Ketubot 73b (עג:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara resolves:

No!

The Mishna is speaking of a case where

he betrothed her without specifying a condition and married her without specifying a condition.

Only then does she require a get.

But

if

he betrothed her on a condition and married her without specifying a condition, she likewise does not require a get.

This is in accordance with Shmuel’s statement.

And we raise an objection: If so,

rather than teach

at the beginning

“One who betroths a woman on the condition that she has no vows, and vows are found upon her, she is not betrothed,”

which indicates that even if he married her on a condition,

let it teach

an even greater novelty—that even if

he married her without specifying a condition and vows were found upon her, she is not betrothed,

in accordance with Shmuel’s statement,

and all the more so in this case,

where he married her on a condition?

And we answer:

That is indeed what it is saying.

This is truly the intent of the Mishna:

“One who betroths a woman on the condition that she has no vows, and marries her without specifying a condition, and vows are found upon her, she is not betrothed.

But if

he betrothed her without specifying a condition and married her without specifying a condition, she shall leave without her ketuba.”

The Gemara discusses: We learned in the Mishna that if he betrothed her without specifying a condition and married her without specifying a condition, and vows were found upon her, she shall leave without her ketuba.

And we inferred:

It is the ketuba that she does not require; but she does require a get.

And what is different about the ketuba, that she does not require it?

Because

he said: “I do not want a woman who makes vows.”

I did not marry you with this understanding.

If so, she should not require a get either,

since this is a mistaken transaction, and the betrothal was nullified retroactively?

Rabba said:

Indeed, as a matter of law she does not require a get, but

she requires a get by rabbinic ordinance, so that people will not say: “A married woman is leaving without a get.”

so that people will not say: “A married woman has left without a bill of divorce.”

And Rav Hisda likewise said: She requires a get by rabbinic ordinance.

Rava said

differently:

The tanna was uncertain.

That is, the tanna was uncertain whether an ordinary person takes issue with a woman who makes vows.

Therefore,

with regard to monetary matters, that is, requiring him to pay the ketuba, he ruled

that is, to obligate him to pay the marriage contract, he ruled

leniently.

We do not extract a ketuba from him in a case of uncertainty, since the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract property from his fellow.

But

with regard to a prohibition,

requiring her to obtain a get, he ruled

stringently.

The Gemara returns to explain the dispute between Rav and Shmuel in additional ways, apart from Abaye’s explanation:

Rabba said: The dispute

between Rav and Shmuel, in a case where he betrothed her on a condition and married her without specifying a condition, applies only

when the mistake involved two women.

For example, he betrothed one woman on a condition, and afterward married another woman without specifying a condition.

Shmuel holds that since he had already revealed his view that he did not desire a woman who makes vows, the betrothal was nullified, and she leaves without a get.

And Rav holds that she requires a get, since perhaps the woman whom he has now married is dear to him, and he does not object if he finds vows upon her.

But when the mistake involves one woman, that is, he betrothed one woman on a condition and married her without specifying a condition,

that is, he betrothed one woman on a condition and married that same woman without stipulation,

everyone agrees that she does not require a get from him,

since he relied upon his original condition.

Abaye said

to him: But what of our Mishna? It involves one woman, and we raise a refutation from it —the members of the bet midrash previously challenged Shmuel’s statement from our Mishna, even though the Mishna deals with a mistaken betrothal involving one woman, demonstrating that in their view Rav and Shmuel also disagree in a case involving one woman ?

[the members of the house of study previously challenged Shmuel’s view from our Mishna, even though the Mishna deals with the mistaken identity of one woman; this proves that, in their view, Rav and Shmuel disagree even in a case involving one woman] ?

Rather, if this was stated, it was stated as follows: If these matters were said, this is how they were said:

[if these matters were said, this is how they were said:]

Rabba said: The dispute

between Rav and Shmuel applies only

in a case involving one woman resembling a case involving two women,

for example, he betrothed a woman on a condition, divorced her before marrying her, and afterward married her again without a condition.

And they disagree in this case: According to Rav, she requires a get from him, since he did not rely upon his original condition and married her without specifying a condition. And according to Shmuel, she does not require a get, because he certainly married her on the basis of his original condition.

But in the case of a simple mistake involving one woman, everyone agrees that she does not require a get from him.

Since the condition was not fulfilled, he certainly married her on the basis of his original condition.

And the Mishna too deals with a case in which he betrothed her on a condition, divorced her, and then married her again without specifying a condition.

Abaye raised an objection to him:

[he challenged him]

Abaye

said: We learned in the Tosefta:

“If he betrothed her mistakenly, or with less than the value of a peruta, and likewise if a minor betrothed a woman, even though he sent betrothal gifts to his bride

[gifts to his bride]

afterward —that is, after he came of age, or after he betrothed her with less than the value of a peruta, or after he betrothed her mistakenly—

[that is, after he came of age, or after he betrothed her with less than the value of a peruta, or after he betrothed her mistakenly],

she is not betrothed.

