Ketubot 33b — the Talmud in English

Perhaps

the punishment of

lashes, being more severe

than death, is!?

For

behold,

Rav said: Had they been

subjected

to beatings, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah—

had they been tortured with torments so that they would bow to the image, they indeed would have

worshipped the image—

they would not have withstood it and would have worshipped it by bowing, even though they did not recoil from being thrown into the fiery furnace in order to die! Thus, the torments are more severe than death, and it again follows that one warned concerning death is not warned concerning lashes; and the proof that one who injures his fellow pays money and is not flogged is nullified!? The Tosafot wrote that that image was not actual idolatry, but rather was made in honor of the king; nevertheless, there was sanctification of the Name in it, and therefore they gave themselves over to death. This is what is written [Daniel 3]: “We do not worship your god, nor do we bow to the golden image that you have erected.” This implies that the image did not possess divinity; therefore, it was permitted for them to bow to it, and if they had tortured them, they indeed would have bowed to it. However, they raised an objection to this from the wording of the Gemara, “they worshipped the image,” which implies that it possessed divinity and that worship of it was applicable.

He said—

he objected—

to him, Rav Sama son of “Rav Asi,” to Rav Ashi; and some say, Rav Sama son of “Rav

Ashi”

was the one who objected

to Rav Ashi,

concerning Rav Ashi’s comparison of lashes imposed by the court for a prohibition to the tortures of the kingdom, from which he learned that lashes are more severe than death:

And is no distinction apparent to you

between

a beating that has a fixed measure [a limit],

such as the lashes of the court, which are thirty-nine,

and a beating

of the kingdom

that has no fixed measure,

such as that of Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah!?

Rav Yaakov of Nehar Pekoḍ raised an objection [a place name]

to the inference from the passage concerning the money for miscarriages, that one who injures his fellow is flogged and pays:

This works out well according to the Rabbis, who say:

“And if there is a fatality, then you shall give a life for a life,” which the Torah stated; this means that he becomes liable for

an actual life,

since according to their view it is indeed necessary that the verse is speaking of one who struck with a warning for death, for otherwise he would not become liable for an actual life.

But according to Rabbi, who says:

the Torah does not intend to say that if the woman dies, the one who struck her becomes liable for his life, for he did not intend her; and although he intended his fellow, according to Rabbi, “one who intended to kill this person and killed that person” does not become liable for his life—

and what the Torah stated, that if the woman dies, “then you shall give a life for a life,” means that the one who struck her shall pay

money,

the value of the woman—

and according to Rabbi, there is no necessity to say that the verse is speaking of one who was warned that he would become liable for death if he killed his fellow. If so,

what can be said,

from where is it known that one who injures his fellow pays and is not flogged!?

Rather, Rav Yaakov of Nehar Pekoḍ said in the name of Rava: From here

it may be learned that one who injures his fellow pays money and is not flogged:

For it is written: “And when men quarrel and one man strikes his fellow, and he does not die but falls into bed.

If he rises [the injured man]

and

walks outside on his support [in his health, having returned to his strength and his original vigor],

and

the striker is acquitted [from death by the court], he shall only give for his loss of work and shall surely provide healing”—

and the verse requires explanation, for

is it conceivable that

this

injured man

walks in the marketplace while this

striker

is executed,

so that the Torah needed to say, “and the striker is acquitted”? Behold, several verses prove that a murderer becomes liable only if the injured man dies, as the Torah said, “One who strikes a person and he dies shall surely be put to death,” and other verses!?

Rather,

this verse was written only so that it would

teach: they imprison

in the prison

him [the striker],

and

if the injured man dies

then

we execute him

the striker, as the law of a murderer;

and if the injured man does not die,

then the striker is completely acquitted from the hands of the court, and

“for his loss of work he shall give”—

the striker—

“and he shall surely provide healing.”

Once the meaning of the verse has been clarified—that they imprison him so that if he dies, the striker will become liable for his life—it follows from this verse that one who injures his fellow pays money and is not flogged:

For

what are the circumstances

in which the one who injured him would become liable for his life if the injured man dies?

If he was not warned

that if the injured man dies he will become liable for death,

why is he executed

the striker, even if the injured man died!?

Rather, it is obvious that he was warned

for death,

and one warned concerning a severe matter

is

warned

also

concerning a lesser matter,

namely, lashes for injuring him if the injured man does not die—

and

nevertheless

the Merciful One said: “For his loss of work he shall give and he shall surely provide healing,”

and he is not exempt from the payments by means of the lashes to which he became liable.

Thus, the verse taught you that one who injures his fellow pays money and is not flogged.

Rav Ashi raised an objection

in the manner in which he objected to the previous inference:

From where is it established that one warned concerning a severe matter is considered warned concerning a lesser matter!?

Perhaps he is not

warned—and

even

even

if you should say

that one warned concerning a severe matter

is

warned concerning a lesser matter—

from where is it established that death is more severe

than lashes?

Perhaps lashes are more severe

than death—

For

behold,

Rav said: Had they not tortured Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah,

they would have

worshipped the image.

He said—

Rav Sama son of Rav Asi

objected to Rav Ashi; and some say, Rav Sama son of Rav Ashi

was the one who objected

to Rav Ashi,

when he challenged Rav Ashi’s previous objection:

And is no distinction apparent to you between a beating that has a fixed measure and a beating that has no fixed measure!?

Furthermore,

Rav Mari raised an objection:

From where is it established that

the verse is discussing one who strikes

intentionally, “and the striker is acquitted,”

which the verse stated, meaning

from execution [from death by the court],

which requires a warning?

Perhaps

the verse is discussing one who struck

unintentionally,

and the meaning of the verse is that they imprison the striker to determine whether the injured man will die, in which case the striker will become liable for exile, to which one who unintentionally takes a life is liable; and if the injured man does not die—

“the striker is acquitted”

the injured man

from exile.

Since the verse is dealing with an unintentional act, a warning is not relevant here!?

And we conclude: indeed,

it is difficult.

Here the Gemara returns to the objection that the Gemara raised above, on page 32a, concerning what is explained in our Mishna regarding one who has intercourse with women liable for karet who have a fine, whereas in the Mishna in Makkot it is explained that one who has intercourse with women liable for karet has an obligation of lashes; and since we hold that “he is not flogged and pays,” why does he pay a fine when he became liable for lashes? The Gemara brings an additional resolution to this objection.

Reish Lakish said

to resolve the objection:

Whose is this

our Mishna, which obligates a fine for one who has intercourse with his sister even though he is liable for lashes?

It is Rabbi Meir, who says:

everyone who becomes liable for lashes and money

is flogged and pays

at once. This is as we learned in the Mishna in Makkot cited above, page 32b: the prohibition that brings him to lashes [“You shall not uncover the nakedness of your sister”] is not the same prohibition that brings him to payments [“The man who lies with her shall give the father of the young woman fifty silver pieces”].

The Gemara wonders:

If

this is

it is Rabbi Meir

our Mishna, then

even

when he has intercourse with

his daughter as well,

he should become liable for a fine, whereas in the latter clause of our Mishna [the following Mishna] it is explained that one who has intercourse with his daughter is not liable for a fine, since “he is judged by the greater penalty” and does not become liable for death and money together.

And if you say

to resolve this, that

Rabbi Meir does hold “he is flogged and pays”,

but

does not hold “he dies and pays”,

and he agrees with the Rabbis that he is judged only with the more severe death; therefore, when he has intercourse with his daughter, Rabbi Meir says that he is not liable for a fine, and our Mishna is thereby established according to Rabbi Meir.

But does he not—does Rabbi Meir not also hold “he dies and pays”!?

A person who steals an ox, a sheep, or any other object becomes liable to pay double the value of the theft: namely, the principal, which is a monetary obligation, and an additional payment equal to the value of the theft, which is a fine for the theft. If he slaughters or sells the sheep, he pays four times the value of the theft, namely: the principal, double payment for the theft, and two payments as a fine for the slaughter. If he slaughters or sells an ox, he pays five times: one is the principal, and the other four are a fine.

And it was taught in a beraita:

One who stole

an ox or a sheep

and slaughtered

it

on Shabbat,

when there is death by the court for slaughtering on Shabbat—

and likewise one who

stole

an ox or a sheep

and slaughtered

it

for

the purpose of

idolatry,

when there is death by the court for offering to idolatry—or

stole an ox sentenced to stoning

[because the ox killed a person and became liable for stoning], which is forbidden for benefit,

and slaughtered it.

In all these cases, he

pays the payments of four and five; these are the words of Rabbi Meir.

But the Rabbis exempt.

It follows that it is explained from the beraita that Rabbi Meir obligates death—namely, for slaughtering on Shabbat and offering for idolatry—and money together. If our Mishna is according to Rabbi Meir, the latter clause is difficult: why does the tanna exempt him from payment of the fine when he became liable for death by the court!?

And we answer:

this was stated concerning it

that beraita:

Rabbi Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan—

And some say: Rabbi Yirmeya said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish—

and also

Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Ilaa, and the entire group in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, said:

that beraita is dealing

with one who slaughters through another,

for the thief sent another person to slaughter, and that person slaughtered on Shabbat or for idolatry.

It follows that the thief, who becomes liable for the monetary payments for the agent’s slaughter, did not become liable for death, and therefore he pays money. However, Rabbi Meir admits that one who has intercourse with his daughter does not pay money, because “he is judged by the greater penalty.”

The Gemara wonders about this interpretation of the beraita:

Is it so that this one—

the agent—

sins

by slaughtering the theft,

while this one—

the thief—

becomes liable

for four and five on account of the sin of the agent who slaughtered!?

But we hold: “There is no agency for a transgression”!

Rava said:

slaughtering a stolen animal has a different law, and agency for a transgression applies to it.

Because

the Merciful One said: “And he slaughters it or sells it,”

the verse juxtaposed slaughtering to selling, in order to teach:

Just as selling

makes him liable

through another,

since the thief’s sale cannot take place without a buyer,

so too slaughtering

makes him liable even

through another,

who was sent by the thief to slaughter.

The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught

another source for liability for four and five through an agent:

The verse said, “And he slaughters it or sells it”; therefore the Torah said

“or”,

and did not say, “and he slaughters it and sells it,” in order

to include the one who

slaughters through a

agent.

The school of Ḥizkiyya taught

another source:

The verse said, “Five cattle shall he pay in place of the ox and four sheep in place of the sheep”; therefore the verse said

“in place of”

the ox, and did not say, “he shall pay with an ox,” in order

to include

the one who slaughters through a

agent—

that is, even if someone acting in place of the thief slaughters it, the thief is liable to pay.

Mar Zutra raised an objection

to the interpretation of the beraita, that when the slaughter is performed through an agent, the sender becomes liable even though the agent became liable for death for his slaughter:

Is there such a thing, that if he himself had acted,

the sender, in the same manner in which the agent acted,

he would not become liable,

because “he is judged by the greater penalty,”

while he acts

the

agent and the sender becomes liable!? Is the power of the agent, who acts through the power of the sender, to be greater than the power of the sender!?

And we answer:

He himself,

the sender,

is

not because he would not become liable—

the sender is not removed from the obligation of slaughtering.

Rather,

he is exempt from paying when he slaughtered on Shabbat

because “he is judged by the greater penalty,”

and it is the liability for death that exempts him; therefore, when he sent an agent and he himself did not become liable for death, he is liable to pay.

The Gemara wonders about this interpretation of the beraita:

If

the beraita is dealing

with one who slaughters through another,

then

what is the reason of the Rabbis, who exempt him!?

It works out well if the beraita is dealing with the thief’s own slaughter: their dispute concerning slaughtering on Shabbat or for idolatry is well explained—Rabbi Meir holds “he dies and pays,” while the Rabbis hold “he does not die and pay.” But according to this interpretation of the beraita, that the sender himself did not become liable for death, but only his agent, what is the reason of the Rabbis who exempt the sender!?

And we answer:

Who are the Sages,

who are the Sages in the beraita who exempt—