Ketubot 28b — the Talmud in English

or he put on tefillin in the presence of his master, or he read three verses in the synagogue,

we do not say that had his master not freed him, his master would not have allowed him to conduct himself according to Jewish practice; rather,

this one did not go out to freedom,

because there are those who allow their slaves to study Torah and conduct themselves as Jews.

In any event, it is proven that it is permitted to teach one’s slave Torah, and this is not as we said above?

And we answer:

there,

it is speaking of a case

where he happened to be called a slave on his own initiative,

and in such a case there are people who are not particular about this, and there is therefore no proof from it that they freed him.

But

when we say

that it is forbidden,

it is when

the master

conducts himself toward him with the practice of sons:

We learned in the Mishna that a single witness who testified when he grew up that, when he was a child, he saw another person go

to immerse in order to eat teruma,

is trustworthy to feed him teruma:

And we say in the Gemara that he is trustworthy only to feed him

rabbinic teruma,

such as teruma of the Diaspora or teruma of produce, concerning which the Sages granted trustworthiness in matters of rabbinic status. But concerning Torah-level teruma, he is not trustworthy to testify as an adult about what he saw as a child. [Because even according to the one who says that one does not raise a person from Torah-level teruma to matters of lineage, nevertheless a valid witness is required, as we found above concerning one who speaks innocently, about whom Tosafot wrote that he is trustworthy only concerning rabbinic teruma].

And

so too we learned in the Mishna that one who testifies as an adult about another person

that he used to receive a share with us at the threshing floor,

is trustworthy to feed him rabbinic teruma:

And we object:

perhaps he is a priest’s slave,

and that is why he received a share at the threshing floor?

And we answer: we must necessarily say that

we learned

in our Mishna

according to the one who says that

that

one does not distribute teruma to a slave unless his master is with him,

and therefore, if he saw him receiving a share at the threshing floor without his master, he is certainly not a slave.

For it was taught —

a priestess whose child became mixed up with the child of her maidservant: both go out to the threshing floor and take a share as one, because

one does not distribute teruma to a slave unless his master is with him,

so that they will not raise him to matters of lineage. And perhaps he is the slave; therefore they distribute to them as one, for then it is certain that the slave received a share together with his master.

These are the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Yose says: he can say, “If I am a priest,

give it to me on my own behalf; and if I am a priest’s slave,

give it to me on behalf of my master.”

And the reason for their dispute is that

in Rabbi Judah’s place they would raise a person from teruma to matters of lineage,

and therefore they were concerned that if they distributed teruma to a slave without his master, people would come to raise him to matters of lineage.

But

in Rabbi Yose’s place they would not raise a person from teruma to matters of lineage,

and therefore they were not concerned about distributing teruma to a slave without his master.

It was taught: Rabbi Eleazar son of Rabbi Yose said: “In all my days I never testified. Once I testified, and they raised a slave to the priesthood on my testimony.”

And we object:

“They raised him”—does this enter your mind?!

Is it possible that a mishap came about through Rabbi Eleazar,

for now, if concerning the animals of the righteous the Holy One, blessed be He, does not bring about a mishap through them, concerning the righteous themselves, is it not all the more so?!

Rather, they sought to raise a slave to the priesthood on his testimony,

but in the end they did not raise him.

And this was the incident:

Rabbi Eleazar saw

Rabbi Eleazar

in the place of Rabbi Yose

that they fed a slave teruma without his master, in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yose, who says that one distributes teruma to a slave without his master, because he held that one does not raise a person from teruma to matters of lineage.

And Rabbi Eleazar went

Rabbi Eleazar

and testified [ [והעיד] and testified ]

that the slave had eaten teruma

in the place of Rabbi Judah,

that that slave had eaten teruma; and in Rabbi Judah’s place they would raise a person from teruma to matters of lineage, and they came to raise him to matters of lineage on the basis of Rabbi Eleazar’s testimony.

And

so too we learned in the Mishna that a person is trustworthy to say

“this place is a beit ha-peras,”

and no farther, and they declare its surroundings pure on the basis of his testimony.

And we object:

what is the reason

that he is trustworthy?

And we answer: because the impurity of a

beit ha-peras

is only

rabbinic.

For Rav Judah said in the name of Samuel:

a field in which a grave was plowed, concerning which they decreed the impurity of a “beit ha-peras,” to render impure one hundred cubits surrounding the grave, out of concern that the plow brought a bone there; and a person passed through it and afterward prepared pure items, and he wishes to check whether he passed through a place where there is a bone —

a person blows [ [מפזר את העפר על ידי רוח] he disperses the earth by means of wind ]

the soil [by dispersing it with the wind]

the earth of a beit ha-peras, and proceeds.

And he relies on the fact that if there is a bone, he will see it, because this impurity is only rabbinic.

And Rav Judah bar Ami said in the name of Rav Judah: A beit ha-peras that was trampled [ [שהלכו בו אנשים הרבה, ודשו אותו ברגליהם] through which many people walked and trampled it with their feet ]

[where many people walked through it and trampled it with their feet]

is pure. What is the reason?

Because

it is impossible for a barley-grain-sized bone not to have been trampled by a foot,

and it was reduced to less than the requisite measure.

And

so too we learned in the Mishna that he is trustworthy to say

“We used to come only up to here on Shabbat,”

and according to his words they establish the city’s two-thousand-cubit boundary.

And the Gemara explains that the reason he is trustworthy is because

he holds that boundaries are rabbinic,

and the Sages granted him trustworthiness in a rabbinic matter.:

And

so too we learned that

he is not trustworthy to say —

“So-and-so had a path in this place; so-and-so had a standing and a eulogy in this place.”

And the Gemara explains:

what is the reason

that he is not trustworthy? Because

we do not remove money

except through two valid witnesses, whose testimony was begun and completed with validity.

The Gemara further discusses the laws of the trustworthiness of disqualified witnesses:

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

a child is trustworthy

to testify as an adult about what he saw as a child, and

to say —

“So my father said to me: this family is pure; this family is impure.”

And we object: is it really

“pure and impure”

literally?

Does this enter your mind?!

And what relevance do impurity and purity have to a family?

Rather,

certainly the intention of the beraita is to say that he is trustworthy to testify that

this family is fit

for teruma,

and this family is disqualified .

And the beraita adds that he is trustworthy to say —

“We ate at a ketzatzah” [ [יבואר לקמן] this will be explained below ]

“We ate at the ceremony of cutting off”

“for the daughter of so-and-so who married so-and-so, and that we used to bring hallah and gifts to so-and-so the priest.”

But concerning this testimony, that “we used to bring hallah,” and so on, he is trustworthy only if he testifies that he used to bring hallah

personally, but not

that he saw people bringing hallah to him

through another person. And all of them [ [היינו בכל עדויות אלו] that is, in all these testimonies ] —

by another person. And all of them

if he was a gentile and converted,

and he testifies about what he saw during his gentile status, or if he was

a slave and was freed,

and he testifies about what occurred during his slavery,

they are not trustworthy. And he is not trustworthy to say, “So-and-so had a path in this place; so-and-so had a standing and a eulogy in this place,”

as above, because concerning money, valid testimony is required

. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: They are trustworthy.

And the Gemara discusses: the words of

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka,

who said, “They are trustworthy,”

— with regard to what [ [על מה אמרם] did he say them ]?

?

If you say

that it applies

to the latter clause,

that they are trustworthy to testify about the place of a standing and a eulogy, this cannot be said, for this testimony is

a removal of money,

and certainly valid testimony is required.

Rather,

certainly Rabbi Yohanan’s words were said

with regard to the first clause,

which we learned:

“And all of them: if he was a gentile and converted, or a slave and was freed, they are not trustworthy,”

and concerning this he said —

“Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: They are trustworthy.”

And we object:

In what do

the first tanna and Rabbi Yohanan disagree?

And we explain:

The first tanna holds —

since

he saw the testimony at a time when he

was a gentile, he was not precise,

and therefore we do not rely on his testimony.

And Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka holds: since

even at the time when he saw the testimony there was

in his mind an intention to convert, he was precise,

and therefore he is trustworthy.

The Gemara returns to explain the beraita:

What is “ketzatzah”

that we learned in the beraita? And the Gemara explains:

For the Sages taught

in a beraita,

how

and when does one perform

a ketzatzah? If one of the brothers married a woman who was unsuitable for him, the members of the family

of the brother

bring a barrel full of produce, break it in the middle of the public square, and say: “Our brothers, house of Israel, hear! Our brother so-and-so married a woman who is unsuitable for him, and we fear lest his offspring become mixed with our offspring. Come and take an example for generations,

so that it will be a remembrance

“that his offspring not become mixed with our offspring.” And this is the ketzatzah concerning which

we learned that

the child is trustworthy to testify about it.

We shall return to you, chapter “The Woman Who Was Widowed.”

A. The Torah said [in Deuteronomy 28:29], concerning

the one who rapes

a virgin young woman: "

When a man finds a virgin young woman who is not betrothed, and he seizes her [by force] and lies with her, and they are found.

The man who lies with her shall give the father of the young woman fifty silver [shekels].

And she shall be his wife, in place of the fact that he afflicted her; he may not send her away all his days."

B. It was further said in the Torah [in Exodus 22:15], concerning

the seducer

a virgin young woman: "

And when a man seduces a virgin who is not betrothed, he shall surely hasten to take her for himself as a wife."

That is, he shall marry her, and shall become obligated to give her a "marriage payment," a ketuba, as every husband becomes obligated to his wife. And if he did so, this is sufficient for him, and he is not obligated to pay a fine.

But, "If her father absolutely refuses to give her to him [as a wife]—he shall weigh out money [the seducer shall pay a fine, fifty silver shekels, into the hand of the father of the seduced virgin young woman. And the value of this sum is] like the marriage payment of virgins."

That is, the seducer shall pay fifty silver shekels.

And the amount of the number of shekels, which is fifty, is learned from the amount stated in the Torah concerning one who rapes a virgin.

C. Our Mishna explains that the obligation of the fine of one who rapes or seduces a virgin young woman applies not only when he raped or seduced a young woman permitted to him in marriage, but also when he had intercourse with a young woman who is among the women forbidden to him.

And he is obligated in a fine whether the young woman was among the women forbidden to him, but kiddushin takes effect for him with them [such as women forbidden by a positive prohibition and women subject to negative prohibitions, according to the Sages], or whether she was among the women forbidden to him by a prohibition of karet, with whom kiddushin does not take effect for him.

And our Mishna needed to teach this to us because there are tannaim who make the obligation of the fine dependent upon the possibility that kiddushin of the one who rapes or seduces the virgin young woman can take effect. Since it is stated, "And she shall be his wife," which is an expression of the formation of kiddushin, and a woman whom he is not fit to retain as his wife, since we cannot read in her, "And she shall be his wife," he is not obligated in a fine [as explained on 29b].

And our Mishna comes to exclude this position.

D. In the following Mishna it will be explained that one who rapes or seduces one of the women for whom he is liable to a court-imposed death penalty does not become obligated in a fine, because "kim lei be-rabba minei" [translation: it is enough to place him under [a punishment] greater than it].

That is, anyone who performs an act whose performance entails two separate punishments, one lenient and one severe, such as death and monetary payment—

Since death is a severe punishment, whereas money is a lenient punishment, he is exempt from the lenient punishment.

And this principle, "kim lei be-rabba minei," is stated even if he did not actually become liable for the severe punishment; it is enough that he transgressed an offense that also has a severe punishment.

For example, he committed the offense for which one is liable for a severe punishment unintentionally, in which case he is not punished with death, and nevertheless he is exempt from the lenient punishment of money.

Therefore, if he had intercourse unintentionally with a virgin young woman for whom one is liable for a court-imposed death penalty when intentional, he is not obligated to pay a fine, since if he had been intentional concerning the prohibition, he would have been liable for a court-imposed death penalty.

E. Our Mishna maintains that the law of "kim lei be-rabba minei" applies only to those liable for court-imposed death penalties, but those liable for karet are not exempt from monetary payment. This is unlike the view of Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana, who maintains that even those liable for karet are exempt from monetary payment and from the fine. His position will be explained in the Gemara.

F. Our Mishna is divided into three parts:

The first part: young women who are forbidden to the one who has intercourse with them by a negative prohibition [those liable for negative prohibitions]. And the Mishna teaches that one who has intercourse with them is obligated in a fine.

The second part: young women considered "virgins," despite the fact that they had intercourse.

The third part: young women for whom the one who has intercourse with them is liable for karet. And the Mishna teaches that one who has intercourse with them is obligated in a fine.