Ketubot 70a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Meir

in our Mishna,

it is he! For he says: “It is a mitzva to fulfill the words of the deceased.”

and therefore we must always consider what the deceased’s wish was.

Rav Hisda said in the name of Mar Ukva: The halakha is, whether he said, “Give

a shekel

,” and whether he said, “Do not give

but a shekel,”

they give them all that they require.

And we raise an objection: Why, when he said, “Do not give them more than a shekel,” do they give them all that they require?

Is it not established for us that the halakha follows Rabbi Meir, who says, “It is a mitzva to fulfill the words of the deceased,”

and yet the deceased commanded that they be given only a shekel per week and no more

And we answer:

These words

that we must be particular about fulfilling his words, in his command concerning

mili aharanita [

in other matters in general].

But in this matter,

concerning the sustenance of his sons,

minah nahih lei

their deceased father is content that they be given all that they require.

And the fact that he said this [“

Do not give them more than a shekel”],

was only intended to spur them on.

So that they would not become lazy in seeking their sustenance.

We learned there: With regard to minors, their purchase is a valid purchase and their sale is a valid sale with regard to movable property.

But with regard to land, it is not so, until he produces two pubic hairs. And if he comes to sell his father’s property that fell to him as an inheritance, he cannot sell it until he is twenty years old.

Rafram said: They taught this

that minors can sell their movable property themselves

only when there is no guardian

who is responsible for their livelihood.

But

if

there is a guardian, their purchase is not a valid purchase and their sale is not a valid sale.

From where [

from where did Rafram derive his words]?

From the fact that it teaches

in our Mishna:

“The act of a minor girl is nothing.”

And necessarily, this is because there is a guardian.

And

And we raise an objection:

Perhaps where there is a trustee it is different!

Since the father explicitly specified what the trustee should do with the property, we have no right to alter this. But with a guardian, whom the father did not explicitly command what to do with the property, perhaps the minors may sell, for the guardian too will ultimately sell for the sake of their sustenance, and this is not a changing of the command of the deceased

And we answer:

If so,

that the reason in the Mishna is that the trustee was commanded what to do with the property,

let it teach: “But with a minor girl —

the trustee should do with the property whatever he was entrusted with.”

the trustee shall do what was entrusted to him.”

Why,

why did the Mishna use the wording

“The act of a minor girl is nothing”?!

Infer from this

that

even in general,

wherever there is a guardian, the act of minors is nothing!

We shall return to you, chapter “The Finding of a Woman.”

Introduction to the chapter of one who makes his wife mudar from him

Above, in the course of the tractate, the husband’s obligations toward his wife were explained, among them his obligation to fulfill the mitzva of ona, his obligation to provide his wife with food and to clothe her, and additional obligations.

Likewise, it was explained that the husband who rebels by failing to fulfill his obligations toward his wife is penalized by the Sages, who add three dinars to her ketuba each week, for up to six months. And if he persists in his rebellion, he must divorce her and give her the ketuba.

However, specifically with regard to one who rebels, evading the fulfillment of his obligation toward his wife, the Sages dealt with him, perhaps he would return from his rebellion and keep her as his wife. But if he is not evading his obligation, but rather explicitly announces, “I will not have intercourse with her,” or “I will not provide her with food,” he must divorce her immediately and give her the ketuba.

And if he made himself mudar by a vow from the benefit of marital intercourse, then since he is not now rebelling of his own will, but is forbidden to have intercourse with her because of his vow, the Sages gave him a fixed period: one week according to Beit Shammai, or two weeks according to Beit Hillel. More than this, he must divorce her and give her the ketuba.

And the reason for the measure of this period is that, even with an ordinary woman, it is possible that she will not have intercourse with him for one week, such as when she is a menstruant, or for two weeks, in the case of a woman who has given birth; therefore, there is no complete nullification here of the marital obligations that the husband is obligated toward her. But where there is a complete nullification of the marital obligations, he must divorce her immediately.

