Ketubot 70a (ע.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Meir

in our Mishna,

it is Rabbi Meir! For he says: “It is a mitzva to fulfill the words of the deceased.”

Therefore, we must always consider what the deceased’s wishes were.

Rav Ḥisda said that Mar Ukva said: The halakha is that whether he said, “Give them

a shekel

,” or whether he said, “Do not give them

more than a shekel

they give them all that they require.

And we raise an objection: Why, when he said, “Do not give them more than a shekel,” do they give them all that they require

? Is it not established for us that the halakha follows Rabbi Meir, who says: “It is a mitzva to fulfill the words of the deceased,”

whereas the deceased instructed that they be given only one shekel per week and no more

And we answer:

That applies

when we must insist on fulfilling his instructions concerning

other matters [ושאר הענינים בעלמא]in general matters.

[in general matters].

But in this case,

concerning the sustenance of his sons,

it is agreeable to him

that their deceased father’s sons be given all that they require.

And the fact that he said this ["

“Do not give them more than a shekel”],

was intended to spur them on.

So that they would not become lax in seeking their sustenance.

We learned there: With regard to minors, their purchases are valid purchases and their sales are valid sales with regard to movable property.

But not with regard to land, until they grow two pubic hairs. And if he seeks to sell his father’s property that fell to him as an inheritance, he may not sell it until he reaches the age of twenty.

Rafram said: They taught this

that minors can sell their movable property themselves

only when there is no guardian

responsible for providing for their sustenance.

But

if

there is a guardian, their purchases are not valid purchases and their sales are not valid sales.

From where [מנין למד רפרם את דבריו]did Rafram derive his statement?

did Rafram derive his statement?

From the fact that it teaches

in our Mishna:

“The action of a minor girl is of no effect.”

And it must necessarily be because there is a guardian.

And

we raise an objection:

Perhaps where there is a trustee it is different!

Since the father explicitly specified what the trustee should do with the property, we may not alter that. But in the case of a guardian, whom the father did not explicitly instruct concerning what to do with the property, perhaps the minors may sell it, since the guardian too will ultimately sell it for the sake of their sustenance, and this would not constitute altering the deceased’s instructions

And we answer:

If so,

if the reason in the Mishna is that the trustee was instructed what to do with the property,

let it teach: “But in the case of a minor girl,

the trustee should do with the property whatever he was entrusted with.”

the trustee should do with the property what was entrusted to him.”

Why,

why did the Mishna use the wording

“The action of a minor girl is of no effect”?!

Learn from this

that

even in general,

wherever there is a guardian, the actions of minors are of no effect!

We will return to you, chapter “The Finds of a Woman.”

Introduction to the Chapter on One Who Forbids His Wife by Vow

Earlier, throughout the tractate, the husband's obligations toward his wife were explained, including his obligation to fulfill the mitzva of onah, his obligation to provide his wife with food and clothing, and additional obligations.

It was also explained that when a husband rebels by failing to fulfill his obligations toward his wife, the Sages penalize him by requiring him to add three dinars to her ketubah every week, for up to six months. If he persists in his rebellion, he must divorce her and give her the sum of her ketubah.

However, it is specifically with regard to a rebel who evades fulfilling his obligation toward his wife that the Sages concern themselves with him, in the hope that he will retract his rebellion and continue to maintain her as his wife. But if he does not evade his obligation, rather explicitly declares, “I will not have relations with her,” or “I will not provide her with food,” he is obligated to divorce her immediately and give her the sum of her ketubah.

And if he prohibited himself by vow from benefiting from marital relations, then, since he is not now rebelling of his own volition, but is forbidden to have relations with her because of his vow, the Sages set him a period of time: one week according to Beit Shammai, or two weeks according to Beit Hillel. Beyond that, he must divorce her and give her the sum of her ketubah.

The reason for this period is that even with regard to an ordinary woman, it is possible that she will not have relations with him for a week, for example, when she is a menstruant, or for two weeks, in the case of a woman who has given birth. Thus, there is no complete annulment here of the marital obligations that the husband owes her. But where there is a complete annulment of the marital obligations, he must divorce her immediately.

Likewise, this applies not only when he withholds from her something that he is obligated to provide her, but also when he does not allow her to live properly—for example, when he withholds jewelry from her. In that case, he is obligated to divorce her immediately.

And even in this case of withholding, if he does not withhold it from her of his own volition, but rather “a prohibition has been imposed upon him,” such as when he made a vow in a manner that prevents her from having jewelry, the Sages set him a period of time, so that there will not be a complete annulment.

This is the subject of our chapter: When, by means of a vow, he withholds from his wife the things he is obligated to provide her, or prevents her from living properly, what period of time did the Sages set during which he may keep her as his wife?

Mishna:

If one prohibits his wife by vow from benefiting from him,

meaning that he forbade her by a vow to benefit from his property, and he is unable to provide her with food—how will he fulfill the obligation of providing her with sustenance that rests upon him?

Until thirty days,

he must appoint a provider.

That is, an agent who will provide her with food.

The Gemara will explain how they permitted him to provide her with food through an agent. After all, the agent acts through his power, and she is benefiting from him.

Beyond that, he must divorce her,

and give her the sum of her ketubah.

The reason will be explained in the Gemara.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of an Israelite,

since if he divorces her he can marry her again,

one month—

he may maintain her. And two—

he must divorce her and give her the sum of her ketubah.

This is in accordance with the view of the first tanna. The Gemara will explain in what they differ.

But

in the case of a koэн

who cannot remarry his divorced wife, the Sages gave him a longer period, so that in the meantime he might regret his vow and annul it,

and therefore,

two—

he may maintain her, and

only after

three

months—

he must divorce her and give her the sum of her ketubah.

If one prohibits his wife by vow from tasting any one of all the types of fruit [

and he can prohibit her from all the fruit in the world, even though a person cannot prohibit another with regard to something that does not belong to him, as, for example, when she vowed not to eat any one of all the fruits, and he ratified her vow ].

And therefore, according to the first tanna

—he must divorce her and give her the sum of her ketubah

immediately. We do not wait thirty days in this case, since if she wants him to divorce her, she will not seek an opening for her vow. It is only where the husband made the vow that we wait until he finds an opening for his vow.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of an Israelite,

who can remarry her if she becomes divorced—

one day —

he may maintain her; two—

he must divorce her and give her the sum of her ketubah.

And in the case of a koэн,

who cannot remarry his divorced wife—

two, he may maintain her; three, he must divorce her and give her the sum of her ketubah.

And likewise,

if one prohibits his wife by vow from adorning herself with any one of all the types of adornment,

for example, when she made the vow and he ratified her vow—

he must divorce her

immediately,

and give her the sum of her ketubah.

Rabbi Yose says: With regard to

poor

women,

he must divorce her and give her the sum of her ketubah only

when he did not set a period.

That is, when she vowed never to adorn herself, and he ratified her vow.

And

with regard to

wealthy women,

who customarily adorn themselves from time to time, it is sufficient that she vowed for

thirty days,

and he ratified her vow, for him to be obligated to divorce her.

Gemara:

The Mishna states that if he prohibited her from his property, the vow takes effect and he cannot provide her with food.

And we raise a difficulty:

And since he is bound to her

with regard to sustenance,

how can he prohibit her by vow ?

Can it be that

it is entirely within his power [

how can he have the power]]

to annul her lien ?

And

indeed,

we learned:

A woman who said to her husband—

“The work of my hands is forbidden as a konam to you,”

meaning that she forbade the proceeds of her handiwork to her husband—

he need not annul

her vow, since the vow does not take effect with regard to something to which she is bound.

The Gemara infers:

Apparently, since she is bound to him

with regard to the proceeds of her handiwork,

it is not entirely within her power to annul his

lien.

And

here too,

when he prohibited her from his property,

since he is bound to her

to provide her with food,

it is not entirely within his power to annul her lien.

If so, why does the vow take effect, and why is he obligated to provide her with food only through a provider?

The Gemara answers:

Rather, since he can say to her, “Let the proceeds of your handiwork serve for your sustenance,”

that is, take the proceeds of your handiwork that belong to me in place of your sustenance—