Ketubot 36b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

If he is claiming

the husband of the mature woman

a claim concerning blood,

that he did not find virginal blood in her,

so too,

indeed he is deemed credible to cause her to lose her ketuba, for even the mature woman’s blood had not yet been exhausted.

But

here—

in the beraita in which we learned that a mature woman does not have a claim concerning virginity—

with what are we dealing, where he claims

the husband

the claim, “An open opening

I found.”

However, with a mature woman this is not a claim, because since her vagina is not narrow as it was initially, it appears to him as though her opening is open. And he has no proofs; rather, he says so on the basis of his own statement, and he is mistaken with regard to a mature woman.

We further learned in the beraita brought above:

Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A blind woman does not have a claim concerning virginity:

And we explain:

What is Sumakhos’s reason?

Rabbi Zeira said: Because

the blind woman

is struck

when she falls

upon the ground,

and her hymen is torn away, as he proceeds to explain.

And we challenge: But

all

women

are also struck

the other women are also struck], and what difference is there between a blind woman and other women!?

And we explain: There is a distinction between the other women, who are also struck, and a blind woman:

For

all

women

see

blood when their hymens are torn away through the striking,

and show

it

to their mothers,

who explain to them that their hymens were torn away. It follows that if her hymen was indeed torn away, she is aware of this, and she should have informed her husband of it; and when she did not inform him, he relied on the assumption that her hymen had not been torn away. Since it had indeed been torn away, it is a mistaken transaction.

But

this one,

the blind woman,

does not see

the blood when her hymen is torn away,

and does not show

it

to her mother.

It follows that even if the hymen was torn away, she is not aware of this, and she had no obligation to inform him, while he married her on the presumption of a woman whose hymen had been loosened.

D. We further learned in the beraita:

And a woman who leaves because of an evil reputation has neither a fine nor seduction:

Ordinarily, a woman who leaves because of an evil reputation is a woman about whom her husband spread a report that he did not find virginal blood in her, and he also says that he investigated the matter and found witnesses who testified about her that she committed adultery while betrothed, and he even brought them before the court, and they testified to this, and the court ruled concerning her that she is a sota and must leave her husband.

And it might have entered our minds that our Mishna is dealing with such a woman who leaves because of an evil reputation: if a man raped her or seduced her after she left her husband בעקבות the evil reputation, she has no fine, since she is a woman who has had intercourse.

Therefore the Gemara wondered: But

a woman who leaves because of an evil reputation—

she is liable to stoning,

as the law of a betrothed young woman who committed adultery, and it is obvious that she is not subject to a fine, for it is certainly known that she had intercourse, to the point that we execute her by stoning for this!?

Rav Sheshet said: This is what

the tanna in the beraita

is saying: One about whom an evil reputation emerged in her youth

that she committed adultery while she was unmarried,

again has neither a fine nor seduction,

for she is presumed to have had intercourse.

Rav Pappa said: Learn from this,

from the fact that we say that the woman is presumed to have had intercourse because of a voice that emerged concerning her, that

this defective document [

a defective promissory note], about which a report emerged that it was forged, and that the witnesses signed on it had never signed it,

we do not collect with it,

because we are concerned that it is indeed forged.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

What are the circumstances?

In what type of report concerning forgery can one learn from the beraita that one must be concerned about it?

If you say that a report emerged concerning the document that it is forged,

if your intention is a document about which an ordinary report emerged that it was forged, and you compare that to the case of our Mishna.

If so, necessarily,

here likewise,

you must establish the words of the tanna in the beraita, correspondingly, in a case where

a report emerged concerning her that she committed adultery, an ordinary report emerged concerning her that she committed adultery in her youth, and concerning this we learned that she has neither a fine nor seduction.

And this cannot be explained in that manner. For—

And behold,

Rava said:

One about whom

a name emerged for her in the city as “an adulteress”—

we do not concern ourselves with her,

lest she have become disqualified, and she is permitted even to the priesthood, since we do not take account of an emerging report in order to remove her from the presumption of fitness that every daughter of Israel possesses.

And necessarily, the beraita is not speaking of such a report; and if so, it is impossible to learn from here concerning a document about which a report emerged of forgery, that we are concerned about it and say that the document is forged!?

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the beraita is dealing with a case where

two witnesses came,

two witnesses came

and said: “She solicited us for intercourse in a forbidden manner” [

this woman solicited us to have intercourse with her, but we did not heed her], and consequently there is concern that she made herself available also to others who heeded her.

The comparison between this report and a report emerging concerning the document will still be difficult.

