Ketubot 73a (עג.) — the Talmud in English

Do not say that Rav’s reasoning is [the meaning is: Do not say that the reason Rav rules]

that she requires a get from him is

because, once he married her without specification,

and did not reiterate his condition, perhaps

he waived his condition [he relinquished the condition].

And he is obligated to give her a ketuba if he wishes to divorce her.

Rather, Rav’s reasoning is that a person does not render his intercourse licentious intercourse.

That is, although he still maintains his condition that she not have vows, nevertheless he does not want his intercourse to be licentious intercourse; therefore, he has intercourse for the purpose of kiddushin.

However, he is not obligated to give her a ketuba, since he still maintains his condition that she not have vows, and it follows that she causes her own divorce. Whenever a woman causes her own divorce, she does not receive a ketuba.

And we raise an objection: If we say that Rav and Shmuel disagree over this principle—whether a person renders his intercourse licentious intercourse or not—

then

they have already

disagreed about it once before.

They already disagreed about this elsewhere; why, then, did they disagree again in our sugya?

And where did they disagree?

As it was stated

[a statement was made in the beit-midrash]:

A minor who was orphaned, whom her mother and brothers married off, and whose kiddushin was rabbinic in force, with the practical consequence

that she could exercise mi'un with regard to her kiddushin and leave without a get. But she

who

could exercise mi'un

did not exercise mi'un, and she came of age.

After she came of age, her first husband had intercourse with her. She exercised mi'un with regard to him, and

proceeded to marry

another man.

Rav said: She does not require a get from the second man.

Since a person knows that a minor’s kiddushin is of no consequence, and does not want to render his intercourse licentious intercourse, when she came of age and her first husband had intercourse with her, he intended that this intercourse effect fully valid kiddushin. Therefore, her subsequent exercise of mi'un with regard to him was ineffective, and she is a married woman; the second man’s kiddushin does not take hold in her.

And Shmuel said: She requires a get from the second man.

Since anyone who has intercourse does so on the basis of the original kiddushin, her first husband did not intend to betroth her through this intercourse. And since her marriage had only rabbinic force, the second man’s kiddushin took hold in her.

However, Shmuel agrees that she is prohibited to the second man by rabbinic law, as explained in tractate Niddah (52a).

If so, it still remains difficult: Why did Rav and Shmuel disagree a second time, also in our sugya?

And we resolve:

It is necessary!

For if it had been stated in that case,

if Rav and Shmuel had disagreed only with regard to a minor who did not exercise mi'un,

I would have said that

it was only in that case that Rav said

that he has intercourse for the purpose of kiddushin,

because there is no condition.

He did not stipulate that there should be no kiddushin, and therefore, certainly, when he again had intercourse with her after she came of age, he intended to have intercourse for the purpose of kiddushin, since everyone knows that a minor’s act has no effect.

But in this case

[where he betroths a woman on condition that she have no vows and marries her without specification],

where there is a condition, I would say that he agrees with Shmuel,

that he does not wish to retract his condition, since he does not desire a woman who has vows, and she is not betrothed.

And if it had been stated in this case,

if Rav and Shmuel had disagreed only in our case, where he explicitly stipulated a condition,

I would have said that it was only

in this case that Shmuel said

that she is not betrothed, since he stipulated the condition explicitly.

But in that case,

namely, a minor who did not exercise mi'un,

I would say that he agrees with Rav,

that a person does not render his intercourse licentious intercourse.

Therefore,

it is necessary.

Rav and Shmuel needed to disagree in both cases.

The Gemara challenged Shmuel’s view:

We learned

in our Mishna:

“If he married her without specification, and vows were found upon her, she leaves without a ketuba.”

The Gemara infers:

It is the ketuba that she does not require; but she does require a get.

Is that not

[the case] where he

betrothed her on condition and married her without specification?!

And it is thereby established that she requires a get, in accordance with Rav’s view.

A refutation of Shmuel!