Ketubot 34b (לד:) — the Talmud in English

b.

And Rabbi Meir holds that one is flogged and pays, but if he dies

and pays, he does not hold that he pays.

And if you say: If so, why is one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat or for idolatry liable for the payments of four and five? This is Rabbi Meir’s position:

But these are different

the payments of four and five, which are a fine,

for it is an innovation that the Torah introduced

in every case of

a fine

that it must be paid. A fine is unlike ordinary payments, in which one pays the value of the item that he stole or damaged—

And since the very essence of a fine is an innovation, this too contains such an innovation,

for even though he kills it

he

pays.

And Rabba’s statement follows

Rabba explained Rabbi Meir’s view as being that in the case of a fine, he dies and pays; and Rabba himself holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir’s view—

according to his own reasoning

that is, according to his own view!

For Rabba said:

a. One who steals in violation of Shabbat, for example, by acquiring the stolen item through transferring it from one domain to another, is not liable to pay the principal of the theft because of the principle of kam lei bidrabba minei. And since he is not liable for the principal, he is likewise not liable for the fine for slaughtering the animal, because the Torah stated “four and five”—meaning the principal together with the additional three or four payments of the fine [for an ox or a sheep]—but not merely the three or four payments of the fine.

And he further wrote: “Alternatively, when it is bound,” because when the animal is bound, we do not say: “A living being carries itself.” b. One who stole without violating Shabbat, becoming liable for the principal and the double payment, and then slaughtered or sold the animal in violation of Shabbat, is liable to pay four and five. The payments for slaughter or sale are a fine, and liability to death does not exempt one from a fine. Therefore:

If he had a stolen kid

from before Shabbat

and slaughtered it on Shabbat,

and became liable to a court-imposed death penalty for the slaughter, he is

liable

to pay four and five, and he is not exempt because of “kam lei bidrabba minei.”

Since he

had already become liable for the theft

and for payment of the principal

before he came to violate Shabbat.

That is, he did not steal in violation of Shabbat, in which case he would be exempt from the principal by virtue of “kam lei bidrabba minei.” Although he became liable for the fine in violation of Shabbat, death does not exempt him from the fine.

But

if he stole and slaughtered on Shabbat,

where the theft itself was also carried out through a labor forbidden on Shabbat, in addition to the slaughter, which took place on Shabbat, and he was already exempt from payment of the principal of the theft by virtue of kam lei bidrabba minei, he is

exempt

from paying a fine for the slaughter.

For although the fine for the slaughter is not exempt by virtue of kam lei bidrabba minei, it is impossible to obligate him for the slaughter alone,

for if there is no theft

for which you can obligate him to pay the principal,

there is neither slaughter nor sale

because the Torah stated “payments of four and five,” and not “payments of three and four.”

Thus, Rabba’s view is that the fine for slaughter or sale is not exempt by virtue of kam lei bidrabba minei, and Rabba ruled in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

And

he further

Rabba

further:

said:

If he had a stolen kid and became liable for its principal and double payment,

and slaughtered

the kid

in a tunnel,

at a time when he was subject to the death penalty like a thief found in a tunnel, for whom there is no bloodguilt and whom anyone may kill, he is

liable

to pay four and five.

And because he

had already become liable for the theft

and for the principal for which he was liable

before he came to the prohibition of the tunnel, he is not exempt, by virtue of kam lei bidrabba minei, from the fine for the slaughter, which took place under the prohibition of the tunnel.

But

if he stole and slaughtered in a tunnel,

he is

exempt

from everything. Since he did not become liable for the principal of the theft because of the death penalty to which he was subject for entering the tunnel, we likewise do not obligate him for the fine for the slaughter,

for if there is no theft, there is neither slaughter nor sale.

And it is necessary

for Rabba to teach us these two similar statements, one concerning Shabbat and the other concerning entry into a tunnel!

For had he taught us

Rabba only with regard to

Shabbat,

I would have said:

It is only Shabbat that exempts one from monetary liability

because its prohibition is an everlasting prohibition

that is, the death penalty on its account never lapses: the court would execute him whenever witnesses came forward against him.

But with regard to a tunnel, whose prohibition is a temporary one,

that is, the death penalty lasts only temporarily, as long as the thief is in the tunnel, and this is unlike “there shall be no tragedy,” from which the exemption of kam lei bidrabba minei is derived —

I might say no:

perhaps such a death penalty would not exempt him from monetary liability.

