Ketubot 59a — the Talmud in English

The Sages instituted

the support of

food

in place of

her earnings.

And the silver coin

is what the Sages instituted for her

in place of the surplus of

her earnings—

And

if we interpret according to Rav Adda bar Ahava, that our Mishna is dealing with a case in which he gives her food but does not give her a silver coin, then

since he does not give her [

he does not give her]

a silver coin,

then the

surplus—

belongs to her [

it is hers]! For the surplus is what the Sages instituted in place of the silver coin, and since here the surplus belongs to her, he cannot consecrate it.

But

Rav Adda bar Ahava holds

that

they instituted food in place of the surplus, and the silver coin in place of her earnings—

And since he gives her food [

that he gives her food], then the

surplus—

belongs to him [

it belongs to the husband], and therefore he can consecrate it.

And the Gemara discusses:

In what do they disagree?

What is the reasoning behind their disagreement?

One master,

Rav and Shmuel,

holds

:

a thing that is common [

a common thing], namely food,

from a thing that is common

they instituted it in place of a common thing, which is her earnings. They did not institute food in place of the surplus, because the surplus is not common.

And the other,

Rav Adda bar Ahava,

holds: a thing that is fixed [

a thing that has a fixed measure], namely the silver coin,

from a thing that is fixed

in place of a fixed thing, namely the principal of her earnings, whose amount is fixed—how much she is obligated to produce for him. And not the silver coin in place of the surplus, whose amount is not fixed. But in place of the surplus, whose amount is not fixed, the Sages instituted food, which also is not a fixed thing.

The following objection was raised

against Rav Adda bar Ahava from this, for it was taught:

They instituted food in place of her earnings.

And this is difficult for Rav Adda bar Ahava, who holds that food is in place of the surplus!?

And we answer:

say

that you should teach the following in the beraita: They instituted food

in place of the surplus of her earnings.

Come and hear

in accordance with the words of Rav Adda bar Ahava, and not in accordance with Rav and Shmuel:

From that which we learned [below, 64b]: “And

if he does not give her a silver coin for her needs—

her earnings are hers.”

And it is proven that the silver coin is in place of the earnings. This is difficult for Rav and Shmuel!?

And we answer:

say

that the Mishna says as follows: If he does not give her a silver coin for her needs—

the surplus of her earnings is hers.

The Gemara objects to this answer:

But concerning it,

concerning these words of the Mishna,

it teaches,

the tanna teaches later in the Mishna [on page 64b]:

What does she do for him [

with the labor of spinning]?

The weight of five sela [

woolen threads of]

spindle-work in Judea,

which are [a weight of] ten sela in the Galilee.

And it is proven from the Mishna that the Mishna is discussing her earnings, and not the surplus!?

And we answer:

This is what

the tanna in that Mishna

says:

Her earnings—

how much are they, in order

to know her surplus, how much? [

What is the measure of her earnings, so that we will know what the surplus over her earnings is]?—

the weight of five sela

of threads of

spindle-work [

whose spinning is more difficult than the spinning of weft threads],

in Judea.

Which are

the weight of

ten sela in the Galilee [

since the weight of a sela in Judea is double its weight in the Galilee].

And what the woman produces beyond this measure is the “surplus,” and it is this that the Mishna discusses.

Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker

in our Mishna, that the surplus does not become consecrated, because a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into the world!

The Gemara objects:

And did Shmuel say this,

that a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into the world!?

But we learned

in tractate Nedarim [85a]:

A woman who says to her husband:

Konam

what

I make for you [

the earnings that I will make shall be forbidden to you like an offering] —

He does not need

her husband

to annul

her vow!

The husband, who can annul his wife’s vows, does not need to annul this vow, since the vow does not take effect at all, because her earnings belong to him, and she cannot prohibit to him something that is his and not hers.

Rabbi Akiva says:

He shall annul it.

For although the vow does not take effect upon the principal of her earnings, nevertheless we must be concerned

lest

she pressure herself and

produce extra for him,

exert herself and perform her labor

more than what is proper for him [

more than the measure that the Sages established for a woman to perform for her husband]. And Rabbi Akiva holds that this “extra produced through exertion” does not belong to the husband, but to the woman, and her vow can therefore take effect upon that extra; consequently, he must annul her vow, which prohibits her extra production to him.

Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri said:

Even her vow that prohibits to her husband the principal of her earnings—

he shall annul it,

the husband.

