Ketubot 58b — the Talmud in English

But according to Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda

who explained above that the reason an betrothed woman does not eat teruma is because of simpon, then this is difficult:

And behold, the reason of the

first

Mishna

is because of simpon

as was said above,

and

the reason of the

last

Mishna

is also because of simpon

as was said here—

And if so,

what is the difference between them,

that is to say: why, according to the first Mishna, does she eat teruma once the time has arrived, whereas according to the last Mishna does she not eat until she enters the chuppa?!

And we explain:

there is a difference between them,

that is to say: it is concerning this that the first Mishna and the last Mishna disagree—

an external examination [

the examination that he conducts through his female relatives]—whether it is an examination.

One

the first Mishna

holds: an external examination is called an examination,

and therefore, once the time has arrived, when he examines her through his female relatives, she eats teruma.

And the other

the last Mishna

holds: an external examination is not called an examination

until he himself secludes himself with her and examines her; and therefore she does not eat teruma until she enters the chuppa, for then he himself secludes himself with her and examines her.

A. The Sages disagree about the husband’s obligation to support his wife: whether it is מן התורה, mandated by Torah law, or מדרבנן, instituted by the Sages.

The Mishna, and the discussion in the Gemara, the Talmudic discussion of the Mishna, below, follow the view that the husband’s obligation to provide his wife’s sustenance was instituted by the Sages [Meiri].

The Sages also instituted that the husband give his wife a silver coin every week, which she can spend for her needs.

B. The Sages instituted an additional ordinance: that the wife perform for her husband the household tasks needed for his use, as explained in the Mishna below, on 64b.

They also instituted that the wife engage in work that would bring her husband income, namely, that she spin woolen threads in the amount explained below in the Mishna on 64b.

C. The Sages further said that even if she works or earns more through her labor than the amount that the Sages obligated her to produce, the “surplus of her labor” also belongs to the husband. This is called the “surplus” or the “extra.”

When does this apply, that even the “surplus of her labor” belongs to the husband? When she did not exert herself in this work.

But if she strained herself and exerted herself in her work, and as a result produced extra through her labor—“extra produced through exertion”—the tannaim disagree in the Mishna in tractate Nedarim [which is cited below in our discussion] whether it belongs to her or to her husband.

D. The amoraim, Sages of the Gemara, disagree in the discussion below as to how the Sages established these ordinances—

Did the foundation of their ordinance consist of the husband’s giving his wife sustenance and giving her a silver coin for her needs, while they instituted that in exchange for her sustenance, the products of her labor would belong to her husband, because if she did not give them to him, there would be hostility between them: he would provide her sustenance, while she would not give him the products of her labor?

Or was the primary ordinance of the Sages that the wife engage in work that brings monetary profit to her husband, and that the products of her labor belong to him [and even if she produces more through her labor than the amount that the Sages obligated her to produce, the extra would also belong to the husband]? Rather, in exchange for the products of her labor, the Sages instituted that the husband provide her sustenance and give her a silver coin every week.

D. According to the second possibility, the amoraim disagree in the discussion below: Did the Sages institute the sustenance “in exchange for the products of her labor, and did the Sages institute the silver coin in exchange for the ‘surplus of her labor’”?

Or is the sustenance in exchange for the surplus of her labor, while the weekly silver coin is in exchange for the principal products of her labor?

Mishna:

One who consecrates

the

products of his wife’s labor

that she is obligated to perform for her husband [as explained in the Mishna below, on 59b: “And she spins wool”] before she has produced them—the products of her labor do not become consecrated through his declaration. Rather,

she continues to produce

the products of her labor for herself,

and eats

from them, as the reason will be explained in the Gemara.

But if he consecrated the

“surplus”

of the products of her labor, beyond the amount established by the Sages, [and this surplus also belongs to the husband]—

Rabbi Meir says:

it is

consecrated.

Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker says:

it is

ordinary property.

The entire Mishna is explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav:

A woman can say to her husband: “I will not be supported

by you,

and I will produce nothing

for you. Rather, I will work only for myself and support myself.”

The Gemara explains:

Rav holds

that

when the Sages instituted

sustenance and the products of labor as one in exchange for the other, the ordinance concerning

sustenance

was

the primary

ordinance, and they instituted it for the benefit of the woman, lest the products of her labor not suffice for her sustenance.

And

the ordinance that

the products of her labor

would belong to her husband, the Sages instituted only in exchange for the sustenance that he provides her.

And they instituted it

because of “hostility”

in order to prevent hatred between them if he provides her sustenance [by virtue of their ordinance], while she does not give him the products of her labor.

And

therefore,

when she said

the woman:

“I will not be supported

by you, because I do not want this benefit that the Sages instituted for me,

and

therefore I also

will not produce

products of labor for you in exchange!”—

she has that option.

They raise an objection from a source

against Rav, from the words of the beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna, in which the opposite of his statement was taught:

As it was taught:

The Sages instituted

that the husband give the woman

sustenance—

in exchange for the products of her labor.

But Rav holds that they instituted that the products of her labor are in exchange for her sustenance!?

And we answer:

Say

that this is how the beraita should be read:

They instituted that the products of her labor are in exchange for sustenance.

The Gemara discusses:

Can we say that it supports him,

that there is support for Rav’s statement from our Mishna?

As we learned:

One who consecrates his wife’s products of labor,

his consecration does not take effect,

and she continues to produce

her work,

and eats,

supporting herself from it, because the products of her labor do not belong to him, so that he could consecrate them and prohibit them to his wife.

The Gemara infers from this that the Mishna says that this woman supports herself from the products of her labor and not from sustenance provided by her husband, and that the husband cannot consecrate the products of her labor even though they belong to him:

Is it not the case

that our Mishna is dealing

with

a woman who is

supported

by her husband, who has property and wishes to support her, but she does not wish to be supported by him and said to her husband, “I will not be supported and I will not produce”?

Therefore, the husband cannot consecrate the products of her labor, because if she said this to him, they do not belong to him.

This proves Rav Huna’s statement in the name of Rav, that a woman can relinquish the ordinance instituted for her benefit and say, “I will not be supported and I will not produce.” We reject this:

No,

not as you said—that our Mishna is dealing with a woman whose husband wishes to support her, but she refuses and wishes to support herself through her work.

Rather, in fact, a woman cannot say, “I will not be supported and I will not produce.” The ordinance of the Sages was established in the opposite manner: the products of her labor belong to the husband, and in exchange they instituted that the husband support her. They did not institute that the products of her labor are in exchange for her sustenance, as Rav holds.

The reason that her products of labor are not consecrated, despite the fact that her products of labor belong to her husband, is that our Mishna is dealing

with

a woman

who is not supported

by her husband because he has no property and no ability to support her. In such a case, her products of labor do not belong to him; rather, she is entitled to support herself from the products of her labor. Therefore, the husband cannot consecrate them.

The Gemara questions the interpretation that the Mishna is dealing with such a case:

But

if

our Mishna is dealing

with

a woman

who is not supported

by her husband, then

what is the point of stating it!?

What novelty is there in saying that he has no right to consecrate her products of labor when he does not provide her sustenance, and why did the tanna need to teach this law? It is obvious that if she receives no sustenance from her husband, she need not go begging from door to door; rather, she supports herself from the products of her labor! For—

Even according to the one who says

that the master can

[the master of a slave]

say to his slave

who belongs to him,

“Work for me

but

I

will not

support you;

rather, go and beg from door to door,”

this applies to a Canaanite slave, for it is not written concerning him [

Deuteronomy 15:16] “For it is good for him

with you” [as it is written concerning a Hebrew slave], and therefore his master is not obligated to maintain living conditions for him equal to his own [as he is obligated to do with a Hebrew slave]—

[как написано об иврейском рабе], и поэтому его господин не обязан обращаться с ним на условиях жизни, равных его собственным [как он обязан обращаться с ивритским рабом] —

But concerning a Hebrew slave, about whom it is written: “And it shall be, when he says to you [the Hebrew slave], ‘I will not leave you, for it is good for him

с тобой”» —

with you’”—

no!

His master cannot say to him, “I will not give you sustenance, while the products of your labor belong to me; go and beg from door to door.” For if the master says this to his slave, the living conditions of the Hebrew slave will not be equal to those of his master, whereas the Torah obligated the master of a Hebrew slave, “and it shall be good for him with you,” meaning that his living conditions must be similar to yours—

And all the more so

the husband cannot say this to

his wife,

for she is not his maidservant.

And we answer: In fact, our Mishna is speaking of a woman who is not supported by her husband.

And as for what you asked—what is the Mishna’s novelty—

the answer is:

The latter clause

of our Mishna

was necessary for the tanna

to teach us, as it contains a novelty. Because of the latter clause, he also stated the first clause, even though it contains no novelty.

