Ketubot 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

because she cannot say to him, “Your field has been flooded”.

Since this is the fixed time at which she is not fit to marry.

Therefore, the Sages did not obligate him, when the twelve-month period arrived, to provide her with sustenance if she was a menstruant at that time, since this is not an occurrence of “your field has been flooded,” which depends on the husband’s fortune. Rather, this is the ordinary course of a woman, and this is the time at which she was destined to become a menstruant.

If you raise the dilemma for yourself

whether he must provide her with sustenance when she became a menstruant or not—that is, when she became a menstruant

not at the time of her expected menstrual period.

And the question is,

what

is the status of a woman who became a menstruant not at the time of her expected menstrual period, with regard to her receiving sustenance from her husband?

And these are the sides of the dilemma:

Since it occurred not at the time of her expected menstrual period

the onset of menstruation,

she can say to him,

she is able to say to him,

“Your field has been flooded”!

For she can claim: The cause of my becoming a menstruant outside the expected time was not my fortune; rather, it was your fortune that caused you to suffer the loss, and you must provide me with sustenance.

Or perhaps, since there are women whose menstrual periods change,

since there are women who change the time of

their menstrual periods—

this is therefore the ordinary course of a woman. Consequently, even if she became a menstruant not at the time of her expected menstrual period, it

is like

the onset of menstruation at

the time of her expected menstrual period.

And it is not caused by his fortune; rather, it is the ordinary practice of a woman to change her menstrual period from time to time. Therefore, he is not obligated to provide her with sustenance.

Rav Aḥai resolved

this dilemma from the Mishna below [57a], where we learned:

When the appointed time

of twelve months

arrived, and they were not married—

they eat from his property, and they eat teruma—

if they married a koen.

And Rav Aḥai infers:

“They did not marry”,

which means that the men did not marry the women; that is, the delay was caused by the men—

it does not say

in this Mishna.

Rather, “they were not married”,

which means that the women were not married.

And one must examine:

What are the circumstances?

Why were the women not married?

If they were delaying themselves,

meaning that the women, of their own volition, prevented their husbands from marrying them—

This is impossible. For—

Why do they eat

then

from his property?

And

why

do they eat

then

teruma

if their husbands are kohanim? They themselves, of their own volition, are preventing the marriage!

Rather, is it not

necessarily that the Mishna is speaking of a case

in which they were prevented by circumstances of this kind,

that they were prevented from marrying because they became menstruants outside the expected time of their menstrual periods?

And

nevertheless, it

teaches

in the Mishna:

“They eat from his property, and they eat teruma.”

Thus the dilemma is resolved: if she became a menstruant outside the expected time of her menstrual period, her betrothed is obligated to provide her with sustenance.

Rav Ashi said:

The dilemma still stands.

For

I can say to you

that in

every circumstance beyond her control

that resulted from the woman’s side—

she does not eat

sustenance from her betrothed.

And

here the Mishna is speaking of a case

in which they were delaying,

that is, the men were delaying the marriage, and not the women.

And

therefore,

it is legally proper—

it would have been appropriate

for it to teach, “They did not marry”,

since the men were the ones causing the delay.

However,

since

the reason is

that he taught the first clause with regard to them,

as the tanna first teaches the laws of the woman: “A virgin is given twelve months, and a widow thirty days”—

therefore,

he also taught the latter clause

in wording referring

to them,

to the women. Therefore, the tanna said, “They were not married,” even though the delay was caused by the men.

See the introductory remarks to the following discussion in the note.

Rava said:

The statement that we learned earlier in the words of Rav Yosef—“Therefore, if he became ill, or she became ill, or she became a menstruant, he does not provide her with sustenance”—meaning that in every case where the delay resulted from circumstances beyond one’s control, it is not considered a delay, and therefore he is exempt from providing her with sustenance if he delayed marrying her because of circumstances beyond his control—applies only with regard to sustenance—

But

with regard

to bills of divorce,

this is not so!

That is, with regard to divorcing a woman by means of a bill of divorce, even a delay caused by circumstances beyond one’s control is considered a delay, because there is no claim of circumstances beyond one’s control with regard to a bill of divorce, as will be explained.