And although, as long as she is married to him, the vow does not take effect at all, nevertheless we must be concerned

lest he divorce her,

in the future, at which point the vow will take effect, since she will no longer be bound to him with regard to her earnings,

and she will be forbidden to return

to him, since she prohibited her benefit to him, and it is impossible for the husband to be careful that she not grind or bake for him, and likewise all the other labors that a woman performs for her husband. And although he has not yet divorced her, and it is impossible for the vow to take effect today, but only after he divorces her—and this is considered something that has not yet come into the world—Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri holds that a person can prohibit with a konam something that has not yet come into the world.

And Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri!

And it is proven that, according to Shmuel, a person can prohibit with a konam, which resembles consecrated property, something that has not yet come into the world. For Shmuel ruled that the vow will take effect in the future, when he divorces her.

And this contradicts Shmuel’s words here, where he said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker, that a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into the world!?

And we answer:

When Shmuel said, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri”—

only

with regard

to the matter of

extra production!

Shmuel’s intention in saying, “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri,” is only with regard to the fact that he must annul the vow, but not for his reason.

For according to Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri, the vow by which she prohibited the principal of her earnings requires annulment. But Shmuel holds that the vow concerning the principal of her earnings does not require annulment, since a person cannot prohibit something that has not yet come into the world. Rather, he should annul it because perhaps she will produce extra for him, more than what is proper for him. The Gemara objects to this answer:

And

if so,

let

Shmuel

say: “The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri”—

with regard to extra production.

Alternatively,

he should say:

The halakha is not in accordance with the first tanna,

who holds that he does not need to annul it, but rather he should annul it.

Alternatively,

he should say:

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva!?

Rather, Rav Yosef said:

This is how to resolve the contradiction in Shmuel’s words: on the one hand, concerning our Mishna, he said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker, that consecration does not take effect upon something that has not yet come into the world; while on the other hand, Shmuel said that a konam takes effect even upon something that has not yet come into the world:

You speak of konamot!

Are you coming to raise a difficulty concerning the law of consecrated property from the law of konamot!?

They cannot be compared to one another, because

different

is the law of

konamot

from the law of consecrated property!

For

since

we find with regard to konamot

that a person

prohibits even

the

produce of another to himself [

to himself], even though this produce does not belong to him but to another—

so too,

a person “consecrates,”

that is, prohibits with a konam, which is like consecrated property [but the konam itself is not consecrated property!], even

something that has not yet come into the world.

For when a person vows to prohibit himself from the produce of another, the produce of another is considered, with regard to the one who vowed, like something that has not yet come into the world. For the one who vowed has no right whatsoever in the produce of another, just as he has no right whatsoever in something that has not yet come into the world.

And if we find that a person can prohibit himself with a konam even from the produce of another, despite having no right whatsoever in it, so too a person has the power to prohibit himself with the prohibition of a konam even from something that has not yet come into the world, despite having nothing in it.

But one who consecrates something for the Temple treasury can consecrate only his own produce, but he cannot consecrate the produce of another, since he has no right in it. Therefore, too, a person cannot consecrate for the Temple treasury something that has not yet come into the world, since he has no right in it.

He said,

objecting,

Abaye

to Rav Yosef:

Indeed, you are correct that when a person prohibits himself from the produce of another with a konam, the other person’s produce is considered with regard to the one who vowed like something that has not yet come into the world, since it is not in his possession, just as something that has not yet come into the world is not in his possession.

However, from that very place from which you come to learn, you should learn the opposite!

For we find with regard to konamot that a person can prohibit something with a konam only when at least one of two things is “in his possession”—

a. The produce is in his possession. Then he can prohibit it even to another, although the other “is not in his possession.”

b. The person who vows himself is “in his possession.”

Therefore, a person can prohibit the produce of another to himself with a konam, because although the produce of the other is not in his possession, he himself is “in his possession.”

And if so,

granted that

a person prohibits the produce of another to himself,

to himself, even though the produce of another is not in the possession of the one who vowed, this is understandable.

although the other person’s produce is not in the possession of the one making the vow.

For

we find that

a person prohibits his produce—

to another,

even though the other is not in the possession of the person who vowed.

That is, from the fact that a person prohibits the produce of another to himself, although the other is not in his possession, since the produce is in his possession, you should learn that a person can prohibit something that has not yet come into the world to himself.

For something that has not yet come into the world is like the produce of another: both are not in the possession of the person who prohibits.

But how can you say that the woman can prohibit to her husband her earnings, which have not yet come into the world?

And is it the case that

a person will prohibit with a konam

something

that has not yet come into the world—

to another!?

But in this case, both the produce and the other person are not in his possession!?

On the contrary, from the place from which you came to learn, you should learn that a person cannot prohibit something that has not yet come into the world to another—

for a person cannot prohibit the produce of another to another!

But to prohibit something that has not yet come into the world to another is like prohibiting “the produce of another to another.” Both are not in his possession: neither the person himself nor the produce.