As we learned in the latter clause: When a husband consecrates the

surplus

of his wife’s products of labor—

Rabbi Meir says: It is consecrated.

Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker says: It is ordinary property.

The Gemara will explain below why, according to Rabbi Meir, the consecration takes effect on the surplus even though the husband does not support her, and apparently also does not give her the weekly silver coin, in exchange for which the Sages instituted that he acquire the surplus [see Rashi, who added that the consecration takes effect on the surplus only after the woman dies and her husband inherits her].

The Gemara now returns to the main statement of Rav Huna in the name of Rav, and explains:

This disagrees

with this statement of Rav Huna in the name of Rav, who holds that a woman can say to her husband, “I will not be supported and I will not produce,” with the statement

that

was

said by Reish Lakish!

For Reish Lakish said: Do not say,

do not say that

the reason for Rabbi Meir

in our Mishna, who said that the husband can consecrate the surplus of his wife’s products of labor even though she has not yet produced them, and they are “something that has not yet come into existence”—

is

because Rabbi Meir holds:

Rabbi Meir holds that

a person can consecrate something that has not yet come into existence. For it is possible that Rabbi Meir also holds that a person cannot consecrate something that has not yet come into existence.

Ведь возможно, что и согласно рабби Меиру человек не может посвятить вещь, которой ещё нет в мире.

Rather, the reason for Rabbi Meir,

who holds that he can consecrate the products of his wife’s labor, is:

Since he can

the husband

compel

his wife so that even the surplus would be

the products of her labor

belonging to him, it follows that he is considered to have a right to her hands themselves.

Therefore, when he consecrates the products of her labor,

it is as though

he

said to her: “May your hands be consecrated

to the One who made them”!

That is, it is as though he said: “Your hands themselves shall be consecrated to the Holy One, blessed be He, who made your hands!”

Therefore, the consecration takes effect, since his wife’s hands do indeed exist in the world. And since Reish Lakish said that he can compel her to do this, it follows that the woman cannot remove his right to the products of her labor by saying, “I will not be supported and I will not produce.”

But the Gemara questions Reish Lakish’s interpretation of Rabbi Meir’s statement:

But he did not say to her

the husband did not say to his wife

this!

For he did not consecrate the hands themselves; rather, he consecrated the products of her hands!?

And we answer:

Since we have heard Rabbi Meir say: A person does not make his words meaningless,

and when a person says something that he knows cannot take effect as he stated it, we explain his words as meaning that he intended them in a manner through which they can take effect —

Therefore, even when he consecrated the product of the hands themselves, since he knows that a person does not consecrate something that has not yet come into the world,

he is considered as saying to her, “Let your hands be consecrated to their Maker”.

For only in this manner will his words be fulfilled!

And the Gemara raises an objection against the words of Reish Lakish:

And

since

Rabbi Meir held

that

a person does not consecrate something that has not yet come into the world,

was it necessary for Reish Lakish to say, “Do not say” that Rabbi Meir’s reason is because a person consecrates something that has not yet come into the world?!

And it was taught in a beraita: One who says to a woman

whom he cannot betroth at present—

“Behold, you are betrothed to me”—

a.

“after I convert”!

For example, he was a gentile, and he betroths a Jewish woman, so that her betrothal should take effect after he converts. For while he is a gentile, he is not fit to betroth a Jewish woman.

Or, “after you convert”.

For example, an Israelite betrothed a gentile woman and said to her that her betrothal should take effect after she converts.

b. Or he was a slave and betrothed a Jewish woman, saying to her that his betrothal should take effect

“after I am freed”

and become fit to betroth a Jewish woman.

Or she was a maidservant, while the husband was a free Israelite, and he betrothed her so that her betrothal should take effect

“after you are freed”,

and you become fit to be betrothed to me—

c. Or he betrothed a married woman,

“after your husband dies”,

and you become unmarried and fit to be betrothed to me—

d.

Or

“after”

“your sister dies”,

the one currently married to me, for then you will not be forbidden to me by the prohibition of “a wife’s sister,” and you will be fit to be betrothed to me—

e.

Or

one who betroths a yevama while she is a “woman awaiting levirate marriage,” and says to her that his betrothal should take effect in her

“after your yavam performs halitza for you”,

and you will no longer be a woman awaiting levirate marriage, and you will be fit to be betrothed to me—

In all these cases—

Rabbi Meir says:

Although it is impossible for the betrothal to take effect now, but only after the couple become fit for betrothal, and these betrothals are consequently now betrothals involving something that has not yet come into the world—in spite of this, she is

betrothed!

