Ketubot 52a (נב.) — the Talmud in English

However,

a mamzeret or a netina

married to

an Israelite,

even though she too has a ketuba and the conditions of the ketuba, which she collects when she leaves him,

he is not obligated to redeem her,

since from the outset he did not undertake this condition,

as

indeed

I do not find applicable to her

what is written for an Israelite woman in the conditions of the ketuba:

“And I will take you back as my wife,”

since he cannot take her back.

Rava said: Anyone for whom the prohibition resulting from captivity causes the difficulty,

such as a woman married to a kohen, who, had she not been taken captive, would have been permitted to him—

he is obligated to redeem her,

since this is what he undertook toward her from the outset.

But if

a different prohibition causes the difficulty,

such as a woman married to a High Priest—

he is not obligated to redeem her,

because he did not undertake this obligation toward her from the outset, as we say regarding a mamzeret and a netina: he did not undertake it toward her originally.

Rava maintains that the conditions of the ketuba of an Israelite and of a kohen are identical; the kohen merely adds a stipulation that even if she becomes forbidden to him because of captivity, she will not lose her ketuba obligation of redemption.

Shall we say

that the dispute between Abaye and Rava

is

a dispute over the

condition

?

For we learned in a beraita:

One who makes his wife prohibited by vow from deriving benefit

from him,

and she is taken captive, Rabbi Eliezer says:

Even though he will ultimately have to divorce her because of the vow, he

redeems

her

and gives her the payment of her ketuba.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: He gives her the payment of her ketuba

but does not redeem her.

Rabbi Natan said: I asked Sumakhos: When Rabbi Yehoshua said

that he

gives her the payment of her ketuba but does not redeem her,

did he mean specifically

when he made her prohibited by vow and she was subsequently taken captive, or

perhaps even

when she was taken captive and he subsequently made her prohibited by vow

he does not redeem her, even though it is reasonable to assume that he made her prohibited by vow only in order to avoid the redemption obligation?

And he said to me: I have not heard

anything concerning this matter.

But it appears that

the

matter is

specifically that when

he made her prohibited by vow and she was subsequently taken captive

he is not obligated to redeem her.

For if you say

that even when she was

taken captive and he subsequently made her prohibited by vow

he does not redeem her,

he would come to resort to deception

and make her prohibited by vow in order to avoid redeeming her!

Is that not

specifically

when one makes the wife of a kohen prohibited by vow,

that is, when a kohen makes his wife prohibited by vow—

they disagree,

because although she has become forbidden to him by the vow, I still find applicable to her the phrase, “And I will restore you to your land,” and therefore Rabbi Eliezer says that he redeems her. But in the case of the wife of an Israelite, to whom I cannot apply the phrase, “And I will take you back as my wife,” he does not redeem her.

And

if so,

Abaye stated his opinion in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer,

who says that he redeems her,

and Rava stated his opinion in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua,

who says that he does not redeem her, because a different prohibition caused the difficulty for her.

And we reject this:

No. With what are we dealing here? With a case where she made a vow

herself

and he upheld it

for her—that is, either he said that the vow should remain in force, or he remained silent on the day he heard the vow and did not annul it.

Rabbi Eliezer holds

that this is as though

he placed a finger between her teeth

for her to bite, since he caused the vow to remain in force, preventing him from fulfilling the phrase, “And I will restore you as my wife”; therefore he is obligated to redeem her.

And Rabbi Yehoshua holds

that this is as though

she placed a finger between her teeth

and was bitten, since she caused herself to prevent the husband from fulfilling the phrase, “And I will restore you as my wife”; therefore he is not obligated to redeem her.

And we question this:

If she placed a finger between her teeth,

thereby causing herself to become forbidden to him, then

what is the basis for the ketuba,

that she should receive payment of her ketuba?

Furthermore,

we learned in that same beraita:

Rabbi Natan said: I asked Sumakhos: When Rabbi Yehoshua said

that he

gives her the payment of her ketuba but does not redeem her,

did he mean

when he made her prohibited by vow and she was subsequently taken captive

specifically,

or

even

when she was taken captive and he subsequently made her prohibited by vow,

despite the concern that he made her prohibited by vow in order to avoid redeeming her?

And

Sumakhos said

to him: I have not heard.

And if

the case is

that she made the vow herself

and he upheld it,

what difference is there

whether

he made her prohibited by vow and she was subsequently taken captive, or whether she was taken captive and he subsequently made her prohibited by vow?

