Ketubot 79a — the Talmud in English

She came before him [the woman came before

her]

Rav Naḥman

to claim the property from her daughter, and the daughter produced the deed of gift that she had received from her mother, and

he tore it

Rav Naḥman tore the deed.

Since she had not given an absolute gift, but only in order to conceal the property from her husband.

Rav Anan went before Mar Ukva [Rav Anan saw this incident and came before Mar Ukva, who was the head of the court] and

Rav Anan saw this incident and came before Mar Ukva, who was head of the court, and

said to him: See, Master, how Naḥman the farmer tears people’s deeds! [May your honor see how Naḥman, who is not expert in laws, like a farmer, tears people’s deeds unlawfully].

May my master see how Naḥman, who is no more expert in law than a farmer, improperly tears people’s deeds.

He said to him,

Mar Ukva said to Rav Anan:

Tell me, please, the body of the incident—

how was it [Tell me, my friend, what was the incident there]?

Tell me, my friend, what happened there.

He said to him,

Rav Anan said to him:

This and this is what happened.

He said to him,

Mar Ukva said to him:

Are you speaking of a deed of concealment [Was the case there one of a woman who wished to conceal her property from her husband]?!

?

Behold,

this is what Rav Ḥanilai bar Idi said in the name of Shmuel: I am an authorized decisor [I received permission from the Exilarch to issue rulings],

I received permission from the Exilarch to issue rulings in such matters,

if a deed of concealment comes into my hands—

I will tear it!

Since she did not intend an absolute gift, but only to conceal her property from her husband.

And the Gemara returns to describe what happened in Rav Naḥman’s court:

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

Why did you tear the deed? Did you rely on Shmuel’s statement that he said: “If a deed of concealment comes into my hands, I will tear it”?

After all,

what is the reason

that Shmuel said, “I will tear it”? It is because

a person does not abandon himself and give to others [It is logical that she did not intend an absolute gift, since a person does not ordinarily give his property to others for no reason; rather, certainly the purpose of her giving it was only to conceal her property from her husband].

It is reasonable to assume that she did not intend to give an absolute gift, since a person does not ordinarily give all her property to others for no reason; rather, her purpose in giving it was certainly only to conceal it from her husband.

And if so,

these words

apply when she gave her property

to others, but

in our case, when she gave it

to her daughter [to her daughter]—

to her daughter—

she gave it [Certainly her intention was an absolute gift]!

surely she intended an absolute gift!

Rav Naḥman said to him:

Even so,

Shmuel’s reasoning still applies, since even

in place of her daughter, her own interest is preferable to her [Even when she wrote the deed for her daughter, her own benefit was still more important to her, and certainly her intention was to conceal the property].

Even when she writes a deed for her daughter, her own interests are still more important to her, and she certainly intended only to conceal the property.

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rav Naḥman’s words:

It was objected from what we learned in a beraita in the Tosefta:

what we learned in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna:

One who wishes to conceal her property from her husband—how does she act?

She writes a deed of appeasement [a deed of appeasement, that is, a deed that is not genuine, but she appeases another person to accept this gift not in truth, but in order to help her conceal the property from her husband]

a deed that is not genuine, but is written to persuade another person to accept the gift only in appearance, in order to help her conceal the property from her husband

to others.

That is, her intention is not a genuine gift, but only to conceal her property ,

the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel.

And the Sages say—

if he wishes,

the recipient of the deed

is making sport with her.

That is, he can claim her property for himself.

Until she writes to him: “

My property is acquired by you

from today, and when I wish [that is, if I wish] ,”

and then there is concealment from her husband: if he comes to acquire it, she will say, “Behold, I wish my gift to take effect,” and if the purchaser comes, she will say, “I do not wish it” .

and then this is an effective concealment from her husband: if he comes to acquire the property, she can say, “I wish my gift to take effect,” while if the recipient comes to acquire it, she can say, “I do not wish it to take effect” .

And the Gemara infers:

The reason

that, according to the Sages, she can conceal her property from her husband is only because

she wrote to him thus: “

When I wish.”

Had she not written to him thus—

the purchaser would acquire it!

And this is not like Shmuel’s statement, “If a deed of concealment comes into my hands, I will tear it,” implying that this applies even if she did not write to him, “When I wish”?

Rabbi Zeira said: It is not difficult!

This

that Shmuel said, “If a deed of concealment comes into my hands, I will tear it,” refers

to

a case in which she wrote to him

all of it [all her property]; and in this case we certainly assess her intention as not having been for an absolute gift, but only to conceal it.

all her property. In that case, we certainly assess her intention as not having been to make an absolute gift, but only to conceal the property.

And

this

that the Sages said, “If he wishes, he is making sport with her,” refers to a case in which she wrote to him

a portion

of her property

. And then, if she did not write to him, “from today and when I wish,” the purchaser can make sport with her.

In that case, if she did not write to him, “From today and whenever I wish,” the recipient may make sport of her.

And

we ask: According to Shmuel, who says that a deed of concealment does not transfer the property to the purchaser,

if the purchaser does not acquire it—

let the husband acquire it,

as he acquires her other property; and what did her concealment accomplish ?

Abaye said: They made them

these assets

like assets unknown to the husband, and according to Rabbi Shimon

mentioned in our Mishna, that if a woman has property overseas and the husband did not know about it, he does not acquire it. Here too, since to the husband it appears as though she sold it to another before the marriage, it is considered like property unknown to him .

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains the husband’s rights in his wife’s property:

If money fell to her [she received it by inheritance or as a gift]

received through inheritance or as a gift

after the marriage,

after the marriage,

land shall be purchased with it

so that the principal’s value will be preserved , and

he,

the husband,

eats the produce

from that land. But the principal belongs to the woman, since they enacted for the husband only the produce in exchange for his redemption of her [so that he will redeem her if she is taken captive].

And likewise, if

detached produce fell to her from the land, land shall be purchased with it, and he eats the produce.

And

if produce fell to her that is

attached to the land—

Rabbi Meir said: The land is assessed

according to

how much it is worth with produce, and how much it is worth without produce, and

the

difference [the amount of the difference]

the amount of the difference

shall be used to purchase land, and he eats the produce.

Rabbi Meir reasons: what grew under the husband’s authority is produce, while what did not grow under his authority is considered principal. Therefore, the amount by which the land is now more valuable because of the produce upon it is considered principal. Thus, it is sold, land is purchased with its price, and he eats its produce.

And the Sages say—

that which is attached to the land,

even that which did not grow under the husband’s authority—

belongs to him!

And these too are considered produce, since the body of the land still belongs to the woman

. And that which is detached from the land,

belongs to her, and

is considered principal in its own right; therefore

land shall be purchased with it, and he eats the produce.

Rabbi Shimon says—

where his power is strong upon her entry, his power is weakened upon her departure; where his power is weakened upon her entry, his power is strong upon her departure.

And the Mishna explains—

How?

Produce attached to the land—

Upon her entry—

it belongs to him.

Like the Sages.

And upon her departure—

that is, if he divorced her, and there was produce attached to the land in her property—

it belongs to her.

And she takes her lands together with the produce upon them, since according to Rabbi Shimon he acquires the produce only at the time it is detached [Rashi below].

And that which is detached from the land—

Upon her entry—

it belongs to her.

And land is purchased with it, and the husband eats the produce, as when she brought him money.

And upon her departure—

if he divorced her, and there was detached produce from the land in her property—

it belongs to him.

He had already acquired it at the time it was detached, and she does not take it.

And the Gemara will explain what was renewed in Rabbi Shimon’s words.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses a case in which money fell to her, and they came to purchase property with it, and an argument arose between the husband and the woman as to what they should purchase.

And we say:

It is obvious:

if one of them wishes to purchase

land [land],

land,

and

the other

houses,

they purchase

land.

Since its yield is greater and it does not rot. Therefore, both of them can prevent it

And likewise, if they argued whether to purchase

houses

or

palm trees,

they purchase

houses, since their yield is greater than that of palm trees, since palm trees are liable to dry out.

since their profit is greater than that of palm trees, as palm trees are liable to dry out.

And likewise—

palm trees and other trees,

they purchase

palm trees, since the palm tree endures longer than other trees.

since a palm tree lasts longer than other trees.

And likewise,

other trees and grapevines [vines], they purchase

grapevines, they purchase

other trees.

Since trees endure longer than grapevines .

And the Gemara discusses: if

a forest of wild trees [a forest of wild trees, used for cutting wood]

or

a fishpond [a fishpond] fell to the woman, whether the trees growing in the forest or the fish growing in the pond are considered produce or principal—

a fishpond, the trees growing in the forest or the fish growing in the pond are considered produce or principal:

Some say [there are those who say]:

there are those who say:

produce.

And some say—

principal.

Since if one takes the trees or the fish, the land will not produce trees and fish anew beneath them, the matter is therefore considered principal, and they are sold, land is purchased with their price, and the husband eats the produce.

The general principle of the matter:

Something whose

trunk is replaced [which grows anew continually] is considered

grows again continually

produce, but if its

produce,

trunk is not replaced—it is considered

trunk

principal .

principal .

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya in the name of Rabbi Yannai, and some say—

Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya in the name of Rabbi Yannai—