Ketubot 80b (פ:) — the Talmud in English

Or perhaps, when the Sages instituted that the husband receives the produce, it was because of the benefit to the household,

so that there would be abundant food in the home, thereby benefiting the wife,

but to sell

the land,

he may not?

Yehuda Mar bar Mareimar said in the name of Rava:

What he did is effective.

Rav Pappa said in the name of Rava:

He accomplished nothing.

Rav Pappa said: The statement of Yehuda Mar bar Mareimar was not stated explicitly; rather, it was inferred.

Yehuda bar Mareimar did not hear the ruling explicitly from his teacher; rather, he derived it from an incident that occurred.

And this was the incident:

A certain woman brought two maidservants into her husband’s marriage, as nikhsei melog. The husband then went and married another woman, and gave her one of them.

There was an incident involving a woman who brought two maidservants to her husband as nikhsei melog. The husband went and married another woman and gave her one of his maidservants.

She came before Rava and cried out, but he paid no attention to her.

That woman came before Rava and complained about what had happened, but Rava paid no heed to her words.

One who witnessed this thought

that Yehuda bar Mareimar, who saw this incident, assumed that Rava did not heed her

because he held: “What he did is effective,”

and therefore concluded that the husband had the right to sell the nikhsei melog that his wife had brought him, with regard to their produce.

That is not so.

Rava in fact held that the Sages’ enactment was

because of the benefit to the household,

and therefore the husband cannot sell the land with regard to its produce. But

this

incident involving the maidservant was different, since even after he gave the maidservant to the second wife, there was still

benefit.

The maidservant continued to perform the needs of the household. Therefore, he did not heed the claims of the first wife.

And the halakha is:

If a husband sold land for its produce, he accomplished nothing!

What is the reason?

Abaye said: We are concerned lest he impoverish it

lest the purchaser fail to tend the land properly and it deteriorate.

Rava said: Because of the benefit to the household.

What is the practical difference between them?

What practical consequence emerges from their dispute?

There is a difference between them with regard to land that is near the city,

land close to the city, which can easily be supervised so that the purchaser cannot cause it to deteriorate.

Alternatively,

in a case where the

husband is a tenant farmer

on that field, in which case there is no concern that he will cause the land to deteriorate.

The case is one in which he gives all the produce to the owner of the field who sold him the land, while he himself takes his wages from the produce for his work on the field that he sold to the purchaser. There is no benefit to the household from that money [unless he uses it for business, as in the following case].

Yet in both of these cases, the reason that he may not sell it because of the benefit to the household still applies.

Alternatively,

if the husband received

money in exchange for the produce and conducts business with it.

In this way, benefit to the household is present. Nevertheless, there is still concern lest he impoverish it.

Mishna:

Introduction:

The wife’s property is divided into two types. A. Nikhsei melog: property that the woman brings from her father’s home but does not bring to her husband as a dowry, and which is not recorded in the ketuba, as well as property that she inherits after the marriage, as stated above. With regard to this property, the land itself belongs to the woman, while the husband receives only its produce.

B. Nikhsei tzon barzel—that is, property that she brought to her husband in her ketuba as a dowry, whose value he records in the ketuba. With regard to this property, he may use it as he wishes, and any loss or appreciation belongs to him. Only if he divorces her must he pay her its original value.

Our Mishna discusses the nikhsei melog and nikhsei tzon barzel of a shomeret yavam—that is, a woman whose husband died without sons and who awaits the yavam to fulfill the mitzva of yibbum with her.

The basis of the issue is that since the “bond of yibbum” is a status defined as a “doubtful marriage,” since it is unknown whether she will undergo yibbum or ḥalitza, one must now inquire into the rights of the yavam and his heirs to her property in this situation.

If a shomeret yavam inherited property,

when she had already become a shomeret yavam,

Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel agree that she may sell and give it away

with regard to this property,

and

her sale or gift

is valid.

Although when she inherited property while betrothed, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disputed at the beginning of this chapter whether she may sell it initially, here everyone agrees that she may sell it.

A shomeret yavam is not comparable to a betrothed woman: a betrothed woman is certainly destined only for marriage, and therefore she may not sell; whereas a shomeret yavam is also destined for ḥalitza, and therefore, because of the uncertainty, the property is in her possession and she may sell it. (Tosafot above, 78a, s.v. sifa.)

And if

she dies, what will be done with her ketuba

that is, the nikhsei tzon barzel

and with the property that enters and leaves with her

that is, the nikhsei melog? It is uncertain to us who will inherit her: whether her husband’s relatives, since the bond of yibbum still rests upon her and it is considered as though she died during his lifetime, in which case he inherits her,

or perhaps the bond of yibbum is not sufficiently strong, and therefore her father’s relatives inherit her?

Beit Shammai say:

Because of the uncertainty,

the husband’s heirs divide it with the father’s heirs

that is, her brothers and her father’s family. Their reference is to nikhsei melog, in which both she and her husband have a claim: she to the principal, and he to the right to consume the produce and to inherit it. But with regard to nikhsei tzon barzel, they did not dispute with Beit Hillel; and Beit Hillel’s position is disputed in tractate Bava Batra 158b. With regard to the hundred and two hundred zuz of her ketuba, Beit Shammai agree that only her husband has possession of it, and it is not taken from the husband’s heirs.

And Beit Hillel say: The property remains in their possession,

meaning that the nikhsei tzon barzel are considered to be in the possession of both heirs: in the possession of her father’s family, since the property belongs to the woman, and in the possession of the husband’s heirs, because responsibility for it rests upon him. Therefore, with regard to this property, the heirs divide it between them.

And the ketuba

the hundred and two hundred zuz that the husband obligated himself to pay his wife in her ketuba

is in the possession of the husband’s heirs,

since they have possession of the money of the ketuba, and therefore they are not required to pay it to the heirs of her father’s family.

And

the property that enters and leaves with her

the nikhsei melog

is in the possession of the father’s heirs.

Since this property belongs to the woman and the husband bears no responsibility for it, her father’s family will take it.

Our Mishna also teaches that all the property of her deceased husband serves as security for her ketuba, and the yavam is not permitted to sell this property:

If his brother left

her first husband

money

as an inheritance, the yavam may not spend it; rather,

land is purchased with it, and he consumes its produce.

And if he left

produce:

if

the

produce was

detached from the ground

it has the status of money, and it is sold, and

land is purchased with it, and he consumes its produce,

so that the principal will remain preserved for payment of her ketuba.

But if

the

produce was

attached to the ground,

Rabbi Meir says: They assess them

the fields

according to how valuable they are with produce

how much they are worth because of the produce growing on them,

and how valuable they are without produce

how much they would be worth without the produce,

and the difference

the difference between these amounts

is used to purchase land, and he consumes its produce.

Since all produce that grew while the property was in the possession of the deceased serves as security for her ketuba, and the yavam consumes only produce that grew while it was in his possession.

And the Sages say:

If his brother left

produce:

if

the

produce was

attached to the ground, it is

his,

but the Gemara emends the text to read: “hers.” The Sages agree with Rabbi Meir that produce that grew while the property was in the possession of the deceased serves as security for her ketuba.

But if

the

produce was

detached from the ground,

whoever takes possession of it first acquires it.

Since movable property is not subject to the lien of a ketuba, unless the woman seized it during the husband’s lifetime.

Therefore, if

he took precedence,

that is, the woman did not seize it, but he had possession of it

he acquires it.

But if

she took precedence

and acquired it during the husband’s lifetime,

land is purchased with it, and he consumes its produce.

The same applies when his brother left money: it has the status of detached produce. Rashi.

And if

he took her in levirate marriage

that is, he performed yibbum with her,

she is his wife in every respect,

and if he comes to divorce her, she requires a get. Ḥalitza is not sufficient. Likewise, if he divorces her, he may take her back, and she is not subject to the prohibition of a brother’s wife with regard to him.

And

only

in this matter alone is she different from other women:

that the lien of

her

ketuba is upon the property of her first husband,

and not upon the property of the yavam.

But the Gemara explains that if her first husband left no property, the Sages enacted that she receives a ketuba from the property of the yavam.

The Mishna teaches us another law:

He may not say to her, “Your ketuba is lying on the table,”

meaning that the yavam cannot take the amount of the ketuba from his brother’s property, set it aside for her, and say, “This money is designated for your ketuba,” while using all the remaining money

rather, all his property serves as security for her ketuba

and he may not sell it; he may only consume its produce.

And a man may not say to his wife:

“Your ketuba is lying on the table.” Rather, all his property serves as security for her ketuba.

The reason is explained in the Gemara: so that she not be insignificant in his eyes to the point that he divorces her. For if the ketuba were set aside from his other property, when he became angry with her he could say to her, “Take your ketuba and leave.”

If he divorced her,

the yavam

she has only her ketuba,

and the rest of the property belongs to the yavam.

And if

he took her back,

she is like all other women,

for when a man divorces his wife and takes her back, he takes her back on the basis of her first ketuba.

And she has only

the

amount of the ketuba

-

itself

the first one

alone.

The Gemara will explain what new point the Mishna teaches with this law.

Gemara:

They raised a dilemma

the students in the beit-midrash were uncertain:

A shomeret yavam who died—who buries her?

That is, upon whom does the obligation to bury her rest: her father’s heirs or her husband’s heirs?

The sides of the uncertainty are as follows:

Perhaps

the husband’s heirs bury her,

because

they inherit

the

ketuba

-

,

and we learned above (47b): “Her burial is in exchange for her ketuba.”

Or perhaps the father’s heirs bury her, because they inherit

the

property that enters and leaves with her

the nikhsei melog.

Rav Amram said: Come and hear

what we learned concerning this matter:

As it is taught

in a beraita:

“A shomeret yavam who died,