Ketubot 79a (עט.) — the Talmud in English

She came before

that woman came before

Rav Naḥman

to claim the property from her daughter, and the daughter produced the deed of gift that she had received from her mother, and

he tore it

Rav Naḥman tore the deed.

Since she had not given an absolute gift, but had done so only in order to conceal the property from her husband.

Rav Anan went before Mar Ukva

Rav Anan witnessed this incident and came before Mar Ukva, who was the head of the court, and

said to him: See, master, how Naḥman the farmer tears people’s deeds!

Master should see how Naḥman, who is no more versed in legal matters than a farmer, tears people’s deeds unlawfully.

He said to him,

Mar Ukva said to Rav Anan:

Tell me, please, the details of the incident—

how did it happen

my friend, tell me what happened there?

He said to him,

Rav Anan said:

This and this is what happened.

He said to him,

Mar Ukva said:

Are you referring to a deed intended to conceal property—was the case one of a woman who wished to conceal her property from her husband

?

For

this is what Rav Ḥanilai bar Idi said in the name of Shmuel: I am authorized to issue legal rulings

I received authorization from the Exilarch to issue rulings in this matter—

if a deed intended to conceal property comes into my hands—

I shall tear it!

Since she did not intend to give an absolute gift, but only to conceal her property from her husband.

The Gemara returns to describe what occurred in Rav Naḥman’s court:

Rava said to Rav Naḥman:

Why did you tear the deed? Did you rely on Shmuel’s statement: “If a deed intended to conceal property comes into my hands, I shall tear it”?

Is it not the case that

what is the reason

Shmuel said, “I shall tear it”? It is

that a person does not deprive himself and give to others

It is reasonable to assume that she did not intend an absolute gift, since a person does not ordinarily give all his property to others for no reason. Rather, clearly her sole purpose in giving it was to conceal her property from her husband.

If so,

that applies

when she gave her property

to others, but

in the case before us, when she gave it

to her daughter

to her daughter—

she gave it

surely she intended an absolute gift!

Rav Naḥman said to him:

Even so,

Shmuel’s reasoning still applies, since even

in place of her daughter, her own interests are preferable to her

Even when she wrote the deed for her daughter, her own welfare was still more important to her, and certainly her intention was to conceal the property.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Naḥman’s statement:

Meytivi,

from what we learned in a beraita in the Tosefta:

If a woman wishes to conceal her property from her husband, what does she do?

She writes a deed of appeasement

a deed of appeasement, meaning a deed that does not reflect a genuine transaction, through which she appeases another person to accept this gift fictitiously, in order to help her conceal the property from her husband—

to others.

That is, her intention is not to make a genuine gift, but only to conceal her property ,

the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And the Sages say:

If he wishes,

the recipient of the deed

he may mock her.

That is, he may claim her property for himself.

Until she writes to him “

my property is acquired by you

from today, and whenever I wish

”—that is, if I wish—,”

and then this is an effective concealment from her husband: If he comes to acquire the property, she can say, “I wish my gift to take effect,” whereas if the purchaser comes, she can say, “I do not wish it to take effect” .

The Gemara infers:

The reason

that, according to the Sages, she can conceal her property from her husband is only

because she wrote to him in this manner: “

whenever I wish.”

If she did not write to him in this manner—

the purchaser acquires them!

And this is not in accordance with Shmuel’s statement, “If a deed intended to conceal property comes into my hands, I shall tear it,” which implies that this is so even if she did not write to him, “whenever I wish”?

Rabbi Zeira said: It is not difficult!

This

statement of Shmuel, “If a deed intended to conceal property comes into my hands, I shall tear it,” is referring

to

a case where she wrote to him

all of it

all her property. In that case, we certainly assess her intention as not being to make an absolute gift, but only to conceal the property.

And

this

statement of the Sages, “If he wishes, he may mock her,” is referring to a case where she wrote to him

part

of her property

.

In that case, if she did not write to him, “from today and whenever I wish,” the purchaser may mock her.

And

we raise a difficulty: According to Shmuel, who says that a deed intended to conceal property does not transfer the property to the purchaser,

if the purchaser does not acquire them—

let the husband acquire them,

as he acquires her other property; what, then, has her concealment accomplished ?

Abaye said: They treated them

as property

like property unknown to the husband, and this is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon

mentioned in our Mishna, who says that if a woman has property overseas and her husband is unaware of it, he does not acquire it. Here too, since it appears to the husband as though she sold the property to another person before the marriage, it is considered property unknown to him .

Mishna:

Our Mishna explains the husband’s rights in his wife’s property:

If she inherited

received through inheritance or as a gift

money

after the marriage,

land is purchased with it

so that the principal will be preserved ,

and he

the husband

consumes the produce

from that land. However, the principal belongs to the woman, since the Sages instituted the husband’s right only to the produce in exchange for his obligation to redeem her, if she is taken captive.

Likewise, if she inherited

produce detached from the land, land is purchased with it, and he consumes the produce.

And

if she inherited produce

attached to the land—

Rabbi Meir says: The land is assessed

the land

according to how much it is worth with the produce and how much it is worth without the produce, and the

the

difference

in the amount of the difference

is used to purchase land, and he consumes the produce.

Rabbi Meir holds that whatever grew while the property was under the husband’s authority is produce, whereas whatever did not grow under his authority is considered principal. Therefore, the amount by which the land is now more valuable because of the produce upon it is considered principal; consequently, it is sold, land is purchased with its proceeds, and he consumes its produce.

And the Sages say:

The produce attached to the land,

even that which did not grow while the property was under the husband’s authority, is

his!

It too is considered produce, since the land itself still belongs to the woman

. And the produce detached from the land,

belongs to her, and

is considered principal in its own right; therefore

land is purchased with it, and he consumes the produce.

Rabbi Shimon says:

Where his power is strengthened upon her entering his domain, his power is weakened upon her leaving it. Where his power is weakened upon her entering his domain, his power is strengthened upon her leaving it.

The Mishna explains:

How so?

Produce attached to the land—

Upon her entering his domain—

it is his.

Like the opinion of the Sages.

And upon her leaving it—

that is, if he divorced her and there was produce attached to the land in her property,

it is hers.

She takes her land together with the produce upon it, since according to Rabbi Shimon he acquires the produce only when it is detached [Rashi below].

And produce detached from the land—

Upon her entering his domain—

it is hers.

Land is purchased with it, and the husband consumes the produce, as when she brought him money.

And upon her leaving it—

if he divorced her and there was produce detached from the land in her property,

it is his.

He had already acquired it when it was detached, and she does not take it with her.

The Gemara will explain what new point is taught by Rabbi Shimon’s statement.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses a case in which she inherited money, and property was to be purchased with it, leading to a disagreement between the husband and the wife over what should be purchased.

And we say:

It is obvious:

If one of them wishes to purchase

land

land,

and

the other

houses,

they purchase

land.

Since its yield is greater and it does not deteriorate. Therefore, either of them can prevent the other

Likewise, if they dispute whether to purchase

houses

or

palm trees,

they purchase

houses,

since their yield is greater than that of palm trees, as palm trees are liable to dry out.

Likewise, with

palm trees and other trees,

they purchase

palm trees,

since a palm tree lasts longer than other trees.

Likewise, with

other trees and grapevines

grapevines, they purchase

other trees.

Since trees last longer than grapevines .

The Gemara discusses the case where the woman inherited

a forest of wild trees

a forest of non-fruit-bearing trees used for woodcutting,

or a fishpond

a fishpond: Are the trees growing in the forest, or the fish growing in the pond, considered produce or principal?

Some say

there are those who say:

Produce.

And some say—

principal.

Since if the trees or fish are taken, the land will not produce new trees or fish in their place, the item is considered principal; they are therefore sold, land is purchased with the proceeds, and the husband consumes the produce.

The general principle of the matter:

An item whose

stump regenerates

that continually grows anew is considered

produce,

but if it

does not regenerate—

it is considered

principal .

principal .

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, who said in the name of Rabbi Yannai; and some say—

Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya, who said in the name of Rabbi Yannai—