Ketubot 59b (נט:) — the Talmud in English

“This field that I mortgaged to you” [and the property itself is mine, the owner of the field],

and the substance belongs to me, the owner of the field],

“when I redeem it from you”—

“it shall become consecrated!”

It became consecrated

the field.

On the contrary, you can learn from there that indeed the woman’s konam is effective.

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, raised an objection

to Rav Pappa’s statement:

Are these cases comparable?

A konam that she makes concerning the labor of her hands, which are subjugated to her husband, is comparable to a mortgaged field whose owner consecrates it after it is redeemed!?

But

there,

in the case of a mortgaged field,

it is in his power,

that of its owner who mortgaged it,

to redeem it

from the one in whose possession it is mortgaged. And anything that is “in his power” to do is not considered lacking an act. But

here,

with regard to “Konam: what I produce is forbidden to you,”

she has no ability to divorce

her

self!

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, continues his objection and says:

If you indeed came to resolve the Mishna of “Konam: what I produce is forbidden to you” by comparing it to a mortgaged field, do not compare it to a mortgaged field without a fixed term, which is in his power to redeem now. Rather:

This—

Konam: what I produce is forbidden to you—

is comparable only to one who says to his fellow: “This field that I mortgaged to you for ten years”

[so that it is not in his power to redeem it now]—

“when I redeem it from you, it shall become consecrated!” It became consecrated

that field.

So too, the woman can consecrate the labor of her hands, even though she has no ability to divorce herself.

Rav Ashi raised an objection,

to the statement of Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi:

Are these cases comparable!?

There, after

ten years,

at least, it is in his power to redeem it.

But

here,

indeed

it is not in the power

of the woman

to divorce

her

self ever.

Rather, Rav Ashi said,

this is how the contradiction in Shmuel’s statements should be resolved: With regard to the consecration of the proceeds of her labor, Shmuel ruled that she cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence, whereas with regard to a konam, Shmuel ruled that she can forbid the labor of her hands after she is divorced, even though at the time she made the konam her hands were subjugated to her husband:

You are speaking of konamot!

Are you comparing konamot to the law of consecration!?

But

there is a difference with regard to konamot—

for

in the category of

“sanctity of the body” they are!

The law of konamot is like the sanctity of an altar, which has no redemption. So too, konamot have no redemption by which they become permitted to the one to whom they were forbidden. They are not like consecrated property for Temple maintenance, which does have redemption.

Since konamot are like “sanctity of the body,” the question is no longer difficult: How can she forbid something to him through a konam before he divorces her? An item defined as having “sanctity of the body” has the power to remove the husband’s lien

as

stated by

Rava!

For Rava said:

Consecration—

for example, when one placed his ox under a lien to his creditor and then consecrated his ox as a sacrifice—removes the creditor’s lien. The creditor can no longer collect his debt from the ox, since sacrificial sanctity has taken effect upon it; rather, he collects his debt from other property—

Likewise, a konam removes the husband’s lien on his wife’s hands with regard to the proceeds of her labor. And although as long as she is subjugated to him the konam does not take effect, because the Sages reinforced his lien, nevertheless, after her husband divorces her, the konam takes effect, and this is not considered something that has not yet come into existence.

Leavened bread

If an Israelite placed his leavened bread under a lien as apotiki for a loan he took from a gentile, and Passover eve arrived, the leavened bread becomes permanently forbidden for benefit. It is not considered the gentile’s leavened bread, which is permitted for benefit after Passover, because the prohibition of leavened bread that takes effect upon the loaf removes the gentile’s lien, and the leavened bread becomes forbidden for benefit as an Israelite’s leavened bread.

And emancipation

If a borrower designated his slave as apotiki for his creditor, and the borrower emancipated the slave, the slave is emancipated. The emancipation of a slave and making him free is considered “sanctity of the body,” which removes him from a lien, and the creditor collects his debt from other property.

All these

remove property from a lien,

as explained.

And we raise a difficulty: If so,

the proceeds of her labor should already become consecrated

now

from this point onward,

rather than only after he divorces her, since you say that “a konam removes property from a lien”!?

And we explain:

The Sages reinforced the husband’s lien

[the Sages strengthened and reinforced the husband’s lien upon the proceeds of his wife’s labor],

so that they would not become consecrated from now

[so that the konam would not take effect upon them immediately and remove his right, but only when the woman dies and he inherits her]!

Mishna:

And these are the tasks that a woman performs for her husband:

She grinds

flour for him,

and bakes

bread,

and launders,

and

cooks.

And nurses her son.

And

makes

for her husband

the bed.

And performs

labor

with wool,

so that her labor will provide her husband with monetary gain.

And if

she brought him

to her husband

one maidservant,

she

does not grind, nor bake, nor launder,

since her maidservant performs these tasks in her place.

And if she brought him

two

maidservants, she

also does not cook, and does not nurse her son.

And if she brought him

three

maidservants, she

also does not make

the

bed for him, and does not perform labor with wool.

And if she brought him

four

maidservants, the woman

sits in a chair,

and does not trouble herself at all for her husband, even to go on his behalf to bring him an item from one house to another.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him one hundred maidservants,

the husband

compels

her

to perform

labor

with wool,

because

idleness leads to licentiousness.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who forbids his wife by vow from performing labor—

he must divorce her and give her her ketuba,

because

idleness leads to insanity

[madness].

