Ketubot 34b — the Talmud in English

2.

And Rabbi Meir holds: he is flogged and pays, he holds

he does not hold that he dies and pays.

And if you will say: if so, why is one who slaughters [an animal] on Shabbat or for idolatry liable for the payments of four and five? This is Rabbi Meir’s method:

And these are different:

the payments of four and five, which are a fine,

for it is a novelty that the Torah innovated

in every case of

a fine

that it must be paid; for a fine is not like other payments, in which he pays the value of the thing that he stole or damaged—

and since the entire essence of a fine is a novelty, this novelty also exists in it,

for even though he kills

the animal,

he pays.

And Rabba’s statement follows

who explained Rabbi Meir’s view that with regard to a fine he dies and pays, and Rabba himself holds according to Rabbi Meir’s method—

according to his own position [that is, his method]!

that is, according to his own view!

For Rabba said:

a. One who steals in violation of Shabbat, such as when he “acquires” the theft by carrying it from one domain to another, is not liable to pay the principal of the theft, because of the principle “he stands liable for the greater [penalty]”; and since he has no liability for the principal, he is likewise not liable for a fine for slaughtering the animal, because “four and five”—that is, the principal together with the additional three and four of the fine [for an ox or sheep]—is what the Torah stated, but not merely the additional three and four of the fine.

b. One who stole not in violation of Shabbat, and became liable for the principal and the double payment, and then went and slaughtered or sold [the animal] in violation of Shabbat, is liable to pay four and five, for the payments for slaughter or sale are fines, and liability to death does not exempt one from the fine; therefore:

If he had a stolen kid

before Shabbat

and slaughtered it on Shabbat

and became liable to a court-imposed death for the slaughter, he is

liable

to pay four and five, and he is not exempt on account of “he stands liable for the greater [penalty].”

Since

he had already become liable for the theft

and for payment of the principal

before he came to the violation of Shabbat.

That is: he did not steal in violation of Shabbat, which would exempt him from the principal by the law of “he stands liable for the greater [penalty],” and even though he became liable for the fine in violation of Shabbat, death does not exempt one from the fine.

But

if he stole and slaughtered on Shabbat,

so that the theft itself too was performed through a labor of Shabbat, apart from the slaughter, which took place on Shabbat, and he was already exempt from payment of the principal of the theft by the law of “he stands liable for the greater [penalty],” he is

exempt

from paying a fine for the slaughter.

For although the slaughter-fine is not exempt by the law of “he stands liable for the greater [penalty],” it is impossible to make him liable for the slaughter alone,

for if there is no theft

for which you can make him liable for the principal,

there is neither slaughter nor sale,

for the Torah stated payments of “four and five,” and not “three and four.”

Thus, Rabba’s view is that the fine for slaughter or sale is not exempt by the law of “he stands liable for the greater [penalty],” and this is in accordance with Rabbi Meir, whose view Rabba ruled in accordance with.

And

he said

Rabba

further:

If he had a stolen kid

and became liable for its principal and double payment,

and slaughtered

the kid

in a tunnel,

at a time when there was a law of death upon him, like a thief found in a tunnel, for whom there is no bloodguilt and whom anyone who sees him may kill, he is

liable

to pay four and five.

And because

he had already become liable for the theft

and for the principal for which he is liable

before he came to the violation of the tunnel,

and for the slaughter-fine, which was performed in violation of the tunnel, he is not exempt by the law of “he stands liable for the greater [penalty].”

But

if he stole and slaughtered in a tunnel,

he is

exempt

from everything, because since he did not become liable for the principal of the theft, on account of the law of death that applied to him because he entered a tunnel, we likewise cannot make him liable for the slaughter-fine,

for if there is no theft, there is neither slaughter nor sale.

And it is necessary:

Rabba had to teach us these two similar statements, one concerning Shabbat and the other concerning entering a tunnel!

For if he had taught us

Rabba only concerning

Shabbat,

which exempts the principal of the theft, I would say:

Only Shabbat exempts the money

because its prohibition is an eternal prohibition,

that is: the liability to death on its account has no interruption, and the court will always put him to death whenever witnesses come against him.

But a tunnel, whose prohibition is a temporary prohibition,

that is: the law of death lasts only temporarily, as long as the thief is in the tunnel, and it is unlike “there shall be no disaster,” from which the exemption of “he stands liable for the greater [penalty]” is derived —

let it be not so:

perhaps a liability to death of this kind does not exempt the monetary liability.

Therefore Rabba had to teach us that one who steals in a tunnel is exempt from the principal of the theft because of “he stands liable for the greater [penalty].”

And if he had taught us

Rabba only concerning

a tunnel,

which exempts monetary liability, I would say:

Only a tunnel exempts the money

because his tunnel

of the thief

is his warning,

that is: he does not require a warning.

But Shabbat, which requires a warning

in order to make him liable to death,

let it be not so:

perhaps it does not exempt the monetary liability.

Therefore

it is necessary

to teach us that both Shabbat and a tunnel exempt one from monetary liability.

Rav Pappa said: If he had a stolen cow and slaughtered it on Shabbat,

he is

liable

for the slaughter, since

he had already become liable for the theft

and for its principal

before he came to the violation of Shabbat,

and the violation of Shabbat does not exempt the slaughter-fine, in accordance with Rabba.

If he had a borrowed cow and slaughtered it on Shabbat,

and this slaughter is thereby an act of robbery of the animal—

he is

exempt

from the payments for the robbery, for this liability is monetary and not a fine, and one is not liable for it when he became liable together with it to death for slaughtering on Shabbat.

He said

in astonishment

to him, Rav Aha son of Rava, to Rav Ashi:

And is it the case that

Rav Pappa came to teach us “a cow”—that is: what novelty is there in Rav Pappa’s words beyond Rabba’s words? There is no difference between them except that one spoke of a kid and the other of a cow; did Rav Pappa need to teach us his statement in order to innovate that the same law applies even to a cow?!

that is, what innovation is there in Rav Pappa’s statement beyond Rabba’s statement? There is no difference between them except that one spoke of a kid and the other of a cow. Did Rav Pappa really need to teach us his statement merely to innovate that the same law applies to a cow?!

He said to him

Rav Ashi to Rav Aha son of Rava:

Rav Pappa came to teach us “borrowed”, that is: the final clause of the statement, when the cow was borrowed by him—this is Rav Pappa’s novelty! And there is a novelty in the matter, for

that is, the latter part of the statement, where the cow had been borrowed by him—that is Rav Pappa’s innovation! There is an innovation here, for

it might enter your mind to say: since Rav Pappa himself said

himself:

A borrower

from the time of taking possession [ [A0145]]of the animal at the time of the borrowing]

[the animal at the time of the loan]

is the one who became liable to him [ [A0147]]he already became liable]

[has already become liable]

for its provisions,

the provisions of the animal that he borrowed; therefore, even if he became liable to lashes at a time when he had to provide it with provisions, he is not exempt from paying—if he withheld its provisions—by the law of “one is not flogged and pays”

. Here too

let us say:

from the time of borrowing [that is, “from the time of taking possession”] the cow had already

[that is, “from the time of pulling”] with regard to the cow, he had already

become liable for its accidents,

by the law of a borrower, and he would not be exempt from paying for the loss of the cow that was subsequently lost, even though at the time of the loss he was subject to a capital prohibition—

That is: I might have thought that he should be made liable for the slaughter that the borrower performed, even though he slaughtered it on Shabbat, not because of the robbery in the act of slaughter, but because at the time of taking possession the borrower had already become liable to pay the value of the animal if an accident or negligence should happen to it. If so, he should be liable to pay even though he slaughtered it on Shabbat, because the liability does not take effect now, but at the time when he borrowed and took possession of the cow—

It teaches us

Rav Pappa that this is not so: the time of a borrower’s liability for accidents is not the time of the borrowing but the time of the accidents, and since at that time, when he becomes liable both by the law of a borrower and by the law of a robber, it is the time of liability to death, he is therefore exempt from the payments for the cow.

Rava said:

a.

Their father left them

the orphans

a borrowed cow

from another person; the orphans therefore

use it throughout all the days of its borrowing,

which had been fixed between the lender and their father.

And even though they possess borrowing rights in the animal, which they inherited from their father, nevertheless, if

the animal dies,

the animal,

the heirs are not

liable

for its accidents,

unlike their father, who was liable for accidents by the law of a borrower; and the reason is that they did not become borrowers with regard to the cow, but their father did.

b. And if

they thought

the orphans concerning that borrowed animal that

it was their father’s,

the cow, and that it had not come to their father through borrowing, so that according to their view they were heirs to the body of the cow,

and

therefore

they slaughtered it and ate it,

the orphans

pay

the lender for their benefit from the flesh of the cow

the value of cheap meat,

for they “benefited” from his cow, and anyone who benefits pays the value of cheap meat —

And what is its measure? Every zuz of the cow’s value is assessed as four danka [a danka is a ma’a, and six silver ma’a make a zuz ], that is, two-thirds of its true value.

