Ketubot 70b (ע:) — the Talmud in English

he is regarded as having said to her

when he prohibits her from his property—

“Let the proceeds of your handiwork serve for your sustenance ,”

since this was certainly the basis of his intention when he prohibited her.

And

the Gemara asks:

If it is so [

if we accept]]

this statement of Rav Huna citing Rav, as Rav Huna citing Rav said—

“A woman can say to her husband, ‘I do not want to be sustained by you, and I will not perform work,’”

and we maintain the halakha in accordance with his ruling,

then when she said

“The work of my hands is forbidden as a konam to you,” why

did we state above that he

need not annul her vow?

Let us say

as well—

since she can say, “I do not want to be sustained by you, and I will not perform work,” she is regarded as one who says to him, “I do not want to be sustained by you, and I will not perform work,”

as we say with regard to the husband?

The Gemara answers:

Rather, do not say, “She is regarded

as one who says this,” since we cannot interpret his words in that manner, as was demonstrated by the case of “The work of my hands is forbidden as a konam to you.”

Rather,

the case is one

where he says to her, “Let the proceeds of your handiwork serve for your sustenance.”

Then, since he said this explicitly, he is not obligated to provide her with sustenance and can prohibit her from it.

But the beraita that states, “The work of my hands is forbidden as a konam to you; he need not annul,” is speaking of a case where she did not say to her husband, “I do not want to be sustained, and I will not perform work.”

And we raise a difficulty:

If so,

that he is not bound to her,

why does she need a provider?

After all, he is not obligated to her at all.

And we answer: The case is

one where she does not have sufficient means,

as the proceeds of her handiwork are insufficient for all her sustenance. Therefore, he must supplement her sustenance through a provider.

And we raise a difficulty:

If

the case is

one where she does not have sufficient means, the original difficulty returns to its place,

since the vow does not take effect at all with regard to what she lacks, because he is bound to provide it to her. Why, then, should he feed her only through a provider?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said:

the case is

one

where, through her handiwork, she

has enough for major needs, but not enough for minor needs,

and it is for those things that he must appoint a provider.

The Gemara explains:

What are these “minor needs”? [

What is the case?]

If she is accustomed to them,

and therefore he is obligated to provide them for her through a provider,

she is accustomed to them!

Why, then, does the vow take effect at all? After all, he is bound to provide them for her.

And if she is not accustomed to them, why does she need a provider?

After all, he is not obligated to provide her with anything.

Rather,

it is necessary

to establish the case

where she was accustomed to them in her father’s home,

that is, with things to which she had been accustomed in her father’s home,

and

when they married,

she adapted herself to him,

meaning that she did not demand them from her husband, but became accustomed to living according to her husband’s practice rather than her own.

But now that he has vowed to prohibit her from them, he must appoint a provider even for these things, because

she said to him—

“Until now, [

until this point,]

when you had not prohibited me,

when you had not prohibited me from benefiting from your property,

I adapted myself to you [

and waived my demands of you; I agreed to conduct myself according to your practice and not according to mine. But]

now that you have prohibited me, I cannot adapt myself to you.”

And

we ask:

What is different about thirty days

during which he may establish a provider for her? Why should he not establish a provider indefinitely?

And we answer:

For thirty days, people do not hear about it, and

it is not degrading for her,

as the matter does not become public. Therefore, he may support her in this manner, and having her fed by means of a provider does not constitute an affront to her honor. But

afterward,

more than thirty days,

people hear about it, and it is degrading for her,

and therefore he must divorce her.

Alternatively,

there is another way to explain why the vow takes effect, even though the husband is obligated to provide for her:

It is referring to a case in which he

vowed to prohibit her when she was betrothed,

when he was not yet obligated to provide for her, and therefore the vow took effect.

And we ask: If so, why does he establish a provider for her? Is

a betrothed woman entitled to support?!

The Gemara establishes it as a case in which

the time

for the marriage had arrived—that is, the Sages established twelve months from the day the husband demanded that his betrothed prepare herself to marry him—

and

they

had still not married.