And likewise, it is not specifically when he withholds from her something to which he is obligated, but if he does not allow her to live properly, such as when he withholds jewelry from her, he must divorce her immediately.

And also with this withholding, if he does not withhold it from her of his own will, but rather “a prohibition rests upon him,” such as when he made a vow in a manner that does not allow her jewelry, the Sages gave him a fixed period, in such a way that there would not be a complete nullification.

And this is the subject with which we are occupied in this chapter: when he withholds from his wife his obligations toward her, or prevents her from living properly, by means of a vow, what is the fixed period that the Sages set for him during which he may keep her as his wife?

Mishna:

One who makes his wife mudar from benefiting from him,

that is, he prohibited her by a vow from benefiting from his property, and he cannot provide her with food—how will he fulfill the obligation of sustenance imposed upon him?

Until thirty days,

he must appoint a provider.

That is, an agent who will provide her with food.

And in the Gemara it will be explained how they allowed him to provide her with food through an agent; does the agent not come through his power, and is she not thereby benefiting from him?

More than this, he must divorce her,

and give her the ketuba.

And the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of an Israelite,

for if he divorces her, he can return and marry her,

one month—

he may keep her. And two—

he must divorce her and give her the ketuba.

And this is like the view of the first tanna. And in the Gemara it will be explained in what they disagree.

But

in the case of a kohen,

who cannot take back his divorced wife, the Sages gave him an extended period, so that in the meantime he might regret and annul his vow,

and therefore

two—

he may keep her, and

only after

three

months—

he must divorce her and give her the ketuba.

One who makes his wife mudar, so that she may not taste any one of all the fruits [

and he can prohibit all fruits in the world to her, despite the fact that a person cannot prohibit another person with regard to something that is not his—for example, when she vowed not to eat any one of all the fruits, and he upheld her vow ].

And therefore, according to the view of the first tanna—

he must divorce her and give her the ketuba ,

immediately. And we do not have to wait here thirty days, since if she wants him to divorce her, she will not seek an opening for her vow. Only where the husband made the vow do we have to wait until he finds an opening for his vow .

Rabbi Yehuda says: In the case of an Israelite,

who can take her back if she becomes divorced—

one day —

he may keep her; two—

he must divorce her and give her the ketuba.

And in the case of a kohen,

who cannot take back his divorced wife—

two, he may keep her; three, he must divorce her and give her the ketuba.

And likewise,

one who makes his wife mudar so that she may not adorn herself with any one of all the types of adornment,

for example, she vowed and he upheld her vow—

he must divorce her

immediately,

and give her the ketuba.

Rabbi Yose says: With

women

who are poor,

he must divorce her and give her the ketuba only in a case

where no period was set.

That is, she vowed not to adorn herself forever, and he upheld her vow.

And

with women

who are wealthy,

whose practice is to adorn themselves at occasional times, it is sufficient that she vowed for

thirty days,

and he upheld her vow, in order to obligate him to divorce her.

Gemara:

It is explained in the Mishna that if he made her mudar from his property, the vow takes effect, and he cannot provide her with food.

And we raise an objection:

And since he is subordinated to her

for sustenance,

how can he make her mudar ?

And is

it entirely within his power [

how is it within his power]

to nullify her subordination ?

And

indeed

we learned:

The woman who said to her husband—

“What I produce is konam to you,”

that is, she prohibited the proceeds of her handiwork to her husband,

he need not annul

her vow, since the vow does not take effect with regard to something to which she is subordinated.

And the Gemara infers:

Apparently, since she is subordinated to him

with regard to the proceeds of her handiwork,

it is not entirely within her power to displace

his subordination.

And

here too,

when he made her mudar from his property,

since he is subordinated to her

to provide her with food,

it is not entirely within his power to displace her subordination.

And if so, why does the vow take effect, and is he obligated to provide her with food only through a provider?

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, since he can say to her, “Let your handiwork be in place of your sustenance,”

that is, take the proceeds of your handiwork, which belong to me, in place of your sustenance—