But they return the hide to the lender.

3. A person's lands are mortgaged for the repayment of his debts, and even if the debtor dies, the creditor collects his debt from those lands that belonged to the debtor at the time when he became obligated; and therefore:

if

their father left them encumbered property

[lands], then they are

obligated to pay,

and it explains this and proceeds.

There are those who teach it,

there are those who explain what Rava said, “Their father left them encumbered property, they are obligated to pay”

with regard to the beginning

of Rava's statement, who said: The heirs are not obligated for the accidents of a borrowed cow that their father left them; and for this Rava added: If their father left them lands, they must pay from these lands for the accidents of the cow, should they occur, because at the time of the taking the father, who was the borrower, became obligated, and his lands had already become encumbered.

And there are those who teach it,

and there are those who explain what Rava said, “Their father left them encumbered property, they are obligated to pay”

with regard to the end

of Rava's statement, who said: If they slaughtered it and ate it in error, they do not pay the entire value of the animal; and concerning this Rava added: If their father left them encumbered property, they must pay a complete repayment and not at a reduced price.

And the Gemara explains:

a.

The one who teaches it with regard to the beginning,

that if their father left them encumbered property, they must pay for the accidents of the cow,

all the more so with regard to the end,

when they ate it, that they are obligated to pay from the lands a complete repayment and not at a reduced price—

b.

And it disagrees

this statement of Rava—with regard to the one who teaches it with regard to the beginning—with

Rav Pappa,

for according to Rav Pappa, who holds that every borrower becomes obligated for them from the time of the accidents, the father's lands do not become encumbered for payment of the accidents or the damage that the sons caused, since the father had not yet become obligated, and his lands are encumbered only for his own debt, even if he dies and leaves them to the orphans.

c.

And the one who teaches it with regard to the end,

when they slaughtered it and ate it, they pay from the lands a complete repayment and not at a reduced price,

but with regard to the beginning,

that the cow was damaged through an accident,

not

did Rava say that the father's property should become encumbered for payment of the accidents,

and this is Rav Pappa's view,

for the father did not become obligated for the accidents so long as they had not occurred, and therefore his lands do not become encumbered for this debt.

And here the Gemara returns to their dispute, Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, in explaining our Mishna: Rabbi Yohanan explained it as referring to a case in which he was not warned, and therefore he is obligated to pay; and Reish Lakish explained it in accordance with Rabbi Meir, that a person “is flogged and pays.” And it explains:

Granted, Rabbi Yohanan did not say in accordance with Reish Lakish,

who explains our Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Meir, because

Rabbi Yohanan

here

establishes it in accordance with the Rabbis,

whose view is the halakha, and therefore this resolution is preferable.

But Reish Lakish—for what reason did he not say in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan,

to explain our Mishna as referring to a case in which he was not warned, and therefore he is obligated to pay?

He could say to you,

Reish Lakish: It is impossible to establish it in accordance with the Sages, since

because if they had warned him,

he would have been

exempt

from monetary payments according to the Sages,

when they did not warn him as well, he is exempt

from monetary payments, as Reish Lakish derives later in the sugya from the verses.

And they proceeded

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, who disagree in explaining our Mishna—

according to their own positions,

according to their method, in which they disagreed concerning those liable for inadvertent lashes according to the Sages: Are they exempt from monetary payments?

For when Rav Dimi came, he said: Those liable for inadvertent deaths, and those liable for inadvertent lashes, and another matter,

namely money, Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagreed in these two cases:

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is obligated,

to pay the money.

And Reish Lakish said: He is exempt,

from paying the money.

And the Gemara explains the reasoning of each one:

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is obligated,

since

he was surely not warned,

and he is not liable for death or lashes; so what would exempt him from the money?

Reish Lakish said: He is exempt, because if they had warned him

he would have been

exempt

from paying money;

when they did not warn him as well, he is exempt,

as he explains his reasoning below.

Reish Lakish raised an objection

who obligates those liable for inadvertent deaths in monetary payment

to Rabbi Yohanan:

But it is written: “And when men quarrel and they strike a pregnant woman, and her children emerge

and there is no fatality, he shall surely be punished

[with the value of the offspring].” It follows that if there is a fatality, he is not punished with the value of the offspring, for he is subject to the greater penalty.