Ketubot 52b (נב:) — the Talmud in English

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says:

Indeed!

Captives are not redeemed for more than their value, for the betterment of society.

That is, so that the captors will not become accustomed to increasing the ransom demanded for the captives.

And we raise an objection: It follows from the beraita that, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, it is specifically when they demand more than the captives’ value that the captives are not redeemed.

But when they demand their value—

they are redeemed

by them,

even though her redemption exceeds

the amount of

her ketuba!

And we raise a contradiction: If she was taken captive, and they were demanding from him up to ten times the amount of her ketuba, the first time—

he redeems her. From then onward, if he wishes—

he redeems her; if he wishes—

he does not redeem her.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If her ransom was equal to her ketuba—

he redeems her. If not—

he does not redeem her!

And this proves that even though the captors are not demanding more than her value, if they demand more than the amount of her ketuba, he is not obligated to redeem her!

And we answer:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds two leniencies

[two lenient positions concerning redemption]:

a. He does not redeem her for more than the value she commands in the marketplace.

b. Even when the ransom does not exceed her market value, he is not obligated to redeem her for more than the amount of her ketuba.

We learned in our Mishna:

If she became ill, he is obligated to heal her.

The Sages taught: A widow

who

is sustained from the property of the orphans and requires medical treatment—

it is

[the medical treatment]

like sustenance,

and she receives the cost of her medical treatment from them. This is because both of these matters—sustenance and medical treatment—are necessities of her life.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Medical treatment whose cost is fixed—

she is healed from

the money of

her ketuba,

and it is not included in sustenance, since sustenance has no fixed cost.

But medical treatment

whose cost is not fixed—

it is

like sustenance.

For it resembles sustenance, which likewise has no fixed cost.

Rabbi Yohanan said: In Eretz Yisrael, they treated bloodletting—

as medical treatment whose cost is not fixed.

Rabbi Yohanan’s relatives had a father’s wife

[their father’s wife],

who required medical treatment every day,

and they were required to pay for her treatment, since it is like sustenance, whose cost is not fixed.

They came

the relatives

before Rabbi Yohanan

to ask how they should proceed.

He said to them: Go and establish a fixed fee for her with the physician,

that is, agree with the physician on a sum for which he will undertake to treat her permanently. In this way, her medical treatment will be considered something whose cost is fixed, and she will collect that amount from her ketuba; it will not be treated like sustenance!

Rabbi Yohanan said: We have made ourselves like advocates for the litigants

[that is, one who favors one of the litigants, presents his arguments persuasively to the judge, and arranges the case before him in order to have him acquitted. He is called an “advocate for the litigants,” because he arranges the judges so as to turn their hearts in this person’s favor]. For I too gave my relatives advice on how to avoid paying for her medical treatment.

And we wonder:

At first,

initially, when he gave them the advice,

what did he think, and ultimately,

when he regretted it and said, “We have made ourselves like advocates for the litigants,”

what did he think?

And we explain:

At first he thought

that he was required to give them advice because of what is written:

“And from your flesh

[your relative]

you shall not hide yourself.”

But ultimately he thought: A distinguished person—

such as I

[who am different] , and therefore I should have been careful not to give advice even to my relatives.

Mishna:

If he

did not write for her

in her ketuba:

“The male children that you will have from me, they shall inherit the money

of your ketuba, in addition to their share with their brothers,”

[that is, he writes for her that if she dies during his lifetime and he inherits her, the male children she has from him will inherit the money of her ketuba and her dowry, in addition to the share they will divide with their brothers from another wife, while the children of the other wife will likewise inherit their mother’s ketuba. The practical difference is when this woman’s ketuba is larger than the other’s, or when the second wife has more sons; in such cases it is advantageous for them to take their mother’s ketuba, even if the two ketubot are equal], nevertheless

he is obligated

to fulfill this provision, because

it is a stipulation of the court.

And likewise, if he did not write for her:

“The female children that you will have from me shall reside in my house and be sustained from my property until they marry men”—

he is obligated, as it is a stipulation of the court.

And likewise, if he did not write for her:

“You shall reside in my house and be sustained from my property all the days of the duration

of your widowhood in my house

[all the days of the duration of your widowhood]”—

he is obligated, as it is a stipulation of the court.

This is how the people of Jerusalem used to write.

And likewise,

the people of the Galilee—

used to write as did the people of Jerusalem.

But

the people of Judea used to write

in the ketuba: “You shall reside in my house, etc.

until the heirs wish to give you your ketuba. Therefore, if the heirs wish, they give her the amount of her ketuba—

and release her.

Gemara:

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: Since the husband inherits his wife,

why did

the Sages

institute the ketubat benin dikhrin,

so that he would bequeath to her sons the dowry that he inherited from her?

So that a man will be impelled to write for his daughter

a generous dowry—

like

that which he leaves to

his son

as an inheritance. Since her father now knows that her sons will receive what he gives her, he will give it to her generously!

