Ketubot 51b — the Talmud in English

For we learned: One who found promissory notes, if they contain lien on property,

that the borrower mortgaged his properties to the lender—

he shall not return

the document to the lender, even if the borrower admits that he did not repay the debt.

And the reason is, because

the court collects from them,

from a document that contains a lien, and seizes from purchasers; and if so, there is concern lest the borrower truly already repaid the loan, and the borrower and the lender made a collusion between themselves, so that the lender will now seize from the purchasers, and they will divide it between themselves.

But if

they do not contain lien on property—

he shall return,

since

the court does not collect from them,

and here there is no concern of collusion.

The words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Both this and that [

whether it contains a lien, or whether it does not contain one]

he shall not return,

because

the court collects from them,

since the fact that a lien was not written in the document is a scribal error, and if so, there is always concern of collusion. And Rabbi Judah is included among these Sages who disagreed with Rabbi Meir, who was of his generation.

And if so, it is difficult: Is the

first part

of the Mishna—the words of

Rabbi Meir

—

and

the

latter part

of that same Mishna—the words of

Rabbi Judah

—?!

And if you would say

that

the entire

is the words of

Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Meir distinguishes for himself between a marriage contract and

other

documents,

for indeed, with regard to all documents Rabbi Meir holds that the lien is not a scribal error, but with regard to a marriage contract he holds that it is a scribal error,

and does he distinguish for himself?

But it was taught: Five

matters

are collected

only

from unencumbered property [

from free men], and if there is no unencumbered property, one does not seize from the encumbered property.

And these are they:

a.

Produce, and improvement of produce,

that is, for example, where a person robbed a field from another and sold it to someone else, and the purchaser improved it, for he fertilized it and plowed it, and afterward the robbed person removed it from the purchaser’s possession together with the improvement that he improved in it, and also with its produce; and now the purchaser returns to the seller who sold it to him with a guarantee, to collect from him. He collects the principal from encumbered properties, but the improvement and the produce he collects only from unencumbered properties, since they are not fixed in amount, and the purchasers could not have taken care not to purchase from him properties corresponding to the improvement and the produce.

b.

And one who undertakes to support his wife’s son and his wife’s daughter,

they too do not collect from encumbered properties, since the support is not fixed in amount, and the matter is not written in a document.

c.

And a debt document [

a promissory note]

that does not have

written

in it a lien,

d.

and a woman’s marriage contract that does not have

written

in it a lien.

And from the fact that it is written in the beraita that a document that does not contain a lien does not collect from encumbered properties, it is proven that the tan­ na who taught the beraita holds that the lien is not a scribal error.

And

whom do you hear who says that a lien is not a scribal error? Rabbi Meir! And it teaches

in the beraita that even with regard to

a woman’s marriage contract

we do not say that the lien is a scribal error!

And we answer:

If you wish, say—

our Mishna is

Rabbi Meir’s

words,

and if you wish, say—

Rabbi Judah’s

words.

If you wish, say—

it is Rabbi Judah’s

words.

There,

what Rabbi Judah said, that he may write for her two hundred and give only one hundred, refers specifically when

she wrote for him, “I have received from you

one hundred,” but

here,

in our Mishna, it refers to a case where

she did not write for him, “I have received.”

And our Mishna informs us that even though he did not write a marriage contract for her, we do not say that she waived it for him; rather, we say that she relied upon the enactment of the court, for everyone knows that one who marries a woman—she has a marriage contract.

And

if you wish, say—

it is Rabbi Meir’s

words, and

what is the meaning of “he is liable,” which it teaches

in our Mishna [that if he did not write a marriage contract for her, he is liable to give it to her]? It means that she collects only

from unencumbered property,

but she does not collect from encumbered properties, since the debt was not written in a document, and the lien is not a scribal error.

We learned in our Mishna:

“He did not write for her, etc.”

Abbahu of Samuel said: A married Israelite woman who was raped—

is forbidden to her husband.

Because

we are concerned lest the beginning

of the intercourse indeed was

under compulsion,

but

—its end was willingly.

Rav raised an objection to Abbahu of Samuel

from what they write in a marriage contract:

“If you are taken captive, I will redeem you”—

“and I will restore you to myself as a wife,”

and yet evidently the captive woman had intercourse while she was in captivity, and nevertheless the husband may restore her to himself as a wife!

He was silent,

Abbahu of Samuel, for he had no answer to this.

Rav recited concerning Abbahu of Samuel

this verse:

“Princes restrained themselves from speaking, and they placed a hand upon their mouths.”

What could he say?

That specifically

with regard to a captive woman they were lenient

and permitted her husband to restore her, for we did not see that she had intercourse! But what Abbahu of Samuel said—that she is forbidden—refers to a case where we saw that she had intercourse.

And we ask:

And according to Abbahu of Samuel,

who said that a woman who was raped is forbidden to her husband,

the rape that the Torah permitted [

as it is written in the section of the suspected adulteress, “and she was not seized,” meaning that she was not raped. And they expound: but if she was seized, she is permitted]—

where do you find it

that she is permitted to her husband, for we are concerned that its end was willingly? And we explain:

For example, where witnesses say that she cried out from the beginning to the end

of the intercourse, so that it is evident to us that from beginning to end it was under compulsion.

And

what Abbahu of Samuel said

—disagrees with Rava.

For Rava said: Any case where its beginning was under compulsion and its end willingly, even if she says, “Leave him alone”

to the one having intercourse with her,

for had he not forced himself upon her, she

would have

hired him

to come upon her! Even so—

she is permitted.

What is the reason?

Because we say that through the beginning of the intercourse, which was under compulsion,

the impulse clothed her [

the one having intercourse with her implanted an impulse in her], and if so, the end of the intercourse too was under compulsion.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rava:

It is written in the section of the suspected adulteress

“and she was not seized”—

then she is

forbidden.

It follows:

but

if

she was seized,

that she was raped—

she is permitted.

And

what is written, “and she”—it is a restriction, and the verse comes to teach us that

you have

a woman

other, who even though she was not seized—

is permitted.

And who is this?

This is any woman whose beginning was under compulsion

and whose end was willingly.

For even though the end of the intercourse was according to her will, and she was not seized, nevertheless she is permitted.

Another beraita was taught: “And she was not seized”—

she is forbidden. But if she was seized—

she is permitted. And

from the fact that the restrictive expression “and she” is written, we learn that

you have another woman who even though she was seized—

is forbidden.

And which is this?

This is the wife of a koen gadol,

for even though she was raped, she is forbidden.

Rav Judah said in the name of Samuel in the name of Rabbi Ishmael: “And she was not seized”—

she is forbidden. But if she was seized—

she is permitted. And you have another woman who even though she was not seized—

is permitted.

And which is this?

This is one whose betrothal is a mistaken betrothal,

that is, she was betrothed on a condition, and in the end the condition was not fulfilled.

Even if her son is riding upon her shoulder,

that is, she has already borne him a child,

she refuses—

and goes away,

for her betrothal is nothing. And if she committed adultery while with him, she is permitted to him, for it became clear that she was unmarried when she committed adultery!

Rav Judah said: These women who were stolen

by

thieves

from beneath their husbands—

are permitted to their husbands [

those women are permitted to their husbands when they return to them], since the thieves have intercourse with them under compulsion.

The Rabbis said to Rav Judah: But

we see that while they are under the thieves,

they bring them [

lead to them] those women

bread [

for they bring them bread and food]!

And we say: What they bring them—

they do because of fear

and not because they consented to them.

And we object:

But they send them arrows [

they hand them arrows when they are fighting]! And we say: This too they do

because of fear.

But this

certainly,

that if

they let them go [

release them] the thieves to return to their husbands,

and they go

themselves

of their own accord [

by themselves] to the thieves—

they are forbidden.

The Sages taught: Royal captives,

whom the king took captive for sexual use—

they are like captives,

and are permitted to their husbands.

But

robber-captives [

whom robbers stole]—

they are not like captives,

and are forbidden to their husbands.

And we ask:

But was it not taught oppositely,

that royal captives are not like captives, whereas robber-captives are like captives?!

And we answer:

Kingdom regarding kingdom—

there is no difficulty: this

what we said, that royal captives are like captives—

refers to a kingdom

like the kingdom of

Ahasuerus,

for he is a great king, and she knows that he will not marry her; therefore, his intercourse with her is intercourse under compulsion.

Whereas

this,

what we learned in the beraita, that they are not like captives—

refers to the kingdom of Ben Netzer,

who was a robber, and captured towns and ruled over them, and became the chief of robbers. And with regard to such a kingdom we learned that they are not like captive women, since she thinks that he will marry her, and she submits willingly.

Robbery regarding robbery—

there is no difficulty: this,

what we learned, that she is forbidden,

refers to

robbery of

Ben Netzer,

for she thinks that he will marry her, and she submits willingly.

Whereas

this,

what we learned, that she is permitted—

refers to an ordinary robber,

for she does not wish to marry him, and therefore her intercourse with him is under compulsion.

And we ask:

And Ben Netzer,

it follows according to what we have now explained that

there,

in the second beraita,

it calls him a king, whereas here,

in the first beraita,

it calls him a robber?!

And we say:

Yes.

Indeed, so it is. The first beraita speaks of the kingdom of Ahasuerus, and Ben Netzer

with regard to Ahasuerus

is a robber. Whereas the second beraita speaks of an ordinary robber, and Ben Netzer

with regard to an ordinary robber—

is a king.

We learned in our Mishna:

“And with regard to the wife of a koen, ‘I will restore you to your country,’ etc.”

Abaye said: A widow

who is married

to a koen gadol,

for we have established below [page 100a] that even though she is forbidden to him, she has a marriage contract, and she also has those conditions of the marriage contract that she takes and leaves [but the conditions of the marriage contract to which he is liable while she is under him, such as support and medical treatment, she does not have]—

he is liable to redeem her. For

he is obligated to redeem her. For

I apply to her

what we learned in the Mishna:

“And with regard to the wife of a koen,

he writes for her among the conditions of her marriage contract:

‘I will restore you to your country’” [

for he cannot restore her, since a koen’s wife who was raped is forbidden to her husband], and this condition of the marriage contract, too—that of redemption—she takes and leaves.

[for he cannot take her back, since the wife of a kohein who was raped is forbidden to her husband], and she receives and leaves with this condition of the marriage contract as well, namely, redemption.