And if so, this is difficult: Since Rabbi Meir holds that a person can perform an act so that it takes effect even upon something that has not yet come into the world, Rabbi Meir’s words in our Mishna are found to have their simple meaning, for although the surplus of the product of the hands is not found in the world, according to Rabbi Meir a person consecrates something that has not yet come into the world. And if so, why did Reish Lakish need to explain Rabbi Meir’s words in another manner?!

And we answer: This is what Reish Lakish said:

From that

beraita,

yes,

it is indeed proven that Rabbi Meir holds that “a person transfers ownership of something that has not yet come into the world”—

But Reish Lakish said that

from this,

from our Mishna concerning the surplus of the product of the hands—

nothing can be inferred from it

that Rabbi Meir holds that a person can perform an act that takes effect upon something that has not yet come into the world, since it is possible to explain his reason as Reish Lakish explained it, and this law would be correct even if we say that a person does not consecrate something that has not yet come into the world.

We learned in the Mishna: If the husband consecrated

the surplus—

Rabbi Meir says: It is consecrated.

And the Gemara discusses:

When is

the surplus consecrated?

Does the surplus of the product of the hands become consecrated immediately when she produces it, because our Mishna is dealing with a husband who has a right to the surplus of the product of the hands,

even though he has no right to the principal product of her hands and cannot consecrate it, as explained in the first clause?

Rav and Shmuel, both of whom said:

The surplus

of the product of her hands—only

after death

is it

consecrated.

When his wife dies and the husband inherits the surplus. But during her lifetime it is not consecrated, for our Mishna is dealing with a woman who is not sustained by her husband, as explained in the first clause. And presumably her husband also does not give her a silver coin, which is in exchange for the surplus.

Rav Adda bar Ahava said: The surplus—

even

during her lifetime

is it

consecrated,

immediately when she produces it. And because he has a right to the surplus, although he has no right to the product of the hands itself. And the Gemara proceeds to explain the reason for the matter.

Consider it

with astonishment,

Rav Pappa: In what

manner does our Mishna deal?

If you say,

if it is said that

he gives her

the husband

sustenance, and gives her

also

a silver coin for her needs,

and in exchange for these two things the husband acquires both the principal product of her hands and the surplus of the product of her hands—

It is impossible to say so. For it would be difficult—

What is the reason of the one who says

[Rav and Shmuel] that only

after death

alone is it

consecrated

the surplus?! For since he gives her both sustenance and a weekly silver coin, the product of her hands and the surplus of the product of her hands already belong to him during her lifetime, so why can he not consecrate it?!

But rather, perhaps you will say that our Mishna deals

with a case

where the husband does not

give her

sustenance, and does not give her a silver coin for her needs—

This too is impossible to say. For it would be difficult—if so,

what is the reason of the one who says

[Rav Adda bar Ahava] that already

during her lifetime

it is

consecrated?!

For surely the surplus of the product of her hands does not belong to him when he does not give her what is due to her in exchange for the surplus?!

And we answer: According to Rav and Shmuel, who hold that the surplus of the product of the hands is not consecrated during her lifetime, our Mishna is dealing with a husband who gives his wife neither sustenance nor a silver coin. Therefore, the husband has no right either to the product of her hands or to the surplus of the product of her hands. Just as she produces and eats the principal product of her hands during her lifetime, so she takes the surplus of the product of her hands and eats it. And that which we learned, that the surplus is consecrated, means specifically after death.

But according to Rav Adda bar Ahava, our Mishna is dealing with a different situation:

In fact,

where he gives her sustenance,

for according to Rav Adda bar Ahava it is in exchange for “the surplus of the product of her hands,” and not in exchange for “the product of the hands.” And since he gives her the payment for “the surplus of the product of her hands,” he can consecrate the surplus even during her lifetime.

But

however,

he does not give her a silver coin for her needs,

which is in exchange for the principal product of her hands.

Therefore, he cannot consecrate the principal product of her hands during her lifetime; rather, she produces and eats, as we learned in the first clause.

And the Gemara explains the reason for the dispute between Rav and Shmuel and Rav Adda bar Ahava:

Rav and Shmuel—

who do not explain the Mishna like Rav Adda bar Ahava—their reason is that they

hold,

that the sustenance that the husband gives her is not in exchange for the surplus. Rather: