Ketubot 74a (עד.) — the Talmud in English

And with regard to this:

In the name of Rabbi Eliezer they said: She performs ḥalitza but does not undergo yibbum,

as a decree due to an orphan during her father's lifetime."

This concludes the discussion of the Gemara in tractate Yevamot.

But here,

where he took her back when she was a minor and she matured in his home,

it is comparable to the case of a mistaken marriage, [as when he betrothed a woman on the condition that a particular condition would be fulfilled, and the condition was not fulfilled—so that the betrothal was mistaken; likewise here, when he betrothed her while she was a minor, his betrothal was not effective by Torah law],

as in the case of one who betrothed her conditionally and the condition was not fulfilled—so that his kiddushin was mistaken; so here too, when he betrothed her when she was a minor, his kiddushin did not take effect by Torah law,

and Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree

whether, when he has intercourse with her without specification, his intention is to betroth her now with a fully effective betrothal, or not, and not as Rabba said, that according to everyone he has intercourse on the basis of his initial betrothal? And we answer:

There too, they disagree about this; one Master holds [the Rabbis]:

[the Rabbis]:

A person knows that the betrothal of a minor is entirely ineffective, and he proceeds to have intercourse for the sake of betrothal; and the other Master holds [Rabbi Eliezer]:

[Rabbi Eliezer]:

A person does not know that the betrothal of a minor is entirely ineffective, and when he has intercourse, he does so on the basis of the initial betrothal.

But when he betrothed her on a condition and then had intercourse, his intention is certainly directed to his initial condition.

It was also stated

in accordance with Rabba's statement:

Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one betrothed a woman on a condition and then had intercourse, everyone agrees that she does not require a bill of divorce from him.

Since he has intercourse on the basis of his initial condition.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, his sister's son, raised an objection to him, [his nephew Rav Aḥa challenged him]:

[his nephew, Rav Aḥa, challenged him]:

We learned:

“An invalid ḥalitza is valid,”

And the amoraim discussed:

What is an invalid ḥalitza?

Reish Lakish said: Any case in which one says to him, “Perform ḥalitza with her, and by doing so you will marry her.”

Even though he intended to marry her through this ḥalitza and did not intend to release her to marry anyone else, nevertheless she is released to marry anyone else.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: I teach that whether he intended [the requisite purpose] and she did not intend, or she intended and he did not intend, her ḥalitza is invalid until both of them intend,

for the purpose of a ḥalitza that releases her,

and you say that her ḥalitza is valid?! Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Any case in which one says to him, “Perform ḥalitza with her on the condition that she give you two hundred zuz.”

And she did not give him two hundred zuz.

And in this case we learned: “An invalid ḥalitza is valid.”

Rav Aḥa infers:

Apparently, once he performed an act,

meaning that he performed ḥalitza after stipulating the condition,

he relinquished his condition,

and therefore the ḥalitza is valid even though the condition was not fulfilled.

And

here too, once he has intercourse, he relinquished his condition,

and not as Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov said above: If he betrothed her on a condition and had intercourse, and the condition was not fulfilled, she does not require a bill of divorce, since he has intercourse on the basis of his initial condition

? He said to him,

Rav Aḥa bar Ya'akov said to Rav Aḥa:

Scholar,

you have asked well [young man, have you asked properly]?!

The reason for Rabbi Yoḥanan's ruling is not that he waived his condition; rather, a condition is entirely ineffective with regard to ḥalitza.

Since

after all, from where do we derive the laws of all conditions? From the condition of the descendants of Gad and the descendants of Reuben. [Were not all the laws of conditions learned from the condition that Moses our teacher made with the descendants of Gad and the descendants of Reuben: If you cross over armed, you will receive the land east of the Jordan, and if you do not cross over, you will not receive it?] Therefore, every condition must meet all the requirements present in the condition of the descendants of Gad.

