Ketubot 28b (כח:) — the Talmud in English

Or if he put on tefillin in the presence of his master, or read three verses in the synagogue,

we do not say that, had his master not emancipated him, his master would not have allowed him to conduct himself according to Jewish custom; rather,

this is not evidence that he was emancipated,

because there are people who allow their slaves to study Torah and conduct themselves as Jews.

In any event, it is proven that one is permitted to teach his slave Torah, contrary to what we said earlier?

We answer:

There,

it is speaking of a case where

he called himself a slave of his own accord,

and in such a case there are people who are not particular about this; therefore, there is no proof from it that they emancipated him.

But

when we say

that it is prohibited, it is when

he conducts himself toward him

the master

as toward a son:

We learned in the Mishna that if one witness testified as an adult that he had seen, when he was a child, that another person went

to immerse in order to eat teruma,

he is deemed credible to feed him teruma:

And we say in the Gemara that he is deemed credible only to feed him

rabbinic teruma,

such as the teruma of the Diaspora or the teruma of produce, regarding which the Sages deemed him credible in a matter of rabbinic law. But with regard to Torah-level teruma, he is not deemed credible to testify as an adult about what he saw as a child. [For even according to the one who says that one does not raise a person from Torah-level teruma to matters of lineage, nevertheless, a fit witness is required, as we found earlier concerning one who speaks innocently, regarding whom Tosafot wrote that he is deemed credible only with regard to rabbinic teruma].

And

so too we learned in the Mishna that one who testifies as an adult about another person

that he used to share with us at the threshing floor

is deemed credible to feed him rabbinic teruma:

We challenge this:

Perhaps he was a priest-slave,

and that is why he shared in the produce at the threshing floor?

We answer: We are compelled to say that

we learned

in our Mishna

in accordance with the one who says

that

one may not distribute teruma to a slave unless his master is with him,

and therefore, if he saw him sharing at the threshing floor without his master, he is certainly not a slave

. As it was taught:

If the child of a priestess became mixed with the child of her maidservant, both go out to the threshing floor and take a share together, because

one may not distribute teruma to a slave unless his master is with him,

so that he will not be raised to matters of lineage—for perhaps he is the slave. Therefore, they distribute to them as one, since it is then certain that the slave received his share together with his master.

These are the words of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: He can say, “If I am a priest,”

give me a portion for myself; and if I am a priest-slave,”

give me a portion on behalf of my master.”

The basis of their dispute is that

in Rabbi Yehuda’s place, they would raise a person from teruma to matters of lineage,

and therefore they were concerned that if they distributed teruma to a slave without his master, people would come to raise him to matters of lineage

. But

in Rabbi Yosei’s place, they would not raise a person from teruma to matters of lineage,

and therefore they were not concerned about distributing teruma to a slave without his master.

It was taught: Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Yosei said: In all my days I never testified; once I testified, and they raised a slave to priesthood on the basis of my testimony.

We challenge this:

“They raised him”—can this enter your mind?!

Is it possible that an error occurred through Rabbi Elazar,

for if, even with regard to the animals of the righteous, the Holy One, blessed be He, does not bring about an error through them, with regard to the righteous themselves, all the more so?!

Rather, they sought to raise a slave to priesthood on the basis of his testimony,

but ultimately they did not raise him.

And this was the incident:

Rabbi Elazar saw

in

Rabbi Yosei’s place

that they fed a slave teruma without his master, in accordance with Rabbi Yosei’s view that teruma may be distributed to a slave without his master, because he held that one does not raise a person from teruma to matters of lineage.

And

Rabbi Elazar

went and testified

[and testified]

in Rabbi Yehuda’s place

that the slave had eaten teruma. In Rabbi Yehuda’s place, they would raise a person from teruma to matters of lineage, and they came to raise him to matters of lineage on the basis of Rabbi Elazar’s testimony.

And

so too we learned in the Mishna that a person is deemed credible to say

that this place is a beit ha-peras,

but no farther, and they deem the surrounding area pure on the basis of his testimony

. We challenge this:

What is the reason

that he is deemed credible?

We answer: Because the impurity of a

beit ha-peras

is only

rabbinic.

For Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

With regard to a field in which a grave was plowed, concerning which they decreed beit ha-peras impurity—to render impure one hundred cubits surrounding the grave, out of concern that the plow brought a bone there—and a person passed through it and subsequently prepared items of purity, and wishes to check whether he passed through a place containing a bone,

he scatters

[he disperses the earth by means of wind]

the earth of the beit ha-peras, and proceeds.

He relies on the fact that if there is a bone, he will see it, since this impurity is only rabbinic

. And Rav Yehuda bar Ami said in the name of Rav Yehuda: A beit ha-peras that has been trampled

[where many people passed through it and trampled it with their feet]

is pure. What is the reason?

Because

it is impossible for a barley-grain-sized bone not to have been trampled underfoot

and reduced to less than the requisite measure.

And

so too we learned in the Mishna that one is deemed credible to say

“This is as far as we would come on Shabbat,”

and they establish, on the basis of his statement, the city’s two-thousand-cubit Shabbat limit.

And the Gemara explains that the reason he is deemed credible is that

he holds that the laws of Shabbat limits are rabbinic,

and the Sages deemed him credible in a matter of rabbinic law.

And

so too we learned that one

is not deemed credible to say

“There was a path belonging to so-and-so in this place; there was a place of standing and eulogy belonging to so-and-so in this place.”

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that he is not deemed credible? Because

we do not take money away

except on the basis of two fit witnesses, whose testimony began and ended with them being fit witnesses.

The Gemara further discusses the laws governing the credibility of disqualified witnesses:

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

A child

is deemed credible to testify as an adult about what he saw as a child and

to say

“So my father said to me: This family is fit; this family is unfit.”

We challenge this: Is it really

“fit and impure”

in the literal sense?

Can this enter your mind?!

What relevance do impurity and purity have to a family?

Rather,

the beraita certainly means to say that he is deemed credible to testify that

this family is fit

for teruma,

and this family is disqualified

. The beraita adds that he is deemed credible to say

“We ate at the ketzatzah”

[this will be explained below]

“of so-and-so’s daughter for so-and-so, and we would bring ḥalla and the gifts to so-and-so the priest.”

But with regard to this testimony that they would bring ḥalla and so on, he is deemed credible only if he testifies that he himself would bring ḥalla

on his own, but not

that he saw others bringing ḥalla to him

through another person. And all of them

[that is, in all these testimonies]

if he was a gentile and converted,

and is testifying about what he saw while he was a gentile, or if he was

a slave and was emancipated,

and is testifying about what occurred during his enslavement,

they are not deemed credible. And one is not deemed credible to say, “There was a path belonging to so-and-so in this place; there was a place of standing and eulogy belonging to so-and-so in this place,”

as stated above, because in monetary matters a fit testimony is required

. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: They are deemed credible.

And the Gemara discusses: The statement of

Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka,

who said, “They are deemed credible,”

with regard to what

[did he say it]?

If you say

that it

refers to the latter clause,

that they are deemed credible to testify about a place of standing and eulogy, this cannot be said, since this testimony

takes money away,

and certainly fit testimony is required.

Rather,

the statement of Rabbi Yohanan was certainly said

with regard to the first clause,

as we learned:

“And all of them, if he was a gentile and converted, or a slave and was emancipated, they are not deemed credible,”

and concerning this he said:

“Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: They are deemed credible.”

We challenge this:

In what do the

first tanna and Rabbi Yohanan

differ?

The first tanna holds

that since

he saw the testimony at a time when he

was a gentile, he was not precise,

and therefore we do not rely on his testimony.

And Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka holds that since

even at the time when he saw the testimony, his

intention was to convert, he was precise,

and therefore he is deemed credible.

The Gemara returns to explain the beraita:

What is “ketzatzah”

that we learned in the beraita? The Gemara explains:

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

How

and when do they perform

a ketzatzah? If one of the brothers married a woman who was unfit for him, the members of the family

of the brother

come and bring a barrel full of produce, and break it in the middle of the marketplace, and say: “Our brothers, the house of Israel, listen: Our brother so-and-so married a woman who was unfit for him, and we fear that his offspring may become mixed with our offspring. Come and take an example for future generations,

so that it will serve as a reminder

that his offspring should not become mixed with our offspring.” And this is the ketzatzah concerning which

we learned that

the child is deemed credible to testify.

We have returned to you, chapter “A Woman Who Was Widowed”

A. The Torah says [in Deuteronomy 28:29], concerning

rape of a

young virgin: "

When a man finds a young virgin who is not betrothed, and he seizes her [by force] and lies with her, and they are discovered.

The man who lies with her shall give the girl's father fifty silver coins.

She shall be his wife, because he afflicted her; he may not send her away all his days."

B. It is further stated in the Torah [in Exodus 22:15], concerning

the seducer of a

young virgin: "

If a man seduces a virgin who is not betrothed and lies with her, he shall make haste to take her as his wife."

That is, he must marry her and becomes obligated to give her a mohar, a marriage settlement, just as every husband becomes obligated to his wife. If he does so, this suffices, and he is not obligated to pay a fine.

However: "If her father utterly refuses to give her to him [as a wife], he shall weigh out money [the seducer shall pay a fine of fifty silver shekels to her father, the father of the seduced virgin. The value of this sum is] according to the mohar of virgins."

That is, the seducer shall pay fifty silver shekels.

The number of shekels, fifty, is learned from the sum stated in the Torah in the case of one who rapes a virgin.

C. Our Mishna explains that the obligation of the fine imposed upon one who rapes or seduces a young virgin applies not only when he raped or seduced a young woman whom he is permitted to marry, but also when he had relations with a young woman who is among those forbidden to him.

He is obligated to pay the fine whether the young woman is among those forbidden to him by a prohibition, but with whom kiddushin takes effect for him [such as those subject to a positive prohibition and those subject to a prohibition according to the Sages], or whether she is among the women forbidden to him by a prohibition punishable by karet, with whom kiddushin does not take effect for him.

Our Mishna needed to teach this because there are tanna’im who make the obligation to pay the fine dependent upon the possibility that kiddushin can take effect between the rapist or seducer and the virgin. This is because it is stated: "She shall be his wife," an expression denoting the establishment of kiddushin; and a woman whom he is not permitted to keep as his wife, since the phrase "She shall be his wife" does not apply to her, does not incur a fine [as explained on 29b].

Our Mishna comes to exclude this approach.

D. The next Mishna will explain that one who rapes or seduces one of the women for whom he is liable to receive the death penalty from the court does not become liable to pay a fine, because "kim lei bidraba minei" [translation: We leave him with the [punishment] that is greater than the other].

That is, whenever someone performs an act whose performance entails two separate penalties, one lenient and one severe, such as death and monetary payment—

since death is the severe punishment, whereas monetary payment is the lenient punishment, he is exempt from the lenient punishment.

This principle, "kim lei bidraba minei," applies even when he was not actually sentenced to the severe punishment; it is sufficient that he committed a transgression that also carries a severe punishment.

For example, if he committed the transgression for which one receives the severe punishment unintentionally, in which case he is not punished by death, he is nevertheless exempt from the lenient monetary punishment.

Therefore, if he unintentionally had relations with a young virgin for whom one who does so intentionally is liable to receive the death penalty from the court, he is not obligated to pay a fine, since had he intentionally violated the prohibition, he would have been liable to receive the death penalty from the court.

E. Our Mishna maintains that the principle of "kim lei bidraba minei" applies only to those liable to receive the death penalty from the court; but those liable to karet are not exempt from monetary payment. This is contrary to the view of Rabbi Neḥunya ben HaKana, who maintains that even those liable to karet are exempt from monetary payment and from the fine. His view will be explained in the Gemara.

F. Our Mishna is divided into three parts:

The first part: young women whom the man who has relations with them violates a prohibition. The Mishna teaches that one who has relations with them is liable to pay a fine.

The second part: young women who are considered "virgins" despite having had relations.

The third part: young women for having relations with whom the man is liable to receive karet. The Mishna teaches that one who has relations with them is liable to pay a fine.