Ketubot 36b (לו:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

If he claims

the husband of a bogeret

a claim of blood,

that he did not find the blood of virginity in her,

so too,

he is indeed deemed credible to cause her to forfeit her ketuba, because even the blood of a bogeret has not necessarily disappeared.

But

here—

in the beraita in which we learned that a bogeret has no claim of virginity—

with what case are we dealing, where he claims

the husband

the claim, “An open opening

I found”.

However, in the case of a bogeret this is not a claim, because since her vagina is not tight as it was initially, it appears to him as though her opening is open. And he has no evidence; rather, he makes the claim on the basis of his own statement, and he is mistaken with regard to a bogeret.

We further learned in the beraita cited above:

Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A blind woman has no claim of virginity:

And we explain:

What is Sumakhos’s reason?

Rabbi Zeira said: Because

the blind woman

is struck

when she falls

onto the ground,

and her hymen falls away, as will be explained.

And we challenge:

All

women

are also struck [that is, other women are also struck]; so what distinguishes a blind woman from other women!?

And we explain: There is a distinction between other women, who are also struck, and a blind woman:

Because

all

women

see

blood when their hymen falls away as a result of the blow,

and they show

it

to their mother,

who explains to them that their hymen has fallen away. Consequently, if her hymen did in fact fall away, she is aware of it, and she should have informed her husband. When she did not inform him, he relied on the assumption that her hymen had not fallen away; and since it had in fact fallen away, the marriage was based on a mistaken premise.

But

this

blind woman

does not see

the blood when her hymen falls away,

and does not show

it

to her mother.

Consequently, even if her hymen fell away, she is unaware of it and was not required to inform him; and he married her on the presumption that her hymen was intact.

d. We further learned in the beraita:

And a woman who leaves because of an evil reputation has neither a fine nor a payment for seduction:

A woman who leaves because of an evil reputation, without further qualification, is a woman concerning whom her husband publicized that he had not found her hymen, and he also says that he investigated the matter and found witnesses who testified against her that she had committed adultery while betrothed. He even brought them to the court, and they testified to this, and the court ruled that she was a sota and must leave her husband.

And it might have entered our minds that our Mishna is dealing with such a woman who leaves because of an evil reputation: If a man raped or seduced her after she left her husband as a result of the evil reputation, she has no fine, since she is a woman who has already had relations.

Therefore the Gemara asks:

A woman who leaves because of an evil reputation—

she is liable to stoning

as the law of a betrothed na'ara who committed adultery, and it is obvious that she is not subject to a fine, since it is certain that she had relations, to the extent that we execute her by stoning for it!?

Rav Sheshet said: This is what

the tanna of the beraita

said: One concerning whom an evil reputation emerged during her youth

that she had committed adultery when she was unmarried,

has neither a fine nor a payment for seduction,

because she has the presumptive status of a woman who has had relations.

Rav Pappa said: Learn from this,

from the fact that we say that a woman has the presumptive status of one who has had relations because of a rumor that emerged about her, that

this defective document [a defective promissory note],

about which a rumor emerged that it was forged and that the witnesses whose signatures appear on it never signed it,

we do not collect with it,

because we are concerned that it is indeed forged.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

What are the circumstances?

What type of rumor concerning a forgery can be inferred from the beraita as one that must be taken seriously?

If you say that a rumor emerged about the document that it is forged,

if you mean a document about which there is merely a rumor that it is forged, and you compare that to the case in our Mishna,

then necessarily,

here too, correspondingly,

you must establish the words of the tanna of the beraita as referring to a case

where a rumor emerged about her that she had committed adultery.

That is, a mere rumor emerged that she had committed adultery during her youth, and concerning this we learned that she has neither a fine nor a payment for seduction.

But this cannot be the interpretation. For—

Didn’t Rava say:

One about whom

a reputation emerged in the city that she is promiscuous—

we do not take this into consideration,

lest she have become disqualified; rather, she remains permitted even to a kohen, since we do not take a rumor into account in order to remove her from the presumption of ritual fitness that every Jewish woman possesses.

Necessarily, the beraita is not speaking of such a rumor. If so, one cannot learn from here about a document concerning which a rumor of forgery emerged, that we must be concerned that the document is forged!?

Rather, perhaps you will say that the beraita is dealing with a case

where

two witnesses came

and two witnesses came

and said: “She solicited us for a forbidden act” [this woman solicited us to have relations with her, but we did not heed her], and consequently there is concern that she also abandoned herself to others who heeded her.

The comparison between this rumor and a rumor that emerges concerning a document is still difficult.

For according to this explanation, necessarily

here too, correspondingly,

in the matter of a document, the case is one

where two witnesses came

and two witnesses came

and said: “To us

that is, to us

he said, ‘Forge it for me’.”

He asked us to sign falsely, and consequently we must be concerned that he asked other people to do so as well, and they agreed and signed falsely.

If so, this case is not comparable to the one stated in the beraita.

For

granted, there,

in the case of one about whom an evil reputation emerged,

there are promiscuous men,

there are men who are promiscuous and available to her, and we must be concerned that one of them agreed to her request.

But here,

with regard to false testimony,

if he—

the “lender”—indeed

has established a reputation,

since we saw him seeking false witnesses,

have all Jews established a reputation

for being liars and for agreeing to sign false testimony on a document? We should not disqualify the document, for why should we assume that anyone agreed to his request!?

And we answer:

Here,

with regard to the document,

also,

we are not concerned that other witnesses signed it for him, for indeed, why should we suspect them? Rather, the concern is that

since he is seeking to forge it [since we know that he is attempting to forge a document], for initially he asked witnesses to sign falsely,

perhaps

he forged and wrote

the signatures of witnesses who did not sign for him. And even though we verified the signatures, perhaps the verification was incorrect.

Mishna:

And these have no fine:

a. Women who have the presumptive status of having had relations:

One who has relations with a female convert, or with a captive woman,

or with

a maidservant,

who are accustomed to having relations during their gentile status and servitude, or through their captors—

who were redeemed, who converted, or who were emancipated

when they were

more than three years and one day old.

Since they were fit for intercourse, they have the presumptive status of being available and having had relations, and therefore they have no fine.

Rabbi Yehuda says: A captive woman who is redeemed remains in her

presumptive status of

sanctity, even if she was an adult

at the time of her redemption [that is, older than three years and one day], as the Gemara will explain the reason for this.

b. Women for whom one is liable to a court-imposed death penalty:

One who has relations with his daughter,

with his daughter’s daughter, with his son’s daughter, with

his wife’s daughter, with her son’s daughter, or with her daughter’s daughter has no

fine, because he is liable for his life—

their death

of these women forbidden by incest

is at the hands of the court

and he is liable to be executed.

And anyone who is liable for his life does not pay money.

As it is stated: “And there shall

be no calamity

when the woman who was struck does not die, in which case—

he shall surely be punished

the one who struck her, to pay the value of the fetuses.”

But if there is a calamity to the woman—meaning that she died because of the one who struck her—he is not punished with payment for the fetuses, since he is liable to death.

Gemara:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Yehuda

in our Mishna

and Rabbi Dosa—

stated the same matter: They are not concerned that a captive woman may have had relations.

And the Gemara explains:

Rabbi Yehuda—

that which we said

in our Mishna: A captive woman who is redeemed remains in her presumptive status of sanctity.

Rabbi Dosa, as it is taught:

A daughter of a kohen, or the wife of a kohen, who was

taken captive,

she

may eat teruma,

and we are not concerned that a gentile captor had relations with her, which would disqualify her from teruma,

the words of Rabbi Dosa.

He said

Rabbi Dosa

said

explaining his reason:

And what did this Arab

fellow

do to her while she was in his hands during her captivity?

Would you say that merely because he rubbed her between her breasts he disqualified her from marrying into the priesthood?!

That is: We need not be concerned that they treat these women as available for forced intercourse; rather, they merely play with them.

He said

Rabba rejected this:

Perhaps that is not so

as you said, that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Dosa follow one position. For it may be said:

Rabbi Yehuda stated his position here only thus far,

that we do not assign a captive woman the presumptive status of one who has had relations,

but

with regard to this,

so that the sinner

who had relations with her through rape or seduction after she was emancipated

should not profit.

But there,

with regard to the prohibition against eating teruma, it may be said that Rabbi Yehuda

holds in accordance with the Sages,

who are concerned that she may have been disqualified from teruma through relations with the gentile captor.

Alternatively, one can distinguish between the words of Rabbi Yehuda and those of Rabbi Dosa in another manner:

Rabbi Dosa stated his position there only thus far,

that we are not concerned that she was disqualified from teruma,

but only with regard to teruma

of rabbinic status.

of rabbinic status.

Since the prohibition against eating teruma in this case is only rabbinic, they did not impose a prohibition in a case of uncertainty.

But a fine is a Torah-level obligation, to extract money from the rapist where there is uncertainty, which is a Torah matter,

it may be said that Rabbi Dosa holds in accordance with the Sages,

and the one who had relations is not liable for a fine in a case of uncertainty, because perhaps she had already had relations.

Abaye said to him,

to Rabba:

And is

the

reason of Rabbi Yehuda here

because of

“so that the sinner should not profit”

alone?

Is that

the only reason,

and did he state it only with regard to a fine and not with regard to other matters, as you said!?

But it is taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: A captive woman who was taken captive remains in her presumptive status of sanctity, even

if she is

ten

years

when she was emancipated—

her marriage contract is two hundred

as that of a virgin, and not one hundred as that of a widow.

And there,

with regard to the ketuba,

what relevance is there to “so that the sinner should not profit”?

And we answer:

There too,

there is another reason not to assign her the presumptive status of one who has had relations:

perhaps even Jews will refrain

and

will not marry her [lest they refrain from marrying her].

lest they refrain from marrying her].

And we challenge:

And

does

Rabbi Yehuda hold

that the captive woman

remains in her presumptive status of sanctity,

as explained in our Mishna!?

One who has relations with a gentile is disqualified from teruma, just as she is disqualified from the priesthood, and a kohen is prohibited from marrying her. Consequently, the law of a captive woman with regard to teruma and with regard to the priesthood is the same.

But isn’t it taught:

A kohen

who redeems a captive woman

may

marry her,

even though there is no testimony concerning her that she is pure. But if he

testifies about her

that she is fit and did not have relations, he

may not marry her.

This is how the Gemara initially understood the interpretation of the beraita, and it proceeds to explain it.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In either case, he may not marry her

the kohen.

The Gemara first explains the beraita:

This itself is difficult!

You said:

a kohen

who redeems a captive woman

then

may marry her,

and he does not need to testify.

And then

but afterward the

tanna

continues and says: And if he

testifies concerning her,

in addition to redeeming her,

he may not marry her.

But

because he testifies concerning her

that she is fit,

he may not marry her!?

This is not difficult,

for in fact a captive woman is not fit to marry into the priesthood unless someone testifies concerning her that she is fit. And what we learned in the beraita, that if he “testifies concerning her, he may not marry her,” does not refer to the testimony of the redeemer himself. Rather, this is what it is saying: A kohen

who redeems a captive woman and testifies concerning her,

himself, that she is fit,

may marry her,

even though it turns out that he is testifying for his own benefit, since he intended to marry her.

Since he spent money to redeem her, he knows with certainty that she was not violated; for if she had in fact been violated, he would not have spent his money for nothing, since he redeemed her in order to marry her in a permitted manner.

But if he did not redeem her, and he

testifies concerning her in order

solely to testify about her that she is fit,

he may not marry her,

because we are concerned that perhaps he has taken a liking to her, and he is testifying falsely.

Rabbi Yehuda says: In either case—whether the man who wishes to marry her testified concerning her but did not redeem her, or whether he himself redeemed her—he may not marry her. For we are always concerned that perhaps he has taken a liking to her, and his testimony is not valid testimony.

After the beraita has been explained, the Gemara returns to its difficulty:

In any event, this is difficult

from this beraita, in which Rabbi Yehuda said, “In either case, he may not marry her,”

according to Rabbi Yehuda,

who said in our Mishna that a captive woman retains her presumptive status of fitness and requires no testimony at all!?

Rav Pappa said: Say

that you should revise the wording of the beraita as follows:

Rabbi Yehuda says: In either case, he may marry her.

Since the captive woman retains her presumptive status of fitness, we do not require his testimony at all.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: In fact, it is as it is taught

in the beraita: In either case, he may not marry her. But

Rabbi Yehuda—

he said this to the Rabbis according to their position: As for me,

who hold that a captive woman retains her presumptive status of fitness,

in either case, he may marry her.

Rather, according to your position,

that you are concerned that she may have been violated,

in either case it should have said: He may not marry her.

For we cannot rely on his testimony, since perhaps he has taken a liking to her—even when he himself redeemed her.

And the Rabbis

what is their reason for not being concerned that he has taken a liking to her when he himself redeemed her!?

And we explain:

One who redeems a captive woman and testifies concerning her may marry her,

because

a person does not spend money for nothing

[a person does not spend his money gratuitously], and she was truthful in saying that she is fit.

But if he

testifies concerning her in order

without having invested his money in redeeming her,

he may not marry her,

because we are concerned:

perhaps he has taken a liking to her.

Rav Pappa bar Shmuel raised this difficulty to Rav Yosef: