Ketubot 36a — the Talmud in English

“Forbidden relations”

that we learned [here] were

actual forbidden relations

written in the portion of Aharei Mot, for which one is liable for karet—

and

“secondary relations,”

which we learned, are relations of a second degree of closeness — those forbidden

by rabbinic decree?

Thus, it is certainly impossible to explain it this way. For secondary relations to forbidden relations,

since by Torah law she is fit for him,

are fit for him, and we apply to them “and she shall be his wife,”

why do they not have a fine,

and why should they not receive a fine!?

Rather,

explain it this way:

“Forbidden relations,”

they are relations for which the one who has intercourse with them is

liable for a court-imposed death penalty,

and they should be exempt from a fine because they are liable for a court-imposed death penalty, and kam lei bid'rabba minei—

and

“secondary relations,”

they are forbidden relations for which he is not liable for a court-imposed death penalty, but they are

those liable for karet

alone. And even these do not have a fine, since I do not apply to them “and she shall be his wife,” which implies: a woman in whom there is marital possibility.

The intention of the beraita is to say that not only those liable for court-imposed death penalties do not have a fine, since kam lei bid'rabba minei, but even those liable for karet, in whose case there is no kam lei bid'rabba minei, nevertheless do not have a fine, since there is no marital possibility in their case—

But those liable for prohibitions,

in whose case there is marital possibility,

do have a fine.

And whose

is the tannai of the beraita following the view of?

It follows the view of

Shimon the Yemenite,

who holds above [29b] that the women excluded from a fine by virtue of the verse “and she shall be his wife” are only those in whom there is no marital possibility for him, but not those liable for prohibitions, since kiddushin takes effect in their case.

Some say

to explain the beraita:

“Forbidden relations”

means

those liable for court-imposed death penalties and those liable for karet

because kiddushin does not take effect for him with them, and they do not have a fine because there is no marital possibility in their case—

and

“secondary relations”

means even

those liable for prohibitions,

in whose case there is marital possibility for him, and even these do not have a fine, since they are not fit for him to retain as wives.

And

whose

beraita is this?—

It is Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya,

who holds that all those women whom it is not fit for him to retain as wives were excluded from a fine.

b. We also learned in a beraita:

“A girl who exercises mi'un has neither a fine nor payment for seduction”:

And we raised the following difficulty: mi'un for the marriage of a minor daughter exists only while she is a minor. If so, regarding that which it teaches, “a girl who exercises mi'un” does not have a fine, she is necessarily a minor; and it follows from here:

an ordinary minor

who was not married and did not exercise mi'un—

does

have

a

fine.

And if so,

whose

beraita is this?—It must be that according to

the Rabbis it is [

in the beraita brought at the beginning of the chapter],

who say:

even

a minor has a fine.

But

let us consider the latter clause,

which we learned in it:

“An ailonit has neither a fine nor payment for seduction.”

And this latter clause necessarily

comes according to Rabbi Meir, who says that a minor has no fine

but only a young woman does.

And

therefore,

this

, an ailonit, who has no period of young womanhood, but

emerges from minority into adulthood,

at the end of her period of minority she becomes an adult; therefore she has no fine—

And if so, you will raise a difficulty: Is it possible that the

first clause

follows the view of

the Rabbis

,

and

the

latter clause

follows the view of

Rabbi Meir

!?

And if you would say

to explain: In reality,

the entire

beraita follows the view of

Rabbi Meir,

who holds that a minor has no fine, but only a young woman does, and consequently an ailonit has no fine.

And that which it teaches, “one who exercises mi'un,” is speaking of a case in which she exercised mi'un after she had already grown up, and the tannai of the beraita holds that she can exercise mi'un even in her adulthood, since

with regard to one who exercises mi'un [

that is, with regard to the question until when a girl exercises mi'un]

he holds

Rabbi Meir

like Rabbi Yehuda,

that even after she has grown up she can still exercise mi'un until the black hair increases [as will be explained below]; and one cannot infer from the beraita that an ordinary minor has a fine, since it is speaking of one who exercises mi'un when she is an adult.

It is impossible to answer this way. For—

And is it possible,

to say that

Rabbi Meir holds

like Rabbi Yehuda, that there is mi'un even after she has grown up!?

And it was taught: Until when does a girl exercise mi'un?

Until she produces two hairs.

But once she grows up, by producing two hairs, she can no longer exercise mi'un,

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If her husband has not yet had intercourse with her after she grew up, she can exercise mi'un,

until the

hair becomes

predominantly black.

There must be an abundance of black hairs in that place. However, two hairs lying down are sufficient, so that the matter appears as though “the black has increased.”

It follows that according to Rabbi Meir only a minor exercises mi'un. And if so, the difficulty arises: If the earlier beraita follows the view of Rabbi Meir, why did we learn in it, “one who exercises mi'un has no fine,” when according to Rabbi Meir every minor, even one who does not exercise mi'un, has no fine!?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that that beraita was stated according to the view of

Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that she exercises mi'un even after she has grown up, and thus one can no longer infer from that beraita that an ordinary minor has a fine—

and with regard to a minor he holds

—the tannai of that beraita—

like Rabbi Meir,

that she has no fine, and therefore he said that an ailonit has no fine, since she emerges from minority into adulthood.

Even this cannot be said.

For

is it possible

[that is, is it possible]

that Rabbi Yehuda holds

like Rabbi Meir, that a minor has no fine, so that he exempts an ailonit from a fine because she has no period of young womanhood?

But Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: This

which we learned in the Mishna [below, 40b], that a minor has no fine,

is the statement of Rabbi Meir

.

But the Sages say: a minor has a fine.

And if it is so,

as you say, that Rabbi Yehuda holds like Rabbi Meir, that a minor has no fine, then

“This is the statement of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda”—

he should have had to say

this, Rav!

Therefore the Gemara resolves the beraita in another way:

This beraita is not entirely according to the view of Rabbi Meir, and it is not entirely according to the view of Rabbi Yehuda; rather, part of it follows Rabbi Meir and part of it follows Rabbi Yehuda.

This tannai

who taught this beraita

holds like Rabbi Meir in one matter,

that a minor has no fine, and therefore an ailonit too has no fine.

And he disagrees with him

—with Rabbi Meir—

in one matter,

in what he holds, that a woman exercises mi'un only while she is a minor; rather, he holds like Rabbi Yehuda, that she exercises mi'un even in her adulthood, and therefore it is specifically because she exercises mi'un that she has no fine.

Rafram said

to resolve the beraita in an additional way:

In reality, it follows the view of Rabbi Meir, and therefore an ailonit has no fine. And concerning what is difficult for you from “one who exercises mi'un,” do not raise a difficulty:

For

what does “one who exercises mi'un” mean?—

A woman

fit to exercise mi'un

had she been married. That is: a minor has neither a fine nor payment for seduction.

And

the Gemara wonders about this resolution: And

let it teach

the beraita explicitly that

a minor

has neither a fine nor payment for seduction; why did it mention the minor using the expression “one who exercises mi'un”?

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult

—this question.

c. We learned in a beraita:

“An ailonit has neither a fine nor payment for seduction.” And we raise a contradiction

from another beraita:

For it was taught:

“A deaf-mute woman, an imbecile, and an ailonit

have a fine

because they are presumed to be virgins.

And they have

—if they married on the presumption that they were virgins—

a claim concerning virginity.

For if he had intercourse with her and did not find virginity signs, she loses her marriage contract.

It is thus stated explicitly in this beraita that an ailonit has a fine, unlike the beraita that we learned, in which it says that an ailonit has no fine!?

The Gemara wonders about the question:

But what contradiction is there

here? What contradiction is there!?

This

beraita that we learned, which says that an ailonit has no fine, follows the view of

Rabbi Meir,

who holds that a minor has no fine, but only a young woman; and since an ailonit has no young womanhood, she has no fine.

This

beraita that we learned, which says that an ailonit has a fine, follows the view of

the Rabbis,

who hold that even a minor has a fine; therefore an ailonit too has a fine, until she reaches adulthood.

And the Gemara explains:

And the one who raised it, why did he raise it,

what was the reasoning of the one who asked the contradiction, when it has a simple resolution, as the Gemara resolved it!?

And we explain: the questioner did not bring the beraita to the beit-midrash in order to raise from it a contradiction to the beraita that we brought, since this is not a question at all.

Rather, he brought it to the beit-midrash

because he had

—the questioner—

another contradiction to raise against it,

since the questioner had a difficulty against this beraita, in which it is explained that a deaf-mute woman and an imbecile have a claim concerning virginity, from another beraita in which the opposite is explained:

For it was taught:

“A deaf-mute woman, an imbecile, an adult woman, and one injured by wood

in that place—

all these

do not have a claim concerning virginity.

A deaf-mute woman and an imbecile, because perhaps she was raped after betrothal [as will be explained further in the sugya], and an adult woman and one injured by wood, because they do not have virginity signs.

But a woman who is

blind or an ailonit

does have a claim concerning virginity.

Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: a woman who is

blind

does not have a claim concerning virginity,

and the reason will be explained further in the sugya.

It is thus stated in this beraita that a deaf-mute woman and an imbecile do not have a claim concerning virginity, contrary to the words of the earlier beraita, in which it is explained: “A deaf-mute woman and an imbecile have a claim concerning virginity”!?

Rav Sheshet said: It is not difficult

to reconcile “a deaf-mute woman and an imbecile” with “a deaf-mute woman and an imbecile”:

This—

the second beraita, which holds that a deaf-mute woman and an imbecile do not have a claim concerning virginity—

is Rabban Gamliel,

as in the Mishna in the first chapter [12b], who holds that every woman for whom virginity signs were not found, and who says, “I was raped after he betrothed me,” is believed. Therefore, even in the case of an imbecile and a deaf-mute woman, since they do not know how to make the claim, we make the claim on their behalf that this is what happened, and therefore they do not lose their marriage contracts.

And this—

the first beraita, which holds that a deaf-mute woman and an imbecile do have a claim concerning virginity—

is Rabbi Yehoshua,

who holds that a woman is not believed to say, “I was raped after he betrothed me,” because “we do not live by her mouth.” Therefore, even a deaf-mute woman and an imbecile do have a claim concerning virginity.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against this: we say that according to Rabban Gamliel a deaf-mute woman and an imbecile do not have a claim concerning virginity, and although they did not claim before us, “I was raped after he betrothed me,” we make the claim on their behalf. But one might say that Rabban Gamliel’s view is heard only

where she herself makes the claim [

we have heard Rabban Gamliel say that she is believed only where she herself claims, “I was raped after he betrothed me”]—

But

where she herself does not make a claim

, such as a deaf-mute woman and an imbecile, who make no claim at all

— do you hear him say

that claims are made on her behalf

!? And we answer

: Yes

, indeed, according to the words of Rabban Gamaliel, these do not require even a claim

. Since Rabban Gamaliel said

that if she had made a claim, she would have been

believed

[trustworthy]

— In a case such as this, “Open your mouth for the mute!” is applicable!

For the court must make the claim in their place, since they do not know how to make a claim, for in this matter they are considered as mute

We learned in a beraita—a tannaitic source that was not included in the Mishna—which was cited shortly afterward:

“And a mature virgin does not have a claim concerning her virginity.”

.

We learned in a beraita brought nearby : And a bogeret has no claim concerning virginal signs : The blood of virginal signs does not render the woman impure with the impurity of niddah

. And we object

: But Rav said: A bogeret

who married

, they give her

the entire

first night

, for all the acts of intercourse that he performs during that night, in which she sees blood, we attribute to the blood of virginal signs, and she is not impure

. It is thus explicit that even a bogeret has blood of virginal signs . And therefore, if he did not find virginal signs in her, by law he should forfeit her ketuba, for he married her on the presumption that she was a virgin, whereas she is found not to be a virgin, and it is a mistaken transaction !?