Ketubot 3a — the Talmud in English

Sometimes he was not under duress,

for his being prevented from returning was not under duress; rather, he did not return of his own will. In that case, the condition was fulfilled, his get is a get, and his wife is permitted to marry another man.

И

and if she, the modest woman,

thought that he was under duress,

that he was not coming because of duress preventing him, and her get was not a get, since duress applies with gittin,

she would remain agunah and sit,

without marrying.

And according to the law, she need not be concerned lest he was under duress and therefore did not return, for among most people incidents of duress that prevent them from returning do not occur. But, in her modesty, she will be stringent with herself and will not marry.

And therefore the Sages instituted that there should be no claim of duress with gittin, and she is divorced even if he was under duress and therefore did not come.

And because of promiscuous women—

For if you say

that delay caused by duress

should not make it a get,

because duress applies with gittin—

sometimes he is under duress

in his being prevented from returning, and since duress applies with gittin, his get is not a get,

and the

promiscuous woman would say that he was

not under duress,

and her get is indeed a get. And we must be concerned that she will say this even in a case where the report has spread that he is not returning because of duress, or that she will say this even when she herself knows that he is under duress.

And she goes and marries,

and she goes and marries another man.

И

And if her husband comes, and it becomes clear that his being prevented from returning was because of duress, and duress nullifies the get—

It is found that the get is null, and her children

from the second husband are

mamzerim.

And therefore the Sages instituted that there should be no claim of duress with a get, and duress will never nullify the get.

And the Gemara wonders: How is it possible that the Sages should institute such an enactment?

And is there such a thing,

is there such a thing as this,

that according to Torah law it should not be a get,

since according to Torah law duress applies with gittin,

and because of

the enactment of

modest women and because of

the concern for the conduct of

promiscuous women—

we permit,

we permit

a married woman

to marry

the world!?

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed, such a thing is possible.

Since

every

Jewish man

who betroths

a woman—

it is upon the דעת of the Sages,

according to what the Sages of Israel instituted in Israel, he

betroths

her as a wife.

And it is in the mind of the betrother that his kiddushin will be valid or void according to the enactments that the Sages enacted. And if the Sages wish to annul his kiddushin by means of a get with which it is fit to divorce only by their words, his kiddushin is annulled retroactively, even though the get that he gives her is null according to Torah law.

And the Sages uprooted the kiddushin from him.

The Sages retroactively uprooted his kiddushin if he gives a get on a condition, duress occurs, and he is unable to fulfill the condition.

And although according to Torah law duress applies with gittin, and this get is null, the Sages came and uprooted his initial kiddushin, made the money that he gave her for her kiddushin into gift money, and established that it was not kiddushin money.

That is to say, the Sages have the power to uproot the act of kiddushin retroactively and to say that there was no kiddushin here at all, since they uprooted the kiddushin money and made it a gift instead of acquisition money for kiddushin.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This works

if he

betrothed

the woman

with money,

the Sages properly uprooted the money and said that it was not kiddushin money but rather gift money.

For a get according to Torah law is not comparable to a rabbinic get, since a get according to Torah law cuts off the marital bond between them from that point onward.

But a rabbinic get cannot cut off the marital bond. Rather, following the giving of a rabbinic get, the Sages use their power and uproot the kiddushin retroactively, as though it had never existed at all.

Since everyone who betroths a woman betroths her upon their דעת, they can establish, even after the passage of time, that the kiddushin money was not acquisition money but gift money. Consequently, the woman is not betrothed and is permitted to the market like any woman who was not betrothed.

But if he

betrothed

the woman

through intercourse—

what is there to say?

What will the Sages do with kiddushin through intercourse? Can they uproot it retroactively and say that it was promiscuous intercourse and not intercourse for kiddushin?

Ravina assumed that a man who has intercourse with a woman for the purpose of kiddushin is not prepared to agree that the Sages should uproot his intercourse as intercourse for kiddushin and regard it as promiscuous intercourse. And since he does not agree to this, the Sages do not have the power to do so.

Rav Ashi said to Ravina: One who betroths through intercourse also does so upon the דעת of the Sages, that they should define his intercourse according to their will. Therefore, in a case where he divorced with a get that is not a get according to Torah law but only according to rabbinic law—

the Sages made his intercourse

so that it should not be intercourse for kiddushin, but rather

promiscuous intercourse

that does not effect acquisition.

That is, they have the power to uproot retroactively even intercourse for kiddushin and to regard it as mere promiscuous intercourse, since he betroths upon their דעת even when he betroths the woman through kiddushin by intercourse, just as with kiddushin by money.

And now the Gemara brings an opposite interpretation of Rava’s words:

There are those who say—

thus

Rava said concerning what Rav Yosef said, that there is a claim of duress regarding the obligation of maintenance in marriage, and “therefore, if he became ill or she became ill, he does not provide her with maintenance”—

по поводу слов Рава Йосефа о том, что ссылка на вынуждающее обстоятельство действует в вопросе обязанности содержания в браке: «Поэтому если он заболел или заболела она, он не предоставляет ей содержание», —

and likewise concerning gittin,

there is a claim of duress in them, just as concerning marriage, and delay caused by duress is not considered fulfillment of the condition, and the get is null.

It follows,

it is proven from here that

Rava holds: duress applies with gittin.

And from now on, all the proofs that the Gemara brought above for Rava’s words become objections against him.

They objected to Rava from that which we learned:

one who says to a woman,

“This is your get if I do not come from now until twelve months,” and he died within twelve months—

it is not a get,

and she requires levirate marriage with his brother.

And the Gemara infers: since he

died—

it is specifically then that it is not a get,

since the dead do not divorce.

But

if he

became ill—

it is a get!

And it is proven that even delay in returning because of duress is considered fulfillment of the condition and does not nullify the get, since there is no claim of duress with gittin!

And the Gemara answers:

Actually, I can say to you,

that even if he

became ill, it is also not a get.

Because duress applies with gittin.

And that itself it teaches us,

the Mishna—

that there is no get after death.

And therefore the Mishna used the wording “he died.” It does not intend to say specifically “he died” and not “he became ill.”

And we challenge: But this law that

“there is no get after death”—

this

already

the tanna taught it to him—

the tanna taught this law in the

first clause!

And there is no need for the latter clause to repeat it. Necessarily, the intention of the latter clause in saying “he died” is to exclude “he became ill” and to teach that there is no claim of duress with gittin.

And we answer:

Perhaps

the intention of the Mishna, which stated in the latter clause, “This is your get if I do not come from now until twelve months, and he died, it is not a get,” is

to exclude the view of our Rabbis,”

who hold that his intention is to save her from levirate marriage, and the meaning of his words is that the get should take effect from now. Therefore, there is no proof from here concerning a claim of duress with a get.

And the Gemara brings another proof against Rava’s words:

Come and hear

from that which we learned there later in the Mishna: one who says to his wife, “This is your get

from now, if I do not come from now until twelve months,” and he died within twelve months—

it is a get.

Is it not

that we say: just as the duress of death, which is the greatest duress, is not considered to nullify the get,

the same law applies

to the duress of

“he became ill”

which is a lesser duress than it, and does not nullify the get!

And it is proven that duress does not apply with gittin!

And we answer:

No,

you cannot say that when he died, the same law applies when he became ill.

Rather, if he

died specifically,

the get is not nullified, since

he does not want her to fall before a levir,

and he wants the get to take effect from now if he dies, and therefore he made this condition in the get.

But if he became ill, he does not want the get to take effect; rather, on the contrary, he wants it nullified. And since there is a claim of duress with gittin, if he became ill, the get is nullified.

And the Gemara brings an additional proof, from Samuel’s words, against Rava’s words:

Come and hear

a proof

из

from the incident involving

a certain

man

who said to

the witnesses:

“If I do not come from now until thirty days—

let it be

this get that I am giving my wife

a get.”

He came at the end of thirty days, and the ferry stopped him.

And he said to them, “See that I have come! See that I have come!”

And Samuel said:

since he did not reach the city itself within thirty days, although his delay was due to the duress of the ferry,

it is not called coming!

This is not arrival in the city, and his get is a get. And it is proven that there is no claim of duress with a get.

And the Gemara rejects the proof:

A common duress—

is different.

For since he should have stipulated

that if this duress occurred, the get would not take effect but would be nullified—for it could enter his mind that such duress might occur—

And since he

did not stipulate,

then—

he himself caused his own loss.

And now the Gemara comes to explain the matter of the enactment that the Sages enacted, that a virgin should marry specifically on Wednesday:

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak said: They taught

that a virgin should marry specifically on Wednesday

only from Ezra’s enactment onward,

because

с

from Ezra’s enactment onward

rabbinical courts are not permanently established

in all the towns

but only on Monday and Thursday.

But before Ezra’s enactment, when rabbinical courts were permanently established every day

equally, for they were not fixed for a particular day but would convene on every day when there was a need, according to the matter—

a woman may marry every day

of the days of the week.

And the Gemara wonders: What concern of ours is it to know when a woman used to marry

before Ezra’s enactment?—

What was, was!

What happened happened, and this does not concern us.

And we answer:

This is what he said

Rav Shmuel bar Yitzchak:

If there are

if there are

rabbinical courts permanently established nowadays

now, equally on every day,

as before Ezra’s enactment—

a woman may marry every day.

And we wonder: How may a woman marry every day,

for we require,

for one must toil over the feast for three days before the wedding, and this is possible if he toils during the first three days of the week and marries her on Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday, but not every day. For we learned [as will be explained below, where we learned this]

“The Sages were diligent

for the enactment concerning the daughters of Israel for three days, the first day of the week, the second day of the week, and the third day of the week, and on Wednesday he marries her”!

And we answer: In a situation

where he has toiled for it,

for example, where he toiled and prepared the feast beforehand, before Shabbat, in which case he can marry her also on Sunday or Monday.