Ketubot 51b (נא:) — the Talmud in English

As we learned in a Mishna: If one found promissory notes, if

they contain a lien on property, meaning that the borrower mortgaged his property to the lender—

he may not return

the document to the lender, even if the borrower admits that he did not repay the loan.

And the reason is that

the court collects from them,

from a document that contains a lien, and seizes property from purchasers. If so, there is concern that perhaps the borrower actually already repaid the loan, and the borrower and lender made a collusive arrangement between them, so that the lender will now seize property from the purchasers and divide the proceeds with the borrower.

But if

they do not contain a lien on property—

he returns it,

because

the court does not collect from them,

and there is no concern of collusion.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

But the Sages say: Both this and that

whether it contains a lien or whether it does not contain one—

he may not return it,

because

the court collects from them,

since the omission of a lien from the document is a scribal error. If so, there is always concern of collusion. And Rabbi Yehuda is included among these Sages who disagreed with Rabbi Meir, as he was his contemporary.

If so, this is difficult: Is the

first clause

of the Mishna the statement of

Rabbi Meir

and

the

second

clause

of that same Mishna the statement of

Rabbi Yehuda

?!

And if you would say

that

the entire

Mishna is the statement of

Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir distinguishes between a marriage contract and

other

documents,

for although Rabbi Meir maintains with regard to all other documents that the mention of a lien is not a scribal error, with regard to a marriage contract he maintains that it is a scribal error,

does he really distinguish between them?

And it was taught in a beraita: Five

matters

are collected

only

from unencumbered property

[from free property], and if there is no free property, one does not seize property from encumbered property.

And these are they:

1.

Produce and the appreciation of produce,

that is, for example, if a person robbed a field from another and sold it to someone else, and the purchaser enhanced it by fertilizing and plowing it, and afterward the robbed party took the field from the purchaser together with the enhancement that he had made in it, and also with its produce; the purchaser now returns to the seller, who sold it to him with a guarantee, to collect from him. He collects the principal from encumbered property, but he collects the appreciation and the produce only from unencumbered property, since their amount is not fixed, and the purchasers could not have taken care to avoid purchasing from him property corresponding to the appreciation and the produce.

2.

And one who undertakes to provide sustenance for his wife’s son and his wife’s daughter,

these too do not collect from encumbered property, since the amount of the sustenance is not fixed, and the matter is not written in a document.

3.

And a promissory note

[a debt document]

that does not

state

a lien,

4.

and a woman’s marriage contract that does not

state

a lien.

And from the fact that the beraita states that a document that does not contain a lien does not allow collection from encumbered property, it is proven that the tanna who taught the beraita maintains that the mention of a lien is not a scribal error.

And

who is it that you hear say that the mention of a lien is not a scribal error? Rabbi Meir! And it teaches

in the beraita that even with regard to

a woman’s marriage contract

we do not say that the omission of a lien is a scribal error!

And we answer:

If you wish, say—

our Mishna is the statement of

Rabbi Meir

and

if you wish, say—it is the statement of

Rabbi Yehuda.

words.

If you wish, say—it is the statement of

Rabbi Yehuda.

In

that

case, what Rabbi Yehuda said—that he may write in her marriage contract two hundred and give her only one hundred—applies specifically when

she wrote for him, “I have received from you one hundred,”

but

here,

in our Mishna, it is referring to a case where

she did not write for him, “I have received.”

Our Mishna teaches us that even though he did not write a marriage contract for her, we do not say that she waived her claim to it. Rather, we say that she relied on the enactment of the court, since everyone knows that when a man marries a woman, she has a marriage contract.

And

if you wish, say—it is the statement of

Rabbi Meir,

and

what is the meaning of “he is liable,” which it teaches

in our Mishna [that if he did not write a marriage contract for her, he is liable to give it to her]? It means that she collects only

from unencumbered property,

but she does not collect from encumbered property, since the debt was not written in a document, and the mention of a lien is not a scribal error.

We learned in our Mishna:

“If he did not write for her,” and so on.

Abbahu of Shmuel said: A Jewish woman who was raped—

is forbidden to her husband.

Because

we are concerned that perhaps the beginning

of the intercourse was indeed

under coercion,

but

the end was consensual.

Rav raised an objection to Abbahu of Shmuel

from what is written in the marriage contract:

“If you are taken captive, I will redeem you”—

“and I will restore you to myself as a wife,”

yet it is reasonable that the captive woman had intercourse while in captivity, and nevertheless the husband may take her back as his wife!

Abbahu

remained silent, for he had no answer to this.

Rav recited concerning Abbahu of Shmuel

this verse:

“Rulers refrained from speaking, and placed their hand upon their mouth.”

What could he say?

That specifically

in the case of a captive woman they were lenient

and permitted her to return to her husband, since we did not see that she had intercourse. But what Abbahu of Shmuel said—that she is forbidden—refers to a case where we saw that she had intercourse.

And we ask:

But according to Abbahu of Shmuel,

who said that a woman who was raped is forbidden to her husband,

the rape that the Torah permits

[as it is written in the passage concerning a sota: “And she was not seized,” meaning that she was not raped. And they expound: If she was seized, she is permitted]—

how can you find it

that she is permitted to her husband, since we are concerned that the end was consensual? And we explain:

For example, witnesses say that she cried out from the beginning to the end

of the intercourse, so that it is clear to us that from beginning to end it was under coercion.

And

what Abbahu of Shmuel said

disagrees with Rava.

For Rava said: In every case where the beginning was under coercion and the end was consensual, even if she says, “Leave him alone,”

to the rapist,

for had he not forced himself upon her, she

would have

hired him

to have intercourse with her, nevertheless—

she is permitted.

What is the reason?

Because we say that through the beginning of the intercourse, which was under coercion,

the inclination possessed her

[the rapist aroused desire in her], and if so, the end of the intercourse was also under coercion.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rava:

It is written in the passage concerning a sota:

“And she was not seized”—

in which case she is

forbidden.

It follows that

if

she was

seized,

meaning that she was raped—

she is permitted.

And

the word “she” is an exclusion, and the verse comes to teach us that

there is for you

a woman

who, although she was not seized—

is permitted.

And which is it?

This is one whose beginning was under coercion

and whose end was consensual.

For although the end of the intercourse was consensual, and she was not seized, nevertheless she is permitted.

Another beraita was taught: “And she was not seized”—

she is forbidden. If she was seized—

she is permitted. And

from the exclusion expressed by the word “she,” we learn that

there is another woman who, although she was seized—

is forbidden.

And which is she?

This is the wife of a kohein,

who is forbidden even if she was raped.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: “And she was not seized”—

she is forbidden. If she was seized—

she is permitted. And there is another woman who, although she was not seized—

is permitted.

And which is she?

This is a woman whose betrothal was a mistaken betrothal,

meaning that she was betrothed on a condition, and in the end the condition was not fulfilled.

Even if her son is straddling her shoulder,

meaning that she has already borne him a child,

she refuses

and goes away,

for her betrothal has no validity. And if she engaged in intercourse with another man while married to him, she is permitted to him, since it has become clear that she was unmarried when she engaged in intercourse!

Rav Yehuda said: These women whom thieves abduct

from

thieves

from beneath their husbands’ authority—

they are permitted to their husbands

[those women are permitted to their husbands when they return to them], because the thieves have intercourse with them under coercion.

The Sages said to Rav Yehuda: But

we see that while they are under the control of the thieves,

they bring them

[they lead them] those women

bread

[they bring them bread and food]!

And we say: What they bring them, they do

out of fear

and not because they consented to them.

And we challenge:

But they send them arrows

[they hand them arrows when they are fighting]! And we say: They do this as well

out of fear.

But this

certainly

is so: If

they release them

[they let them]—the thieves—to return to their husbands,

and they go

themselves

of their own accord

[on their own] to the thieves—

they are forbidden.

The Sages taught: Royal captives,

whom the king captured for the purpose of intercourse—

they are considered like captives,

and are permitted to their husbands.

But

the captives of bandits

[whom bandits abduct]—

they are not considered like captives,

and are forbidden to their husbands.

And we ask:

But it was taught oppositely,

that royal captives are not considered like captives, whereas the captives of bandits are considered like captives!?

And we answer:

With regard to royalty and royalty—

it is not difficult: This

that we said, that royal captives are considered like captives, refers to

a kingdom

like the kingdom of

Ahasuerus,

who was a great king, and she knew that he would not marry her; therefore, her intercourse with him was intercourse under coercion.

Whereas

this,

that we learned in the beraita that they are not considered like captives, refers to

the kingdom of ben Netzer,

who was a bandit, captured towns, ruled over them, and became the leader of bandits. And with regard to such a kingdom we learned that they are not like captive women, since she thinks that he will marry her, and she engages in intercourse consensually.

With regard to bandits and bandits—

it is not difficult: This

that we learned, that she is forbidden, refers to

the

bandits of

ben Netzer,

for she thinks that he will marry her, and she engages in intercourse consensually.

Whereas

this

that we learned, that she is permitted, refers to

ordinary bandits,

for she does not wish to marry him, and therefore her intercourse with him is under coercion.

And we ask:

And ben Netzer,

it follows from what we have just explained that

there,

in the second beraita,

he is called a king, whereas here,

in the first beraita,

he is called a bandit?!

And we say:

Yes.

That is indeed so. The first beraita is referring to the kingdom of Ahasuerus, and ben Netzer

relative to Ahasuerus—

is a bandit.

Whereas the second beraita is referring to an ordinary bandit, and ben Netzer

relative to an ordinary bandit—

is a king.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And if she is the wife of a kohein, I will return you to your country,” and so on.

Abaye said: A widow

who is married

to a High Priest,

as we establish below [page 100a], that although she is forbidden to him, she has a marriage contract, and she also has those conditions of the marriage contract that she receives when she leaves him [but she does not have the conditions of the marriage contract that he is obligated to provide while she remains under his authority, such as sustenance and medical treatment]—

he is obligated to redeem her. For

behold,

I apply to her

what we learned in the Mishna:

“And if she is the wife of a kohein,”

he writes for her in the conditions of her marriage contract:

“I will return you to your country”

[for he cannot take her back, since the wife of a kohein who was raped is forbidden to her husband], and she receives and leaves with this condition of the marriage contract as well, namely, redemption.