[After all, all the laws of conditions were learned from the condition that Moses made with the descendants of Gad and the descendants of Reuben: If you cross over armed, you will inherit the land east of the Jordan; and if you do not cross over, you will not inherit it.] Therefore, every condition must fulfill all the requirements that applied to the condition made with the descendants of Gad and the descendants of Reuben.

Therefore:

A condition that can be fulfilled through an agent [in an act that can be performed through an agent]

[in an act that can be performed through an agent]

as there,

where Moses could give them the land through an agent—

that is a valid condition [a condition is effective with regard to it].

[a condition is effective in such a case].

A condition that cannot be fulfilled through an agent, as there,

such as in ḥalitza, where only the brother himself can perform ḥalitza and not his agent,

is not a valid condition [a condition is not effective with regard to it].

[a condition has no effect in such a case] .

And we challenge this:

But intercourse cannot be performed through an agent, as there, and yet a condition is valid!

For if he said, “I am having intercourse with you on the condition that my father agrees,” and his father did not agree, she is not betrothed, even though it is impossible to betroth through intercourse by means of an agent.

And we answer:

There,

a condition is effective

because all forms of betrothal are linked to one another.

That is, all forms of acquisition in marriage are equated with one another. And since a condition is effective with regard to betrothal through money and through a document, it is also effective with regard to betrothal through intercourse .

The Gemara presents a third possibility for explaining the dispute between Rav and Shmuel:

Rav Ulla bar Abba said that Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said: If one betrothed a woman with a loan,

so that his betrothal was ineffective,

and

afterward

had intercourse.

Or if he betrothed her

on a condition,

and the condition was not fulfilled,

and

afterward

had intercourse.

Or if he betrothed her

with less than the value of a peruta and had intercourse, everyone agrees

that she requires a bill of divorce from him.

Since a person does not render his intercourse promiscuous intercourse, he completes the act with the intention of betrothal.

Rav and Shmuel disagreed only when he did not have intercourse, but took her into his home without specification: whether he relinquished his condition or not.

Rav Yosef bar Abba said that Rabbi Menaḥem said that Rav Ami:

Only

if he betrothed her with less than the value of a peruta and had intercourse, she requires a bill of divorce from him.

Since

in this matter alone he does not err, [he does not mistakenly think that his betrothal is effective even with less than the value of a peruta], and he has intercourse for the sake of betrothal.

[he does not mistakenly think that his betrothal is effective even with less than the value of a peruta], and therefore he has intercourse with her for the purpose of betrothal.

But with regard to these,

namely, one who betroths with a loan or on a condition,

he errs,

and thinks that his betrothal took effect [he thinks that she knows that she has no vows and that this is why she marries him, and when he has intercourse, he does so on the basis of the initial betrothal and not for the sake of betrothal. Likewise, if he betrothed her with a loan, he mistakenly thinks that the betrothal took effect, since he is not expert in the laws of betrothal. Rashi], and he does not intend to have intercourse for the sake of betrothal. This is not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar's statement.

Rav Kahana said in the name of Ulla: If one betrothed a woman on a condition and had intercourse, she requires a bill of divorce from him,

perhaps he completed the act with the intention of betrothal.

There was an incident

in which a man betrothed a woman on a condition, the condition was not fulfilled, and he had intercourse,

and the Sages did not have the power to release her without a bill of divorce,

because of the uncertainty, lest he have intercourse for the sake of betrothal. But she has no ketuba, since the burden of proof rests upon the one seeking to extract payment from his fellow.

To the exclusion of this tanna, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael:

It is written in the Torah that a woman who had intercourse,

“and she was not seized,”

meaning that she was not violated,

is forbidden. But

if she

was seized, she is permitted.

And

we infer: Since it is written “and she,” this indicates that specifically she is forbidden to her husband if she committed adultery willingly. However,

there is another woman who, even though she was not seized

and committed adultery willingly,

is permitted

to her husband.

And which

woman

is this? One whose betrothal was a mistaken betrothal,

for example, he betrothed her on a condition and the condition was not fulfilled,

so that even when her son is mounted upon her shoulders—