As we learned in a Mishna: “If the time arrived and they did not marry, they eat from his property and eat teruma,”

and therefore the vow takes effect, since it is a prohibition by Torah law, whereas the obligation to provide sustenance is only rabbinic. On the other hand, he is obligated to support her by virtue of the Sages’ enactment, and therefore he establishes a provider for her.

And

we ask:

What is different

that he should establish a provider only

for thirty days,

and not indefinitely? Here, since they have still not married, the reason mentioned above—“it is degrading for her”—does not apply.

And we answer:

For thirty days, the agent carries out his agency. Afterward, he does not carry out his agency.

For thirty days the agent performs his agency, but after that he does not perform it.

Alternatively,

if you wish to say so, the Mishna can be established as referring to a case in which

he vowed to prohibit her when she was betrothed,

and at that time he was still not obligated to provide for her;

and

afterward she

married him,

and when she married him the vow had already taken effect. Therefore, he can support her only through a provider.

We ask:

She married him?! She reasoned and accepted!

That is, why is he obligated to support her at all? Did she not marry him on the understanding that he was not obligated to provide her sustenance?

And we answer: Even though she married him on that understanding, he is obligated to support her through a provider if she demands sustenance, because

she can say: “I thought I could accept it,

that is, I thought I could marry him without an obligation of sustenance;

now

I see that

I cannot accept it.”

We find a similar rationale in a later Mishna (77a): “And these are those whom they compel to divorce: one afflicted with boils, and one who has a foul odor, and so on. And concerning all of them Rabbi Meir said: Even if she stipulated with him, she may say: ‘I thought I could accept it; now I cannot accept it.’”

We ask:

Say that we say this with regard to defects,

that is, we find this rationale only concerning defects: Even if she stipulated with him, she may say, “Now I cannot accept it.” But

with regard to sustenance, do we say this as well?!

Rather,

certainly

it is clear

as

we originally answered.

That is, either the case is one in which he said to her, “Let your earnings provide for your sustenance,” or it is a case in which he vowed to prohibit her once the time had arrived.

We learned in the Mishna: “One who vows to prohibit his wife from benefiting from him,

for thirty days he must establish a provider for her”:

The plain meaning of the Mishna is that he gives her sustenance to the provider, and the provider gives it to his wife—or, at the very least, he pays the provider in order that he support her.

And

we ask: How did they permit him to support her through a provider? Does

the provider not perform his agency?!

It is therefore as though she directly benefited from his property.

And we answer:

Rav Huna said: It is when he says—

“Whoever supports her will not lose,”

and then he is not obligated to pay the person who supports his wife, since he did not explicitly obligate himself to do so; rather, he merely relies on him not to cause him a loss. Therefore, he may support her in this manner.

The Gemara still found this difficult:

When he says this, does the provider not perform his agency?

Is this not considered the appointment of an agent, obligating him to pay the provider for the sustenance, with the result that the woman benefits from his property?

And

indeed

we learned: If one was cast into a pit and said: “Anyone who hears his

my

voice should write a bill of divorce for his wife

my wife”—

these people,

those who hear his voice,

should write and deliver

a bill of divorce to his wife, since the expression “Anyone who hears should write” signifies the appointment of an agent.

Here too, when he says, “Whoever supports her will not lose,” the meaning is the appointment of an agent. Why, then, was he permitted to support her in this manner?

The Gemara answers:

Is that comparable?!

How can these cases be compared?!

Certainly, one must distinguish between them and say: Only

there,

with regard to “Anyone who hears his voice should write,” does this expression constitute the appointment of an agent, since

he says, “should write,”

in the language of a command.

But

here, does he say, “should support her”

in the language of a command?! He merely says

“whoever supports her,”

and this expression does not constitute the appointment of an agent, nor is he obligated to pay the provider who supports her. Therefore, he was permitted to support her in this manner.

We ask:

But Rav Ami said: In the case of a fire

that broke out in a person’s property on Shabbat,

they permitted one to say—

“Whoever extinguishes it will not lose,”

even though in general it is prohibited to command a gentile to desecrate Shabbat on his behalf. Here they permitted it because a person is distraught over his property, and if he were not permitted to act in this manner, he would come to extinguish the fire himself.

The Gemara infers: Rav Ami’s statement implies that it was permitted to use this expression only

in the case of a fire,

and not in other matters. For what purpose, then, did Rav Ami say this limitation?

To exclude what?

Rav Ami said:

Was it not to exclude a case like this?! That is, was his intention not to exclude the statement, “Whoever supports her will not lose,” since this is considered the language of the appointment of an agent?

And we answer:

And we answer:

No,

his intention was only

to exclude other prohibitions of Shabbat,

with regard to which they were stringent and prohibited making such a statement even when it was not phrased as an agency. But with regard to vows, it is permitted to say, “Whoever supports her will not lose.”

Rav objected

that is, he raised a difficulty

Rabba,

from a Mishna that we learned in tractate Nedarim:

“If one is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from another, and he has no

for his fellow, the person prohibited by the vow

food

that he may

eat,

and the one who imposed the prohibition wishes to give food to the person prohibited by the vow,

he should go to a shopkeeper who regularly deals with him and say to him: ‘So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from me, and I do not know what I should do for him!’

The shopkeeper understands from his words that he wishes to ask him to support the person prohibited by the vow, and the one who imposed the prohibition will pay him for it.

He

the shopkeeper

gives it to him, and then comes and takes payment from this one

from the one who imposed the prohibition.” This concludes the Mishna.

Rabba infers: Only

in this manner,

where he did not mention at all, “He will not lose,” but the shopkeeper relies on him, because of their acquaintance, not to cause him a loss,

is it permitted.

But

to say

“Whoever supports her will not lose”—

no.

Since this implies an undertaking to pay!

And we answer:

He stated the matter in the form of “It is not necessary to say”!

The tanna did not mean to say that it is permitted only in this manner. Rather, he intended to teach that even in this manner, where there was reason to be stringent, they were lenient.

The Gemara explains:

It is not necessary to say

that if he said

“Whoever supports her will not lose,” he was speaking to the public,

and not to a particular person, and therefore it is certainly permitted in this manner.

But in this case,

that is, when he says it to the shopkeeper, one might have thought:

Since he regularly deals with him, and he goes and says this to him, it is like saying to him, “Go and give it to him,”

and it should be prohibited.

It teaches us

that the tanna teaches that even in this case it is permitted.

And since part of the Mishna in Nedarim was cited above, the Gemara cites

the body

of that Mishna:

“If one is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from another, and he has no

for his fellow, the person prohibited by the vow

food

that he may

eat,

and the one who imposed the prohibition wishes to give food to the person prohibited by the vow,

he should go to a shopkeeper who regularly deals with him and say to him: ‘So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from me, and I do not know what I should do for him,’

and the shopkeeper understands on his own that he should give food to the person prohibited by the vow, and the one who imposed the prohibition will pay him for it.

Therefore,

he

the shopkeeper

gives it to him, and comes

to the one who imposed the prohibition,

and takes payment from him.

And similarly, if the one who imposed the prohibition wished

to build

the house

of the person prohibited by the vow,

or

to

build

his fence,

or

to

harvest

his field,

he should go to laborers who regularly deal with him and say to them—

“So-and-so is prohibited by a vow from benefiting from me, and I do not know what I should do for him”—

they perform the work for him, and come and take their wages from this one

that is, from the one who imposed the prohibition.

And similarly, if

the one who imposed the prohibition

and the person prohibited by the vow

were traveling on the road, and the latter had no

with him, that is, the person prohibited by the vow had no

food, the former gives

him sustenance

to another as a gift, and the latter

the person prohibited by the vow

takes

it from the other

and eats it, and it is permitted.

And if there is no other person, he places

the sustenance

upon a rock or upon a fence, and says, ‘They are

declared ownerless for anyone who wishes to take them,’ and the latter

the person prohibited by the vow

takes them and eats them, and it is permitted.

But Rabbi Yose prohibits

declaring the food ownerless so that another person may acquire it.” This concludes the Mishna.

Rava said: What is the reason for Rabbi Yose’s opinion?

Once he declared the food ownerless or gave it to another person, the person prohibited by the vow is no longer benefiting from the property of the one who imposed the prohibition, so why should it be prohibited?