Because

he sent them on account of the original betrothal.

But the original betrothal did not take effect.

And if he had relations with her, they acquire her.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael:

Even

if he had relations with her, they did not acquire her.”

Their dispute will be explained below.

And Abaye infers:

But here, it is a case involving one woman, and they disagree

—the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon—whether, once he had relations with her, she is betrothed.

Is it not a case of a mistaken betrothal due to vows?! Does the Tosefta not deal with a case in which he stipulated that she have no vows, and she did have vows? This demonstrates that Rabba’s view is incorrect, and that even in the case of a mistaken betrothal involving one woman, there is room to say that if he had relations with her, she is betrothed?

[Is the Tosefta not dealing with a case in which he stipulated that she have no vows, and she did have vows?] This proves that Rava’s statement is not correct, and that even in a case involving the mistaken identity of one woman, it is possible to say that if he had relations with her, she becomes betrothed.

And we answer:

No!

The Tosefta does not deal with a case in which he made a condition, but rather with

a mistake involving less than the value of a peruta.

But if he made a condition, she is never betrothed.

And we raise an objection: How can the words of the Tosefta be explained—“he betrothed her mistakenly”—as referring to a mistake involving

less than the value of a peruta,

when

it explicitly teaches this

later in the beraita:

“He betrothed her mistakenly, or with less than the value of a peruta”?

And we answer:

It explains the phrase: What is meant by “he betrothed her mistakenly”? For example, he betrothed her with less than the value of a peruta.

But the tanna is not dealing with a case in which he betrothed her on a condition.

The Gemara explains:

With regard to what do they disagree?

What is the disagreement between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon?

One master holds the first tanna:

[the first tan­ na]:

A person knows that betrothal does not take effect with less than the value of a peruta, and

therefore, when he had relations with her afterward,

he resolved to have relations with her for the sake of betrothal.

And the other master holds Rabbi Shimon:

[Rabbi Shimon]:

A person does not know that betrothal does not take effect with less than the value of a peruta, and when he has relations with her, he does so on the basis of the original betrothal.

He raised an objection to him Abaye challenged Rabba’s position: We learned: “

[Abaye challenged Rava’s statement]: We learned: "

The one who says to a woman:

‘I am having relations with you on the condition that my father will agree,’ even though the father did not agree, she is betrothed.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If the father agreed, she is betrothed; if the father did not agree, she is not betrothed.”

And Abaye carefully analyzes this:

But here, this is a case in which he explicitly made a condition, and nevertheless Rabbi Shimon holds that the betrothal took effect. The reason is certainly that a person does not make his intercourse an act of licentiousness;

[here he explicitly stipulated a condition, and nevertheless Rabbi Shimon holds that the betrothal took effect; this is certainly because a person does not make his relations relations of promiscuity],

for it resembles a case of a mistaken betrothal involving one woman, and

nevertheless

they disagree

the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon. This demonstrates that Rabba’s statement is incorrect?

And we answer:

There, this is what they disagree about:

One master the first tanna

[the first tan­ na]

holds

that when he said, “Betroth yourself to me

on the condition that my father will agree,”

his intention was

“on the condition that my father remain silent.” And he did remain silent.

Therefore, the betrothal took effect.

And the other master Rabbi Shimon

[Rabbi Shimon]

holds

that his intention was

“on the condition that my father say, ‘Yes,’ and my father did not say, ‘Yes.’”

Therefore, the betrothal did not take effect.

But in general, when he made a condition and then had relations with her, everyone agrees that the betrothal did not take effect, in accordance with Rabba’s statement. Rather, it is a case of one woman resembling a case of two women, as stated above.

He raised an objection to him Abaye challenged Rabba’s statement: We learned in tractate Yevamot: If one divorces his wife, remarries her, and then dies childless, she is permitted to the yavam like any other woman.

[Abaye challenged Rava’s statement]: We learned in tractate Yevamot: If a man divorces his wife, then remarries her, and dies childless, she is permitted to his brother for levirate marriage like any other woman.

But Rabbi Eliezer prohibits her, as a rabbinic decree due to an orphan during her father’s lifetime.

The Gemara explains:

“The Sages agree with Rabbi Eliezer

that she performs chalitza but does not perform yibbum

in the case of a minor whom her father married off, who was divorced, and who was an orphan during her father’s lifetime, and whom he remarried: She performs chalitza but does not perform yibbum, because her divorce was a complete divorce, whereas her remarriage was not a complete remarriage,

since her second marriage took effect only by rabbinic law, and it follows that she still has the status of her brother’s divorced wife.

When does this statement apply? When he divorced her while she was a minor and remarried her while she was a minor.

And he died before she came of age.

But if he divorced her while she was a minor and remarried her when she was an adult,

and the marriage took effect by Torah law,

or if he remarried her while she was a minor, and she came of age while living with him,

and he had relations with her after she came of age, presumably for the sake of betrothal,

and he died, she either performs chalitza or performs yibbum.