And the Gemara proves this:

Apparently,

it is evident from here that

Rava holds: There is no

“claim of

circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce!”

That is, one who gives a woman a bill of divorce subject to a condition that the divorce take effect if he does not return home by a certain time, and circumstances beyond his control prevent him from returning home before the time he stipulated—we do not say that being prevented from returning because of circumstances beyond his control is not considered a delay, and that the condition “if I do not return” was therefore not fulfilled.

Rather, it is considered that his condition “if I do not return” was fulfilled, since he indeed did not return by the date he specified, and the divorce took effect.

And a claim of circumstances beyond one’s control is not effective to establish that it should be considered as though the condition “if I do not return” was not fulfilled, thereby annulling the bill of divorce and preventing the divorce from taking effect.

And we raise a question:

From where does Rava derive this,

the distinction between a delay caused by circumstances beyond one’s control in the case of divorce, which is considered a delay, and a delay caused by circumstances beyond one’s control in the case of marriage, which is not considered a delay?

If you say that he derives it from that which we learned

in tractate Gittin [76b]: One who gives a woman a bill of divorce and says to her:

“This is your bill of divorce”

subject to the condition:

“If I do not return from now until twelve months”.

And he dies

the husband

within twelve months—

it is not a bill of divorce.

For the tanna of this Mishna maintains that the intention of the divorcing husband in this wording is that the divorce should take effect after twelve months, if he does not return by then.

Since he died during this period, she became a widow before she was divorced.

Therefore, if the deceased husband has no sons, she is obligated to undergo levirate marriage with his brother and is not permitted to marry someone outside the levirate bond as a divorcee.

And the Gemara infers from these words of the Mishna:

He died

within twelve months—

it is specifically that it is not a bill of divorce,

because she became a widow before the divorce could take effect. A dead man cannot divorce, since the dead do not divorce, and there is no divorce after death.

But

if

the husband became ill,

and because of the illness he was prevented from returning—

it is a bill of divorce!

For if illness too is considered circumstances beyond one’s control and is not considered a delay, so that the condition “if I do not return” was not fulfilled [because “there is a claim of circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce”], and if he does not return within twelve months because of illness the divorce does not take effect, then the tanna should have taught: “If the husband became ill and therefore did not return within twelve months, it is not a bill of divorce.” I would then know by a kal va-homer that if he failed to return because he died on the way, the divorce likewise would not take effect, since there is no circumstance beyond one’s control greater than death.

Since the tanna specifically stated “he died,” it is evident from his words that the divorce does not take effect only because she became a widow, since divorce cannot take effect after death. But if he became ill, his delay caused by circumstances beyond his control is considered a delay, and a claim of circumstances beyond one’s control is ineffective with regard to a bill of divorce to prevent the divorce from taking effect.

And the Gemara rejects this proof for Rava’s statement:

Perhaps,

in fact,

I can say to you that if

that if

the husband became ill

and therefore was unable to return,

it is also not a bill of divorce,

because a delay caused by circumstances beyond one’s control is not considered a delay even with regard to a bill of divorce, as it is not considered a delay with regard to marriage, and the condition “if I do not return” was not fulfilled.

And do not infer the inference that you drew from that Mishna: It is specifically when the husband died, because he died before the divorce took effect, that it is not a bill of divorce; but if he was delayed because of circumstances beyond his control and therefore did not return, it is a bill of divorce.

Rather, the tanna maintains that even if the husband were alive and unable to come because of circumstances beyond his control, the divorce would likewise not take effect. For being prevented from returning because of circumstances beyond one’s control is not called a delay.

And as for your inference: If so, why did the tanna state specifically “he died” and not “he became ill”?

Since

that itself,

this very point,

the tanna teaches us

in that Mishna:

There is no bill of divorce after death!

Even if the husband did not stipulate a condition, but gave her a bill of divorce and said that the divorce should take effect after his death, so that she would not be subject to levirate marriage, it is not a bill of divorce, and she remains subject to levirate marriage, since there is no bill of divorce after death.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this rejection:

But the fact

that there is no bill of divorce after death—

the tanna already taught it

in the

first clause

of that Mishna. It is therefore impossible to say, as you did, that this very point—that there is no bill of divorce after death—is what the tanna came to teach.

