Ketubot 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English

Introduction to the Chapter “A Virgin Is Married” When a man marries a woman on the presumption that she is a virgin, and comes to the court and makes a “claim concerning virginity,” stating that he found her to have had intercourse, although he married her on the presumption that she was a virgin, his claim involves two matters: A. A matter of prohibition, perhaps she had intercourse with a stranger while she was betrothed to him, in which case she becomes forbidden to him. B. A matter of money, for if she committed adultery while betrothed to him, he is not obligated to pay her a ketuba at all. Alternatively, he is not obligated to pay her the ketuba of a virgin, which is two hundred zuz, but only the ketuba of a woman who has had intercourse, which is one hundred zuz. The claim concerning virginity is based on the absence of the signs of virginity, which are two. The first sign of virginity is the blood that flows from a virgin during her first intercourse. The absence of blood is evidence that she is not a virgin. The second sign is the tightness at the entrance of the woman’s vagina that the husband encounters when having intercourse with a virgin for the first time. If the entrance is not tight during the first intercourse, this is evidence that she has already had intercourse and is no longer a virgin. The husband is deemed credible with regard both to his claim that she is forbidden to him, where there is only one uncertainty as to whether she had intercourse with another man after becoming betrothed to him—but not where the uncertainty has the status of a compound uncertainty, as will be explained below—and to his claim concerning the ketuba. The Gemara discusses this matter in the chapter and explains the extent of the husband’s credibility. The husband is deemed credible when the woman contradicts him and claims that she was a virgin when she had intercourse with him. However, if the woman claims that she had indeed had intercourse previously, while she was betrothed to him, but that she is not forbidden to him because the intercourse occurred under duress, and therefore she is also entitled to her ketuba—the tannaim disputed this in the Mishna later in the chapter: does her claim stand, since it is a claim of certainty, together with her presumption concerning her physical condition, which indicates that she was a virgin when she became betrothed, and together with her presumption of eligibility, against the husband’s credibility, since his claim is based on uncertainty, as he is uncertain whether she committed adultery while betrothed to him? Since the Sages wished to preserve the sanctity of the Jewish people and prevent wrongdoing during the waiting period that was customary in the past between betrothal and marriage, they ordained that a virgin’s marriage should take place on the day immediately preceding the day on which the court sits, so that the woman would know that if she had intercourse with a stranger, then immediately on the morning after the wedding, after her husband discovered that she was not a virgin, he would come to court and make his claim concerning virginity while still enraged. The woman should not rely on her ability to persuade him to keep her despite the fact that she had had intercourse with another man while betrothed to him. The Sages ordained that the marriage of a virgin should take place on Wednesday, and that of a widow on Thursday.

The Mishna before us explains only the reason for establishing Wednesday as the time for the marriage of a virgin; the reason for establishing Thursday as the time for the marriage of a widow will be explained in the Gemara.

A. There are three reasons for the Sages’ ordinance that a virgin should be married specifically on Wednesday. The primary reason is explained in the Mishna, and two additional reasons are explained in the Gemara.

The primary reason for the Sages’ ordinance establishing Wednesday as the day of marriage for a virgin is that if her husband finds that she is not a virgin, he will rise early the next morning, Thursday, and go to court, since Thursday is the day on which the court sits, while he is still angry that he found her to have had intercourse rather than to be a virgin, and make his “claim concerning virginity” in court. His anger will not cool through waiting until another day on which the court sits.

Thus, word will spread that he found her to have had intercourse rather than to be a virgin, and, perhaps because the matter becomes public, witnesses will come and testify that she had intercourse with another man during the period of betrothal, and the matter will be established through witnesses. -

must not come to court and make a claim concerning virginity and bring her into disrepute! See Eilat HaShahar, which discusses at length the extent to which the husband is required to clarify this uncertainty that has arisen for him. For example, if a person enters a store containing both kosher meat and meat that may be non-kosher, is he permitted to take meat from the store without asking at all whether this is the kosher meat or the possibly non-kosher meat, relying on a compound uncertainty without even taking an interest in asking whether it is kosher?! See his extensive discussion. B. Ezra ordained that courts should sit in all the towns on Mondays and Thursdays. Before Ezra’s ordinance, there was no fixed day for the court’s session.

C. A husband who married his wife on the presumption that she was a virgin and she was found to have had intercourse must be concerned that perhaps she had intercourse with another man between the time of betrothal and the time of marriage [for in those days betrothal was not immediately followed by marriage; rather, the betrothed woman, who was a married woman in every respect, remained in her father’s home until the time of the marriage]. If she had intercourse with another man while betrothed to him, she becomes forbidden to him, as is the law with regard to a married woman who committed adultery while married -

If the husband is a kohen, she becomes forbidden to him whether she had intercourse willingly or under duress. But if the husband is an Israelite, she becomes forbidden to him only if she had intercourse with another man willingly.

D. According to this reason, the virgin could have been married on Sunday as well, and he could then have risen early on Monday morning and made his claim that he found her to have had intercourse before the court’s session, since courts sit in all the towns on Monday as well.

But there was an additional reason for the ordinance that a virgin should be married specifically on Wednesday, since “the Sages took care for the welfare of the daughters of Israel, so that [the groom] would labor over the wedding feast for three days—Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday—and on Wednesday he would marry her.”

The Gemara also explains an additional reason: Thursday is the day on which the blessing of procreation was pronounced [during the creation of the world] for the fish. If a man marries a woman on Wednesday, he will have intercourse with her on the following night, the eve of Thursday, which has an aspect of blessing for procreation.

E. Before Ezra’s ordinance, and likewise nowadays, when there is no specific day for the court’s session, and likewise when nowadays there is no need to be concerned about a claim concerning virginity because there is no interval between betrothal and marriage, only the second and third reasons remain.

Therefore, if the husband has already labored over the wedding feast and is not particular to have intercourse specifically on the day on which the blessing of procreation was pronounced, he need not wait until Wednesday and may marry a woman on any day except Shabbat and the night following Shabbat, for the reason that will be explained in the Gemara.

Mishna:

The Sages ordained that a

virgin is married on Wednesday

of the week,

and a widow

is married

on Thursday.

Because

twice during the week,

on weekdays,

the courts sit in

all the

towns—

on Monday and on Thursday.

Therefore, the Sages ordained that a man should marry a virgin on Wednesday, so that he would have intercourse with her on the eve of Thursday,

for if he had a claim concerning virginity,

because he found her to have had intercourse, and he must be concerned that perhaps she had intercourse during her betrothal and became forbidden to him—

he would rise early and go to court,

and claim that he found her to have had intercourse. Word would spread, and as a result of the publicity witnesses might come to court and establish that she had committed adultery.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that a virgin is married on Wednesday: “for if he had a claim concerning virginity, he would rise early and go to court.”

Rav Yosef came to explain the words of the Mishna in accordance with the words of his teacher, Shmuel.

But since Rav Yosef became ill and forgot his learning, he initially recited the words of his teacher Shmuel incorrectly, questioned them, and afterward corrected them.

This is how Rav Yosef initially expounded the words of his teacher Shmuel -

Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: For what reason did the Sages say

that

“a virgin is married on Wednesday”?

Rav Yosef understood that Shmuel was not asking why the Sages ordained that she be married only on Wednesday and not on Sunday, despite the fact that courts also sit on Monday.

Rather, Shmuel’s question was: What practical difference does this ordinance make, apart from the basic determination that this is the proper time for marriage? To this Shmuel answered:

As we learned [below, 57a], a betrothed virgin is given twelve months to prepare herself, her jewelry, and all her wedding needs, from the day her betrothed demanded that she prepare for marriage with him until the day of the wedding canopy.

that a period of twelve months is granted to a betrothed virgin to prepare herself, her jewelry, and all her marital needs, from the day her betrothed demanded that she prepare herself for marriage to him until the day of the bridal canopy.

And if

the

time,

time

arrived, meaning that twelve months had passed,

and the virgins were not married

because of the husbands’ delay, then they

eat from his—

the husband is obligated to provide her sustenance just as he is obligated to provide sustenance for his married wife.

And

likewise, if they were betrothed to a kohen, even if they were Israelite women, from that time they

eat

already

of teruma,

as is the law of an Israelite woman married to a kohen, who eats teruma.

And since we learned in this Mishna that when the time arrives the husband is obligated to provide her sustenance—

it is possible

that even if

the

time

time arrived on Sunday, he should provide her with

immediately

sustenance,

since twelve months had already passed and he was delaying marrying her.

On Sunday there is no reason for the Mishna’s statement that one should not marry, lest he find her to have had intercourse and his mind cool before he has the opportunity to come to court, since he could come to court the next morning, Monday, when the court sits -

For this reason we learned

in our Mishna that the Sages established that

“a virgin is married on Wednesday.”

From here you learn that until Wednesday, the day of the week established by the Sages for marriage, he is not obligated to provide her with sustenance, since the delay is not his fault but results from the Sages’ ordinance.

Rav Yosef did not explain, when citing Shmuel’s words, why a virgin is indeed not married on Sunday as well, because according to Rav Yosef’s present understanding, that was not Shmuel’s question!

He said

and

Rav Yosef

questioned the words of his teacher Shmuel:

Master of Abraham!

God of Abraham!

He makes a teaching depend

How could Shmuel, my teacher, make the reason for our Mishna depend

on something that is not taught

in a Mishna that “is not taught”?

That is, Shmuel said that our Mishna teaches the establishment of Wednesday as the time for marriage in order to teach about the matter of sustenance, which is a practical difference derived from a Mishna that “is not taught.”

The Gemara challenges Rav Yosef’s question:

Which

Mishna

is taught, and which

Mishna

is not taught!?

After all,

this one too is taught, and

also

that one is taught!

Both the Mishna here and the Mishna below concerning the arrival of the time are explicit Mishnayot!

Rather,

the Gemara explains that this was Rav Yosef’s argument:

He makes a teaching depend,

how could Shmuel make our Mishna depend

on what explains

in it

the reason

why a virgin is married on Wednesday, so that he will rise early on Thursday morning and make a claim concerning virginity—

on what is taught

in the Mishna concerning the arrival of the time below,

which does not explain

in it

the reason

why, when the time arrives on Sunday, he does not provide her with sustenance, even though he can approach the court the next day [Monday]!

That is, it is impossible that our Mishna, in which the reason for the Sages’ ordinance is explicitly stated—to enable him to rise early in the morning and go to court—should establish a practical consequence concerning the provision of sustenance when the time arrives on Sunday, while the Mishna concerning the arrival of the time itself gives no reason for this distinction. After all, our Mishna does not deal at all with the obligation to provide sustenance when the time arrives; it gives a reason for establishing Wednesday as the time, so that he can rise early in the morning and go to court, without explaining why a man should not also marry a woman on Sunday.

By this reason alone, Sunday is also suitable for marriage. According to the reason given by our Mishna, he should indeed have to provide sustenance beginning on Sunday.

If so, Rav Yosef asks, how could Shmuel say that our Mishna, which states “a virgin is married on Wednesday,” has the practical consequence that if the time arrived on Sunday he does not provide her with sustenance?

Therefore, Rav Yosef said:

Rather, if it was stated

with regard to Shmuel’s words, they must necessarily be corrected, and one must say that

this is what was stated:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

We learned in the Mishna:

“For what reason did they say that a virgin is married on Wednesday?”—

For if he had a claim concerning virginity, he would rise early and go to court

on Thursday, which is the day on which the court sits, and his anger would not cool while waiting for the next day on which the court sits.

Rav Yosef explains that this was Shmuel’s question:

Since this is the reason for the Mishna, one should ask -

And let her be married

also

on Sunday,

since on Sunday as well there is the possibility

that if he had a claim concerning virginity, he would rise early

on Monday morning

and go to court!?

Rav Yosef explains that Shmuel answered: There is an additional reason for the matter, because of which she is to be married only on Wednesday. For -

The Sages took care for the welfare of the daughters of Israel, so that

the groom

would labor over the feast

of the marriage, so that it would be fittingly dignified,

for three days—

Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, and on Wednesday—

he marries her.

And in light of this, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

And now,

since

we also taught

the reason that

“the Sages were diligent

over the enactment for the daughters of Israel, that the groom should trouble himself with the feast for three days” —

that

Mishna

we taught

below,

“When the time arrived and they were not married, they eat from his property and eat teruma” —

if

the time arrived on Sunday,

then

since he cannot enter the marriage canopy

until Wednesday —

he does not provide her sustenance

until Wednesday.

And in light of this, Rav Yosef himself adds to Shmuel’s words:

Just as, when the time arrived on Sunday, he does not provide her sustenance, since he still cannot marry her because of circumstances beyond his control, as Wednesday, the day on which he can marry her, has not yet arrived —

therefore,

in every circumstance beyond his control, whether the circumstance was on his part or on her part—for example, if, when the twelve-month period arrived,

he became ill,

and cannot marry her,

or she became ill, or she became menstruant,

and therefore he does not marry her —

he

does not provide her sustenance.

This is Rav Yosef’s statement according to one version.

And there is another version,

in which it is explained

that

Rav Yosef

posed it as a question,

he was uncertain about this matter and formulated it as a problem:

If he became ill

when the twelve-month period arrived, and consequently delayed marrying her —

what

is the ruling concerning providing her sustenance?

And these are the sides of the uncertainty:

There,

when the time arrived on Sunday,

what is the reason

that he is exempt from providing her sustenance? Is it not

because he is prevented by circumstances beyond his control

from marrying her, due to the enactment that he should not marry her until Wednesday?

And

if so,

here too, he is prevented by circumstances beyond his control,

since he cannot marry her because of his illness.

Or perhaps, there he is prevented by circumstances beyond his control

because of

the enactment that the Sages instituted for him,

and this is not a private circumstance beyond his control; therefore, the Sages did not obligate him to provide her sustenance.

But

here,

when he became ill and could not marry her,

he is not

prevented by circumstances beyond his control because of the Sages’ enactment, but because of his illness. It is possible that in such a case the Sages did not exempt him from their enactment obligating him to provide sustenance once the time arrived and they were not married.

And

also,

even if you should say: he became ill,

since the impediment to the marriage is on his part, indeed he

provides her sustenance —

the question remains whether, if

she became ill,

what

is the ruling concerning providing her sustenance? And these are the sides of the uncertainty:

Can he

say to her: “I am here before you!”

I am ready and prepared to marry you, and therefore I need not provide you with sustenance, since you are the one delaying the marriage?

Or perhaps, she can say to him,

she can claim:

“Your field has been flooded!”

This is a metaphorical expression, as though she were saying to him, “Your field has been flooded and ruined.”

That is, she claims to him: I already belong to you, and once the time arrived, you are obligated to provide me with sustenance. The fact that you cannot marry me because of my illness is your misfortune, which caused you to suffer a loss; I should not have to suffer a loss because I cannot marry you.

And

also

even if you should say

that she can indeed

say to him, “Your field has been flooded”,

there is still an uncertainty: if

she became menstruant

when the time arrived, and therefore he does not marry her —

what

is the ruling concerning providing her sustenance?

And Rav Yosef explains: If she became menstruant

at the time of her expected menstrual period,

when she is accustomed to be menstruant —

there is no need to ask you,

there is no uncertainty in the matter,