Ketubot 28a — the Talmud in English

And if he was a kohen,

if she had not yet married

he may not

live with her

even

in

that

alley—

an alley is larger than a neighborhood, and even so they prohibited it because a kohen is prohibited from [being with] an unmarried divorced woman, and we are concerned that he may come to have relations with her.

And if she married, he may not live with her in the same neighborhood [that is, at a distance of three houses from one another], but he may live with her in the same alley, because a married woman is more severe for him, and we are not concerned to such an extent. Tosafot.

And

if it was a small village,

even though it contained more than three houses, nevertheless—

this was an incident, and they said:

that

a small village is judged like a neighborhood,

because people are not commonly found there and he is accustomed to come to her.

And the Gemara is uncertain: A divorced man and a divorcee who lived in the same place, and now they divorced,

who is banished because of whom?

That is, which of them must move to live in another neighborhood?

And we resolve it:

Come

and

hear

what we learned concerning this in a beraita:

for it was taught—

a divorced man and a divorcee who lived in the same place,

she is banished because of him,

to move to another place,

and he is not banished because of her. And if there was

the

courtyard

in which they lived

that was hers, he is banished because of her.

And still

they raised a question before them

in the b eit-midrash: If

it was

the

courtyard belonging to both of them, what [is the law,]

who is banished because of whom?

And we say:

Come

and

hear,

for this case too is resolved from the aforementioned beraita, since we learned in the beraita—

“she is banished because of him,”

and we ask about it:

with what are we dealing,

that the woman is banished because of the man?

If you say,

when she lived

in his courtyard,

this

is obvious,

and surely the beraita did not trouble itself to teach us this simple law.

But rather,

perhaps you will say that the beraita is speaking when previously they lived

in her courtyard.

And

is it not impossible to say so, for

behold

is

it was taught

in the latter part of the beraita that

if it was her courtyard,

behold

he is banished because of her.

And if so, our question returns: With what is the first part dealing, which said, “She is banished because of him”?

Rather, is it not so

that we are forced to say that the first part is speaking

in such a case,

where the courtyard belonged to both of them, and the law in this is that the woman is banished because of the man.

And we reject this:

perhaps

the first part is speaking of a case

that he rented and rented [that is,]

the husband rented the courtyard from the woman, and through this the beraita innovated that even though the substance of the courtyard belongs to the woman, nevertheless, since the courtyard is now rented to the husband, the woman is banished because of him. But actually, regarding a courtyard belonging to both of them, there is no resolution from the beraita.

And we ask, still,

what has become of it—

what can we resolve in the case where the courtyard belonged to both of them?

And we resolve it:

Come

and

hear,

for it is stated in Isaiah—

“Behold, the Lord is removing you with the removal of a man,”

and it may be asked: What is the emphasis emphasized by the verse, “the removal of a man”?

And Rav said:

For this reason the verse emphasized “the removal of a man,” because

the removals of a man are more difficult than

the removals

of a woman.

And therefore, also in our case, it may be resolved that where the courtyard belonged to both of them, the woman is banished because of the man, because the man’s removals are more difficult than hers.

The Gemara brings additional cases concerning the laws of a divorced man and a divorcee:

The Sages taught

in a beraita: A kohen who divorced his wife, if

he lent

the husband

from her

before they divorced

against the property of her father,

and afterward they divorced,

she may not collect

from him

except through another person.

So that they should not draw close to one another through words.

Rav Sheshet said: And if they come before us

the kohen and the woman

for judgment,

and they transgressed the enactment of the Sages that they should not draw close to one another except through another person—

we do not attend to them,

that is, we do not adjudicate their case.

And

Rav Pappa

added to his words and

said:

Even

we place them under a ban

[that is,

we ostracize]

them. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua,

added to them and

said: Not only that, but

we flog

[that is,

we administer lashes]

to them as well.

Rav Naḥman said: A tanna [taught] in “Avel Rabbati” [“

Avel Rabbati” is a designation for Tractate Semahot],

in what case are these words said

that she may collect only through another person?

When she was divorced after marriage,

for then his heart is familiar with her.

But when she was divorced after betrothal, she collects through herself,

because

his heart is not familiar with her.

And there was an incident involving

a certain betrothed man and his betrothed woman

who divorced, and the betrothed man was a kohen,

who came before Rava,

and the woman sued her betrothed for money that he had borrowed from her before they divorced.

Rav Adda bar Mattana sat before him [before] Rava, and saw that

Rava, and he saw that

Rava set up an agent between them,

so that they would not speak to one another.

Rav Adda bar Mattana said

to Rava:

But

did

Rav Naḥman said, “A tanna in Avel Rabbati, et cetera,”

as above, that we are not concerned in the case of a betrothed man and his betrothed woman that they will speak to one another, because his heart is not familiar with her; if so, why were you stringent with them and placed an agent between them?

He said to him

Rava to Rav Adda: In this case I saw a need to be more stringent with them, because

we see that they are familiar with one another. [I saw that they are accustomed to one another.]

I saw that they are accustomed to one another.

There are those who say

that this was the incident: They came before Rava and

Rava did not set up an agent between them,

and

Rav Adda bar Mattana said

to Rava:

Let the master set up [establish]

an

an agent between them.

He said to him

Rava:

But [

said]

Rav Naḥman, “A tanna in Avel Rabbati, et cetera,”

as above, that it is unnecessary to set up an agent between a betrothed man and his betrothed woman.

He said to him

Rav Adda:

These words

that they do not set up an agent between them apply specifically

where

we see that

they are not familiar with one another; but these

betrothed man and his betrothed woman who came before us—behold,

we see them being familiar with one another,

and therefore we must set up an agent between them.

Mishna:

And these

are the matters concerning which

the witnesses are trusted

when they

to testify

about them

at

the time of

their adulthood

concerning

what they saw in their childhood,

even though generally the testimony of an adult is required, and the beginning and end of the testimony must be during adulthood; nevertheless, here the Sages were lenient, and the reason will be explained later in the Gemara:

1. A document that comes before us, and we wish to authenticate the signatures of the witnesses signed upon it—

a person is trusted to say, “

I remember from my childhood that

this is my father’s handwriting, and this is my teacher’s handwriting, and this is my brother’s handwriting.”

And we authenticate the document on the basis of his testimony, because the authentication of documents is only rabbinic; the Sages were lenient in it .

2. And likewise a person is trusted to say—

“I remembered

from my childhood

a certain woman who went out with a bridal canopy and with her head uncovered

according to the custom of virgins,” and they give that woman two hundred [zuz] in her ketuba as a virgin. And the reason is explained in the Gemara: Since most women marry as virgins, his testimony is only a mere disclosure of a fact, and therefore he is trusted.

3.

And

likewise he is trusted to say, “I remember from my childhood

that a certain man would leave the school to immerse himself and eat teruma, and that he would share with us at the threshing floor,”

and I eat teruma on his word, and this will be explained in the Gemara.

4.

And

likewise he is trusted to say: “I remember from my childhood that

this place

is

a bet ha-peras,” [that is, there was a grave in this field, and it was plowed with a plow, and one hundred cubits around the grave is the place called a bet ha-peras, in which there is concern for corpse impurity, and it is prohibited for a kohen to enter there.] And they declare the surroundings of that place pure on the basis of his testimony, since the impurity of a bet ha-peras is only rabbinic; they trusted him to testify about it.

5.

And

likewise he is trusted to say—

“Up to here we would come

in our childhood

on Shabbat,”

that this is the Shabbat boundary, and he is trusted because the laws of boundaries are rabbinic .

But a person is not trusted to say—

I remember from my childhood that

a road belonged to a certain person at this place,

or that there was a place of

standing [a place where those accompanying the dead stand]

where the people accompanying the dead would stand,

and a eulogy for a certain person was held at this place,

because for a monetary matter complete testimony is required, whose beginning and end are in a state of qualification.

Gemara:

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said

that this which we say in the Mishna, that a person is trusted to testify in his adulthood concerning what he saw in his childhood, applies specifically—

and this is when there is

another

adult

with

him,

but certainly one witness is not trusted to authenticate the document .

And the Gemara still finds it difficult: What did the tanna teach us by specifying that he is trusted regarding his father, regarding his teacher, and regarding his brother?

And

we answer:

It is necessary

to teach us all these—

for if he had taught us

only that he is trusted to testify concerning the handwriting of

his father,

I would have said that he is trusted only regarding his father,

because he is frequently with him,

and he is familiar with his handwriting,

but not his teacher.

And if he had taught us

only that he is trusted to testify concerning the handwriting of

his teacher,

I would have said that he is trusted only regarding his teacher,

because he has awe of his teacher

and when he teaches him, he focuses his eyes on his writing in order to write like him,

but not his father.

And if he had taught us these two,

namely, his father and his teacher, I would have said specifically

his father, because he is frequently with him, and his teacher, because he has awe of him,

he is trusted to testify concerning their handwriting,

but regarding his brother, who has neither this nor that, I would say no; it teaches us

that he is also trusted regarding his brother, and the same law applies: he is also trusted regarding every other person ,

since the authentication of documents

is only

rabbinic,

therefore

the Sages trusted him regarding a rabbinic matter.

We learned in the Mishna: A person is trusted to say—

“I remembered a certain woman who went out with a bridal canopy and with her head uncovered”

and she collects two hundred [zuz] on his word, as a virgin.

And we ask:

What is the reason

that he is trusted to extract money on the basis of his testimony?

And we answer:

Since most women marry as virgins,

we follow the majority, and she was certainly a virgin, and complete testimony is unnecessary; rather,

it is merely a disclosure of a fact,

and therefore he is trusted.

We learned in the Mishna:

And

likewise a person is trusted to say, I remember

that a certain man would leave the school to immerse himself and eat teruma,

and that person eats teruma on his word:

And we ask:

Perhaps

what he ate as teruma was not because he was a kohen, but because

a slave

of a

kohen he was,

and behold, the slaves of kohanim also eat teruma; but now, after he was freed, he is prohibited from teruma, and it follows that he is eating teruma unlawfully?

And we answer: It must necessarily be said that this law

supports Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. For Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: It is prohibited for a person to teach his slave Torah,

and therefore, if he remembers him in the school, we must necessarily say that he is not a slave.

And we ask:

Is it not?!—

Is it indeed prohibited to teach him?

But

is it not so that

it was taught—

a slave who

his master borrowed from him, or whom his master appointed

as a guardian

over his property,