Ketubot 35b — the Talmud in English

The Gemara still raises an objection: Let it be as you say, that the verse is interpreted with regard to lashes when the injury is not worth a peruta. But

ultimately

, the gezeira shava that you seek to derive concerning these lashes—that they exempt him from monetary payment, even when he was not forewarned—is not because the lashes exempt him, but because

it is not subject to payment

, since we are dealing with a blow that is not worth a peruta!?

And we answer:

It is necessary

—the gezeira shava is not needed to exempt him from payment for the injury, since indeed there is no payment here, as he did not injure him with an injury worth a peruta.

Rather, the gezeira shava is needed to exempt the one who struck—even inadvertently—from other payments, for example:

while he was striking him

in the course of striking his fellow,

he tore his silk garments

he tore his fellow’s silk garments. And the gezeira shava teaches that he is exempt from payment for the silk garments even when he struck his fellow inadvertently.

He said

he raised an objection

Rav Hiyya to Rava:

And according to the tanna of the school of Hezekiah, who said: “One who strikes a person and one who strikes an animal

”—they were juxtaposed to teach: Just as concerning one who strikes an animal you did not distinguish with regard to liability between intentional and inadvertent, so concerning one who strikes a person you shall not distinguish with regard to exemption between inadvertent and intentional—there is a difficulty:

From where is it derived that “one who strikes an animal shall pay” refers to a blow performed

on a

weekday

day and

is written

—and in truth

there is no possibility of distinguishing

, there is no basis for distinguishing in the liability for payment for the animal between inadvertent and intentional, since one who causes damage is liable in every circumstance; and from this you learn that likewise with regard to monetary exemption in the case of one who strikes a person, one should not distinguish between inadvertent and intentional—

there is no basis for distinguishing,

meaning, there is no basis for distinguishing in the liability to pay for the animal between unintentional and intentional action, since one who causes damage is liable in every case; and from this you infer that likewise, with regard to exemption from payment in the case of one who strikes a person, there is no distinction between unintentional and intentional action—

But

perhaps

it is only concerning a blow performed

on a

day

of Shabbat

that it

is written “one who strikes an animal shall pay,”

since

even

with regard to the animal itself

there is a possibility of distinguishing

, we should also distinguish in the case of one who strikes an animal itself between one who acted intentionally regarding the prohibition of Shabbat and one who acted inadvertently, for the Torah made him liable only if he acted inadvertently regarding Shabbat —

And if you say this, then you cannot learn that concerning “one who strikes a person” you did not distinguish, since concerning “one who strikes an animal” you did distinguish!

And we answer:

This cannot enter your mind

to interpret the verse “one who strikes an animal shall pay” as referring to one who struck on Shabbat and acted inadvertently, as you asked!

For it is written

in this verse:

“And one who strikes an animal shall pay, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death.”

But

what are the circumstances?

In what manner is this verse speaking?

If

it is a case

where he was not forewarned

, then

why shall one who strikes a person be put to death

without having been forewarned!?

Rather, obviously

the verse is speaking of a case

where he was forewarned

—

and if

“one who strikes an animal shall pay”

is written concerning Shabbat, then

shall one who strikes an animal pay!?

After all, he is exempt under the principle of kim lei bid’rabba minei.

Rather, is it not

a blow that is

on a

day

of the week

that the verse is discussing.

That is to say: You cannot interpret the beginning of the verse as referring to a person who incurred a capital prohibition inadvertently, since the end of the verse indicates that the capital liability of which this verse speaks was incurred intentionally, and necessarily the beginning of the verse speaks of one who did not incur a capital liability at all. If so, in every case he is liable. And we can juxtapose to him the case of one who strikes a person,

so that he will be exempt from the money in every circumstance.

Here the Gemara returns to the words of Rabbah on page 34a:

Rav Pappa said to Abaye:

According to Rabbah, who said

above, explaining the view of Rabbi Meir:

It is an innovation that the Torah innovated concerning a fine

, and therefore

even though

he is killed

he

pays

and is not exempt under “kim lei bid’rabba minei”—

The Mishna

—our Mishna, in which we learned: These are the young women for whom there is a fine: one who has intercourse with his sister—

according to whom does he establish it

Rabbah, so that there should not be the difficulty of “he does not receive lashes and pay,” as the Gemara asked at the beginning of the sugya above, 32a!?

If

Rabbah interprets it

according to Rabbi Meir

, who holds “he receives lashes and pays,” as Reish Lakish interpreted our Mishna [above, 32b]—

then

there is a difficulty

with the conclusion of our Mishna, in which we learned: One who has intercourse with

his daughter

is exempt from the fine. For according to Rabbah’s understanding of Rabbi Meir, we do not apply “kim lei bid’rabba minei” in the case of a fine!?

If

Rabbah interprets our Mishna

according to Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKana

, who also holds “he receives lashes and pays” —

If, then, our Mishna is according to Rabbi Nehunya—

there is another difficulty

with what we learned: One who has intercourse with

his sister

[and all the other cases of those liable for karet] pays a fine. For according to Rabbi Nehunya, those liable for karet are not liable for a fine, since the liability for karet exempts them from payment, as explained above, 30a, that our Mishna is not according to Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKana!?

And

if

Rabbah will answer that our Mishna holds

according to Rabbi Yitzhak

, who holds that those liable for karet do not receive lashes, and that it disagrees with the Mishna in Tractate Makkot, which imposes lashes for intercourse with his sister, and therefore when he has intercourse with one liable for karet, such as his sister, he pays a fine—

then still

there is a difficulty

with the beginning of our Mishna, in which we learned: One who has intercourse with a

mamzeret

pays a fine.

In the case of a mamzeret, everyone agrees that there are lashes, and there is the difficulty: Is it not the case that “he does not receive lashes and pay”!?

This works out if

Rabbah

held like Rabbi Yohanan

, who holds that those liable for lashes inadvertently are liable to pay money:

he

Rabbah

also resolves it

for our Mishna

according to Rabbi Yohanan

, who interpreted it [above, 32b] as a case where he was not forewarned, and therefore he pays a fine, both in the case of one who has intercourse with his sister and in the case of one who has intercourse with the mamzeret.

But if he holds

Rabbah

like Reish Lakish

, who exempts even those liable for lashes inadvertently from payment, then

how does he resolve it

Rabbah for our Mishna, since he cannot interpret it according to any of the three resolutions stated above concerning this difficulty!?

And we conclude:

It is necessarily the case

that Rabbah

holds according to Rabbi Yohanan

, and he interprets our Mishna as a case where he was not forewarned.

Here the Gemara returns to the words of Reish Lakish, who holds that those liable for lashes inadvertently are exempt from payment:

He said

he asked

Rav Matana to Abaye:

According to Reish Lakish, who said: The Torah explicitly multiplied

those liable for lashes as comparable to those liable for death

, so that they too are exempt from payment when they acted inadvertently—

Who is the tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Nehunya ben HaKana?

Who is the tanna who taught in several Mishnayot that there is a payment obligation in cases involving liability for karet [and not like Rabbi Nehunya, who exempts those liable for karet from payment], and did not exempt them because they are liable for lashes, whereas those liable for lashes are exempt from payment—

for according to Reish Lakish, you cannot say that those Mishnayot are dealing with those liable for lashes inadvertently [as Rabbi Yohanan would interpret those Mishnayot], since even those liable for lashes inadvertently are exempt from payment!?

And we interpret those Mishnayot as belonging to one of the following two tannaim:

Either Rabbi Meir

—they are according to him, as he holds that he receives lashes and pays.

Or Rabbi Yitzhak

—they are according to him, as he holds that there are no lashes for those liable for karet.

The Sages taught:

a.

Forbidden relations, and secondary forbidden relations

, if one has intercourse with them,

they have neither a fine

for rape

nor for seduction.

That is to say: nor a fine resulting from seduction,

and this clause will be explained in the Gemara.

b.

The one who refuses

, who is a minor orphan whom her mother and brothers married off with a rabbinic marriage, and who leaves him even without a bill of divorce, but through mi’un alone, by refusing the marriage—

she has neither a fine nor a seduction payment

if she has intercourse after refusing, since she has the presumptive status of one who has had intercourse, as she was married to a man.

c.

Aylonit —

who has no period of maidenhood, but is either a minor or a grown woman—

she has neither a fine nor a seduction payment

, since the fine for rape and seduction applies only to a maiden [according to the tanna of this beraita].

d.

And the woman who leaves because of a bad name

, whose husband brought out against her and brought witnesses that she had committed adultery while betrothed—

she has neither a fine nor a seduction payment.

This is how the Gemara initially thought of interpreting it, and it raises a difficulty against this below, and explains this clause.

The Gemara explains all the clauses of the beraita:

a. Forbidden relations and secondary forbidden relations have no fine:

What does “forbidden relations

that we learned in the beraita mean,

and what does “secondary forbidden relations mean”?

Above, 29b, Shimon the Temanite and Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya disagreed concerning the law of a fine for women forbidden to him, with whom I do not apply “he shall take her as a wife”:

The view of Shimon the Temanite: The Torah excluded from the fine only those women with whom he has no possibility of effecting a marriage [betrothal], since the Torah said, “he shall take her as a wife.”

The view of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya: Every woman whom he is not fit to maintain as a wife, and with whom he cannot fulfill “he shall take her as a wife,” is excluded from liability for a fine when he has intercourse with her.

The view of our Mishna: Whether one has intercourse with those liable for prohibitions for which betrothal takes effect, or one has intercourse with those liable for karet, for whom betrothal does not take effect, he is liable for a fine.