And we wonder:

Is there anything that the Merciful One said: A son—

shall inherit, whereas a daughter—

shall not inherit

[since by Torah law only a son inherits, while a daughter does not],

and the Sages came and instituted that a daughter shall inherit

[and the Sages came and instituted that a daughter too shall inherit], so that she would receive the money that was fit for his sons to inherit?

And we explain:

This too,

that the father should give his daughter a generous dowry—

is by Torah law, as it is written: “Take wives and beget sons and daughters, and take wives for your sons and give your daughters to men.”

And now,

as for sons—

they are in his power,

as he can seek a wife for himself, since it is customary for a man to pursue a woman.

But as for his daughters—

are they in his power?

Is it customary for a woman to pursue a man?

Rather,

this verse teaches us

that

he should clothe her, provide her with clothing, and give her something

[her father should clothe her, provide her with clothing, and give her a dowry],

so that they will be impelled to pursue her—

and come to marry her

[so that they will be impelled to marry her].

And how much

should he give her as a dowry?

Abaye and Rava both said: Up to one-tenth of his property

[up to one-tenth of his assets].

And we raise an objection:

Perhaps

the dowry

of the father

[that the father gave her]—

shall be inherited,

and her sons will indeed inherit it, since that is why the ketubat benin dikhrin was instituted: so that her father would give her a generous dowry and they would be impelled to marry her. But the ketuba and the additional amount

of the husband—

shall not be inherited!

And we explain:

If so,

if they would not inherit the husband’s ketuba as well, we fear that

the father too would refrain

[would refrain]

and would not write for his daughter,

as the father would say: If the husband is particular about his own property and will not bequeath it to my daughter’s sons, I too will refrain from increasing the dowry I give him.

And we raise an objection: Since the entire institution of the ketubat benin dikhrin is intended to induce the father to write a dowry for his daughter, then

perhaps

only

where the father wrote

a dowry for his daughter

the

husband should write

the ketubat benin dikhrin. But

where the father did not write—

the husband should not write

the ketubat benin dikhrin

at all!

And we answer: Since most ketubot include a dowry,

the Sages did not distinguish

between one ketuba and another, and instituted that the ketubat benin dikhrin be written in every ketuba.

And we raise an objection: Since the entire institution is intended to induce the father to give his daughter a dowry, then why did they institute this provision only for male children? Let us say that

a daughter among the sons,

that is, if this woman has only a daughter, while he has sons from another woman,

shall also inherit

[inherit] her mother’s dowry and ketuba, since the rationale for the institution applies in this case as well!

And we explain: This institution

the Sages established as inheritance,

since they write in the ketuba the language “they shall inherit,” and a daughter does not inherit among sons.

And we raise an objection: And still,

a daughter among the daughters,

that is, if he has only daughters from his two wives—

shall inherit

her mother’s ketuba, since when there are only daughters, they have the status of heirs!

And we say:

The Sages did not distinguish

with regard to the ketubat benin dikhrin, saying that a daughter among sons does not inherit, whereas among daughters she does inherit.

And we consider the matter: Since the rationale for the ketubat benin dikhrin is the dowry that the woman’s father brought into the marriage,

should it also be collected

even

from movable property

[whereas earlier, on page 50, we said that the ketubat benin dikhrin is inherited only from real estate]!

And we say: The ketubat benin dikhrin—

the Sages established it as equivalent to a ketuba ,

and the orphans’ movable property is not liened to the ketuba document.

And we raise an objection: If the Sages established it as equivalent to a ketuba,

should it seize property from purchasers

[and below there is a dispute concerning this]!

And we answer:

“They shall inherit,” we learned ,

for this ketuba is like an inheritance, and an inheritance does not seize property from purchasers.

The law of the ketubat benin dikhrin applies specifically when, in addition to the mother’s ketuba, there is an inheritance containing property worth at least one dinar, with which the division of the inheritance prescribed by the Torah can be carried out.

And we consider the matter:

Perhaps

that

even though there is no surplus of one dinar

in the inheritance beyond the mother’s ketuba, the law of the ketubat benin dikhrin should apply!?

And we answer:

Where the

[the law of]

Torah inheritance would be uprooted—

the Sages did not institute

the ketubat benin dikhrin. Therefore, only where there is a surplus of one dinar, making it possible to maintain the Torah’s law of inheritance, do we say that these sons take their mother’s ketuba and those sons take their mother’s ketuba.

Rav Pappa arranged for his son

to marry a daughter from

the household of Abba Sura'a

[he was his father-in-law, and Rav Pappa married his wife’s sister to his son].

Rav Pappa went

to the girl’s father’s home

to write her ketuba,

where her father would determine and write the amount he would give as her dowry.

Yehuda bar Meremar heard

that Rav Pappa had arrived,

and he went out and came to show him honor.

When they reached the entrance

of Abba Sura'a’s home,

Yehuda was taking leave

of

him,

Rav Pappa.

Rav Pappa said to him

Rav Pappa said to Yehuda:

Let the Master enter with me

[enter together with me]!