Ketubot 58b (נח:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, according to Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda

who explained above that the reason a betrothed woman does not eat teruma is due to simpon, the concern over disqualifying defects, the difficulty is as follows:

But the reason of the

first

Mishna

is due to simpon,

as stated above,

and

the reason of the

latter

Mishna as well

is due to simpon,

as stated here—

If so,

what is the difference between them,

meaning: Why, according to the first Mishna, does she eat teruma once the appointed time has arrived, whereas according to the latter Mishna she does not eat until she enters the wedding canopy?

And we explain:

There is a difference between them,

meaning: This is the matter over which the first Mishna and the latter Mishna disagree—

the external inspection [

an inspection performed through his female relatives]—whether it is considered an inspection.

One master,

the first Mishna,

holds: An external inspection is considered an inspection,

and therefore, once the appointed time has arrived and he has her examined by his female relatives, she eats teruma.

But the other master,

the latter Mishna,

holds: An external inspection is not considered an inspection

until he is secluded with her himself and examines her. Therefore, she does not eat teruma until she enters the wedding canopy, at which point he himself is secluded with her and examines her.

A. With regard to the husband’s obligation to provide his wife with sustenance, the Sages disagreed whether this obligation is from the Torah or rabbinic.

The Mishna and the discussion in the Gemara below follow the opinion that the husband’s obligation to provide his wife with sustenance is rabbinic [Meiri].

The Sages likewise instituted that the husband give his wife one silver ma’a each week, which she can spend on her needs.

B. The Sages instituted an additional ordinance: The wife must perform for her husband the household tasks required for his use, as explained in the Mishna below, on 64b.

They likewise instituted that the wife engage in work that generates income for her husband, namely, that she spin woolen threads in the amount explained below in the Mishna on 64b.

C. The Sages further said that even if she works or earns more through her labor than the amount the Sages obligated her to produce, the “surplus of her earnings” also belongs to the husband. This is called the “surplus” or the “excess.”

When does this statement—that even the “surplus of her earnings” belongs to the husband—apply? When she did not exert herself in this work.

But if she strained and exerted herself in her work, and consequently produced an excess through her labor [“excess produced through exertion”—ha’adafa al yedei hadeḥak], the tanna’im disagreed in the Mishna in tractate Nedarim [which is cited below in our discussion] whether the excess belongs to her or to her husband.

D. The amora’im disagree in the discussion below as to how the Sages established these ordinances—

Did the basis of their ordinance consist in requiring the husband to provide his wife with sustenance and to give her a silver ma’a for her needs, while they instituted that, in exchange for her sustenance, her earnings would belong to her husband, because if she did not give them to him, there would be animosity between them: He provides her with sustenance, while she does not give him her earnings?

Or was the principal ordinance of the Sages that the wife engage in work that brings monetary profit to her husband, and that her earnings belong to him [and even if she produces more through her labor than the amount the Sages obligated her to produce, the excess also belongs to the husband]? Rather, in exchange for her earnings, the Sages instituted that the husband provide her with sustenance and with a silver ma’a each week.

D. According to the second possibility, the amora’im disagree in the discussion below whether the Sages instituted the sustenance “in exchange for her earnings,” and instituted the silver ma’a in exchange for the “surplus of her earnings” [“excess”].

Or whether the sustenance is in exchange for the surplus of her earnings, while the weekly silver ma’a is in exchange for the principal of her earnings.

Mishna:

One who consecrates

the

earnings of his wife

that the wife is obligated to produce for her husband [as explained in the Mishna below, on 59b: “And she works with wool,”] before she has produced them—the earnings are not consecrated by his declaration. Rather,

she continues to produce

her earnings for herself,

and eats

from them, as the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

But if he consecrated

the “surplus”

of her earnings, beyond the amount established by the Sages, and this surplus too belongs to the husband—

Rabbi Meir says:

It is

consecrated.

The explanation of the law from our Mishna that "the moter — behold this is consecrated" was disputed by the Amoraim in the Gemara [and inside it will be clarified according to the first approach]: some explain that our Mishna concerns a woman whose husband gives her what is due to her in return for the moter and does not give her what is due to her in return for the principal ma'aseh yaday, and therefore the ma'aseh yaday is not consecrated but the moter is consecrated. Others explain [according to Tosafot's exposition] that our Mishna concerns one who is not given sustenance and not given a weekly ma'ah coin, and he has no right neither to the principal ma'aseh yaday nor to the moter. And that which we have taught that the moter is consecrated refers to when the woman dies and the husband acquires it by inheritance, then its consecration takes effect. And that the Mishna used the word "moter" and not the principal ma'aseh yaday, see further on this in the notes in the Gemara.

Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker says:

It is

ordinary property.