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “And these are the tasks that a woman performs for her husband: She grinds”:

The Gemara asks in wonder: Did the Sages institute that a woman should

grind

by herself?

Would it enter your mind

to say this!?

But the flow of water turns the wheel, and the mill is what grinds!? And we explain:

Rather, say: She prepares the grinding,

preparing what is needed for the grinding: She places the wheat into the hopper of the mill, the mill grinds it, and the woman gathers the flour from the mill.

Alternatively, if you wish, say:

The Mishna used the expression “she grinds” because our Mishna is dealing with

a hand mill,

in which she herself turns the millstones, rather than the water.

The Gemara explains:

Our Mishna

is

not in accordance with Rabbi Ḥiyya!

For Rabbi Ḥiyya taught:

a.

A woman is

only for beauty,

and not for tasks that diminish her beauty, such as grinding, baking, and nursing her son, and the like.

b.

A woman is

only for children.

And

further

Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: A woman is

only for women’s adornments,

which the husband should purchase for her so that she will adorn herself with them.

And

further

Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: One who wishes to enhance the

beauty of his

wife—

should dress her in garments

of

linen.

And

one who wishes to whiten the

skin of his

daughter,

so that it will be attractive and not dark—

should feed her

the meat of

chicks, and give her milk to drink close to puberty

[the days of youth].

We learned in the Mishna: “And these are the tasks that a woman performs for her husband”—

“and nurses her son”:

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say that our Mishna

is not in accordance with Beit Shammai?

For it was taught: She vowed

the woman

not to nurse her son,

for example, she forbade her breasts to her husband with regard to the benefit of her milk.

Beit Shammai say: Her vow takes effect, and she

Her vow takes effect, and

removes the breast from his mouth

of the infant and does not nurse him, because she is not subjugated to her husband to nurse their son.

And

Beit Hillel say: He compels

her husband compels his wife

and she nurses him.

Since she is subjugated to her husband to nurse their son, the vow does not take effect, for this is as though she forbade her husband’s property to her husband.

If she was divorced

from him, he

can no longer compel

her to nurse their son.

And if

she was divorced and

the infant was

the infant

recognizing

his mother and did not wish to nurse from another woman, the husband

gives her her wages, and compels

her

and she nurses him, because of the danger

to the child!

It follows that according to Beit Shammai the woman is not subjugated to her husband to nurse their son, and consequently our Mishna is apparently not in accordance with Beit Shammai.

And we reject this:

Even if you say

that our Mishna is in accordance with

Beit Shammai, it is not difficult. For

here,

here,

in the beraita,

with what are we dealing,

with a case in which the woman forbade herself the benefit of nursing, since the woman derives benefit from nursing her son. Therefore, there is no impediment to the vow taking effect on account of her subjugation to her husband, since she forbade the benefit to herself—

And Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree about whether she herself may nurse, as this is forbidden according to everyone, since she forbade herself the benefit of nursing. Their disagreement concerns only whether the husband can compel her to hire a wet nurse.

And the beraita is dealing with a case

in which she vowed

[the woman], and

he upheld her vow

[the husband upheld her vow, for example, he said, “Let the vow stand,” or he remained silent and did not nullify it on the day he heard it, and the vow took effect on its own]—

And Beit Shammai hold: It is he,

the husband who upheld the vow, who

“puts

the

finger between her teeth”,

so that she will bite it. That is, he caused the vow to remain in force, and therefore he cannot compel her to hire a wet nurse.

And Beit Hillel hold: It is she

who

“put the finger between her teeth”

in order to be bitten. That is, she is the one who made the vow, and she is the one who must hire a wet nurse.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If their disagreement is a fundamental dispute—when the husband upholds his wife’s vow, who is responsible for the vow, the woman who made the vow or the husband who upheld it—why did they disagree specifically in the case where she vowed to forbid the benefit of nursing her son? This is a fundamental dispute that applies to every vow in which the woman forbids herself to her husband and her husband upholds the vow.

And

if so,

let Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree

in the general case of

a ketuba alone,

and let them disagree as follows:

A woman who vowed to forbid herself to her husband, and the husband upheld her vow:

Beit Shammai say: She leaves, and he gives her her ketuba. For he is the one who put the finger between her teeth; he is responsible for upholding the vow. Therefore, he divorces her and gives her her ketuba.

Beit Hillel say: The woman leaves without a ketuba, for she is the one who put the finger between her teeth; she is responsible for the existence of the vow. Therefore, he does not give her a ketuba.

And furthermore,

it is difficult, for we find explicitly in a beraita that the reason of Beit Shammai is not that she is responsible for the existence of the vow, but that she has the right not to nurse her son even where she did not vow at all.

For

it was taught: Beit Shammai say:

Every woman

does not nurse

her son if she does not wish to nurse him, because she is not subjugated to her husband to nurse.

Rather, it is clear

[the clear explanation is] that

our Mishna—

is not in accordance with Beit Shammai

.

We learned in a beraita:

If he was recognizing

her, he gives her her wages, compels her, and she nurses him: