Ketubot 2b — the Talmud in English

For she cannot say to him, “Your field has been flooded”.

Since this is the fixed time for her, during which she is not fit to marry.

And therefore the Sages did not obligate him, when the time of twelve months arrived, to provide her with sustenance if she was menstruating at that time, since this is not an event of “your field has been flooded,” which depends on the husband’s fortune, but this is the way of a woman, and this is the time fixed for her to become menstruant.

When you raise the question

whether he provides her with sustenance when she became menstruant, or not—that is, when she became menstruant

not at the time of her menstrual period.

And the question is,

what?

What is the law of a woman who became menstruant not at the time of her menstrual period, with regard to the husband’s providing her with sustenance?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Since it was not at the time of her menstrual period

the onset of menstruation,

she can say to him

she is able to say to him

“Your field has been flooded”!

For she claims to him: The cause of my becoming menstruant outside the time of my menstrual period is not due to my fortune, but it is your fortune that caused you to suffer the loss, and you must provide me with sustenance.

Or perhaps, since there are women whose periods change,

since there are women who change the time of

their periods—

this is the way of a woman. And therefore, even becoming menstruant not at the time of her menstrual period

is like

becoming menstruant at

the time of her menstrual period.

And his fortune does not cause this; rather, this is the regular way of a woman: to change her menstrual period sometimes, and therefore he is not obligated to provide her with sustenance.

Rav Aḥai resolved

this problem from the Mishna below [57a], in which we learned:

The time arrived

of twelve months,

and they were not married—

they eat from his property, and they eat teruma

if they married a priest.

And Rav Aḥai infers:

“They were not married”

the meaning of which is that the men did not marry the women, that is, the delay was on the part of the men—

it does not teach

in this Mishna.

Rather, “they were not married,”

the meaning of which is that the women were not married.

And it must be examined:

What are the circumstances

of why the women were not married?

If they themselves were delaying,

that the women, of their own will, delayed their husbands from marrying them—

This is not possible. For—

Why do they eat

then

from his property?

And

why

do they eat

then

teruma

if their husbands are priests? For they are the ones delaying, of their own will, from marrying?

Rather, is it not

necessarily that the Mishna is speaking of a case

where they were prevented in such a manner,

that they were compelled not to marry because they became menstruant not at the time of their menstrual periods?

And

nevertheless it

teaches

in the Mishna:

“They eat from his property, and they eat teruma.”

And through this the problem is resolved: if she became menstruant not at the time of her menstrual period, her betrothed is obligated to provide her with sustenance.

Rav Ashi said:

The problem still remains.

For

I can always say to you

that in

every compulsion

that comes from the woman’s side, he

does not eat

sustenance from her betrothed.

And

here it is speaking of a case

where they were delaying,

that the husbands were delaying the marriage, and not the women.

And

therefore,

it is the law

that it would have been appropriate

for it to teach, “They did not marry”,

since the husbands were the ones delaying.

Rather,

since

because

the tanna taught at the beginning in their terminology,

that the tanna taught at the beginning the law of the woman: “For a virgin, twelve months are granted, and for a widow, thirty days”—

therefore

he also taught at the end

in terminology speaking

in their terminology,

of the woman. And therefore the tanna said “they were not married,” referring to the women, even though the delay was on the part of the men.

See the introductory remarks to the following discussion in the note.

Rava said:

That which we learned above in the words of Rav Yosef: “Therefore, if he became ill, or she became ill, or she became menstruant, he does not provide her with sustenance”—that is, in every matter of delay because of compulsion, this is not considered delay, and therefore he is exempt from providing her with sustenance if he delayed marrying her because of compulsion—this was said only with regard to sustenance—

but

however,

with regard to bills of divorce—

it is not so!

That is, with regard to divorcing a woman by a bill of divorce, even a delay caused by compulsion is considered delay, because there is no “claim of compulsion” with regard to a bill of divorce, as will be explained.

And the Gemara proves:

Apparently,

it is demonstrated from here that

Rava holds: there is no

“claim of

compulsion” with regard to bills of divorce!

That is, one who gives a bill of divorce to a woman on the condition that the divorce take effect if he does not return home by a certain time, and a compulsion occurred that prevented him from returning home before the time he set, we do not say that being prevented from coming because of compulsion is not delay, and that the condition “if I do not come” was not fulfilled.

Rather, the matter is considered as though his condition “if I do not come” was fulfilled, for he indeed did not return by the date he set, and the divorce took effect.

And the claim of compulsion is not effective to say that the matter should be considered as though the condition “if I did not come” was not fulfilled, to nullify the bill of divorce and prevent the divorce from taking effect.

And we inquire about it:

From where does Rava have this

distinction between delay under compulsion in divorce, which is considered delay, and delay under compulsion in marriage, which is not considered delay?

If you say, from that which we learned

in tractate Gittin [76b]: One who gives a bill of divorce to a woman and says to her:

“This is your bill of divorce”

on the condition,

“if I do not come from now until twelve months.”

And he died

the husband

within twelve months—

it is not a bill of divorce.

For the tanna of this Mishna holds that the intention of the divorcing husband in this wording is to say that the divorce should take effect after twelve months [if he does not come].

And since he died within this period of time, it is found that she was widowed before she was divorced.

And therefore, if the deceased husband has no sons, she requires levirate marriage with his brother, and she is not permitted to the marketplace as a divorcee.

And the Gemara infers from these words of the Mishna:

He died

within twelve months—

it is specifically he who does not have a bill of divorce,

because she was widowed before the divorce took effect. And a dead man cannot divorce, for the dead do not divorce, and there is no divorce after death.

Here,

if

the husband became ill,

and because of the compulsion of the illness he was unable to return—

it is a bill of divorce!

For if even compulsion due to illness is not considered delay, and this is not called fulfillment of the condition “if I did not come” [because “there is a claim of compulsion with regard to bills of divorce”], and if he does not return within twelve months because of illness the divorce does not take effect, then the tanna should have taught: “If the husband became ill and therefore did not come within twelve months, it is not a bill of divorce,” and I would know by a kal va-chomer that if he did not come because he died on the way, the divorce should not take effect, for there is no greater compulsion than the compulsion of death.

And from the fact that the tanna specifically stated “he died,” it is proven from his words that only because she became widowed does the divorce not take effect after his death, because there is no divorce after death. But if he became ill, his delay under compulsion is considered delay, and a claim of compulsion is not effective with regard to the bill of divorce to prevent the divorce from taking effect.

And the Gemara rejects the proof from here for Rava’s words:

Perhaps,

indeed,

I can say to you

that if

the husband became ill

and therefore was unable to return, he

also does not have a bill of divorce,

because delay under compulsion is not considered delay even with regard to a bill of divorce, as with marriage, and the condition “if I did not come” was not fulfilled.

And do not infer the inference that you inferred from that Mishna: specifically if the husband died, because he died before the divorce took effect, therefore it is not a bill of divorce; but if he was delayed because of compulsion and therefore did not return, it is a bill of divorce.

Rather, the tanna holds that even if the husband were alive and unable to come because of compulsion, even then the divorce would not take effect. For being delayed from returning because of compulsion is not called delay.

And concerning what you inferred: If so, why did the tanna specifically state “he died,” and not state “he became ill”?

Since

this itself,

this very matter

the tanna teaches us

in that Mishna—

that there is no bill of divorce after death!

And even if the husband did not make a condition, but gave her a bill of divorce and said that the divorce should take effect after death, and that she should not require levirate marriage—this is nothing, and she requires levirate marriage, since there is no bill of divorce after death.

And the Gemara is astonished at the rejection:

But this—that

there is no bill of divorce after death—

he already taught it

at

the beginning

of this Mishna, and it is impossible to say as you said, that this very matter—that there is no bill of divorce after death—is what the tanna came to teach.

For we learned at the beginning [72b, there]: A “terminally ill person,” who is approaching death, who said to his wife:

“This is your bill of divorce if I die,”

when I die.

Or he was ill and said to her:

“This is your bill of divorce”

when I recover

from this illness,

and he died. And since he died in his illness, it is found that he did not divorce her during his lifetime, but only upon his death, when his illness ended.

Or he said without a condition:

“This is your bill of divorce after death”—

he has said nothing!

And the reason for the matter is that there is no bill of divorce after death.

And since the tanna already taught this law—that there is no bill of divorce after death—at the beginning, it necessarily follows that at the end he is not coming to teach us this law.

And if so, Rava’s inference returns: from the fact that at the end the tanna stated, in “This is your bill of divorce if I do not come from now until twelve months, and he died,” that if he “died” it is not a bill of divorce, and the tanna did not state that even if he “became ill” and did not come because of the illness it is not a bill of divorce—

it is because the tanna came to teach the law that there is no compulsion with regard to bills of divorce.

And therefore, even delay from returning because of compulsion is also considered delay, and the condition “if I did not come” was fulfilled, even though the “not coming” was because of compulsion.

And specifically the tanna stated that if he died it is not a bill of divorce, because the dead do not divorce.

But the Gemara still asks that one cannot prove from the Mishna in accordance with Rava.

For

perhaps

the intention of the tanna at the end, when he stated “This is your bill of divorce if I do not come from now until twelve months, and he died,” and did not state “he became ill,” was not to teach the law stated by Rava, “there is no compulsion with regard to bills of divorce.”

Rather, his intention was

to exclude the position of our Rabbis” [and below the Gemara will explain who those “our Rabbis” are], who hold that the divorce takes effect with such a bill of divorce, since in their view the intention of the one divorcing with this bill of divorce is not to say that the divorce should take effect in twelve months if he does not come by then, but that it should already take effect now if he does not come within twelve months.

And according to them, this is not a bill of divorce after death; therefore his divorce took effect from the time he gave the bill of divorce, if he died and did not come.

And according to their view, this is not a bill of divorce after death; therefore his divorce took effect from the time he gave the bill of divorce, if he died and did not come.

For it was taught: And our Rabbis—

permitted her to marry

in the marketplace with this bill of divorce, even if he died without sons and has a brother, without her needing halitza from him. And as stated, according to them, when the condition is fulfilled—that he does not come after twelve months—she is divorced from the time the bill of divorce was given, and it is found that this is not a bill of divorce after death.

And we say: Who

who are

“our Rabbis”?

And

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: The court that “permitted the oil.”

The court of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the grandson of Rabbi, which permitted the decree that the Sages had decreed, prohibiting the oil of idolaters [in tractate Avoda Zara, 37b].

For they

hold like Rabbi Yosei, who said: The date of a document proves its intention.

That is, since the date on which the document was written is written in the document, this is proof that the intention of the writer of the document is that the effect of the document should take effect on the date written in it, provided that the condition is fulfilled.

For if his intention were that the effect of the document should take effect only after twelve months, he should have recorded only the date of another twelve months, when the effect of the document would take place; why would he record the date on which the document was written?

And since it is possible to say that the innovation at the end of the Mishna is to exclude the words of “our Rabbis,” there is once again no proof for Rava’s inference.

For it is possible that this tanna holds that “there is compulsion with regard to bills of divorce.”

And the reason the tanna did not state the compulsion of “he became ill,” from which I would know by a kal va-chomer the compulsion of “he died,” is that the tanna did not wish to teach us the law of compulsion with regard to bills of divorce, but rather wished to teach us something else, contrary to our Rabbis: that the date written in the document does not indicate that his desire is to divorce her now, if he does not return after twelve months, but his intention is to divorce her only after twelve months.

And therefore the tanna specifically taught that if he died before twelve months, the divorce does not take effect, since the dead do not divorce.

But if he does not come because of illness, there is a claim of compulsion with regard to bills of divorce, and the divorce does not take effect, since delay because of compulsion is not delay and the condition “if I did not come” was not fulfilled.

And if the tanna had taught only the law of the compulsion of “he became ill,” that there is compulsion with regard to bills of divorce, we would not have known from it that the time at which the divorce takes effect is the time of writing the bill of divorce.

And the Gemara accepted this rejection: there is no proof from that Mishna for Rava’s words that there is no compulsion with regard to bills of divorce.

But rather, from the end,

from the continuation of that Mishna Rava proves his words, that there is no compulsion with regard to bills of divorce:

For we learned: One who divorces his wife

“from now, if I do not come from now until twelve months.”

And he died within twelve months—

it is a bill of divorce.

For at the end of twelve months he did not come, and his condition was fulfilled, and she is divorced “from now,” from the time he gave her the bill of divorce, and this is not a bill of divorce after death.

And Rava proves:

He died, and the same applies when he became ill.

Therefore, if he did not come because of illness, his condition “if I did not come” was fulfilled, and it is a bill of divorce.

For if compulsion due to death is not a claim of compulsion with regard to bills of divorce, all the more so compulsion due to illness; and it is proven that there is no claim of compulsion with regard to bills of divorce.

And the Gemara rejects Rava’s proof:

Perhaps it is specifically when he died

that it is a bill of divorce, since we attribute it to saying that this was the intention of the one divorcing in writing the bill of divorce: if he dies, the divorce should take effect from now, since

it is not pleasing to him

the divorcing husband

that his wife should fall

his wife

before

his

levir.

And in such coercion, that if he dies, he certainly does not wish that the get be annulled; rather, on the contrary, he wants the get to remain in force.

But in coercion involving illness, where he is comfortable with the annulment of the get if he became ill and was delayed because of his illness, it is possible that there is coercion with regard to gittin, and his delay on account of coercion is not considered a delay, and his condition “if I do not come” was not fulfilled, and the get is annulled.

And there is no proof from here for Rava’s statement that there is no claim of coercion with regard to gittin.

Therefore, the Gemara brings another source for Rava’s ruling:

Rather, from this—

from what Shmuel said, there is proof for Rava that there is no coercion with regard to gittin.

Concerning

the incident that occurred with

that

man,

who said to them

[to the members of his household, or to those present when he gave the get to his wife]:

If I do not come from now until thirty days,

if I do not come back from today until thirty days—

let it be a get!

He came,

that man came to the river adjacent to the city,

at the end of thirty days, and the ferry was not there.

He indeed reached the side of the river adjacent to the city, but he had no ferry with which to cross the river to the city, because the ferry was on the other side of the river.

He said,

he called

to them,

to the people of his city in a loud voice, from the other side of the river:

See that I have come, see that I have come!

See that I have arrived, and the condition “if I do not come” was not fulfilled, and the get that I gave is annulled!

Shmuel said: “It is not called ‘coming’.”

This is not arrival in the city. And his get is a get—even though he was prevented from reaching the city by coercion.

And it is proven from Shmuel’s words in accordance with Rava’s words, that there is no coercion with regard to gittin.

And the Gemara rejects this proof as well:

Perhaps coercion that is common,

such as the absence of the ferry,

is different,

and only in its case is there no claim of coercion.

For since he should have stipulated

explicitly concerning such coercion, that if such coercion occurred the get would be annulled—for it is a common occurrence, and a person brings it to mind—

and he did not stipulate,

and he did not make such a condition—

he himself caused his own loss.

The matter is considered as though he waived this condition, and as though he agreed that the get should take effect and not be annulled even if such coercion should occur.

It follows that there is no source for Rava’s words from Shmuel’s words.

Therefore, the Gemara says:

Rather, Rava—

stated a reasoning of his own!

For although by Torah law there is a claim of coercion with regard to gittin, the Sages instituted that a claim of coercion should not be effective with regard to gittin; rather, the woman is divorced with this get even if coercion occurred,

because of the modest women and because of the promiscuous women,

as will be explained immediately.

Because of

women

who are modest—

For if you say,

that if you say that there is coercion in the fulfillment of the condition, and this is like a condition that was not fulfilled, and

let it not be a get.

We must be concerned—