Ketubot 59a (נט.) — the Talmud in English

The Sages instituted

the Sages

sustenance in exchange for

the principal

of her earnings.

And the ma'ah of silver

is what the Sages instituted for her

in exchange for the surplus

of her earnings—

And

if we explain the matter in accordance with Rav Adda bar Ahava, that our Mishna is discussing a case in which he gives her sustenance but does not give her a ma'ah of silver, then

since he does not give her [

who does not give her ]

a ma'ah of silver,

then the

surplus—

belongs to her [

it is hers ]! For the surplus is what the Sages instituted in exchange for the ma'ah of silver, and since here the surplus belongs to her, he cannot consecrate it.

But

Rav Adda bar Ahava holds,

that

they instituted sustenance in exchange for the surplus, and a ma'ah of silver in exchange for her earnings—

And since he gives her sustenance [

that he gives her sustenance ], then the

surplus—

belongs to him [

it belongs to the husband ], and therefore he can consecrate it.

The Gemara analyzes:

With regard to what do they disagree?

What is the basis of their disagreement?

One Master,

Rav and Shmuel,

holds:

a

common [

a common matter ], namely, sustenance,

in exchange for a common matter,

they instituted it in exchange for something common, namely, her earnings. But they did not institute sustenance in exchange for the surplus, because the surplus is not common.

And the other Master,

Rav Adda bar Ahava,

holds: A quantified matter [

a matter with a fixed measure ], namely, a ma'ah of silver,

in exchange for a quantified matter,

in exchange for something with a fixed measure—namely, the principal of her earnings, for the amount she is obligated to produce for him is fixed. And they did not institute a ma'ah of silver in exchange for the surplus, whose amount is not fixed. Instead, in exchange for the surplus, whose amount is not fixed, the Sages instituted sustenance, which likewise is not a matter with a fixed measure.

Meytivi

against Rav Adda bar Ahava from the following beraita:

They instituted sustenance in exchange for her earnings.

This is a difficulty against Rav Adda bar Ahava, who holds that sustenance is in exchange for the surplus!?

And we answer:

Say

that this is what you should teach in the beraita: They instituted sustenance

in exchange for the surplus of her earnings.

Ta shma,

in accordance with the words of Rav Adda bar Ahava and not with Rav and Shmuel:

From what we learned [below, 64b]: “And

if he does not give her a ma'ah of silver for her needs—

her earnings belong to her.”

It is evident that the ma'ah of silver is in exchange for her earnings. This is a difficulty against Rav and Shmuel!?

And we answer:

Say

that the Mishna should be stated as follows: If he does not give him a ma'ah of silver for her needs—

the surplus of her earnings belongs to her.

The Gemara challenges this answer:

But concerning it,

concerning these words of the Mishna,

it teaches,

the tanna teaches later in the Mishna [on 64b]:

What does she produce for him [

in the work of spinning ]?

The weight of five sela [

of woolen threads ]

of warp in Judea,

which are [a weight of] ten sela in the Galilee.”

It is evident from the Mishna that the discussion concerns her earnings, and not the surplus!?

And we answer:

This is what

the tanna in that Mishna

is saying:

Her earnings—

how much are they, so that

we will know her surplus—how much? [

What is the amount of her earnings, so that we will know what the surplus over her earnings is ]?—

the weight of five sela

of threads

of warp [

whose spinning is more difficult than the spinning of weft threads ],

in Judea.

Which are

a weight of

ten sela in the Galilee [

since the weight of a sela in Judea is double its weight in the Galilee ].

What the woman produces beyond this amount is the “surplus,” and it is this that the Mishna is discussing.

Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan the Sandal-maker

in our Mishna, that the surplus does not become consecrated, because a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into the world!

The Gemara asks:

And did Shmuel say this,

that a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into the world!?

But didn’t we learn

in tractate Nedarim [85a]:

A woman who says to her husband:

Konam

what

I produce for you [

the earnings that I will produce shall be forbidden to you like a sacrifice ]—

He does not need

her husband

to annul

her vow!

The husband, who can annul his wife’s vows, need not annul this vow, since the vow does not take effect at all: her earnings belong to him, and she cannot prohibit to him something that belongs to him and not to her.

Rabbi Akiva says:

He should annul it.

Although the vow does not take effect with regard to the principal of her earnings, nevertheless, we must be concerned

perhaps

she will exert herself and

produce a surplus for him,

exerting herself and working

more than is proper for him [

more than the measure that the Sages established for a woman to produce for her husband ]. Rabbi Akiva holds that this “surplus produced through exertion” does not belong to the husband but to the woman, and her vow can therefore take effect with regard to that surplus; consequently, he should annul her vow that prohibits her surplus to him.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said:

Even her vow prohibiting to her husband the principal of her earnings—

he should annul it

the husband.

