Ketubot 79b — the Talmud in English

The one who steals the offspring of a usufruct animal [nekhsei melog]

a woman who brought an animal to her husband as melog property, and it gave birth to a calf, and that calf was stolen, and they apprehended the thief,

pays double payment to the woman.

And land is purchased with it, and the husband eats the produce.

And the Gemara stated this simply—that even the calf belongs to the woman, and therefore she takes the double payment due for the calf. And the Gemara asks:

According to whom

did Rabbi Yannai hold?

Not according to the Rabbis and not according to Hanania!

For it was taught in a beraita: The offspring of a melog animal belongs to the husband. The offspring of a melog maidservant—

belongs to the woman.

And below the distinction will be explained. This is the view of the Rabbis.

And Hanania son of the brother of Josiah said: They treated the offspring of a melog maidservant like the offspring of a melog animal,

and it too belongs to the husband.

In any event, everyone holds that the offspring of a melog animal belongs to the husband; if so, why does the double payment belong to the woman?

And we answer:

You may even say: It is the view of everyone

[it is possible to explain Rav Yannai’s statement according to everyone], and indeed he too admits that the offspring of a melog animal belongs to the husband, and nevertheless the double payment belongs to the woman, because only

produce

[that is, the body of the offspring]

did the Rabbis institute for him.

But

produce of produce

[the double payment that comes on account of the offspring]

the Rabbis did not institute for him,

and therefore he gives it to the woman.

And the Gemara returns to explain the dispute between Hanania and the Rabbis—

Granted, according to Hanania,

the offspring belongs to the husband, like other produce, and

this is why we are not concerned about death,

that is, his reason is that they are not concerned about the death of the mother, and therefore the law of the offspring is like the law of produce.

But

according to

the Rabbis—

if they are concerned about death,

and therefore they do not give the offspring of the melog maidservant to the husband, so that the principal will not be consumed, but they sell it and purchase land with it, and the husband eats the produce—if so,

even the offspring of a melog animal as well should not be given

to the husband, but it should be sold and land should be purchased with it, and the husband should eat the produce?

And if they are not concerned about death,

if so,

even the offspring of a melog maidservant as well

should be given to the husband; and why did they distinguish between the offspring of a melog maidservant and the offspring of a melog animal?

And we answer:

Actually, they are concerned

about death.

And

in any event, the offspring of a melog animal belongs to the husband, because

an animal is different, since it has its hide,

and even if it dies, the principal is not entirely consumed, and therefore they give the produce—the offspring—to the husband.

Rav Huna bar Hiyya said in the name of Shmuel: The halakha is according to Hanania.

Rava said in the name of Rav Nahman: Although Shmuel said that the halakha is according to Hanania,

that the offspring of a melog maidservant belongs to the husband,

Hanania admits that if she was divorced

after the husband acquired the offspring,

she gives money

to the husband in exchange for them,

and takes them, because of the honor of her father’s household

[that is, it is an honor to her father’s household that she continue to hold these offspring of maidservants].

Rava said in the name of Rav Nahman: If she brought him

as melog property

a goat for its milk, and a ewe for its wool, and a hen for its eggs, and a palm tree for its produce, he eats and continues until the principal is consumed.

Since in all these things the principal is not entirely consumed: with an animal, the hide remains; with a hen, the feathers; and with a palm tree, the tree.

Rav Nahman said: If she brought him a cloak, it is produce; he covers himself with it and proceeds until it is worn out.

[If she brought him a cloak, he covers himself with it until it wears out. Since covering oneself with the cloak is the manner of its use, it is considered its produce,] and the worn-out remains will belong to her as principal.

According to whom?—

Like that tanna.

For it was taught:

If property fell to the woman in a place on the seashore where salt is made by evaporating seawater, or in a place where there is sand for building,

the salt and the sand are produce,

and the husband may take them, since the sand and the salt are not consumed forever.

But if

a mine

[a quarry]

of sulfur fell to her,

or

a quarry of tzrif

[a copper mine; and Rashi explained: a mine from which dye is extracted], whose end is to be consumed—

Rabbi Meir says: [It is] principal.

And it is sold, and land is purchased with it, and the husband eats the produce.

And the Sages say:

The sulfur and the tzrif are considered

produce.

And the husband eats them until they are consumed, since this is their produce and this is the manner of benefiting from them, while the place of the excavation will be hers as principal. And the same law applies to a cloak.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon says: The place where his power is strengthened

when she brings it in, his power is weakened when she takes it out; the place where his power is weakened when she brings it in, his power is strengthened when she takes it out. How so? Produce attached to the land: when she brings it in, it is his, and when she takes it out, it is hers. And produce detached from the land: when she brings it in, it is hers, and when she takes it out, it is his.

And the Gemara asks:

Rabbi Shimon—

is this not the first tanna!

[the Sages mentioned in the Mishna] And what did he innovate by his statement?

Rava said:

If the produce was

attached at the time of departure

[divorce],

there is a difference between them.

According to the Rabbis, the husband acquires them, since they grew in his domain. But according to Rabbi Shimon, the woman acquires them, since we follow the time of detachment.

Mishna:

The Mishna continues with the matter under discussion above:

If aged male and female slaves fell to her

who are no longer fit for work,

they are sold, and land is purchased with them, and he eats the produce.

Rabbi Shimon ben Gamaliel says: She may not sell.

That is, she may prevent him from selling them,

because they are the honor of her father’s household.

[It is an honor to her father’s household that she continue to hold them.]

If aged olive trees and grapevines fell to her

that do not produce produce,

they are sold, and land is purchased with them, and he eats the produce.

Rabbi Judah says: She may not sell. Because they are the honor of her father’s household.

Gemara:

The tannaim in the Mishna disagreed whether, when aged olive trees and grapevines fell to her, she may prevent their sale because of the honor of her father’s household.

Rav Kahana said in the name of Rav: The dispute

applies only in a case

where

the olives

fell

within

her field,

where she inherited the land together with the trees and the olives and grapevines upon it. Then, even if the olive trees die, the land will remain hers, and in this there is a basis for the reasoning of “the honor of her father’s household.”

But

if olives fell to her

in a field that is not hers,

because only the trees belonged to her father and not the land—

everyone agrees that she sells

[she cannot prevent him from selling them]. And the reasoning of “the honor of her father’s household” does not apply here,

because the principal is consumed.

And we ask:

Rav Yosef strongly objected to this: Behold,

with regard to what fell to her,

aged male and female slaves,

aged,

which is equivalent to a field that is not hers,

[since if they die, she has nothing],

and

nevertheless

they disagree,

and according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel she may not sell them because of the honor of her father’s household?

And we answer:

Rather, if it was stated, it was stated in this manner

[if Rav Kahana’s statement was made, it was made as follows]:

Rav Kahana said in the name of Rav: The dispute

between Rabbi Judah and the Sages applies only

when

aged olives fell to her in

a field that is not hers,

and only then did the Sages hold that there is no basis for the reasoning of “the honor of her father’s household,”

but in her field, everyone agrees that she may not sell, because of the honor of her father’s household.

Mishna:

One who expends expenses on the property of

melog that

his wife

brought to him in order to improve it, whether

he expended much and ate a little,

or he expended

a little and ate much: What he expended, he expended; and what he ate, he ate.

And he cannot claim his expenses if he divorced her.

But if he

expended and did not eat

anything—

he swears how much he expended and takes it.

And the Gemara will explain that he takes only expenses to the amount of the improvement; that is, if the expenses exceeded the improvement, he takes only the improvement. This is the law of one who enters his fellow’s field without authorization.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “He expended much and ate a little; what he expended, he expended, and what he ate, he ate.”

And the Gemara explains:

And how much

is the measure of

“a little”?

Rabbi Asi said—

even

if he ate only

one dried fig

[a dried fig]

one,

he can no longer claim his expenses.

And this is when he ate it in an honorable manner.