands unresolved.

And if

he did not eat in a dignified manner, what is the law?

What measure of eating causes him to forfeit his expenses?

Ulla said: Two amoraim in the West, the Land of Israel, disagree about this matter [

Two amoraim from the Land of Israel disagreed about this law ]].

One said –

one issar’s worth [

If he ate produce worth an issar ], he forfeited his expenses.

And one said –

one dinar’s worth.

The judges of Pumbedita said [

Rav Pappa bar Shmuel ]:

Rav Yehuda once rendered a ruling concerning bundles of branches.

That is, there was an incident in which a husband fed his animal bundles of branches belonging to his wife, and then divorced his wife. Rav Yehuda said: “Whatever he consumed, he consumed

; And the Gemara explains:

Rav Yehuda follows his own reasoning,

as he considers even this eating to be eating,

as

it

was

Rav Yehuda

who said: “If one ate orla, produce of the Sabbatical year, or produce of mixed species, this is a presumption of ownership.”

That is, if a person purchases a field from another and resides in it for three years, using during those years only the branches of the field to feed an animal, and not its produce, this eating is considered a “three-year presumption of ownership,” and he need not produce his deed of sale afterward.

In any event, it is proven that eating branches is considered eating.

Rav Yaakov said that Rav Ḥisda said: One who incurs expenses on the property of his minor wife [

whom her mother and brother married off to him, and whose betrothal is valid only by rabbinic ordinance, so that she can perform mi’un and refuse him ] ]

is considered like one who incurs expenses on another person’s property.

And if she performs mi’un and refuses him, the enhancement that he effected is appraised for him, and he takes compensation according to the customary terms of the tenant farmers of the country.

And we raise an objection:

What is the reason?

Why is he not like other husbands, who, if they consumed the produce, receive nothing, but if they did not consume it, receive “the expenses to the extent of the enhancement”?

And we answer:

The Sages instituted a remedy for him, so that we would not cause them to be lost.

The Sages instituted that he should receive compensation like a tenant farmer, so that he would invest in the property of his minor wife and not fear that she might perform mi’un and refuse him.

There was a certain woman who inherited four hundred dinars in Bei Ḥozai. [

There was an incident involving a woman who had four hundred dinars in Bei Ḥozai, which was far from her place of residence. ]

Her husband went, expended six hundred, and brought back four hundred. [

Her husband went to that place, expended six hundred dinars on travel costs, and gained only four hundred. ]

While he was returning, he needed one dinar, and took it from them [

On his way back, the husband needed one dinar and took it from the woman’s money. ]

He came before Rav Ami [

When the husband came before Rav Ami to demand reimbursement of his expenses from his wife ] –

he said to him,

Since you benefited from the money by means of that one dinar, your law is

“Whatever he expended, he expended, and whatever he consumed, he consumed.”

As stated in our Mishna.

The Sages said to Rav Ami –

This applies

when he forfeits his expenses,

where he consumed produce, [

if he consumed produce from the principal and began to exercise his rights as a husband to benefit from the enhancement ]. But

in this case

he consumed the principal! [

He benefited from the principal itself, and since he has no rights to the principal itself, such consumption is not considered the beginning of the exercise of his rights as a husband. Rather, it is considered a loan, which he took from her principal to cover his expenses. ]

And

such benefit

is an expense,

and

therefore it is considered

as

“he expended but did not consume,”

and his law is

that he must swear how much he expended and take.

We learned in the Mishna: “He expended but did not consume” –

he must swear how much he expended and take.

Rav Asi said: And this is when there is enhancement corresponding to the expenses.

And the Gemara explains:

For what halakhic purpose?

Does he mean to say that when the enhancement exceeds the expenses, he takes the expenses without an oath, since he is believed by virtue of a migo: He could have lied and claimed that his expenses equaled the amount of the enhancement and demanded the entire enhancement,

or, conversely, that if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he receives only the amount of the enhancement, even with an oath?

Abaye said: It means that if the enhancement exceeded the expenses, he takes the expenses without an oath.

He is believed by virtue of a migo, since he could have demanded the entire enhancement.

Rava said to him: If so, he will come to resort to deception,

and demand slightly less, so that he can receive without an oath!

Rather, Rava said:

He means to say

that if the expenses exceeded the enhancement, he has only the expenses to the extent of the enhancement. And

even that he receives only

with an oath.

He must swear that this was the amount of his expenses.

They raised a dilemma [

The members of the study hall were uncertain ]:

What is the law concerning a husband who appointed tenant farmers in his place,

to tend the land and take a share of the produce, and after he consumed a small amount, he divorced his wife?

What is the law?

Must the woman give them their share according to their labor? And the sides of the dilemma are as follows:

Is it that

they entered the land with the husband’s rights in mind; once the husband withdraws, they too withdraw [

Did they enter with regard to the rights that the husband had in the land, and consequently, when the husband’s right lapses, their right also lapses? We say: “Whatever he expended, he expended, and whatever he consumed, he consumed” ],

or perhaps they entered with the land itself in mind [

The tenant farmers entered according to the needs of the land ],

and when the land remains, it remains for tenant farmers [

The land is designated for tenancy ],

Rava bar Rav Ḥanan challenged this –

How is this different from

what we established in Bava Metzia –

“One who enters another’s field and plants it without permission: the enhancement is appraised for him, but his hand is on the lower rung”?

Why, here, is there a possibility that they leave with nothing, and in what way are they worse than anyone else who enters another’s field? And we answer:

There, there is no one who would undertake the labor; here, there is a husband who would undertake the labor.

In every case of one who enters another’s field, had he not entered, no one would have tended the land for free, and therefore the landowner must pay him his expenses. Here, however, had the tenant farmers not entered, the husband would have tended the land, and she would not have had to pay him anything. Therefore, it is possible to say that she need not pay the tenant farmers anything either.

In any event,

what conclusion was reached [

What is the law concerning a husband who appointed tenant farmers ]?

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said –

We examine: If the husband is a tenant farmer,

who knows how to work the land, and had they not entered the field, he himself would have worked it, then when

the husband withdraws, they withdraw.

The woman need not pay them anything, just as she does not pay the husband.

And

if the husband is not a tenant farmer,

she must pay them as she would pay anyone who enters another’s field, since

the land is designated for tenant farmers.

They raised a dilemma: What is the law concerning a husband who sold

the

land

that he received as “usufruct property” [nikhsei melog]

to

a purchaser, on the condition that he would work the land and consume its

produce?

Was his sale effective?

And the sides of the dilemma are as follows:

Do we say: Whatever he acquired, he may transfer?

That is, whatever he possesses in the land—the produce—he can transfer to the purchaser,