Although throughout the time that she is married to him the vow does not take effect at all, nevertheless, we must be concerned

perhaps he will divorce her

in the future, at which point the vow will take effect, since she will no longer be obligated to him with regard to her earnings,

and she will be forbidden to return

to him, because she prohibited herself to him from benefiting from her, and it is impossible for the husband to take care that she not grind for him, bake for him, or perform any of the other tasks that a woman performs for her husband. Although he has not yet divorced her, and the vow cannot take effect today but only after he divorces her—and this is considered something that has not yet come into the world—Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri holds that a person can prohibit by konam something that has not yet come into the world.

And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri!

It follows that, according to Shmuel, a person can prohibit by konam, which is similar to consecrated property, something that has not yet come into the world. For Shmuel ruled that the vow will take effect in the future, when he divorces her.

And this contradicts Shmuel’s statement here, that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan the Sandal-maker, who holds that a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into the world!?

And we answer:

When Shmuel said, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri”—

only

with

regard

to the surplus!

Shmuel’s intention in saying that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri is only that he should annul the vow, but not for Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri’s reason.

For according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, the vow by which she prohibited the principal of her earnings requires annulment. But Shmuel holds that the vow concerning the principal of her earnings does not require annulment, because a person cannot prohibit something that has not yet come into the world. Rather, he should annul it because perhaps she will produce for him a surplus beyond what is proper for him. The Gemara challenges this answer:

And

so, then,

let Shmuel say

Shmuel:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri—

with regard to the surplus.

Alternatively,

he should say:

The halakha is not in accordance with the first tanna,

who holds that he need not annul it; rather, he should annul it.

Alternatively,

he should say:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva!?

Rather, Rav Yosef said:

This is how the contradiction in Shmuel’s words should be resolved: On the one hand, concerning our Mishna, he said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan the Sandal-maker, who holds that consecration does not take effect upon something that has not yet come into the world; while, on the other hand, Shmuel said that konam takes effect even upon something that has not yet come into the world:

You are speaking of konamot!

Are you coming to raise a difficulty concerning the law of consecrated property from the law of konamot!?

They cannot be compared, for

different

is the law of

konamot

from the law of consecrated property!

For

since

we find with regard to konamot

that a person

prohibits

even

another person’s produce to himself [

to himself ], although this produce belongs not to him but to another person—

so too

a person “consecrates”,

that is, prohibits by konam, which is like consecrated property [but konam itself is not consecrated property], even

something that has not yet come into the world.

For when a person vows not to benefit from another’s produce, that other person’s produce is considered, with regard to him, something that has not yet come into the world. The one who takes the vow has no rights whatsoever in another’s produce, just as he has no rights whatsoever in something that has not yet come into the world.

And if we find that a person can prohibit even another’s produce to himself by konam, despite having no rights in it whatsoever, then a person likewise has the power to prohibit to himself by konam even something that has not yet come into the world, despite having no rights in it.

But one who consecrates something for the maintenance of the Temple can consecrate only his own produce; he cannot consecrate another person’s produce, since he has no rights in it. Therefore, a person likewise cannot consecrate something for the maintenance of the Temple that has not yet come into the world, since he has no rights in it.

He said,

in challenge,

Abaye

to Rav Yosef:

You are indeed correct that when a person prohibits another’s produce to himself by konam, that produce is considered, with regard to the one taking the vow, something that has not yet come into the world, because it is not in his possession, just as something that has not yet come into the world is not in his possession.

However, from the very place from which you seek to derive this, you can derive the opposite!

For we find with regard to konamot that a person can prohibit something by konam only when at least one of two things is “in his possession”—

a. The produce is in his possession. In that case, he can prohibit it even to another person, although that other person is “not in his possession.”

b. The person taking the vow himself is “in his possession.”

Therefore, a person can prohibit another’s produce to himself by konam, because although the other person’s produce is not in his possession, he himself is “in his possession.”

If so,

it is understandable that

this—that

a person prohibits another’s produce to himself,

to himself, although another’s produce is not in the possession of the one taking the vow—is understandable.

For

we find that

a person prohibits his own produce

to another person,

although that other person is not in the possession of the one taking the vow.

That is, from the fact that a person prohibits another’s produce to himself, although the other person is not in his possession, since the produce is in his possession, you may derive that a person can prohibit something that has not yet come into the world to himself.

For something that has not yet come into the world is like another person’s produce: neither is in the possession of the person imposing the prohibition.

But how can you say that a woman can prohibit her earnings, which have not yet come into the world, to her husband?

And is it the case that

a person will prohibit

by konam

something that has not yet come into the world—

to another person!?

In this case, both the produce and the other person are not in his possession!?

On the contrary, from the place from which you came to derive this, you should derive that a person cannot prohibit something that has not yet come into the world to another person—

for a person cannot prohibit another person’s produce to another person!

To prohibit something that has not yet come into the world to another person is like prohibiting “another person’s produce to another person.” Neither is in his possession—not the person himself and not the produce.

If so, how can the woman prohibit her earnings, which have not yet come into the world, to her husband by konam? Her husband is not in her possession, and her earnings, which have not yet come into the world, are not in her possession either!?

