Ketubot 34a — the Talmud in English

It is Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, who says:

concerning one who slaughters and it is found to be a tereifa, or who slaughtered non-sacred animals in the Temple courtyard, that he is not liable for the slaughtering four or five, because:

an unfit slaughtering,

that is, a slaughtering through which the animal is not permitted for eating—

“It is not called ‘slaughtering”

and not “slaughtering” [tevicha], and every liability and prohibition that comes through slaughtering does not apply to it. Therefore, slaughtering on Shabbat, which is an unfit slaughtering as he explains below, and likewise slaughtering for idolatry, whereby the animal is forbidden in eating and benefit according to the law of “sacrifices of the dead,” is not called slaughtering to make him liable for it for the slaughtering four or five.

And the Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation of the beraita:

For

granted

one who slaughters for

idolatry,

which indeed is an unfit slaughtering.

And

also the slaughtering of

an ox sentenced to stoning,

which the Sages exempted in the beraita from the payments of four or five, is also an unfit slaughtering, for an ox sentenced to stoning is forbidden in benefit.

But the slaughtering on Shabbat

when the agent slaughtered—why did the Sages exempt him? Surely

it is a fit slaughtering!?

For

thus

we learned: One who slaughters on Shabbat and on the Day of Atonement, even though he

is

liable with his life

[for death on Shabbat and karet on the Day of Atonement] ,

his slaughtering is valid

and the meat is permitted for eating!

And

we answer:

he holds—

Rabbi Shimon—

like Rabbi

Yohanan the Sandalmaker,

who forbids eating “an act of Shabbat,” that is, something done in violation of Shabbat intentionally.

For it was taught: One who cooks on Shabbat:

If he cooked

unintentionally—

he shall eat

the cooked food, both the one who cooked it and even on Shabbat.

And if he cooked

intentionally—

the one who cooked it himself

shall not

eat

the cooked food forever, but others eat it.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Judah says:

If he cooked

unintentionally,

the one who cooked it shall not eat it immediately, but

he shall eat

the cooked food

on the conclusion of Shabbat,

when the time of “the time required for it to be done” has passed—that is, when the amount of time in which it could have been cooked had he not cooked it on Shabbat has passed. And this is because Rabbi Judah penalizes unintentional action on account of intentional action, [but others eat it immediately].

And if he cooked

intentionally,

then

he shall not eat

the one who cooked it

forever,

but others eat it.

Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker says:

If he cooked

unintentionally,

then the cooked food

shall be eaten on the conclusion of Shabbat by others

only,

but not by him,

who transgressed and cooked.

And if he cooked

intentionally,

then the cooked food

shall not be eaten forever, neither by him

who transgressed and cooked,

nor by others,

Israelites; but he sells it and gives it to a gentile.

It follows that according to the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker, one who slaughters on Shabbat intentionally has a slaughtering that is not fit to permit the animal for eating, for according to his opinion it is forbidden to the entire world. And the opinion of the Sages who exempt from four or five one who slaughters an ox on Shabbat is likewise the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker,

who holds that an act of Shabbat is forbidden for eating?

As Rabbi Hiyya expounded at the entrance of the house of the Nasi

[as Rabbi Hiyya expounded at the entrance of the house of the Nasi]:

It is written in the Torah:

“You shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy for you”,

and therefore Scripture called it “holy,” in order to teach:

Just as the holy is forbidden for eating, so an act of Shabbat is forbidden for eating.

Lest you say:

Perhaps just as the holy is forbidden in benefit, so an act of Shabbat is forbidden in benefit.

Therefore

Scripture says: “For it is holy”

for you,

“for you”,

and “for you” implies:

it shall be yours

to derive benefit from it.

One might have thought even

if he cooked

unintentionally,

without knowing that today was Shabbat, it should be forbidden for eating like the holy, both for him and for others.

Scripture says: “You shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy for you;

“its profaners shall surely be put to death”,

and Scripture has thus spoken of one who acted intentionally,

and Scripture teaches:

Intentionally

is when

I told you

that an act of Shabbat should be like the holy,

but not unintentionally.

They disagree about it—

in explaining the position of Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker—

Rav Aha and Ravina!

One

of them

said: An act of Shabbat

is forbidden

by Torah law.

And one

of them

said: an act of Shabbat is forbidden only

by

rabbinic law.

And the Gemara explains the reason of each one:

The one who says

that an act of Shabbat is forbidden

by Torah law

according to Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker—his reason is

as we said,

that it is learned from the verse, “It is holy for you.”

And

the one who says

that an act of Shabbat is forbidden only

by rabbinic law,

his reason is:

For

the verse says: “It is holy.”

Scripture teaches by saying “it”:

it

is the Shabbat

that is holy, but its acts are not holy,

and it is the Sages who forbade an act of Shabbat.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

And according to the one who says

that even according to Rabbi Yohanan the Sandalmaker an act of Shabbat is forbidden only

by rabbinic law,

then it is again difficult:

What is the reason of the Sages who exempt

from four or five when he slaughtered on Shabbat? Surely by Torah law it is a fit slaughtering, and by law he should be liable for four or five!?

And we answer: indeed, the Sages did not exempt one who slaughters on Shabbat through another, but

when the Sages exempt

in the beraita, it is only

with regard to the others,

concerning the other cases mentioned in the beraita—

That is: a. One who slaughters through another for idolatry, because it is an unfit slaughtering by Torah law.

b. One who slaughters an ox sentenced to stoning, because it is forbidden in benefit by Torah law, and its slaughtering is an unfit slaughtering.

The Gemara further explains the beraita, in which it is explained that Rabbi Meir makes one liable for slaughtering through another for idolatry:

But the one who

slaughters for idolatry, once he has slaughtered it

a small amount, it becomes forbidden to him

[since he began to slaughter for idolatry—before the one who sent him becomes liable on account of slaughtering —the animal had already become forbidden] on account of an idolatrous offering.

And if so,

the other part, when he slaughters

[the continuation of the slaughtering until its completion, which in its entirety makes him liable for four or five] the animal that had already become forbidden in benefit—

then

it is not the property of its owner that he slaughters

[it is no longer slaughtering an animal belonging to the owner], for the animal no longer belongs to the one robbed, since it is forbidden in benefit, and why should the thief be liable for it for four or five!?

He said

he answered:

Rava: When he says,

the one who slaughters: I am not slaughtering for idolatry from the beginning of the slaughtering, but

it is at the completion of the slaughtering that he

[that is: I]

worship it,

and if so, the animal did not become forbidden until he completed the slaughtering.

The Gemara further raises an objection to the beraita:

an ox sentenced to stoning—

since it is forbidden in benefit—

is it not his

of the one robbed

that the thief slaughters,

and why is he liable for it!?

He said

he answered:

Rabba:

a. In the Gemara in Bava Kamma 76a we learned:

One who steals consecrated property from the owners’ house is exempt, as it is stated, “and he steals from the house of the man,” and not from the house of consecrated property.

Rabbi Shimon says: If he stole consecrated animals for which he is liable, meaning that the owners are obligated to give the Temple another animal in place of this one if the animal is stolen, lost, or dies, the thief is liable for double payment for the theft and for four or five if he slaughtered it. Rabbi Shimon’s reason is that since the owner is liable for it, he slaughters the owner’s property, because “something that causes monetary liability”—such as this animal, which causes him monetary liability, since he would otherwise have to provide another in its place—“is considered property.” That is, it is considered his.

b. The Sages taught in Bava Kamma 44b:

An ox that killed a person: before its verdict was completed [to be stoned], if its guardian returned it to its owner’s house, it is returned. For even though the court will take the ox after its verdict is completed in order to kill it, the guardian is exempt, because at the time he returned it, it was a superior ox [Rashi there].

But if, after its verdict was completed, the guardian returned it to its owner’s house, it is not returned.

Rabbi Yaakov says: Even if, after its verdict was completed, he returned it to its owner’s house, it is returned.

It follows that if a person stole an ox whose verdict to be stoned had been completed from the guardian’s house, his law would depend on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages and on the dispute between Rabbi Yaakov and the Sages. For according to Rabbi Yaakov, who says that the guardian may return it even after its verdict was completed, and if he does not return it he will be liable for the value of the entire ox, the ox is “something that causes monetary liability,” and according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that “something that causes monetary liability is considered property,” the thief will be liable.

Here—

in the beraita that makes one who steals an ox sentenced to stoning and slaughters it liable to pay four or five—

with what are we dealing:

For example, when they gave it

the owners gave the ox

to a guardian, and it caused damage

the ox killed a person

in the guardian’s house, and

also

its judgment was completed

for the ox to be stoned

in the guardian’s house—

And a thief stole from the house of

the

watchman,

and slaughtered it.

And therefore, according to Rabbi Meir, the thief is liable to pay the watchman for the slaughtering—

and

because

Rabbi Meir held like Rabbi Yaakov, and

also

held like Rabbi Shimon.

He held like Rabbi Yaakov, who said: Even once its judgment had been completed, if the watchman returned it to its owners—

it is

returned,

and he is not responsible for the stoning of the ox.

And he held

Rabbi Meir also

like Rabbi Shimon, who said: An item that causes monetary value is considered like money.

And here the Gemara returns to explain another explanation—from the Gemara’s explanation above, on 33b—of the beraita in which Rabbi Meir said that liability to death does not exempt one from payment of four and five:

Rabba said

to explain the beraita in which it is made clear that according to Rabbi Meir, one who slaughters on Shabbat or for idolatry is liable to pay four and five, and we do not say, “kam lei bid’rabba minei”:

And Rabba precedes his explanation with two introductions:

a.

Always

that same beraita in which it is explicit that according to Rabbi Meir one who slaughters on Shabbat is liable speaks

of slaughtering by himself,

and the thief became liable to death by the court.