For we learned in the first clause [72b, there]: A “person dangerously ill” who was dying said to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce if I die”,

when I die.

Or he was ill and said to her:

“This is your bill of divorce

when I recover

from this illness,”

and he died. Since he died from his illness, it turns out that he did not divorce her during his lifetime, but only upon his death, when his illness ended.

Or he said without a condition:

“This is your bill of divorce after death”—

He has said nothing!

The reason is that there is no bill of divorce after death.

Since the tanna already taught this law—that there is no bill of divorce after death—in the first clause, it necessarily follows that in the latter clause he is not coming to teach this law.

If so, Rava’s inference returns: From the fact that in the latter clause the tanna stated, “This is your bill of divorce if I do not return from now until twelve months, and he died,” the tanna stated that if he “died” it is not a bill of divorce, but did not state that even if he “became ill” and did not return because of the illness it is not a bill of divorce—

it is because the tanna came to teach the law that there are no circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce.

Therefore, being prevented from returning because of circumstances beyond one’s control is also considered a delay, and the condition “if I do not return” was fulfilled, even though the failure to return was caused by circumstances beyond one’s control.

The tanna specifically stated that if he died it is not a bill of divorce because the dead do not divorce.

But the Gemara still asks that the Mishna cannot be proved to support Rava.

For

perhaps the intention of the tanna in the latter clause, where he stated, “This is your bill of divorce if I do not return from now until twelve months, and he died,” and did not state “if he became ill,” was not to teach the law stated by Rava, “There are no circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce.”

Rather, his intention was to exclude the opinion of

Rather, his intention was

to exclude the opinion of our Rabbis”—

[and below the Gemara will explain who those “Rabbis” were]—who maintain that the divorce takes effect with such a bill of divorce, because in their view the intention of the divorcing husband in this bill of divorce is not that the divorce should take effect in twelve months if he has not returned by then, but that it should take effect immediately if he does not return within twelve months.

According to their view, this is not a bill of divorce after death. Therefore, the divorce took effect from the moment he gave the bill of divorce, if he died and did not return.

As it was taught: And our Rabbis—

permitted her to marry

someone outside the levirate bond by means of this bill of divorce, even if he died without sons and had a brother, without her needing to undergo ḥalitza with him. As stated, in their view, when the condition is fulfilled—that he does not return after twelve months—she is divorced from the time the bill of divorce was given, and therefore this is not a bill of divorce after death.

And we say: Who

are

“our Rabbis”?

And

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The court that “permitted the oil”.

The court of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s grandson, which permitted the decree enacted by the Sages prohibiting the oil of idolaters [in tractate Avoda Zara, 37b].

For they

maintain the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who said: The date of a document proves its purpose.

That is, since the date on which the document was written is recorded in the document, this proves that the intention of the writer of the document is that the document’s legal effect should take place on the date written in it, provided that the condition is fulfilled.

For if his intention were that the document’s legal effect should take place only after twelve months, he should have recorded only the date twelve months later, when the document would take effect. Why, then, would he record the date on which the document was written?

Since it is possible to say that the novelty of the latter clause of the Mishna is to exclude the words of “our Rabbis,” there is once again no proof for Rava’s inference.

For it is possible that this tanna maintains that “there are circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce.”

And the reason the tanna did not state the circumstance beyond one’s control of “becoming ill,” from which we would know by a kal va-chomer the circumstance of “dying,” is that the tanna did not wish to teach the law of circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce. Rather, he wished to teach something else, contrary to the opinion of our Rabbis: The date written in the document does not indicate that his desire was to divorce her immediately if he failed to return within twelve months; rather, his intention was to divorce her only after twelve months.

Therefore, the tanna specifically taught that if he died before twelve months, the divorce would not take effect, since the dead do not divorce.

But if he does not return because of illness, there is a claim of circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce, and the divorce will not take effect, since a delay caused by circumstances beyond one’s control is not considered a delay and the condition “if I do not return” was not fulfilled.

Had the tanna taught only the law concerning the circumstances beyond one’s control of “becoming ill”—that there are circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce—we would not have known from it that the time at which the divorce takes effect is the time when the bill of divorce was written.

And the Gemara accepted this rejection: That Mishna does not constitute proof for Rava’s statement that there are no circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce.

Rather, from the latter clause,

from the continuation of that Mishna, Rava proves his statement that there are no circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce:

For we learned: One who divorces his wife

immediately, if I do not return from now until twelve months.

And he died within twelve months—

it is a bill of divorce.

For at the end of twelve months he did not return, and his condition was fulfilled; she was divorced “immediately,” from the time he gave her the bill of divorce, and this is not a bill of divorce after death.

And Rava proves:

“He died,” and the same applies if he became ill.

Therefore, if he did not return because of illness, his condition “if I do not return” was fulfilled, and it is a bill of divorce.

For if the circumstance of death is not considered a claim of circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce, all the more so illness is not such a claim. It is therefore proven that there is no claim of circumstances beyond one’s control in the matter of bills of divorce.

And the Gemara rejects Rava’s proof:

Perhaps it is specifically if he died

that it is a bill of divorce, because we presume that this was the intention of the divorcing husband when he wrote the bill of divorce: If he dies, the divorce should take effect immediately, since

he does not wish

the divorcing husband

that

his wife

should fall before

his brother, the

yavam.

And in such coercion, that is, if he dies, he certainly does not want the get to be annulled; on the contrary, he wants the get to remain valid.

But in the case of coercion resulting from illness, where he is content for the get to be annulled if he became ill and was delayed because of his illness, it is possible that there is a claim of coercion with regard to gittin, and his delay due to coercion is not considered a delay, so his condition, “If I do not come,” was not fulfilled, and the get is annulled.

Therefore, no proof can be brought from here for Rava’s statement that there is no claim of coercion with regard to gittin.

Therefore, the Gemara brings another source for Rava’s ruling:

Rather, from this:

from what Shmuel said, there is proof for Rava’s statement that there is no claim of coercion with regard to gittin.

A

case occurred involving

a certain

man,

who said to them

to the members of his household, or to those present when he gave the get to his wife:

If I do not come from now until thirty days—

if I do not return within thirty days from today—

let this be a get!

He came:

that man came to the river adjoining the city

at the end of thirty days, but the ferry had departed.

He had indeed reached the side of the river adjoining the city, but he had no ferry with which to cross the river to the city, because the ferry was on the other side of the river.

He said

he called

to them

the people of his city, loudly, from the opposite side of the river:

See that I have come, see that I have come!

See that I arrived; the condition “If I do not come” was not fulfilled, and the get that I gave is annulled!

Shmuel said: It is not called “arrival”.

This is not arrival in the city. And the get is a valid get, despite the fact that he was prevented from reaching the city by coercion.

It is evident from Shmuel’s words, in accordance with Rava’s statement, that there is no claim of coercion with regard to gittin.

The Gemara rejects this proof as well:

Perhaps coercion that is common

such as the absence of a ferry,

is different

and only in such a case is there no claim of coercion.

Since he should have stipulated

explicitly concerning such coercion, that if such coercion occurred the get would be annulled—for it is a common occurrence, and a person takes it into account—

but he did not stipulate,

and he did not make such a condition—

he himself brought about his own loss.

It is considered as though he waived this condition, and as though he agreed that the get should take effect and not be annulled even if such coercion occurred to him.

It follows that there is no source for Rava’s statement from Shmuel’s words.

Therefore, the Gemara says:

Rather, Rava—

he stated a rationale of his own!

For although according to Torah law there is a claim of coercion with regard to gittin, the Sages instituted that a claim of coercion should not be effective with regard to gittin. Rather, the woman is divorced with this get even if coercion occurred,

for the sake of the modest women and for the sake of the promiscuous women,

as will be explained immediately.

For the sake of

women who are

modest—

For if you were to say

that if you say that there is a claim of coercion in fulfilling the condition, and it is therefore as though the condition was not fulfilled, and

it should not be a get,

we must be concerned—