Rather, Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:

It should be said that a woman who says, “Konam what I produce for you,” is not considered to be prohibiting something that has not yet come into the world, even though the earnings that she prohibits to her husband do not yet exist. For the Mishna in tractate Nedarim is discussing

a

woman who

says

to her husband:

“Let my

[

hands be forbidden by konam, like the sanctity of a sacrifice ]

be sanctified to those who made them”” [

just as a sacrifice is sacred to the Almighty ].

Therefore the konam takes effect, since

the hands

themselves

are

present

in the world,

and it is those hands that she prohibits to her husband by konam, so that he may not benefit from them; there is no deficiency here of “something that has not yet come into the world” on account of earnings that do not yet exist.

But the Gemara challenges Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua:

And when she says this—

does it become consecrated!?

If, while she is married, she says, “Let my hands be sanctified to those who made them,” do her hands become prohibited to her husband by the prohibition of konam!?

But,

surely

she is obligated

the woman

to him [

the woman is obligated to her husband with regard to her earnings ], and the hands themselves are considered his, with regard to his benefit from her earnings; so how can she prohibit him from benefiting from her hands!?

And we answer: Indeed, at present her hands are not in her possession, and she cannot prohibit her husband from deriving benefit from her hands so long as she is married to him.

But the Mishna is dealing with a case

where she said

the woman: “Let my hands be consecrated to their Maker

when I am divorced [after the divorce],” at which point her hands will no longer belong to her husband.

[after the divorce], at which point her hands will no longer belong to her husband.

The Gemara challenges this: It is still difficult, since a person cannot consecrate an entity that does not yet exist

and is there such a thing

that such a thing exists

that if now

, while she is married,

it is not consecrated

, meaning that her hands are not prohibited to her husband through a Konam vow,

but

if

later

, when she is divorced,

it is consecrated!?

Is there anything that cannot be prohibited through a Konam vow while she is married, but will be prohibited through a Konam vow after he divorces her? Surely this itself is a reason to consider her vow a vow concerning an entity that does not yet exist!?

Said

he answered

Rabbi Ela'i: Why

why

not!?

For it follows logically —

If one says to his fellow

when he is selling him his field:

“This field, which I am selling to you,”

[indeed, once I sell it, I will no longer have the ability to consecrate it], but

“when I take it back from you,”

then

“the field shall be consecrated”

the field—

Will it not become consecrated

when the seller takes it back from the buyer? Surely the field will certainly become consecrated, since at the time he consecrates the field it is still in his possession!?

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection

to Rabbi Ela'i’s answer:

Are these cases comparable!?

There, he has it in his power to consecrate it

now, since the field is his; and since he currently has the ability to consecrate it, even if he consecrates it for after he sells it and then takes it back, he can now consecrate it for when it returns to his possession from the buyer—

But

here,

behold,

she does not have the ability

the woman

to divorce herself.

And as long as she is not divorced, she cannot consecrate or prohibit through a Konam vow the product of her labor, and it is therefore an entity that does not yet exist!?

Rabbi Yirmeya continues his challenge:

Now,

the statement of the Mishna, “Konam, the product of my labor is prohibited to you,” which prohibits her hands at a time when she cannot prohibit or consecrate them—

is not comparable,

this is not comparable,

but rather to one who says to his fellow: “This field that

I have already

sold to you—when I take it back from you, it shall be consecrated”—

it does not become consecrated

the field when he takes it back, since he consecrated an entity that did not yet exist!?

Rav Pappa raised an objection

to Rabbi Yirmeya:

You are indeed correct in your challenge: the case of “This field, which I am selling to you” cannot be compared with the case in our Mishna. There is certainly a distinction between the cases, since in the case of the field, the owner of the field can consecrate it now, whereas when the woman is married, she cannot consecrate her hands.

But, on the other hand, I can challenge the comparison you make between the case in our Mishna and the case of “This field that I have sold to you—when I take it back from you, it shall be consecrated,” which does not become consecrated. There is a basis for this challenge:

Are “Konam, the product of my labor is prohibited to you” and “This field that I have sold to you—when I take it back from you, it shall be consecrated” comparable!?

“Let whatever I produce be prohibited to you by a konam” and “this field that I sold you; when I take it back from you, it shall become consecrated”?

For

there,

in the case of one who says, “This field that I have sold to you—when I take it back from you, it shall be consecrated,”

the substance and the produce are in the buyer’s possession,

the field itself and its produce are in the buyer’s possession, and not in his.

But

here—

in the Mishna’s case of “Konam, the product of my labor is prohibited to you”—behold,

the substance itself,

the hands,

is in her possession,

it is in her possession, and the Sages enacted that her husband should have only their produce, namely, the product of her labor!?

Rav Pappa continues his challenge:

Now,

“Konam, the product of my labor is prohibited to you,” in which the substance itself belongs to her—

is comparable only to one who says to his fellow: