Ketubot 59b — the Talmud in English

This field that I mortgaged to you [

and the substance belongs to me, the owner of the field],

when I redeem it from you—

it shall become consecrated!

For it became consecrated

the field.

On the contrary, you can learn from there that indeed the konam of the woman is effective.

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, raised an objection

to the words of Rav Pappa:

Are they comparable?

The konam that she makes concerning the hands that are subordinated to her husband is comparable to a mortgaged field, whose owner consecrates it after it is redeemed!?

But

there,

with a mortgaged field,

it is in the power

of its owner, who mortgaged it,

to redeem it

from the one in whose hands it is mortgaged. And anything that is “in his power” to do is not considered to be lacking an act. But

here,

concerning “konam: what I make shall be for your benefit,”

it is not in her power to divorce

her

self!

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, continues his difficulty and says:

If indeed you came to resolve the Mishna of “konam: what I make shall be for your benefit” by comparing it to a mortgaged field, do not compare it to a mortgaged field without a time limit, which is in his power to redeem now, for:

Here—

“konam: what I make shall be for your benefit”—

is comparable only to one who says to his fellow: ‘This field that I mortgaged to you for ten years’”

[for it is not in his power to redeem it now]—

‘When I redeem it from you, it shall become consecrated!’ It consecrated

that field.

And likewise, the woman can consecrate her hands, even though it is not in her power to divorce herself.

Rav Ashi raised an objection,

to the words of Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi:

Are they comparable!?

There, after

another

ten years, at any rate, it is in his power to redeem it.

But

here,

behold,

it is not in her power

of the woman

to divorce

her

self ever.

Rather, Rav Ashi said,

this is how to resolve the contradiction in Shmuel’s words: concerning the consecration of the proceeds of her labor, Shmuel ruled that she cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into the world, whereas concerning konam, Shmuel ruled that she can forbid her hands after she becomes divorced, even though at the time she made the konam the hands were subordinated to her husband:

You are saying konamot!

Do you compare konamot to the law of consecration!?

But

konamot are different—

for

they are in the category of

“sanctity of the substance”!

For the law of konamot is like the sanctity of the altar, which has no redemption. So too, konamot have no redemption, to become permitted to the one who is forbidden through them. And they are not like offerings for the maintenance of the Temple, which have redemption.

And since konamot are like “sanctity of the substance,” the difficulty no longer arises: how can she forbid him through a konam before he divorces her? For something defined as “sanctity of the substance” has the power to remove the husband’s lien—

as

Rava

said!

For Rava said:

Consecration—

for example, when an Israelite subordinated his ox to his creditor, and afterward consecrated his ox as an offering—the consecration removes the creditor’s lien, and the lender can no longer collect his debt from the ox, since the sanctity of an offering has taken effect upon it; rather, he collects his debt from another place—

And likewise, the konam removes the husband’s lien upon his wife’s hands with regard to the proceeds of her labor. And although as long as she is subordinated to him the konam does not take effect, since the Sages strengthened his lien, nevertheless, after her husband divorces her, the konam will take effect, and this is not something that has not yet come into the world.

Chametz,

if an Israelite subordinated his chametz as designated security for a loan that he took from a gentile, and Passover eve arrived, the chametz became permanently forbidden in benefit, and it is not considered the gentile’s chametz, which is permitted in benefit after Passover; for the prohibition of chametz that took effect upon the loaf removes the gentile’s lien, and the chametz becomes forbidden in benefit as an Israelite’s chametz.

And emancipation,

if the borrower made his slave designated security for the lender, and the borrower emancipated the slave, the slave is emancipated, for the emancipation of a slave and making him free is considered “sanctity of the substance,” which removes [the item] from a lien, and the lender collects his debt from another place.

All these

remove [an item] from a lien,

as has been explained.

And we raise a difficulty: But if so,

let the proceeds of her labor become consecrated

already

from now

from this moment, and not only after he divorces her, since you say that “a konam removes [an item] from a lien”!?

And we explain:

The Sages strengthened the husband’s lien

[the Sages strengthened and reinforced the husband’s lien upon the proceeds of his wife’s labor],

so that it should not become consecrated from now

[so that the konam should not take effect upon them from now, and his right should not be removed, but only when the woman dies and he inherits her]!

Mishna:

And these are the tasks that the woman performs for her husband:

She grinds

flour for him,

and bakes

bread,

and launders, and

and

cooks.

And nurses her child.

And

And makes

for her husband

the bed.

And performs

work

with wool,

so that her work should yield monetary profit for her husband.

And if

she brought him

the woman to her husband

one maidservant,

she

does not grind, nor bake, nor launder,

since her maidservant performs her tasks in her place.

And if she brought him

two

maidservants, she also

does not cook, and does not nurse her child.

And if she brought him

three

maidservants, she also

does not make for him

the

bed, and does not perform work with wool.

And if she brought him

four

maidservants, the woman

sits in a chair,

and does not trouble herself at all for her husband, even to go on his errand to bring him an object from the house to the upper story.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if she brought him one hundred maidservants,

the husband

compels

her

to perform

work

with wool,

because

idleness leads to licentiousness.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Even one who forbids his wife by vow from performing work—

he must divorce her and give her her marriage settlement,

because

idleness leads to insanity

[madness].

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “And these are the tasks that the woman performs for her husband: she grinds”:

And the Gemara wonders: Did the Sages enact that the woman should

grind

herself?

Would it enter your mind

to say so!?

But the stream of water turns the wheel, and the mill is what grinds!? And we explain:

Rather, say: she prepares the grinding,

preparing the needs of the grinding: she places the wheat in the hopper of the mill, the mill grinds, and the woman receives the flour from the mill.

And if you wish, say:

the Mishna used the expression “she grinds” because our Mishna is dealing with

a hand mill,

with a hand mill, which she herself turns the wheels of the mill, and not the water.

And the Gemara explains:

Our Mishna

is

not in accordance with Rabbi Ḥiyya!

For Rabbi Ḥiyya taught:

1.

A woman exists—

only for beauty,

and not for tasks that diminish her beauty, such as grinding, baking, and nursing her child, and the like.

2.

A woman exists—

only for children.

And

further

Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: A woman exists—

only for women’s ornaments.

Which the husband should buy for her so that she will adorn herself with them.

And

further

Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: One who wishes to enhance the

radiance of his

wife—

should dress her in garments

of

linen.

And

one who wishes to whiten the

skin of his

daughter,

so that it will be beautiful and not black—

should feed her

his daughter the meat of

chicks, and give her milk close to her coming of age

[to the days of youth].

We learned in the Mishna: “And these are the tasks that the woman performs for her husband”—

and nurses her child:

The Gemara asks:

Shall we say that our Mishna—

is not in accordance with the School of Shammai?

For it was taught: She vowed

the woman

not to nurse her child,

such as when she forbade her breasts to her husband for the benefit of her milk.

The School of Shammai says:

Her vow takes effect, and

she removes the breast from his mouth

of the infant and does not nurse him, because she is not subordinated to her husband to nurse their son.

And

the School of Hillel says: He compels

the husband his wife

and she nurses him.

Since she is subordinated to her husband to nurse their son, the vow does not take effect, for this is as though she forbade her husband’s property to her husband.

If she became divorced

from him, he again

does not compel

her to nurse their son.

And if

she became divorced and

the infant was

the infant

recognizing

his mother, and does not wish to nurse from another woman, then the husband

gives her her wage, and compels

her

and she nurses him, because of the danger

to the child!

And it is proven that according to the School of Shammai the woman is not subordinated to her husband to nurse their son; consequently, our Mishna is apparently not in accordance with the School of Shammai.

And we reject this:

Even if you say

that our Mishna is according to the

School of Shammai, it is not difficult. For

here,

here,

in the beraita,

with what are we dealing?

With a case in which the woman forbade the benefit of her nursing to herself: the woman derives benefit from nursing when she nurses her child, and therefore there is no impediment to the vow taking effect on account of her subordination to her husband, since it is herself upon whom she forbade the benefit—

And the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel do not dispute whether she herself may nurse, for according to everyone this is forbidden, since she forbade the benefit of her nursing to herself. Their dispute is only whether the husband can compel her to hire a wet nurse.

And the beraita is dealing with

a case in which she vowed

[the woman]

and he upheld it for her

[the husband] her vow, such as when he said, “Let the vow stand,” or remained silent and did not annul it on the day he heard it, and the vow was upheld by itself—

And the School of Shammai hold: He,

the husband who upheld the vow, is the one who

“puts

the

finger between her teeth”,

so that she will bite it. That is, he is the cause of the vow’s remaining in effect, and therefore he cannot compel her to hire a wet nurse.

And the School of Hillel hold: She

is the one who

“put the finger between her teeth”

with the intention of being bitten. That is, she is the one who vowed, and she is the one who must hire a wet nurse.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: If their dispute is a fundamental dispute—when the husband upholds the woman’s vow, who is responsible for the vow, the woman who vowed or the husband who upheld the vow—why did they dispute specifically in the case where she vowed concerning the benefit of nursing her child? But this is a fundamental dispute in every vow in which the woman forbids herself to her husband from deriving benefit, and her husband upholds the vow.

And

if so,

let the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel dispute

concerning

the marriage settlement alone,

and let them dispute as follows:

A woman who vowed not to provide benefit to her husband, and the husband upheld it for her:

The School of Shammai says: She leaves, and he gives her her marriage settlement. For he is the one who put the finger between her teeth, being guilty of the vow’s remaining in effect; therefore he divorces her and gives her her marriage settlement.

The School of Hillel says: The woman leaves without her marriage settlement, for she is the one who put the finger between her teeth, being guilty of the existence of the vow; therefore he does not give her a marriage settlement.

And furthermore,

it is difficult, for we find explicitly in a beraita that the reason of the School of Shammai is not because she is responsible for the existence of the vow, but because it is her right not to nurse her child, even in a place where she did not vow at all.

For

it was taught: The School of Shammai says:

Every woman

does not nurse

her child if she does not wish to nurse him, because she is not subordinated to her husband to nurse.

Rather, it is clear

[the clear explanation is], that

the Mishna—

is not in accordance with the School of Shammai

.

We learned in a beraita:

If he was recognizing her,

he gives her her wage, and compels her, and she nurses him.