The entire Mishna is explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav:

A woman can say to her husband: “I will not be supported

by you,

and I will not produce

anything for you. Rather, I will work only for myself and support myself.”

The Gemara explains:

Rav maintains

that

when the Sages instituted

sustenance and earnings, each in exchange for the other, the ordinance of

sustenance

was

the principal

of the ordinance, and they enacted it for the woman’s benefit, lest her earnings prove insufficient for her sustenance.

And

as for the ordinance that

her earnings

belong to her husband, the Sages instituted it only in exchange for the sustenance he provides her.

And they instituted it

because of “animosity”

in order to prevent hatred between them if he provides her with sustenance [by virtue of their ordinance], while she does not give him her earnings.

And

therefore,

when she says

the woman:

“I will not be supported

by you, because I do not want this benefit that the Sages instituted for me,”

and

therefore also

“I will not produce

earnings for you in exchange”—

she has the option.

The Gemara raises an objection

to Rav from the words of a beraita, in which we learned the opposite of his statement:

As it is taught:

The Sages instituted

that the husband give the wife

sustenance—

in exchange for her earnings.

But Rav maintains that they instituted that her earnings are in exchange for her sustenance!?

And we answer:

Say

that this is what the beraita should read:

They instituted that her earnings are in exchange for her sustenance.

The Gemara discusses this:

Can one say that this supports him,

that there is support for Rav’s statement from our Mishna?

As we learned:

One who consecrates his wife’s earnings,

his consecration does not take effect,

and she continues to produce

her earnings

and eats

from them, supporting herself with them, because the earnings do not belong to him, so that he could consecrate them and prohibit them to his wife.

The Gemara proves from the fact that the Mishna says that this woman supports herself from her earnings, and not from sustenance provided by her husband, and from the fact that the husband cannot consecrate her earnings even though they belong to him:

Is it not

the case that our Mishna is dealing

with

a woman who is

supported

by her husband, who has property and wishes to support her, but she does not wish to be supported by him and said to her husband, “I will not be supported and I will not produce”?

And therefore the husband cannot consecrate her earnings, because once she has said this to him, they do not belong to him.

This proves the statement of Rav Huna in the name of Rav, that a woman can relinquish the ordinance enacted for her benefit and say, “I will not be supported and I will not produce.” We reject this:

No,

it is not as you said, that our Mishna is dealing with a woman whose husband wishes to support her, but she refuses and wishes to support herself from her labor.

Rather, in fact, a woman cannot say, “I will not be supported and I will not produce.” The ordinance of the Sages was established in the opposite manner: Her earnings belong to the husband, and in exchange they instituted that the husband support her. They did not institute that her earnings are in exchange for her sustenance, as Rav maintains.

And the reason that her earnings are not consecrated, even though they belong to her husband, is that our Mishna is dealing

with

a

woman who is not supported

by her husband, because he has no property and no means of supporting her. In such a case, her earnings do not belong to him; rather, she is entitled to support herself from her earnings, and therefore the husband cannot consecrate them.

The Gemara raises a difficulty about establishing the Mishna in such a case:

But

if our Mishna is dealing

our Mishna is dealing

with

a

woman who is not supported

by her husband, then

what is it coming to teach!?

What novelty is there in saying that he has no right to her earnings in order to consecrate them when he does not provide her with sustenance, and why did the tanna need to teach this law? It is obvious that if her husband does not provide her with sustenance, she need not go begging from door to door; rather, she supports herself from her earnings! For—

Even according to the one who says

that a master can

the master of a slave

say to his slave,

his own,

“Work for me

—do labor—

but

I

will not support you

; rather, go out and beg from door to door,”

this applies to a Canaanite slave, concerning whom it is not written [Deuteronomy 15:16], “For it is good for him

Deuteronomy 15:16] “For it is good for him

with you” [as it is written with regard to a Hebrew slave], and therefore his master is not obligated to maintain living conditions for him equal to his own [as he is obligated to do with a Hebrew slave]—

But with regard to a Hebrew slave, concerning whom it is written, “And it shall be, when he says to you [the Hebrew slave], ‘I will not leave you, for it is good for him

When he says to you [the Hebrew slave], I will not go out from before you, for he is good with you" —

with you’”—

no!

His master cannot say to him, “I will not give you sustenance, while your earnings belong to me; go out and beg from door to door.” For if the master were to say this to his slave, the Hebrew slave’s living conditions would not be equal to those of his master, whereas the Torah obligates the master of a Hebrew slave to ensure that “it is good for him with you,” meaning that his living conditions are similar to yours—

And all the more so

the husband cannot say this to

his wife,

as she is not his maidservant.

And we answer: In fact, our Mishna is speaking of a woman who is not supported by her husband.

And as for your question, what the novelty of the Mishna is—

Your answer is:

The latter clause

of our Mishna

was necessary for him—the tanna needed to teach us that it contains a novel element. And because of the latter clause, he also stated the first clause, even though it contains no novelty.

As we learned in the latter clause: A husband who consecrates the

As we learned in the latter clause: When a husband consecrates the

surplus

of his wife’s earnings—

Rabbi Meir says: It is consecrated.

Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker says: It is ordinary property.

And below it will be explained why, according to Rabbi Meir, the consecration takes effect on the surplus even though the husband does not support her, and presumably he also does not give her the weekly silver ma’a, in exchange for which the Sages instituted that he acquire the surplus [see Rashi, who added that the consecration takes effect on the surplus only after the woman dies and her husband inherits her].

Here the Gemara returns to the principal statement of Rav Huna in the name of Rav and explains:

And it disagrees

with this law of Rav Huna in the name of Rav, who maintains that a woman can say to her husband, “I will not be supported and I will not produce,”

with what

was

said by Reish Lakish!

For Reish Lakish said: Do not say

that

Rabbi Meir’s reason

in our Mishna, when he said that the husband can consecrate the surplus of his wife’s earnings even though she has not yet produced them and they are an “entity that has not yet come into the world,” —

is

because Rabbi Meir maintains

that Rabbi Meir holds:

A person can consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world. For it is possible that Rabbi Meir too holds that a person cannot consecrate an entity that has not yet come into the world.

For it is possible that even for Rabbi Meir a person does not consecrate something that has come into the world.

Rather, Rabbi Meir’s reason,

for maintaining that he can consecrate his wife’s earnings, is:

Since he can

the husband

compel his

wife, so that even the surplus of

her earnings

would belong to him, it is as though he has a right to the hands themselves.

Therefore, when he consecrates her earnings,

it becomes as though

he were

saying to her: “May your hands be consecrated

to the One who made them!”

That is, it is as though he said: “Your hands themselves shall be consecrated to the Holy One, blessed be He, who made your hands!”

Therefore the consecration takes effect, since his wife’s hands are indeed in the world. And since Reish Lakish said that he can compel her to do this, infer from it that the woman cannot remove his right to her earnings by saying, “I will not be supported and I will not produce.”

But the Gemara raises a difficulty about Reish Lakish’s interpretation of Rabbi Meir’s statement:

But he did not say to her

the husband to his wife

this!

For he did not consecrate the hands themselves, but rather her earnings!?

And we answer:

Since we have heard Rabbi Meir say: A person does not render his words futile,

and when a person says something that he knows cannot take effect in the manner in which he stated it, we interpret his words as meaning that he intended them in a manner in which they can take effect —

Therefore, even when he consecrated the proceeds of her handiwork themselves, since he knew that a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into the world,

it is as though he said to her: “May your hands be consecrated to their Maker”

. For this is the only way his words can be upheld!

The Gemara raises an objection to the words of Reish Lakish:

And

if

Rabbi Meir held

that

a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into the world,

why was Reish Lakish compelled to say, “Do not say” that Rabbi Meir’s reason is that a person can consecrate something that has not yet come into the world?!

But wasn’t it taught in a beraita: One who says to a woman

whom he cannot betroth at present—

“Behold, you are betrothed to me”—

a.

“after I convert”

, for example, he was a gentile and betrothed a Jewish woman, intending that the betrothal take effect after he converted. For as long as he is a gentile, he is not fit to betroth a Jewish woman.

Or, “after you convert”

, for example, a Jew betrothed a gentile woman and told her that her betrothal would take effect after she converted.

b. Or he was a slave and betrothed a Jewish woman, telling her that his betrothal would take effect

“after I am emancipated”

and become fit to betroth a Jewish woman.

Or she was a maidservant, while the husband was a freeborn Jew, and he betrothed her so that her betrothal would take effect

“after you are emancipated”

, and become fit to be betrothed to me—

c. Or he betrothed a married woman,

“after your husband dies”

, and you become free to marry and fit to be betrothed to me—

d.

Or

he said

“after your sisters die”

, referring to the women who are currently married to me, at which point you will no longer be forbidden to me under the prohibition of “a wife’s sister,” and you will be fit to be betrothed to me—

e.

Or

one who betroths a yevama while she is a “woman awaiting levirate marriage,” and tells her that his betrothal will take effect

“after your yavam performs halitza for you”

, so that you will no longer be a woman awaiting levirate marriage and will be fit to be betrothed to me—

In all these cases—

Rabbi Meir says:

Although the betrothal cannot take effect now, but only after the couple become fit for betrothal, so that these betrothals are currently betrothals involving something that has not yet come into the world, nevertheless she is

betrothed!

If so, this is difficult: Since Rabbi Meir holds that a person can perform an act that will take effect even with regard to something that has not yet come into the world, Rabbi Meir’s words in our Mishna are to be understood simply. For although the proceeds of her handiwork are not yet in the world, according to Rabbi Meir a person can consecrate something that has not yet come into the world. If so, why did Reish Lakish need to explain Rabbi Meir’s words in another manner?!

And we answer: This is what Reish Lakish said:

From that

beraita,

yes,

it is indeed proven that Rabbi Meir holds that “a person can transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world”—

But Reish Lakish said that

from this,

from our Mishna, with regard to the proceeds of her handiwork,

nothing can be inferred

that Rabbi Meir holds that a person can perform an act that will take effect with regard to something that has not yet come into the world, since it is possible to explain his reason as Reish Lakish explained it, and this law would be correct even if we said that a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into the world.

We learned in the Mishna: If the husband consecrated

the surplus—

Rabbi Meir says: It is consecrated.

The Gemara discusses:

When is

the surplus consecrated?

Does the surplus of the proceeds of her handiwork become consecrated immediately, as soon as she produces it, because our Mishna is dealing with a husband who has a right to the surplus of the proceeds of her handiwork, despite the fact that he has no right to the principal of her handiwork and cannot consecrate it, as explained in the first clause?

Or perhaps the surplus does not belong to him, just as her handiwork does not belong to him. Indeed, the consecration does not take effect now; rather, it becomes consecrated only after the woman’s death, when the husband inherits his wife, and the surplus becomes consecrated when it comes into his possession.

Rav and Shmuel, who both say:

The surplus

of the proceeds of her handiwork is

only after death

that it is

consecrated

, when his wife dies and the husband inherits the surplus. But during her lifetime it is not consecrated, since our Mishna is dealing with a woman who is not supported by her husband, as explained in the first clause. Presumably, her husband also does not give her a silver ma’a, which is the payment received in exchange for the surplus.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The surplus—

even

during her lifetime

it is

consecrated,

immediately when she produces it. This is because he has a right to the surplus, even though he has no right to the proceeds of her handiwork themselves. The Gemara proceeds to explain the reason for this.

Rav Pappa pondered this

wonderingly:

In what

manner is our Mishna dealing?

If you say,

if we say that it deals

with a case where he gives her

the husband

support, and gives her

also

a silver ma’a for her needs,

and in exchange for these two things the husband acquires both the principal of the proceeds of her handiwork and the surplus of the proceeds of her handiwork—

This cannot be said. For it would be difficult—

What is the reason of the one who says

[Rav and Shmuel] that only

after death

alone the surplus is

consecrated

?! Since he gives her both support and a weekly silver ma’a, the proceeds of her handiwork and the surplus of the proceeds of her handiwork already belong to him during her lifetime, so why should he not be able to consecrate them?!

Rather,

perhaps you will say that our Mishna deals

with a case where the husband does not

give her

support, and does not give her a silver ma’a for her needs—

This too cannot be said. For it would be difficult—if so,

what is the reason of the one who says

[Rav Adda bar Ahava] that already

during her lifetime

it is

consecrated?!

Surely the surplus of the proceeds of her handiwork does not belong to him, since he does not give her what she is entitled to receive in exchange for the surplus?!

And we answer: According to Rav and Shmuel, who hold that the surplus of the proceeds of her handiwork is not consecrated during her lifetime, our Mishna is dealing with a husband who gives his wife neither support nor a silver ma’a. Therefore, the husband has no right either to the proceeds of her handiwork or to the surplus of the proceeds of her handiwork. Just as during her lifetime she produces and eats the principal of the proceeds of her handiwork, so she takes the surplus of the proceeds of her handiwork and eats it. And that which we learned, that the surplus is consecrated, refers specifically to after death.

But according to Rav Adda bar Ahava, our Mishna is discussing a different situation:

In fact,

it is a case where he gives her support,

which, according to Rav Adda bar Ahava, is in exchange for “the surplus of the proceeds of her handiwork,” and not in exchange for “the proceeds of her handiwork.” Since he gives her the payment for “the surplus of the proceeds of her handiwork,” he can consecrate the surplus even during her lifetime.

And

, however,

he does not give her a silver ma’a for her needs,

which is in exchange for the principal of the proceeds of her handiwork.

Therefore, he cannot consecrate the principal of the proceeds of her handiwork during her lifetime; rather, she produces and eats, as we learned in the first clause.

The Gemara explains the reason for the dispute between Rav and Shmuel and Rav Adda bar Ahava:

Rav and Shmuel—

who do not explain the Mishna like Rav Adda bar Ahava—their reason is that they

hold

that the support the husband gives her is not in exchange for the surplus. Rather: