Ketubot 34a (לד.) — the Talmud in English

It is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who says:

with regard to one who slaughters an animal and it is found to be tereifa, or who slaughters non-sacred meat in the Temple courtyard, that he is not liable for slaughtering it to pay fourfold or fivefold, because:

it is an unfit slaughter,

that is, slaughter by which the animal is not rendered permitted for consumption—

It is not called “slaughter”

and it is not called “slaughtering,” and any liability or prohibition that comes about through slaughter does not apply to it. Therefore, slaughtering on Shabbat, which is unfit slaughter, as the Gemara explains below, and likewise slaughtering for idolatry, where the animal becomes prohibited for consumption and benefit, according to the law of “sacrifices of the dead,” is not called slaughtering so as to make him liable to pay fourfold or fivefold.

The Gemara raises an objection to this interpretation of the beraita:

For

granted

with regard to one who slaughters for

idolatry,

it is indeed an unfit slaughter.

And

also the slaughtering of

an ox sentenced to stoning,

for which the Sages exempted him in the beraita from payment of fourfold or fivefold, is likewise unfit slaughter, since an ox sentenced to stoning is prohibited for benefit.

But what of slaughtering on Shabbat,

where the agent slaughtered the animal—why did the Sages exempt him? Surely

it is fit slaughter!?

As

we

learned: One who slaughters on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, although he

is

liable for his life [

that is, execution for Shabbat and karet for Yom Kippur],

his slaughter is valid,

and the meat is permitted for consumption!

And

we answer:

He holds—

Rabbi Shimon—

in accordance with Rabbi

Yoḥanan the sandal-maker,

who prohibits eating “an act performed on Shabbat,” that is, something done in deliberate violation of Shabbat.

As it was taught: One who cooks on Shabbat:

If he cooked

inadvertently—

he may eat

the dish, both the one who cooked it and even on Shabbat.

But if he cooked

deliberately—

the one who cooked it himself

may not

eat

the dish ever, but others may eat it.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

If he cooked

inadvertently,

the one who cooked it may not eat it immediately; rather,

he may eat

the dish

on the conclusion of Shabbat,

once the period of “the time required for it to be done” has passed—that is, once the amount of time in which it could have been cooked had he not cooked it on Shabbat has passed. This is because Rabbi Yehuda penalizes inadvertence on account of deliberateness. [But others may eat it immediately.]

But if he cooked

deliberately,

then

he may not eat

it—the one who cooked it—

ever,

but others may eat it.

Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker says:

If he cooked

inadvertently,

the dish

may be eaten on the conclusion of Shabbat by others

alone,

but not by him,

who transgressed and cooked it.

But if he cooked

deliberately,

the dish

may never be eaten—not by him,

who transgressed and cooked it,

and not by others,

Israelites; but he may sell it or give it to a gentile.

It follows that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker, one who deliberately slaughters on Shabbat has not performed slaughter that renders the animal permitted for consumption, since according to his opinion it is prohibited to everyone. And the Sages who exempt one from payment of fourfold or fivefold for an ox slaughtered on Shabbat hold in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker.

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker,

who holds that an act performed on Shabbat is prohibited for consumption?

As Rabbi Ḥiyya expounded at the entrance of the house of the Nasi [

as Rabbi Ḥiyya expounded at the entrance of the house of the Nasi]:

It is written in the Torah:

“You shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy to you”,

and therefore Scripture called it “holy,” in order to teach:

Just as that which is holy is prohibited for consumption, so too an act performed on Shabbat is prohibited for consumption.

Lest you say:

If so, just as that which is holy is prohibited for benefit, so too an act performed on Shabbat is prohibited for benefit.

Therefore,

the verse states: “For it is holy”

“to you,”

to you,

which indicates:

It shall belong to you

to derive benefit from it.

One might have thought even

if he cooked

inadvertently,

without knowing that today was Shabbat, it would be prohibited for consumption, like that which is holy, both to him and to others.

The verse states: “You shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy to you;

the one who profanes it

shall surely be put to death.”

Thus Scripture is speaking of one who acted deliberately, and Scripture teaches:

It is only when he acts deliberately

that

I told you

that an act performed on Shabbat should be like that which is holy,

but not when he acts inadvertently.

They disagree about it—

concerning the explanation of Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker’s position—

Rav Aḥa and Ravina!

One

of them

said: An act performed on Shabbat

is prohibited

by Torah law.

And the other

of them

said:

An act performed on Shabbat is prohibited only

by rabbinic law.

The Gemara explains the reasoning of each of them:

The one who says

that an act performed on Shabbat is prohibited

by Torah law

according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker bases his view

on what we said,

that it is derived from the verse “it is holy to you.”

And

the one who says

that an act performed on Shabbat is prohibited only

by rabbinic law,

his reasoning is:

For

the verse states: “It is holy.”

Scripture teaches by saying “it is”:

it—

the Shabbat—

is holy, but its actions are not holy,

and it was the Sages who prohibited an act performed on Shabbat.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

And according to the one who says

that even according to Rabbi Yoḥanan the sandal-maker an act performed on Shabbat is prohibited only

by rabbinic law,

the difficulty arises again:

What is the reason of the Sages who exempt

one from payment of fourfold or fivefold when he slaughtered on Shabbat? Since by Torah law it is fit slaughter, he should legally be liable to pay fourfold or fivefold!?

And we answer: The Sages indeed did not exempt one who slaughters on Shabbat through another,

and when the Sages exempted

him in the beraita, it was only

in the other cases,

with regard to the other cases mentioned in the beraita—

Namely: A. One who slaughters through another for idolatry, because it is unfit slaughter by Torah law.

B. One who slaughters an ox sentenced to stoning, because it is prohibited for benefit by Torah law, and its slaughter is unfit slaughter.

The Gemara further explains the beraita, which teaches that Rabbi Meir holds one liable for slaughtering through another for idolatry:

But in the case of one who slaughters for

idolatry, once he has slaughtered a little of it

it becomes prohibited to him for benefit, [

since once he has begun slaughtering for idolatry—before the one who appointed him becomes liable on account of the slaughtering —the animal has already become prohibited] as an offering to idolatry.

And if so,

when he slaughters the rest [

the continuation of the slaughter until its completion, which in its entirety makes him liable for fourfold or fivefold] the animal that has already become prohibited for benefit—

then

he is not slaughtering his property [

it is no longer slaughtering an animal belonging to the owner], since the animal no longer belongs to the person from whom it was stolen, because it is prohibited for benefit, so why should the thief be liable to pay fourfold or fivefold for it!?

Rava said

in answer:

When he says

that the slaughterer does not say, from the beginning of the slaughter, “I am slaughtering for the sake of idolatry,” but rather

it is at the completion of the slaughter that he [

that is, “I”]

worship it;

and if so, the animal does not become prohibited until he completes the slaughter.

The Gemara raises another difficulty concerning the beraita:

An ox sentenced to stoning—

since it is prohibited for benefit—

is it not his property,

that of the person from whom it was stolen,

that he slaughters,

the thief? Why, then, is he liable for it!?

He said

in answer,

Rabba:

A. We learned in the Gemara in Bava Kamma 76a:

One who steals consecrated property from the owner’s house is exempt, as it is stated: “And he steals from the house of the man,” but not from the house of the Temple treasury.

Rabbi Shimon says: If one steals sacrificial animals for which the owner bears responsibility—that is, the owner is obligated to provide the Temple with another animal in place of this one if the animal is stolen, lost, or dies—the thief is liable to pay double for the theft and fourfold or fivefold if he slaughters it. Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning is that since the owner bears responsibility for it, the thief slaughters the owner’s property, because “an item that causes a monetary liability”—such as this animal, which causes him a monetary liability, since he will have to provide another animal in its place—“is considered money.” That is, it is considered his property.

B. The Sages taught in Bava Kamma 44b:

An ox that killed a person: Before its verdict was finalized [for stoning], if its guardian returned it to its owner’s house, it is considered returned. For although the court will take the ox after its verdict is finalized in order to kill it, the guardian is exempt, because at the time he returned it, it was a sound ox [Rashi there].

But if, after its verdict was finalized, the guardian returned it to its owner’s house, it is not considered returned.

Rabbi Yaakov says: Even if, after its verdict was finalized, the guardian returned it to its owner’s house, it is considered returned.

It follows that if a person steals from the guardian an ox whose verdict was finalized for stoning, the law would depend on the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages and on the dispute between Rabbi Yaakov and the Sages. For according to Rabbi Yaakov, the guardian may return it even after its verdict was finalized, and if he does not return it, he is liable to replace the entire ox. Thus the ox is “an item that causes a monetary liability,” and according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that “an item that causes a monetary liability is considered money,” the thief would be liable.

Here—

in the beraita that makes one who steals an ox sentenced to stoning and slaughters it liable to pay fourfold or fivefold—

with what are we dealing?

For example, the owners gave

the ox

to a guardian, and it caused damage

the ox killed a person

in the guardian’s house, and

even

its verdict was finalized

for stoning

in the guardian’s house—

And a thief stole from the house of

the

bailee,

and slaughtered it.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Meir, the thief is liable to pay the bailee for the slaughtering—

and

because

Rabbi Meir followed the opinion of Rabbi Yaakov, and

also

followed the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

He followed the opinion of Rabbi Yaakov, who said: Even after its verdict had been finalized, if the bailee returned it to its owner;

it is

considered returned,

and he is not responsible for the ox being stoned.

And he followed the opinion of

Rabbi Meir also

followed the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: An item that causes monetary liability is considered money.

Here the Gemara returns to offer another explanation—from the Gemara’s explanation above, on page 33b—of the beraita in which Rabbi Meir said that liability to a death penalty does not exempt one from payment of fourfold and fivefold payment:

Rabba said

to explain the beraita, where it is stated that according to Rabbi Meir, one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat or for idolatry is liable to pay fourfold and fivefold payment, and we do not say, “the more severe penalty exempts one from the lesser penalty”:

Rabba precedes his explanation with two introductions:

1.

In fact

the same beraita that explicitly states that according to Rabbi Meir one who slaughters an animal on Shabbat is liable is speaking

of one who slaughters it himself,

and the thief became liable to a court-imposed death penalty.