And if so, how can the woman prohibit to her husband with a konam her earnings, which have not yet come into the world, when neither her husband nor her earnings, which have not yet come into the world, are in her possession!?

Rather, Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua said:

It must be said that a woman who says, “Konam what I make for you,” is not considered one who prohibits something that has not yet come into the world, even though the earnings that she prohibits to her husband are not yet in the world. For the Mishna in tractate Nedarim is dealing

with

a woman who

says

to her husband:

“Let my

hands be prohibited with a konam, like the sanctity of an offering,

to those who make them”

[

just as an offering is sacred to the Most High].

And therefore the konam takes effect, since

the hands

themselves

are present

they are found

in the world,

and it is them that she prohibits to her husband with a konam, so that he may not derive benefit from them; there is no deficiency of “something that has not yet come into the world” on account of the earnings, which are not in the world.

But the Gemara objects to the words of Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua:

And if she says so—

does it become consecrated!?

And if, while she is married, she says, “Let my hands be prohibited to those who make them,” will her hands become prohibited to her husband with the prohibition of a konam!?

But

behold,

she is bound

the woman

to him [

the woman is bound to the husband with regard to her earnings], and the hands themselves are considered his, with regard to his deriving benefit from her earnings; so how can she prohibit to him the benefit from her hands!?

And we answer: Indeed, now the hands are not in her possession, and she cannot forbid her husband from benefiting from the hands, as long as she is married to him.

But the Mishna is dealing with a case such as

where she said

the woman: “Let my hands be consecrated to the one who makes them” —

when I am divorced [

after the divorce], when her hands will no longer belong to her husband.

And the Gemara wonders: It should still be difficult, since a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence —

and is there such a thing

that is, is there anything like this,

that if now

when she is married,

it is not consecrated

her hands are not forbidden to the husband through a konam,

but

if

later

when she becomes divorced,

it is consecrated!?

Can there be something that cannot be forbidden through a konam as long as she is married, yet will be forbidden through a konam after he divorces her? But this itself is a reason to regard her vow as a vow concerning something that has not yet come into existence!?

Said

he answered:

why

why

not!?

For it is a logical consideration —

If one who says to his fellow

at the time when he sells him his field:

“This field, which I am selling to you

[indeed, when I sell it, I will not be able to consecrate it], but

when I take it from you

then

let it be consecrated

the field!” —

Is it not consecrated

when the seller returned and took it from the buyer? Surely the field was certainly consecrated, since at the time when he consecrates the field it is still in his possession!?

Rabbi Yirmeya challenged

Rabbi Ilaai’s answer:

Are they comparable!?

There, he has the ability to consecrate it

now, for the field is his; and since he now has the ability to consecrate it, even if he consecrated it for after he sells it and then takes it back, he can now consecrate it for when it comes back into his possession from the buyer who bought it —

But

here,

behold,

she does not have the ability

the woman

to divorce herself.

And as long as she is not divorced, she cannot consecrate or forbid through a konam the product of her hands, and it is therefore something that has not yet come into existence!?

And Rabbi Yirmeya continues with his challenge:

This

the statement of the Mishna, “Konam, what I make shall be for your benefit,” which forbids her hands at a time when she cannot forbid or consecrate them —

is not comparable

this is not similar,

but only to one who says to his fellow: “This field that I

already

sold to you, when I take it from you, let it be consecrated” —

it is not consecrated

the field when he takes it, since he consecrated something that had not yet come into existence!?

Rav Pappa challenged

Rabbi Yirmeya:

Indeed, you are correct in your challenge, that “this field which I am selling to you” cannot be compared with the matter of our Mishna. For there is certainly a distinction between the matters: with a field, the owner of the field can consecrate it now, whereas the woman, when she is married, cannot consecrate her hands.

But, on the other hand, your comparison of the matter of our Mishna to “this field that I sold to you, when I take it from you, let it be consecrated,” which is not consecrated — concerning this comparison I have a challenge:

Are “Konam, what I make shall be for your benefit”

comparable to “this field that I sold to you, when I take it from you, let it be consecrated”!?

But

there,

when one says, “This field that I sold to you, when I take it from you, let it be consecrated,”

its substance and its produce are in the possession of the buyer

the body of the field and its produce are in the buyer’s possession, and not in his possession.

But

here —

in the Mishna’s “Konam, what I make shall be for your benefit” — behold,

its substance,

the hands,

is in her possession,

it is in her control, and they instituted that the husband should have only their produce, meaning the product of her hands!?

And Rav Pappa continues with his challenge:

This,

“Konam, what I make shall be for your benefit,” whose substance belongs to her —

is comparable only to one who says to his fellow: