Ketubot 70b — the Talmud in English

it is considered as though he said to her

when he made her mudar from his property—

“Let your handiwork be in place of your sustenance ,”

since he certainly made her mudar with this intention .

And

the Gemara raises a difficulty:

If it is so [

if we hold]

according to this teaching of Rav Huna citing Rav, for Rav Huna said in the name of Rav—

“A woman can say to her husband, ‘I will not be sustained and I will not produce,’”

and we hold accordingly,

then when she said

“What I produce is konam to you,” why

do we learn above that he

need not annul it?

Let us say,

let us also say—

since she can say, “I will not be sustained and I will not produce,” it is considered as though she said to him, “I will not be sustained and I will not produce,”

as we say with regard to the husband?

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, do not say, “It is considered

as though he said,” since we cannot interpret his speech in this manner, as was demonstrated from “What I produce is konam to you.”

Rather,

it is dealing

with one who says to her, “Let your handiwork be in place of your sustenance.”

Then, since he said it explicitly to her, he is not obligated to provide her with sustenance, and he can make her mudar from it.

But the beraita that said, “What I produce is konam to you; he need not annul,” is dealing with a case where she did not say to her husband, “I will not be sustained and I will not produce.”

And we raise a difficulty:

If so,

that he is not subordinated to her,

why does she need a provider?

After all, he is not obligated to her at all ?

And we answer: It is dealing

with a case where she does not have sufficient means,

where the proceeds of her handiwork are not sufficient for all her sustenance, and therefore he must supplement her sustenance through a provider.

And we raise a difficulty:

If

it is dealing

with a case where she does not have sufficient means, the difficulty returns to its place,

since with regard to what she lacks, the vow does not take effect at all, because he is subordinated to her; so why should he feed her only through a provider?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said,

it is dealing

with

a case where through her handiwork she

has sufficient means for major matters, but does not have sufficient means for minor matters,

and for these matters he must appoint a provider.

And the Gemara explains:

What are these “minor matters” like

[

how is it dealing]?

If she is accustomed to them,

then she is accustomed to them!

And why does the vow take effect at all? After all, he is subordinated to provide them to her.

And if she is not accustomed to them, why does she need a provider?

After all, he is not obligated to her in anything.

Rather,

it is necessary

in a case

where she was accustomed in her father’s house,

that is, with things to which she was accustomed in her father’s house,

and

when they married,

she managed along with him,

that is, she did not demand them from her husband, but became accustomed to living according to her husband’s practice.

But now that he has vowed against her, he must appoint a provider for her even for these matters, because

she said to him—

“Until now,

[

until now]

when you had not made me mudar,

I managed along with you [

and I yielded to you and did not demand it from you, but agreed to conduct myself according to your practice and not according to my practice. But]

now, since you have made me mudar, I cannot manage along with you.”

And

we raise an objection:

What is different until thirty days

that he may establish a provider? And why should he not establish one forever?

And we answer:

Until thirty days, people do not hear of it and

it is not a matter of disgrace for her, [

for the matter does not become public, and therefore he may support her in such a manner, and this form of feeding through a provider does not constitute a slight to her honor.] But

afterward,

more than thirty days,

people hear of it, and it is a matter of disgrace for her,

and therefore he must divorce her.

Alternatively,

it is possible to explain in another manner why the vow takes effect, although the husband is obligated to her:

for this refers to a case in which he

imposed the vow upon her when she was betrothed,

when he was not yet obligated to her, and therefore the vow took effect.

And we raise an objection: If so, why does he establish a provider for her? Does

a betrothed woman have a right to support?!

And the Gemara establishes it: this refers to a case in which

the time

for the marriage had arrived—the Sages established twelve months from the day the husband demanded his betrothed wife, so that she should prepare herself to marry him—

and

still

they had not married.

As we learned: “If the time arrived and they did not marry, they eat from his property, and they eat teruma,”

and therefore the vow takes effect, since it is a prohibition from the Torah, whereas the obligation of support is only rabbinic; and, on the other hand, he is obligated to support her by the enactment of the Sages, and therefore he should establish a provider.

And

we raise an objection:

What is different

that he should establish a provider only

until thirty days,

and not forever? Here, while they had not yet married, the reason mentioned above—“it is a matter of disgrace for her”—does not apply.

And we answer:

Until thirty days, the agent performs his agency. Afterward, the agent does not perform his agency. [

Until thirty days the agent performs his agency, and afterward he does not perform it.]

And alternatively,

if you wish to say, it is possible to establish the Mishna in a case

in which he imposed the vow upon her when she was betrothed,

and at that time he was still not obligated to her,

and

afterward she

married,

and at the time she married the vow had already taken effect, and therefore he can support her only through a provider.

And we raise an objection:

She married?! She reasoned and accepted!

That is to say: Why is he obligated to support her at all? Did she not marry him on the understanding that he was not obligated to provide her support?

And we answer: Even though she married him on that understanding, he is obligated to support her through a provider if she demands support, because

she said: “I thought I was able to accept it, [

that is, to marry him without an obligation of support;]

now

I see that

I am not able to accept it.”

And we find a rationale similar to this in the Mishna below (77a): “And these are the ones whom they compel to divorce: one afflicted with boils and one with a foul odor, and so forth; and concerning all of them Rabbi Meir said: Even though she stipulated with him, she can say, ‘I thought I was able to accept it; now I am not able to accept it.’”

And we raise an objection:

Say that we say this with regard to blemishes,

that is to say: We find this rationale only concerning blemishes, for even if she stipulated with him she can say, “Now I am not able to accept it,” but

with regard to support, do we say this?!

Rather

certainly

it is clear

[it is explained]

as we answered at first.

That is, either when he said to her, “Let your handiwork be for your support,” or when he imposed the vow upon her when the time arrived.

We learned in the Mishna: “One who imposes a vow upon his wife, prohibiting her from benefiting from him,

until thirty days he should establish a provider”:

And, in the plain meaning of the Mishna, its intention is that he should give her support to a provider, and the provider should give it to his wife; or, in any event, he should pay the provider so that he will support her.

And

we raise an objection: How did they permit him to support her through a provider? Does

the provider not perform his agency ?!

And it is therefore as though she directly benefited from his property ?

And we answer:

Rav Huna said: [This is] when he says—

“Whoever supports [her] will not lose,”

and then he is not obligated to pay the one who supports his wife, since he did not explicitly obligate himself to him concerning this; rather, he merely relies upon him not to cause him a loss, and therefore he is permitted to support her in this manner .

And the Gemara still had difficulty:

But when he says this, does he not perform his agency?

Is this not considered the appointment of an agent, so that he becomes obligated to pay the provider for the support, and the woman is found to benefit from his property?

And

indeed,

we learned: One who was cast into a pit and said: “Anyone who hears his voice [

my voice,]

should write a bill of divorce for his wife [

my wife]”—

these,

those who hear his voice,

should write and give

a bill of divorce to his wife, since the formulation “anyone who hears should write” means the appointment of agency.

And here too, when he says, “Whoever supports [her] will not lose,” it means the appointment of agency; why, then, did they permit him to support her in this manner ?

And the Gemara answers:

Is it comparable?! [

What is the comparison?!]

Surely it is necessary to distinguish and say: Specifically

there,

with regard to “Anyone who hears his voice should write,” there is an appointment of agency in this formulation, since

he says, “should write,”

in the language of a command.

But

here, does he say, “should support,”

in the language of a command ?! For he merely

says, “whoever supports,”

and this formulation is not an appointment of agency, and he is not obligated to pay the provider who supports her; therefore they permitted him to support her in this manner.

And we raise an objection:

But Rav Ami said: In a fire [

when a fire breaks out in his property on Shabbat]

they permitted one to say—

“Whoever extinguishes it will not lose,”

even though ordinarily it is forbidden to command a gentile to desecrate Shabbat for him; here they permitted it because a person is frantic over his property, and if he is not permitted to act in this manner, he will come to extinguish the fire himself.

And the Gemara infers: From Rav Ami’s words it follows that only

in the case of a fire

they permitted one to say this formulation, but not in other matters. And

to exclude what

did Rav Ami say this?

Was it not to exclude a case such as this?!

That is, was his intention not to exclude the prohibition of saying “Whoever supports [her] will not lose,” since this is a formulation of the appointment of agency?!

And we answer:

No,

his intention was only

to exclude other prohibitions of Shabbat,

with regard to which they were stringent enough to prohibit even when it was not phrased in the language of agency; but with regard to vows, it is permitted to say, “Whoever supports [her] will not lose.”

Rabba raised an objection [

he objected]

from

the Mishna that we learned in tractate Nedarim:

“One prohibited by a vow from benefiting from his fellow, and he does not have [

his fellow, the person prohibited by the vow, does not have]

what

to

eat,

and the one who imposed the vow wishes to give food to the person prohibited by the vow,

let him go to a shopkeeper who is accustomed to dealing with him and say to him: ‘So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from me, and I do not know what I should do for him!’

And the shopkeeper understands from his words that he wishes to ask him to support the person prohibited by the vow, and the one who imposed the vow will pay him for it .

He [

the shopkeeper]

gives him, and he comes and takes from this one [

from the one who imposed the vow].” This concludes the Mishna.

And Rabba infers: Specifically

in this manner,

that he did not mention at all “he will not lose,” but the shopkeeper relies upon him, because of his closeness to him, not to cause him a loss,

is permitted.

But

to say

“Whoever supports [him] will not lose”—

no.

Since this implies an obligation to pay!

And we answer:

He stated, “It is not necessary,”

That is, the tannaitic teaching did not come to say that they permitted specifically in this manner; rather, it came to teach that even in this manner, where there was room to be stringent, they were lenient.

And the Gemara explains:

It is not necessary

if he said

“Whoever supports [him] will not lose,” for he said it to the public,

and not to a particular person, and therefore certainly they permitted it in this manner;

but this one,

that is, when he says it to the shopkeeper, I might have said:

since he is accustomed to dealing with him, and he goes and says it to him, it is like one who says to him, “Go, give it to him,”

and it is forbidden;

it teaches us

the tannaitic teaching that even in this manner it is permitted.

And since part of the Mishna in Nedarim was brought above, the Gemara brought the

body

of the Mishna:

“One prohibited by a vow from benefiting from his fellow, and he does not have [

his fellow, the person prohibited by the vow, does not have]

what

to

eat,

and the one who imposed the vow wishes to give food to the person prohibited by the vow.

He goes to a shopkeeper who is accustomed to dealing with him and says to him, ‘So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from me, and I do not know what I should do for him,’

and the shopkeeper understands on his own that he must give food to the person prohibited by the vow, and the one who imposed the vow will pay him for it.

And therefore,

he [

the shopkeeper]

gives him, and he comes

to the one who imposed the vow,

and takes from this one.

And likewise, if the one who imposed the vow wished

to build

the house

of the person prohibited by the vow,

o

r

his

fence to fence,

o

r

his

field to harvest,

he goes to workers who are accustomed to dealing with him and says to them—

“So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from me, and I do not know what I should do for him”—

they work with him, and they come and take their wages from this one [

that is, from the one who imposed the vow] .

And likewise, if

the one who imposed the vow and

the person prohibited by the vow

were traveling on the road, and he did not have [

the person prohibited by the vow did not have]

what to eat, he gives

the person prohibited by the vow’s food

to another as a gift, and the latter [

the person prohibited by the vow]

takes

from the other

and eats, and it is permitted.

And if there is no other person there, he places

the food

upon the rock or upon the fence, and says, ‘Behold,

they are ownerless for anyone who wishes [to take them],’ and the latter [

the person prohibited by the vow]

takes and eats, and it is permitted.

And Rabbi Yosei prohibits

from declaring the food ownerless and having another acquire it .” This concludes the Mishna.

Rava said: What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei?

After all, once he declared the food ownerless or gave it to another, the person prohibited by the vow no longer benefits from the property of the one who imposed the vow?