Ketubot 35a — the Talmud in English

Is it not that the meaning of what the Torah says, “and there shall be no calamity,” is that there will be no

calamity in the woman,

an actual calamity—

that she did not die?

If so, it follows that if the woman did die, whether or not the assailant had been warned, he is not liable to pay compensation for the miscarried fetuses.

If so, the verse teaches us that those who unintentionally become liable for capital punishment are exempt from monetary payments. This is difficult for Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that they are liable for payment!?

And we answer:

No,

the verse does not mean what you explained—that the woman did not die.

Rather, the meaning of the verse is as follows: If there is no

legal status of calamity

for the man who struck her—that is, the assailant is not liable to a court-imposed death penalty, either because the woman did not die or because he had not been warned—then he is liable to pay compensation for the miscarried fetuses!

But an “actual calamity” involving the woman, without a “legal status of calamity” involving the man, does not exempt him from paying compensation for the fetuses.

There are those who say: Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to Reish Lakish,

as Rabbi Yoḥanan was the one who challenged Reish Lakish, who holds that those who unintentionally become liable for capital punishment remain liable for monetary payments:

And this is how he challenged him: It is written:

“If there shall be no calamity, he shall surely be punished”.

What is the meaning? Is it not

that the verse means as follows: If there is no

legal status of calamity

involving the assailant, so that he is not liable to a death penalty, then “he shall surely be punished.” But if there is a legal status of calamity involving the man, he is not punished.

If so, it follows that if the woman dies but there is no legal status of calamity involving the assailant—because he is not liable to a court-imposed death penalty, as he had not been warned—then he is liable to pay compensation for the miscarried fetuses.

It follows that the verse teaches us that one who unintentionally becomes liable for capital punishment, such as this man who killed the woman but did not become liable to a death penalty, is liable to pay compensation for the fetuses. This is difficult for Reish Lakish, who exempts even those who unintentionally become liable for capital punishment from monetary payments!?

And we answer:

No,

this is not the meaning of the verse.

Rather, if there is no

actual calamity

involving the woman, then he is liable to pay compensation for the fetuses. But if she did suffer a calamity, even though the assailant had not been warned, the assailant is not liable to pay compensation for the fetuses, because those who unintentionally become liable for capital punishment are exempt from monetary payments.

Rabbi Rava

wondered:

But is there anyone who says

that those who unintentionally become liable for capital punishment

are liable

for monetary payment!?

But the school of Hezekiah taught:

The Torah states [Leviticus 24]: “One who strikes an animal shall pay for it, but one who strikes a person shall not pay money; rather, he shall be put to death” — b. Tosafot explained the Gemara’s exposition here as follows: The verse means that just as, in the case of one who strikes an animal, no distinction is made in the matter stated there—that is, he is liable in every circumstance—so, in the case of one who strikes a person, no distinction is made among all the circumstances of exemption from monetary payment stated there. They further explained that “unintentional and intentional” concern the exemption from monetary payment after the person has become liable for the death penalty. “A descending stroke and an ascending stroke” teaches that in every circumstance a payment of ransom cannot exempt him from the death penalty. According to Rashi’s commentary below, on 38a, beginning “to make him liable for payment,” this does not appear to be the explanation, as is discussed there in the notes. “Intending and not intending” concern payment for the woman herself.

The verse compares one who strikes a person to one who strikes an animal, in order to establish the relevant distinctions between them: One who

has been compared is

one who strikes a person,

who is exempt from monetary payment, and

one who strikes an animal,

who is liable for monetary payment.

This is how the verse compares them, in order to teach:

Just as, in the case of one who strikes an animal, no distinction is made

with regard to monetary payment:

a.

Whether

he struck the animal

unintentionally

or

whether

he struck it

intentionally, for the Torah expanded the liability expressed by “wound for wound” to make a person who damages another’s property liable whether he acted unintentionally or intentionally, and whether he acted under compulsion or willingly.

b.

And

whether

he

intended

to strike the animal

or

one

who did not intend

to strike it.

c. And

whether

he struck the animal

with a descending stroke,

as people strike when bringing the hand downward,

or

whether he struck it

with an ascending stroke,

striking while raising his hand, or cutting it with his sword from below upward.

In all these cases, no distinction is made

to exempt him from payment

in any of these circumstances;

rather, to make him liable for payment

in every circumstance mentioned.

So too, in the case of one who strikes a person, no distinction is made

with regard to exempting him from payment when he kills a person:

a.

Whether

the killer acted

unintentionally,

so that he did not become liable for death,

or whether

the killer acted

intentionally,

so that he became liable for death.

b.

Whether

he

intended

to kill and became liable for death,

or

one

who did not intend

to kill and did not become liable for death.

c. And

whether

the killer acted

with a descending stroke, or

whether he acted

with an ascending stroke.

In all these cases, no distinction is made

to make him liable for payment

in some of them;

rather, to exempt him from payment

in every circumstance mentioned.

Thus, the school of Hezekiah taught us that even those who unintentionally become liable for capital punishment are exempt from monetary payments. If so, how could Rabbi Yoḥanan have said that those who unintentionally become liable for capital punishment are liable for monetary payment!?

Rather, when Ravin came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said:

With regard to those who unintentionally become liable for capital punishment

and monetary payment,

everyone—

both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish—

agrees that they are exempt

from the monetary payment, in accordance with the teaching of the school of Hezekiah.

They disagree—

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish—

with regard to one who unintentionally becomes liable for lashes and another penalty,

that is, monetary payment.

For

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable

for the monetary payment, because only

those who become liable for capital punishment

alone

were compared

to “one who strikes an animal,” through the comparison taught by the school of Hezekiah, to teach that even when they act unintentionally they are exempt.

But

those who become liable for lashes

were not compared

in this verse, and we have no source that exempts them from monetary payment when they act unintentionally.

Reish Lakish says: He is exempt

from monetary payment, because

the Torah explicitly included those who become liable for lashes

as

like those who become liable for capital punishment,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

And the Gemara explains:

Where did the Torah include

this

teaching?

Abaye said: It is derived

that the law of those who become liable for lashes is like the law of those who become liable for capital punishment through a derivation based on an identical expression:

“Wicked, wicked.”

For it is stated: “And it shall be, if the wicked man is liable to be flogged,” where “wicked” refers to one who becomes liable for lashes. And it is stated: “who is wicked, deserving of death,” where “wicked” refers to one who becomes liable for a court-imposed death penalty.

This derivation based on the identical expression teaches that the law of one who becomes liable for lashes is like the law of one who becomes liable for capital punishment. Just as one who unintentionally becomes liable for capital punishment is exempt from monetary payment, so one who unintentionally becomes liable for lashes is exempt from monetary payment.

Rava said:

There is no need for a derivation based on an identical expression to establish that the law of one who becomes liable for lashes is like the law of one who becomes liable for capital punishment. Rather, in the case of those who become liable for lashes themselves, the Torah revealed that they are exempt from monetary payment even when they act unintentionally—

for

it is derived

through a comparison that those who become liable for lashes are exempt from monetary payment even when they act unintentionally:

The verse states

“one who strikes”

with regard to liability for lashes, as the Gemara will explain in full, and it states

“one who strikes”

an animal with regard to liability for monetary payment.

And just as the comparison of those who become liable for capital punishment to one who strikes an animal was effective in exempting them from monetary payment in every circumstance, so the comparison of those who become liable for lashes to one who strikes an animal is effective in exempting those who become liable for lashes from monetary payment even when they act unintentionally.

Rav Pappa said to Rava: Which “one who strikes”

is this? That is, where is the expression “one who strikes” stated with regard to lashes compared to “one who strikes” an animal?

If you say

that they were compared in this verse, as it is stated:

“One who strikes an animal shall pay for it, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death,”

that cannot be said. For:

This

verse

is written with regard to killing,

[that is, those who become liable for a court-imposed death penalty,] and

was written

not with regard to those who become liable for lashes.

Rather, this “one who strikes”

is the expression that was compared to one who strikes an animal, as it is written:

“One who strikes a living being of an animal shall pay for it;

a life for a life.”

And immediately adjacent to it is written: “And if a man inflicts a wound upon his fellow, as he has done

—

so shall it be done to him,”

that he is to be flogged by the court.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

But

here

this

verse, which is stated with regard to those who become liable for lashes,

is it not

the expression

“one who strikes”?

But Rava said: It is derived through “one who strikes” and “one who strikes”!?

And we answer:

We

did not mean specifically the expression “one who strikes.”

Rather,

we mean “striking” and “striking.”

That is, the act of striking a person

that makes him liable for lashes is compared to the act of striking an animal, which makes him liable for monetary payment.

The Gemara raises another difficulty:

But when

this verse, “And if a man inflicts a wound upon his fellow,” is written,

it is written with regard to one who injures his fellow. And one who injures his fellow

is

eligible

for monetary payment,

not for lashes, as explained in the preceding discussion.

It is therefore necessary to explain that when the Torah says, “as he has done, so shall it be done to him,” it means that he must pay money. How, then, can we learn from this verse to compare those who become liable for lashes to one who strikes an animal!?

And we answer:

If

the verse “as he has done, so shall it be done to him”

is not relevant

[that is, it is not needed and is superfluous]

for a striking that involves the value of a peruta,

to teach that an injurer must make a monetary payment—for from another verse, stated by the Torah immediately afterward, “so shall it be given to him,” we learn that he pays “something that involves giving,” that is, money—

Assign it—

to the verse “as he has done, so shall it be done to him”— \-

to a striking that does not involve the value of a peruta,

for which there is no monetary liability, in order to teach that one who injures his fellow is liable for lashes.

And this is what the verse says: Just as he struck his fellow, so shall they strike him as well, with the forty lashes minus one.

Since this verse speaks of lashes, and it is compared to one who strikes an animal, the verse has taught you that one who unintentionally becomes liable for lashes is exempt from monetary payment, just as one who strikes an animal is liable for monetary payment even when he acts unintentionally.