For according to this exposition, necessarily,

here likewise,

in the matter of a document, correspondingly, we are dealing with a case where

two witnesses came,

two witnesses came

and said: “To them”

that is, to us

“he said, ‘Forge it for me.”

He requested of us that we sign falsely, and consequently we must be concerned that he requested this also of other people, and they complied with him and signed falsely.

And if so, this case is not comparable to what is stated in the beraita.

For

granted, there,

with regard to one about whom an evil reputation emerged,

promiscuous people are common,

there are people who are promiscuous and available to her, and there is concern that one of these complied with her.

But here—

with regard to false testimony—

if he,

the “lender,” indeed

has been established,

as a liar, since we saw him seeking false witnesses, then

has every Israelite been established

as a liar and as willing to comply by signing false testimony on a document? We should not have invalidated the document, for what basis is there to say that anyone complied with him!?

And we answer:

Here,

with regard to the document,

also,

we are not concerned that other witnesses signed it for him, for indeed, why should we suspect them? Rather, the concern is:

since he is seeking forgery [

since it is known to us that he is endeavoring to forge a document], for initially he requested that witnesses sign falsely, therefore

say: He forged and wrote,

perhaps he forged the signatures of witnesses who did not sign for him. And even though we authenticated the signatures, perhaps the authentication was not correct.

Mishna:

And these are those who have no fine:

A. Women who are presumed to have had intercourse:

One who has intercourse with a female convert, and with a captive,

and with

a maidservant,

who are accustomed to have intercourse during their non-Jewish status and their servitude, or through their captors—

who were redeemed, converted, or freed when they were

over

three years and one day old.

Since they were fit for intercourse, they are presumed to be available, that they had intercourse, and they no longer have a fine.

Rabbi Yehuda says: A captive who is redeemed is in

the presumption of

her sanctity, even though she was an adult

at the time of the redemption [that is, older than three years and one day], as the Gemara will explain his reason.

B. Women for whom he is liable to a court-imposed death penalty:

One who has intercourse with his daughter,

with his daughter’s daughter, with his son’s daughter, with

his wife’s daughter, with her son’s daughter, with her daughter’s daughter has no

fine, because he becomes liable with his life—

for their death

of these forbidden relations

is at the hands of the court,

it is.

And anyone who becomes liable with his life does not pay money.

рабби Иегуда — это то, что мы сказали

As it is stated: “And there shall not

be a calamity

with the woman who was struck, who did not die, in which case—

he shall surely be punished

the one who struck her, to pay the value of the fetuses.”

But if there is a calamity with the woman—that she died through the one who struck her—he is not punished with payment for the fetuses, since he is liable to death.

Gemara:

Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Yehuda

in our Mishna,

and Rabbi Dosa—

said one and the same thing,

that we are not concerned with regard to a captive lest she had intercourse.

And the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yehuda—

this is what we said,

in our Mishna: A captive who is redeemed is in the presumption of her sanctity.

Rabbi Dosa, for it was taught:

A daughter of a priest, or the wife of a priest, who was

a captive,

she is

permitted to eat teruma,

and we are not concerned about intercourse with a non-Jewish captor, which disqualifies her from teruma,

the words of Rabbi Dosa.

в отношении того,

He said—

he explained

Rabbi Dosa

his reason:

And what did this Arab

one

do to her while she was in his possession during her captivity?

And because he rubbed her between her breasts, does that disqualify her from the priesthood?!

That is: We need not be concerned that they treated them as available in order to force them to have intercourse; rather, they merely played with them.

He said

he rejected

Rabba: Perhaps it is not so,

as you said, that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Dosa follow one position. For it may be said:

Rabbi Yehuda said only this here,

that we do not presume the captive to have had intercourse,

but

with regard to this:

so that the sinner should not be

one who had intercourse with her by force or seduction after she was freed

rewarded.

то есть изъятие денег у насильника в сомнительном случае, что является вопросом, регулируемым Торой, —

But there,

with regard to the prohibition of teruma, it may be said that Rabbi Yehuda

holds like the Rabbis,

that we are concerned lest she was disqualified from teruma through intercourse with the non-Jewish captor.

Alternatively,

there is another way to distinguish between the words of Rabbi Yehuda and the words of Rabbi Dosa:

Rabbi Dosa said only this there,

that we are not concerned that she be disqualified from teruma,

but with teruma

of the Rabbis.

Since the prohibition against eating teruma is only rabbinic, they did not decree a prohibition upon her in a case of doubt.

And see Tosafot, whose words were brought in the note to the Mishna. But a fine under Torah law,

to take money from the rapist in a case of doubt, which is a matter under Torah law, it may be said that Rabbi Dosa

holds like the Rabbis,

and the one who had intercourse is not liable to a fine in a case of doubt, for perhaps she had already had intercourse.

Abaye said to him,

to Rabba:

And

does

Rabbi Yehuda’s reason here

consist of

“so that the sinner should not be rewarded”

alone?

Is it

that he said this only with regard to a fine and not with regard to other matters, as you said!?

But it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: A captive who was taken captive remains in her sanctity, and even

if she is

ten

years

when she was freed—

her ketuba is two hundred,

as that of a virgin, and not one hundred as that of a widow.

And there—

with regard to the ketuba—

what “so that the sinner should not be rewarded” is there?

And we answer:

There too,

there is another reason not to presume her to have had intercourse:

perhaps they will refrain,

even Israelites,

and will not marry her [

lest they refrain from marrying her].

And we challenge:

And

does

Rabbi Yehuda hold

that the captive

remains in her sanctity,

as explained in our Mishna!?

A woman who has intercourse with a gentile, just as she is disqualified from teruma, so she is disqualified from the priesthood, and a priest is forbidden to marry her. It follows that the law of a captive with regard to teruma and with regard to the priesthood is the same.

But it was taught:

A priest

who redeems the captive

is

may marry her, even though there is no testimony concerning her that she is pure. But if he

testifies concerning her

that she is fit and did not have intercourse, then he

may not marry her.

This is how the Gemara understood the beraita’s wording, and it proceeds to explain it.

This is how the Gemara initially understood the interpretation of the beraita, and it proceeds to explain it.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In either case, he may not marry her,

the priest.

And the Gemara first explains the beraita:

This itself is difficult!

You said:

a koen

who redeems the captive woman

is—

he shall marry her,

and he does not need to testify.

And afterward

but afterward the

tan­్నay continues

and says: And if he

testifies about her,

in addition to the redemption,

he shall not marry her.

And is it

because he testifies about her

that she is fit,

he shall not marry her!?

This is not difficult,

and in fact a captive woman is not fit for the priesthood unless there is someone who testifies about her that she is fit. And that which we learned in the beraita, that if he “testifies about her, he shall not marry her,” does not refer to the testimony of the redeemer himself; rather, this is what it is saying: a koen

who redeems the captive woman and testifies about her,

himself, that she is fit, is

he shall marry her,

even though it turns out that he is testifying for his own sake, since he intended to marry her.

Since he spent money in order to redeem her, he knows with certainty that she was not violated, since if she had indeed been violated, he would not have spent his money for nothing, for he redeemed her in order to marry her in a state of fitness.

But if he did not redeem her, and he

testifies about her for the purpose

alone, testifying that she is fit, he is

he shall not marry her,

because we are concerned that perhaps he set his eyes upon her, and he is testifying falsely.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In either case—in the case where the one marrying her testified about her but did not redeem her, and in the case where he himself redeemed her—he shall not marry her. For we are always concerned that perhaps he set his eyes upon her, and his testimony is not testimony.

And after the beraita had been explained, the Gemara returns to its difficulty:

In any event, it is difficult

from this beraita, in which Rabbi Yehuda said, “In either case he shall not marry her,”

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who said in our Mishna that the captive woman remains in her presumed sanctity, and does not need any testimony at all!?

Rav Pappa said: Say

you should alter the wording of the beraita in this way:

Rabbi Yehuda says: In either case he shall marry her.

Since the captive woman remains in her presumed sanctity, and we do not need his testimony at all.

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua says: Actually, as it is taught

in the beraita: In either case he shall not marry her. Rather,

Rabbi Yehuda—

according to the words of the Rabbis, he says to them: As for me—

I hold that a captive woman remains in her presumed sanctity—

in either case he shall marry her.

Rather, according to you,

who are concerned that perhaps she was violated,

in either case it should have said: he shall not marry her.

For we cannot rely on his testimony, lest he set his eyes upon her, and this applies even when he himself redeemed her.

And the Rabbis

what is their reason for not being concerned about “perhaps he set his eyes upon her” when he himself redeemed her!?

And we explain:

One who redeems the captive woman and testifies about her shall marry her,

because

a person does not cast away his money for nothing [a person does not spend his money for nothing], and what he said was true—that she is fit.

[a person does not spend his money gratuitously], and she was truthful in saying that she is fit.

But if he

testifies about her for the purpose

without investing his money in her redemption, he is

he shall not marry her,

because we are concerned:

perhaps he set his eyes upon her.

Rav Pappa bar Shmuel raised an objection to Rav Yosef: