Ketubot 80b — the Talmud in English

Or perhaps, when the Sages instituted for the husband the produce [of his wife's property] because of the benefit of the household,

so that there would be plentiful food in the house, and this would thereby benefit the woman,

but to sell

to sell

not ?

Yehuda Mar bar Mareimar said in the name of Rava:

What he did is done.

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava:

He did nothing.

Rav Pappa said: That statement of Yehuda Mar bar Mareimar was not stated explicitly, but was stated by inference.

Yehuda bar Mareimar did not hear the ruling explicitly from his teacher; rather, he learned it from an incident that occurred.

And this was the incident:

A certain woman brought her husband two maidservants [as usufruct property]. The husband went and married another woman, and gave her one of them.

An incident occurred involving a woman who brought her husband two maidservants as niskhei melog. The husband went and married another woman, and gave her one of his maidservants.

She came before Rava and cried out, but he paid no attention to her.

That woman came before Rava and complained about this, but Rava paid no attention to her words.

One who saw this thought

Yehuda bar Mareimar, who saw this incident, thought that Rava paid no attention to her

because he thought, “What he did is done,”

and therefore concluded that the husband has the right to sell the niskhei melog that his wife brought him with regard to the produce.

But it is not so.

Rava always held that the Sages’ institution was

because of the benefit of the household, and

therefore the husband cannot sell the land with regard to its produce. But

here

the incident involving the maidservant is different, since even after he gave the maidservant to the second wife, there was still

benefit.

For the maidservant continued to attend to the needs of the household. Therefore he did not pay attention to the claims of the first wife.

And the halakha is:

A husband who sold land for its produce has done nothing!

What is the reason?

Abaye said: We are concerned lest he impoverish it

lest the buyer not tend to the land properly and it be ruined.

Rava said: Because of the benefit of the household.

What difference is there between them?

What practical difference emerges from their dispute?

There is a difference between them with regard to land that is near the city

land that is near the city, which can easily be supervised so that the buyer cannot ruin it.

Alternatively,

in a case where the

husband is a tenant-farmer

on that field, and then there is no concern that he will cause the land to suffer.

And the case is that he gives all the produce to the owner of the field who sold him the land, while he himself takes his wage from the produce for his work in the field that he sold to the buyer. And from that money there is no benefit to the household [unless he uses it for business, as in the following case].

But in both of these cases, the reason that he should not sell because of the benefit of the household still applies.

Alternatively,

if the husband received in exchange for the produce

money, and conducted business with it.

And the benefit to the household is present through this. But there is still concern lest he impoverish it.

Mishna:

Introduction:

The woman’s property is divided into two types: A. Niskhei melog: property that the woman brings from her father’s house, but does not bring to her husband as a dowry, and which is not recorded in the ketuba; and likewise property that falls to her after the marriage, as stated above. With this property, the land itself belongs to the woman, and the husband consumes only the produce.

B. Iron-flock property—that is, the property that she brought to her husband in her ketuba, as a dowry, and whose value he records in the ketuba. With this property he may use it as he wishes, and its loss and appreciation belong to him. Only if he divorces her is he obligated to pay her its original value.

Our Mishna discusses the niskhei melog and the iron-flock property of a woman awaiting levirate marriage—that is, a woman whose husband died without children, and who is waiting for the yavam to fulfill the mitzva of yibum with her.

The root of the issue is that since the “bond of levirate marriage” is a state defined as “doubtful marriage,” since it is not known whether she will undergo yibum or halitza, it is now necessary to question the rights of the yavam and his heirs to her property in this state.

If a woman awaiting levirate marriage had property fall to her,

when she was already awaiting levirate marriage,

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that she may sell and give

this property,

and

her sale or gift

is valid.

Even though when property fell to her while she was betrothed, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed at the beginning of our chapter whether she may sell it initially, here everyone agrees that she may sell it.

Since a woman awaiting levirate marriage is not comparable to a betrothed woman: a betrothed woman is certainly destined only for marriage, and therefore she should not sell. But a woman awaiting levirate marriage is also destined for halitza, and therefore, because of the doubt, the property is in her possession and she may sell it. (Tosafot above, 78a, s.v. “The end”).

And if she

dies, what will they do with her ketuba

that is, with the iron-flock property,

and with the property that enters and leaves with her

that is, the niskhei melog? And it is uncertain to us who will inherit her: whether her husband’s relatives, since the bond of levirate marriage still rests upon her, and it is considered as though she died during his lifetime, so that he inherits her.

Or perhaps the bond of levirate marriage is not so strong; therefore her father’s family relatives will inherit her.

Beit Shammai say:

Because of the doubt,

the husband’s heirs divide it with the father’s heirs

her brothers and her father’s family. Their intention is to niskhei melog, in which both she and her husband are in possession: she of the principal, and he of the right to consume the produce and the right to inherit it. But with regard to iron-flock property, they did not dispute with Beit Hillel, and Beit Hillel’s view is disputed in tractate Bava Batra 158b. And with regard to the one hundred and two hundred of her ketuba, Beit Shammai agree that only her husband is in possession of it, and it is not taken from the husband’s heirs.

And Beit Hillel say: The property is in their possession,

that is, the iron-flock property stands in the possession of both heirs: in the possession of her father’s family, since the property belongs to the woman, and in the possession of the husband’s heirs, because responsibility for it rests upon him. Therefore, with this property, the heirs divide it between themselves.

And the ketuba

the one hundred and two hundred that the husband obligated himself to his wife in her ketuba,

is in the possession of the husband’s heirs,

since they are in possession of the money of the ketuba, and therefore they are not obligated to pay the ketuba to the heirs of her father’s family.

And

the property that enters and leaves with her

the niskhei melog

is in the possession of the father’s heirs.

Since this property belongs to the woman, and the husband is not responsible for it, her father’s family’s heirs will take it.

Our Mishna also comes to teach that all the property of the deceased husband secures her ketuba, and the yavam is not permitted to sell this property:

If his brother left

her first husband

money

as an inheritance, the yavam is not permitted to spend it; rather,

land is purchased with it, and he consumes the produce.

And if he left

produce:

if

the

produce was

detached from the land—

their status is like money, and it is sold, and

land is purchased with it, and he consumes the produce,

so that the principal will be preserved for payment of her ketuba.

But if

the

produce was

attached to the land—

Rabbi Meir says: Their value is assessed

the value of the lands

according to how much they are worth with the produce

how much they are worth because of the produce upon them,

and how much they are worth without the produce

and how much they would be worth without the produce,

and the surplus

the difference

is used to purchase land with it, and he consumes the produce.

Since all produce that grew in the possession of the deceased secures her ketuba, and the yavam consumes only produce that grew in his possession.

And the Sages say:

If his brother left

produce:

if

the

produce was

attached to the land—it is

his, but in the Gemara they emended it to “hers.” And the Sages agree with Rabbi Meir that produce that grew in the possession of the deceased secures her ketuba.

but the Gemara emends the text to read: “hers.” The Sages agree with Rabbi Meir that produce that grew while the property was in the possession of the deceased serves as security for her ketuba.

But if

they

were

detached from the land—

whoever comes first acquires them.

Since movable property does not become liened for a ketuba, unless the woman seized it during the husband’s lifetime.

Therefore, if

he came first,

that is, the woman did not seize them, but he was in possession of them—

he acquired them.

But if

she came first

and acquired them during the husband’s lifetime—

land is purchased with it, and he consumes the produce.

The same law applies when his brother left money: its status is like detached produce. Rashi.

And if he

took her in marriage

performed yibum with her,

she is like his wife in every respect,

and if he comes to divorce her, she requires a bill of divorce. Halitza does not suffice. Likewise, if he divorced her, he may return and take her, and she does not stand under the prohibition of a brother’s wife with regard to him.

And

only

in this matter alone is she different from other women

that

the lien of her

ketuba will be upon the property of her first husband.

And not upon the property of the yavam.

But the Gemara explains that if her first husband has no property, the Sages instituted a ketuba for her from the property of the yavam.

The Mishna teaches us another law:

He may not say to her, “Here is your ketuba lying on the table,”

the yavam cannot take the amount of the ketuba from his brother’s property, set it aside for her, and say, “This money is designated for your ketuba,” while using all the remaining money;

rather, all his property secures her ketuba,

and he is not permitted to sell it; he may only consume its produce.

And likewise, a man may not say to his wife—

“Here is your ketuba lying on the table.” Rather, all his property secures her ketuba.

And the reason is explained in the Gemara: so that she will not be easy in his eyes to divorce, for if the ketuba were separated from his other property, when he became angry with her he would say to her, “Take your ketuba and leave.”

If he divorced her,

the yavam

she has only a ketuba,

and the other property belongs to the yavam.

And if he

took her back—

she is like all women,

for when a man divorces his wife and takes her back, he takes her back on the basis of her first ketuba.

And she has only

the

writ

of the

ketuba

first

alone.

And the Gemara will explain what novelty the Mishna taught with this law.

Gemara:

It was posed to them

the students in the beit-midrash were uncertain:

A woman awaiting levirate marriage who died—who buries her,

that is, upon whom rests the obligation of burial: whether upon her father’s family’s heirs or upon the husband’s heirs?

And the sides of the doubt are:

Whether

the husband’s heirs bury her,

because

they inherit

that is, they inherit

the writ

of the

ketuba,

and we learned above (47b): “Her burial is in exchange for her ketuba.”

Or perhaps the father’s heirs bury her, because they inherit

the

property that enters and leaves with her

the niskhei melog.

Rav Amram said, “Come and hear”

come and hear what we learned concerning this subject:

For it was taught

in a beraita:

“A woman awaiting levirate marriage who died,