Ketubot 51a — the Talmud in English

Abaye said to him:

In the end, everything that is destined to be cut

is considered as cut!

And still, this is collection from movable property!

Rav Yosef said to him: With dates

that still require the palm tree

that still require the palm tree, since they are not completely finished]

I am speaking,

since they are not considered destined to be cut.

There was a certain orphan boy and orphan girl,

brother and sister, whose properties had been deposited with a guardian,

who came before Rava.

Rava said to them: Increase the orphan boy’s

sustenance,

for the sake of

the orphan

girl

being sustained with him.

The Sages said to Rava: But is it not you who said

that they collect

from land, but not from movable property, whether for sustenance, whether for the marriage contract, and whether for the maintenance of the daughters!

And how can you now say that the orphan girl should collect sustenance from movable property deposited with the guardian?

He said to them: If

the orphan boy

wanted a maidservant to serve him, would we not give her to him,

would we not give him this from the inheritance money?

All the more so here—

for there are two things,

since through providing sustenance for his sister the orphan boy gains two things: both that she will serve him, and that his sister is sustained!

The Sages taught: Both property that has responsibility,

that is, land,

and property that does not have responsibility—

they collect

from the orphans

for the sustenance of a wife and for the daughters; these are the words of Rabbi.

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Property that has responsibility—

they collect

from it

for

the needs of the

daughters,

that is, for sustenance and a dowry,

from the sons.

And

likewise, if there are only daughters, and there are adult and minor daughters, and the adult daughters took possession of the properties, they collect

for the daughters

who are minors

from the daughters

who are adults, and they divide the inheritance equally.

And

the same law applies if there are only sons, adult and minor: they collect

for the sons

who are minors

from the sons

who are adults, and they divide the inheritance equally.

And

likewise, they collect

for the sons from the daughters in

a place where there are

many properties.

But not

do they collect

for the sons from the daughters in

a place where there are only

few properties,

which are insufficient to sustain the sons and the daughters until they mature; for then the law is that the daughters will be sustained, while the sons will go begging at the doors.

But

property that does not have responsibility—

they collect for the sons

who are minors

from the sons

who are adults, as above.

And

likewise,

for the daughters

who are minors

from the daughters

who are adults.

And

they collect

for the sons from the daughters.

But not

do they collect at all

for

the needs of the

daughters from the sons

with property that does not have responsibility.

Even though it is established for us

everywhere that

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi against his colleague

when he disputes his colleague, a tanna],

here—

the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

that they do not collect from property that does not have responsibility for the needs of the wife and the daughters.

For Rava said: The halakha is:

they collect

from land

and not from movable property, whether for

the matter of

the marriage contract, whether for sustenance, and whether for maintenance

for a dowry].

Mishna:

If

he did not write her

for his wife

a marriage contract,

if he married her as a

virgin—

she collects two hundred. And

if he married her as a

widow—

she collects

one hundred, because it is a stipulation of the court

to give this amount to a virgin and to a widow.

If he wrote her a field worth one hundred

in place of

two hundred zuz

that he is obligated to give her in her marriage contract,

but he did not write for her: All the property that I have—

is responsible for your marriage contract, he is obligated

all the property to be responsible for her marriage contract, and he cannot say to her: You have only the field written in the document of your marriage contract, because

it is a stipulation of the court

that his properties become encumbered for the marriage contract.

If

he did not write for her: If you are taken captive, I will redeem you, and I will restore you to myself as a wife

if they take you captive, I will redeem you and return you to myself as a wife],

and

likewise

with a daughter of a priest,

if he did not write for her: If you are taken captive, I will redeem you and

I will return you to your country

for he cannot return her to himself as a wife, because a wife of a priest who was violated is forbidden to her husband]—

he is obligated

to redeem them, because

it is a stipulation of the court.

If she was taken captive,

his wife—

he is obligated to redeem her.

And if he said

after she was taken captive:

Here is your divorce document and your marriage contract,

that is, I am divorcing you, and you will collect your marriage contract

and redeem

with it

yourself—

he is not permitted

to do so, because he already became obligated for her redemption when she was taken captive.

If she became ill [

she fell ill]—

he is obligated

the husband

to heal her,

because medical treatment is like sustenance.

And if

he said: Here is your divorce document and your marriage contract,

and

heal yourself—

he is permitted

to do so , for a person is not obligated for the sustenance of his divorced wife!

Gemara:

Our Mishna—

whose opinion is it? It is Rabbi Meir’s, for he says: Anyone who reduces for a virgin from two hundred or for a widow from one hundred—

this is intercourse of licentiousness!

For this is the stipulation of the court: to give specifically two hundred to a virgin, and one hundred to a widow!

For if it is Rabbi Judah, he says

: If

he wants

the husband, and she too agrees,

he writes a document of two hundred for a virgin, and she writes

for him in a receipt:

I received from you one hundred,

even though in truth she did not receive it.

And

likewise he can write

for a widow

in her marriage contract an obligation of

one hundred, and she writes

for him

I received from you fifty zuz.

But Rabbi Meir holds that she cannot waive part of the marriage-contract obligation while she is still married to him.

And it would now occur to our minds that the tanna of our Mishna, who says that if he did not write for her she collects two hundred, means even if she waived it. If so, necessarily our Mishna is Rabbi Meir’s.

Come and hear the latter clause: If he wrote her a field worth one hundred in place of two hundred zuz, but he did not write for her: All the property that I have is responsible for your marriage contract—

he is obligated, for it is a stipulation of the court.

And it would now occur to our minds that the properties became encumbered with every law of an encumbrance, as though they were written in the document. And if he sells some of his properties, she will collect from the purchasers.

If so,

we arrive

at the latter clause specifically

according to

the position of

Rabbi

Judah ,

who says

that a document in which

responsibility

was not written is a scribal error!

The scribe erred and did not write it, and this matter was not done with the lender’s consent; therefore, even though responsibility is not written, he collects from encumbered property!

For if it is Rabbi Meir, he says: Responsibility is not a scribal error,

and if responsibility was not written in the document, he does not collect from encumbered property!