Therefore, Rabba had to teach us that one who steals in a tunnel is exempt from the principal of the theft because of kam lei bidrabba minei.

And had he taught us

Rabba only with regard to

a tunnel,

which exempts one from monetary liability, I would have said:

It is only a tunnel that exempts one from monetary liability

because his tunnel

the thief’s

is his warning,

that is, he does not require a formal warning.

But with regard to Shabbat, which requires a warning

in order to make him liable to death,

I might say no:

perhaps it does not exempt him from monetary liability.

Therefore,

it is necessary

to teach us that both Shabbat and a tunnel exempt one from monetary liability.

Rav Pappa said: If he had a stolen cow and slaughtered it on Shabbat,

he is

liable

for the slaughter, since

he had already become liable for the theft

and for its principal

before he came to violate Shabbat.

The prohibition of Shabbat does not exempt him from the fine for the slaughter, in accordance with Rabba’s statement.

If he had a borrowed cow and slaughtered it on Shabbat,

and this slaughter is consequently an act of robbery of the animal—

he is

exempt

from payment for the robbery, since this liability is monetary rather than a fine, and one is not liable for it when he simultaneously becomes liable to death for slaughtering on Shabbat.

He said

he challenged

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, to Rav Ashi:

But

did Rav Pappa come to teach us the case of a “cow”

that is, what innovation is there in Rav Pappa’s statement beyond Rabba’s statement? There is no difference between them except that one spoke of a kid and the other of a cow. Did Rav Pappa really need to teach us his statement merely to innovate that the same law applies to a cow?!

He said to him,

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava:

Rav Pappa came to teach us the case of a “borrowed” animal,

that is, the latter part of the statement, where the cow had been borrowed by him—that is Rav Pappa’s innovation! There is an innovation here, for

it might have entered your mind to say: Since Rav Pappa himself said

:

A borrower

from the time of pulling

[the animal at the time of the loan]

is already liable to him

[has already become liable]

for its sustenance,

the sustenance of the animal that he borrowed, and therefore even if he became liable to lashes at a time when he was obligated to provide it with sustenance, he is not exempt from paying—if he withheld its sustenance—because of “one who is flogged does not pay” —

Here too,

we would say:

from the time of borrowing

[that is, “from the time of pulling”] with regard to the cow, he had already

become liable for accidents

by virtue of the law of a borrower, and he would not be exempt from paying for the loss of the cow that subsequently perished, even though at the time of the loss he was subject to a death penalty—

That is: I would have thought that he should be liable for the slaughter performed by the borrower, even though he slaughtered it on Shabbat, not because of the robbery involved in the act of slaughter, but because at the time of pulling, the borrower had already become liable to pay the value of the animal if an accident or negligence occurred to it. If so, he should be liable to pay even though he slaughtered it on Shabbat, because the liability took effect not now but at the time that he borrowed and pulled the cow—

He comes to teach us

Rav Pappa that this is not so: the time at which a borrower’s liability for accidents arises is not the time of the loan, but the time of the accident. Since at the very time when he becomes liable both as a borrower and as a robber the death penalty applies, he is therefore exempt from payment for the cow.

Rava said:

a.

If their father left them

the orphans

a borrowed cow

from another person, the orphans

may use it throughout the entire period of its loan

that had been fixed between the lender and their father.

And although they possess rights of borrowing in the animal that they inherited from their father, nevertheless, if

the animal

dies,

the heirs

are not liable for accidents, unlike their father, who was liable for accidents as a borrower. The reason is that they did not become borrowers with regard to the cow; their father did.

b. And if

the orphans thought

with regard to that borrowed animal that

it belonged to their father,

that the cow had not come to their father as a loan, and consequently, according to their understanding, they had inherited ownership of the cow itself,

and

therefore

they slaughtered and ate it.

The orphans

pay

the lender for the benefit they derived from the cow’s meat

the value of inexpensive meat,

since they benefited from his cow, and anyone who benefits must pay the value of inexpensive meat.

And what is the measure of this payment? For every zuz of the cow’s value, we assess four danka [a danka is a ma’a, and six silver ma’ot constitute a zuz] , that is, two-thirds of its true value. And they return the hide to the lender.

3. A person's landholdings are encumbered for repayment of his debts, and even if the debtor dies, the creditor collects his debt from those landholdings that belonged to the debtor at the time he incurred the debt; therefore:

if

their father left them landholdings encumbered by liability

[i.e., land], they are

obligated to pay,

as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

There are those who teach it

, meaning that some explain what Rava said: “If their father left them landholdings encumbered by liability, they are obligated to pay”

with regard to the first clause

, of Rava's statement, in which he said: The heirs are not obligated for the accidents involving a borrowed cow that their father left them; and to this Rava added: If their father left them landholdings, they must pay from those landholdings for the cow's accidental damages, should they occur, because at the time he took possession of the cow, the father, as the borrower, incurred the obligation, and his landholdings had already become encumbered.

And there are those who teach it

, meaning that some explain what Rava said: “If their father left them landholdings encumbered by liability, they are obligated to pay”

with regard to the final clause

of Rava's statement, in which he said: If they slaughtered the cow and ate it unwittingly, they do not pay the full value of the animal; and to this Rava added: If their father left them landholdings encumbered by liability, they must make full repayment and may not pay at a reduced value.

The Gemara explains:

a.

The one who teaches it with regard to the first clause

, that if their father left them landholdings encumbered by liability, they must pay for the cow's accidental damages,

would certainly say so with regard to the final clause

, when they ate it, in which case they must pay from the landholdings in full and may not pay at a reduced value—

b.

And it disagrees

—this teaching of Rava, according to the one who teaches it with regard to the first clause—with

Rav Pappa

, for according to Rav Pappa, who holds that every borrower incurs the obligation only from the time of the accidents, the father's landholdings do not become encumbered for payment of the accidental damages or the damage caused by the sons, since the father had not yet incurred the obligation, and his landholdings become encumbered only for his own debt, even if he dies and leaves them to orphans.

c.

And the one who teaches it with regard to the final clause

, when they slaughtered the cow and ate it, in which case they pay from the landholdings in full and may not pay at a reduced value,

but with regard to the first clause

, where the cow was damaged through an accident,

not

did Rava say that the father's property becomes encumbered for payment of the accidental damages.

And that is the view of Rav Pappa

, for the father did not incur liability for the accidents as long as they had not occurred; therefore, his landholdings do not become encumbered for this debt.

The Gemara now returns to the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish in explaining our Mishna. Rabbi Yohanan interpreted it as referring to a case where the person had not been forewarned, and therefore he is obligated to pay; while Reish Lakish interpreted it in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who holds that a person is “lashed and pays.” It explains:

Granted, Rabbi Yohanan did not say in accordance with Reish Lakish

, who interprets our Mishna in accordance with Rabbi Meir, because

since

Rabbi Yohanan

interprets it in accordance with the Rabbis

, whose opinion is the halakha, and therefore this interpretation is preferable.

But for what reason did Reish Lakish not say in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan

, to interpret our Mishna as referring to a case where the person had not been forewarned, and therefore he is obligated to pay?

He could say to you

that Reish Lakish would respond: It is impossible to establish the Mishna in accordance with the Rabbis, since

when, if they had forewarned him

, he would have been

exempt

from monetary payment according to the Rabbis,

when they had not forewarned him as well, he is exempt

from payment, as Reish Lakish derives later in the sugya from the verses.

And

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish, who disagree in explaining our Mishna, proceeded

according to their own reasoning

, in accordance with their dispute concerning inadvertent transgressors liable to lashes according to the Rabbis: Are they exempt from monetary payments?

For when Rav Dimi came, he said: Inadvertent cases involving liability to death, inadvertent cases involving liability to lashes, and another matter

, namely, monetary liability, Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagreed in both of these cases:

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is liable

to pay the money.

And Reish Lakish said: He is exempt

from paying the money.

The Gemara explains the reasoning of each of them:

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is liable

, because

he was not in fact forewarned

, and he is therefore not liable to death or lashes; so what could exempt him from the monetary payment?

Reish Lakish said: He is exempt, because if they had forewarned him

, he would have been

exempt

from monetary payment;

when they had not forewarned him as well, he is exempt

, as he explains the reason for his ruling below.

Reish Lakish raised an objection

, who exempts one liable to death in an inadvertent case from monetary payment,

to Rabbi Yohanan

: But it is written: “And when men fight and they collide with a pregnant woman, and her children emerge

and there is no fatality, he shall surely be punished

[with payment for the offspring].” This implies that if there is a fatality, he is not punished with payment for the offspring, because he is liable for the more severe punishment.