Ketubot 71a — the Talmud in English

Rather,

a decree on account of the incident of the House of Horon ,

which is brought in tractate Nedarim:

We learned in the Mishna: “One who vows to prohibit his wife from him

Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of an Israelite woman, one month

he may maintain her, but for two months he must divorce her and give her her ketuba; in the case of a priest’s wife, for two months he may maintain her, and for three months he must divorce her and give her her ketuba.”

And so forth:

The Gemara infers: Since Rabbi Yehuda changed from the wording of the first tanna, who said “thirty days,” whereas he said “one month,” it follows that he came to disagree with him even in the case of an Israelite woman.

And we raise an objection: Is it not the case that, with regard to an Israelite woman,

this is identical to the first tanna,

and in what did they disagree?

Abaye said:

Indeed, Rabbi Yehuda did not disagree in the case of an Israelite woman; rather, only concerning

a priest’s wife did he come to teach us

that he waits two months, and incidentally, because of the case of a priest’s wife, he stated “in the case of an Israelite woman, one month.”

Rava said: A full month and a deficient month are the difference between them.

That is to say: According to the first tanna, he waits thirty days, whereas according to Rabbi Yehuda he waits only twenty-nine days, since an unspecified “month” in the language of the Sages is twenty-nine days.

We learned in the Mishna: “Until thirty days, he appoints a provider; beyond this, he must divorce her and give her her ketuba.”

And the matter is to be considered: Do they always give him thirty days through a provider, and even if he vowed indefinitely he is not obligated to divorce her until thirty days have passed,

or perhaps, only if he vowed for thirty days may he provide her sustenance through a provider, but when he vowed indefinitely, he may not?

And the amoraim disagreed concerning this matter:

Rav said: They taught

that he may provide her sustenance through a provider

only when he specifies.

That is, when he explicitly vowed for thirty days.

But when he

vows

without specification, he must divorce her immediately and give her her ketuba.

And the reason is that appointing a provider is not the law ab initio; only after the fact, when he vowed for thirty days, do we not compel him to divorce her because such a short period has passed, since he can at least provide her sustenance through a provider. But if he initially vowed for a long period, there is no reason to wait with him.

And Shmuel said: Even when he

vows

without specification, he need not divorce her

until thirty days have passed,

lest he find an opening for his vow.

And

we raise an objection: Why did Rav and Shmuel repeat their dispute concerning this matter, when

they already disagreed about it once,

elsewhere?

As we learned (

above, 61b):

“One who vows to prohibit his wife from marital relations, the House of Shammai say

he waits

two weeks.

Beyond this, he must divorce her and give her her ketuba.

And the House of Hillel say—

one week

he waits , beyond this, he must divorce her and give her her ketuba.”

And

concerning this

Rav said: The dispute

between the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel is only

when he specifies,

that is, when he explicitly vowed for one or two weeks,

but when he

vows

without specification, he must divorce her immediately and give her her ketuba.

And Shmuel said: Even when it is without specification as well, he need not divorce her, lest he find an opening for his vow.

If so, why did Rav and Shmuel repeat their disagreement and also disagree in our Mishna?

And we answer:

It is necessary!

That is, there is a novel point in each one of the disputes.

For if it had been stated in that one,

if the dispute had been stated only concerning one who vows to prohibit his wife from marital relations,

I might have said that only

in that one Rav said

that one who vows without specification must divorce her immediately,

because it is impossible

to maintain marital relations

through a provider, but in this one [A0080]—in the case of one who prohibits her from sustenance—

[если муж запретил ей получать питание]

where it is possible

to provide sustenance

through a provider, say that he concedes to Shmuel,

and in every case he waits thirty days.

And if it had been stated in this one,

if the dispute had been stated only concerning one who vows to prohibit his wife from sustenance,

I might have said that only

in this one Shmuel said

that in every case he waits thirty days,

because it is possible through a provider, but in that one [A0091]—in the case of one who prohibits marital relations, which cannot be maintained through a provider—

which cannot be maintained through a provider,

say that he concedes to Rav,

and he must divorce her immediately.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to state both disputes.

We learned

in our Mishna:

“One who vows to prohibit his wife from tasting any one of all the fruits must divorce her and give her her ketuba.”

The Gemara assumed that this is referring to a case where the husband said: “The benefit of your marital relations is konam to me forever if you eat any one of all the fruits.”

And one may raise a difficulty: Why must he divorce her immediately? Let her eat that fruit and become forbidden in marital relations, and let him wait one week according to the House of Hillel, or two weeks according to the House of Shammai, and then divorce her?

Granted, according to

the opinion of

Rav,

mentioned above, that wherever he did not specify a period for which he must divorce her immediately, it may be said:

Here [A0109]—in our Mishna—this refers to

the case is

one who

vows

without specification,

and did not specify one or two weeks; therefore, he must divorce her immediately.

And

here [A0116]—the dispute of the House of Shammai and the House of Hillel—

[в споре Бейт-Шаммая и Бейт-Гиллеля] речь идёт

is when he specifies.

As above.

But according to

the opinion of

Shmuel,

who says that in either case he waits one or two weeks,

it is difficult:

why here must he divorce her immediately?

And we answer:

With what are we dealing here? With a case where she vowed

herself

not to eat fruits, and made her vow conditional on marital relations,

and he upheld her vow

of his own.

And Rabbi Meir holds —

he places a finger between her teeth.

That is, the husband, who upheld her vow, is culpable for not annulling it for her; therefore, he must divorce her immediately and give her her ketuba.

And here there is no possibility of waiting one or two weeks, as in the case where the husband vowed, since if the woman vowed, she will not seek an opening for her vow, because the purpose of her vow is that he divorce her. Rashi.

And we raise an objection:

And

does

Rabbi Meir hold

that when she vowed and the husband upheld it, the matter is considered as though

he places a finger between her teeth?!

But

it was

taught in a beraita: A woman who vowed to be a nazirite [A0146]—accepted naziriteship upon herself—

[то есть принявшая на себя назирейство]

and her husband heard and did not annul it,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: She placed a finger between her teeth [A0149]—that is, she caused her own loss.

[то есть сама причинила себе ущерб].

Therefore, if the husband wished to annul it, he may annul it.

And if he said, ‘I do not want a wife who vows,’ she leaves without a ketuba .

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar say: He places a finger between her teeth [A0154]—he caused her loss.

[он причинил ей ущерб].

Therefore, if the husband wished to annul it, he may annul it. And if

he did not wish to annul it, and

said, ‘I do not want a wife who vows,’ he must divorce her and give her her ketuba .

In any event, Rabbi Meir’s position is explained: When she vowed and the husband upheld it, she placed a finger between her teeth. If so, the Mishna cannot be established as referring to a case where she vowed and he upheld it, since in that case he is not obligated to give her a ketuba.

And the Gemara answers:

Reverse it!

Let us reverse the names of the tannaim in the Mishna, and this is how it should be read:

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda say: He places

a finger between her teeth;

Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Elazar say: She placed

a finger between her teeth.

And we raise an objection:

And

does

Rabbi Yosei hold that she placed

a finger between her teeth?!

But we learned

in our Mishna: “One who vows to prohibit his wife from adorning herself must divorce her and give her her ketuba;

Rabbi Yosei says: In the case of poverty, when he did not set a limit.”

But were we not compelled above to establish the Mishna as referring to a case where she vowed and he upheld it? And nevertheless Rabbi Yosei holds that he must divorce her and give her her ketuba. It follows that Rabbi Yosei holds: “He placed a finger between her teeth”?

And we answer:

Say [A0180]—you should read the beraita as follows:

[что в барайте следует читать так]:

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei say: He places

a finger between her teeth.

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Elazar say: She placed

a finger between her teeth.”

And we raise an objection:

And

does

Rabbi Yehuda hold that she placed

a finger between her teeth?!

But

we

learned

in our Mishna: “One who vows to prohibit his wife from tasting any one of all the fruits,

Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of an Israelite woman, she may be maintained for one day.”

But were we not compelled to establish it as referring to a case where she vowed and he upheld it, and nevertheless Rabbi Yehuda holds that he must divorce her and give her her ketuba? It follows that he placed a finger between her teeth. And we answer:

Say [A0197]—the beraita should be read as follows:

[что в барайте следует читать так]:

Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Yosei say: He places

a finger between her teeth;

and Rabbi Elazar says: She placed

a finger between her teeth.

And if you should say

that it is not reasonable to read it this way because

“he teaches them in pairs,”

as the tanna taught the statements of the tannaim in pairs, and it is not reasonable to alter the reading to such an extent that three tannaim say one thing and only one tanna disagrees with them.

Say: “Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar say: She placed

a finger between her teeth; Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei say: He placed.”

And

if you say: If so, Rabbi Meir contradicts himself, for in our Mishna he holds, “He places a finger,” and therefore he must divorce her and give her her ketuba, whereas in the beraita he holds, “She placed a finger”?

It may be said that

this unspecified statement—

is not according to Rabbi Meir.

That is, the first tanna of our Mishna is not Rabbi Meir, but another tanna.

And

we raise an objection: It is explained in our Mishna that

Rabbi Yosei holds \-

“In the case of poverty, when he did not set a limit,”

and if she vowed never to adorn herself, the husband must divorce her and give her her ketuba.

It follows that a husband can annul.

That is, from the fact that he must give her her ketuba, it is proven that he could have annulled her vow; and since he did not annul it, he gives her her ketuba.

And we juxtapose to it,

and we raise the difficulty: Did we not learn:

“These are the matters that the husband may annul: matters that involve affliction of the soul.

And these are they:

‘If I bathe,’ ‘if I do not bathe,’ ‘if I adorn myself,’ ‘if I do not adorn myself.’”

Rabbi Yosei said: These are not vows of affliction of the soul!

And these are vows of affliction of the soul: ‘That I shall not eat meat,’