After all, she was the one who made the vow; therefore there is no concern that he will resort to deception in order to avoid redeeming her!

Rather, always

the case is

that he made her prohibited by vow

himself,

and Abaye explains the matter according to his reasoning, while Rava explains it according to his reasoning.

Abaye explains the matter according to his reasoning

as follows:

A widow married to a High Priest

—

everyone agrees that he is obligated to redeem her,

since I can apply to her both initially, when he stipulated the condition, and ultimately, when the condition comes into effect, the phrase: “And I will restore you to your land.” A mamzeret or a netina married to an Israelite

—

everyone agrees that he is not obligated to redeem her,

since I can apply to her neither initially nor ultimately the phrase, “And I will take you back as my wife,” as she was forbidden to him from the outset.

One who makes the wife of a kohen prohibited by vow,

also—

everyone agrees that he is obligated to redeem her, that is,

as in the case of

a widow married to a High Priest,

since the condition, “And I will restore you to your land,” can be fulfilled both at the time of the stipulation and ultimately.

They disagree

—Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua—

in the case of one who makes the wife of an Israelite prohibited by vow,

since at the time of the stipulation the condition could properly be fulfilled, as he could take her back. But ultimately he cannot take her back, since he made her prohibited by vow. And they disagree as follows:

Rabbi Eliezer follows the initial state,

that is, the time when the condition was stipulated, and at that time he could fulfill it; therefore he is obligated to redeem her.

And Rabbi Yehoshua follows the final state,

when he cannot fulfill the condition; therefore he is not obligated.

And

if

Rava explains the matter according to his reasoning,

it is as follows:

A widow married to a High Priest,

and likewise

a mamzeret or a netina married to an Israelite

—

everyone agrees that he is not obligated to redeem her.

The reason in the case of a mamzeret and a netina is that the condition cannot properly be fulfilled either initially or ultimately, since she is forbidden to him.

And in the case of a widow married to a High Priest, although he can fulfill the condition, “And I will restore you to your land,” this is not because of captivity, but because of a different matter—that is, because she is forbidden to him.

They disagree

in the case of one who makes a woman prohibited by vow, both with regard to the wife of a kohen and with regard to the wife of an Israelite

—that is, whether the husband is a kohen or whether the husband is an Israelite.

In the case of the wife of a kohen, initially, at the time of the stipulation, the condition, “And I will restore you to your land,” could properly be fulfilled because of captivity, and not only because of a different matter. But ultimately he cannot take her back because of a different matter, namely, because of the vow.

Likewise, in the case of an Israelite, initially the condition, “And I will take you back as my wife,” could properly be fulfilled. But ultimately this is no longer possible, since he made her forbidden to him.

And they disagree as follows:

Rabbi Eliezer follows the initial state, and Rabbi Yehoshua follows the final state.

We learned in our Mishna:

If she was taken captive, he is obligated to redeem her, etc.

The Sages taught: If she was taken captive during her husband’s lifetime

and afterward her husband died,

if

her husband knew about it

—that she had been taken captive before he died—

the heirs are obligated to redeem her,

since the husband became obligated to redeem her during his lifetime.

But if

her husband did not know about it

—that she had been taken captive until after he died—

the

heirs

are not obligated to redeem her,

since the husband did not become obligated during his lifetime, and the obligation to redeem her does not rest upon the heirs.

Levi considered acting

—performing an act of practical halakha—

in accordance with this beraita.

Rav said to him: Thus said my beloved

—Rabbi Hiyya, who was his uncle—

the halakha is not in accordance with this beraita,

but even if her husband knew that she had been taken captive before he died, the heirs are not obligated to redeem her.

And this is as it was taught

in a beraita:

If she was taken captive after her husband’s death

—

the orphans are not obligated to redeem her.

Moreover, even

if

she was taken captive during her husband’s lifetime and afterward her husband died

the orphans are not obligated to redeem her,

because

I do not find applicable to her

now, after her husband’s death, the condition written in the ketuba:

“And I will take you back as my wife.”

The Sages taught: If she was taken captive, and they demanded from him

—from her husband—

up to

ten

times her value

—that is, ten times the price she would be worth if sold in the marketplace—

the first time

she was taken captive, he

redeems

her even for such a sum.

But

from that point onward,

if

he wishes

he redeems her. If he wishes,

he does not redeem her,

since the Sages enacted for her only one redemption.