Ketubot 28a (כח.) — the Talmud in English

And if he was a kohen,

if she had not yet remarried—

he may not

reside with her

even

in

that

alley—

an alley being larger than a neighborhood; and nevertheless they prohibited this because a kohen is forbidden to a divorced woman who is unmarried, and we are concerned that he may engage in intercourse with her.

And if she remarried, he may not reside with her in the same neighborhood [that is, they must live at least three houses apart from one another], but he may reside with her in the same alley, because a married woman is more strictly forbidden to him, and we are not so concerned that he will come to engage in intercourse with her. Tosafot .

And

if it was a small village,

even though it contained more than three houses, nevertheless—

this was the incident, and they said:

that

a small village is treated like a neighborhood ,

because people are not commonly found there, and he would habitually come to her.

The Gemara raises a dilemma: If a divorced man and a divorced woman lived in the same place and have now divorced,

who is displaced on account of whom?

That is, which of them must move to reside in another neighborhood?

And we resolve it:

Come

and

hear what we learned concerning this matter in a beraita:

what we learned about this in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna:

as it was taught—

a divorced man and a divorced woman who lived in the same place:

she is displaced on account of him,

moving to another place,

and he is not displaced on her account. And if the

courtyard

courtyard

in which they lived

was hers, he is displaced on her account.

The matter nevertheless

was raised as a dilemma

before the members of the house of study: If

the

courtyard

courtyard belonged to both of them, what is the ruling?

Who is displaced on account of whom?

And we say:

Come

and

hear, for this case too can be resolved from the aforementioned beraita, since we learned in the beraita:

for this case too can be resolved from the aforementioned beraita, since we learned in the beraita:

“She is displaced on account of him,”

and we analyzed it:

With what are we dealing,

that the woman is displaced on account of the man?

If you say it is

when she lived

in his courtyard,

this matter

is obvious,

and certainly the beraita would not have needed to teach us this obvious law.

But rather,

perhaps you will say that the beraita is speaking of a case in which previously they lived

in her courtyard.

But

can this really be said? For

the

remainder

was taught in the latter clause of the beraita:

that

if the courtyard was hers,

then

he is displaced on her account.

And if so, our question returns: With what is the first clause, which stated, “She is displaced on his account,” dealing?

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that the first clause is speaking

of such a case,

in which the courtyard belonged to both of them, and the law in that case is that the woman is displaced on account of the man?

And we reject this:

Perhaps the first clause is speaking of a case

in which

he rented the courtyard [rented] from the woman. In this case the beraita teaches us a novel point: Although the courtyard itself belongs to the woman, nevertheless, since at present the courtyard is rented to the man, the woman is displaced on his account. But in a courtyard belonging to both of them, the beraita does not resolve the question.

the courtyard from the woman. The beraita teaches that although the courtyard itself belongs to the woman, nevertheless, since it is currently rented to the man, the woman is displaced because of him. But in a courtyard belonging to both of them, the beraita does not resolve the question.

And we inquire further:

What has become of it,

what can be resolved concerning the case in which the courtyard belonged to both of them?

And we resolve it:

Come

and

hear, since it is stated in Isaiah:

for it is stated in Isaiah:

“Behold, the Lord will hurl you with a man's hurling,”

and it is difficult: What is the emphasis in the verse, “with a man's hurling”?

And Rav said:

The verse emphasized “with a man's hurling” because

a man's being uprooted is more difficult than

being uprooted

by a woman.

Therefore, in our case as well, it can be resolved that when the courtyard belongs to both of them, the woman is displaced on account of the man, because being uprooted is more difficult for a man than for her.

The Gemara presents additional cases concerning the laws of a divorced man and divorced woman:

The Sages taught

in a beraita: A kohen who divorced his wife—if

the husband lent

her

money

before they divorced

from her father's estate,

and afterward they divorced,

she may not collect

from him

except through another person,

so that they will not come to converse with one another.

Rav Sheshet said: And if they come before us

the kohen and the kohenet

for judgment,

and they violated the decree of the Sages that they may approach one another only through another person—

we do not attend to them,

that is, we do not adjudicate their case.

And

Rav Pappa

added to his words and

said:

We even

excommunicate [ban]

them

as well.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua,

added to them and

said: Not only that, but

we also

flog [administer lashes]

them

as well.

Rav Naḥman said: A tanna taught in “Avel Rabbati” [“Avel Rabbati” is a designation for Tractate Semahot],

“Avel Rabbati” is a designation for Tractate Semahot:

In what case is this statement said,

that she may collect only through another person? It is

when she was divorced after marriage,

for then he is familiar with her.

But when she was divorced after betrothal, she may collect through herself,

because

he is not familiar with her.

There was an incident involving

a certain betrothed man and his betrothed,

who divorced, and the betrothed man was a kohen.

They came before Rava,

and the woman demanded from her betrothed money that he had borrowed from her before they divorced.

Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting before

Rava [before Rava], and he saw that

Rava appointed an agent between them,

so that they would not speak with one another.

Rav Adda bar Mattana said

to Rava:

But

did

Rav Naḥman say, “A tanna taught in Avel Rabbati,” and so on,

as above—that we are not concerned that a betrothed man and his betrothed will converse with one another, because he is not familiar with her? If so, why were you stringent with them and placed an agent between them?

He said to him:

Rava said to Rav Adda: In this case I saw a need to be more stringent with them, because

we see that they are familiar with one another. [I saw that they are accustomed to one another.]

I saw that they are accustomed to one another.

Some say that the incident happened as follows: They came before Rava, and

Rava did not appoint an agent between them,

Rava did not appoint an agent between them.

and

Rav Adda bar Mattana said

to Rava:

Let [let the master appoint]

an agent

between them.

He said to him:

Rava

but

said

Rav Naḥman, “A tanna taught in Avel Rabbati,” and so on,

as above—that it is unnecessary to place an agent between a betrothed man and his betrothed.

He said to him:

Rav Adda

these words

that an agent is not placed between them apply specifically

when

we see that they

are not familiar with one another. But these

betrothed man and his betrothed who came before us—we

see that they are familiar with one another,

and therefore we must place an agent between them.

Mishna:

And these are the matters concerning which

are the matters concerning which

witnesses are trusted

to

testify

when they are adults

at the

time of

their maturity about

about

what they saw when they were minors,

although ordinarily testimony must be given by an adult, and the beginning and end of the testimony must both occur when the witness is qualified. Nevertheless, here the Sages were lenient; the reason will be explained later in the Gemara:

a. A document is brought before us, and we wish to validate the signatures of the witnesses signed upon it—

a person is trusted to say, “

I remember from my childhood that

this is my father's handwriting, this is my teacher's handwriting, and this is my brother's handwriting.”

And we validate the document on the basis of his testimony, because validation of documents is only rabbinic; the Sages were lenient in this matter .

b. Likewise, a person is trusted to say—

“I remember

from my childhood

a certain woman who went out with a hinuma and her hair uncovered

according to the custom of virgins,” and they give that woman two hundred zuz for her ketuba, as a virgin. The reason is explained in the Gemara: Since most women marry as virgins, his testimony is merely the disclosure of a fact, and therefore he is trusted.

c.

And

likewise, he is trusted to say, “I remember from my childhood

that a certain man would leave the schoolhouse to immerse and eat teruma, and that he would partake with us at the threshing floor,”

and I eat teruma on his word; this will be explained in the Gemara.

d.

And

likewise, he is trusted to say, “I remember from my childhood that

this place

was

a beit haperas,” [that is, there was a grave in this field, it was plowed with a plow, and one hundred cubits surrounding the grave is the place called “beit haperas,” where there is concern about impurity imparted by a corpse, and a kohen is forbidden to enter there.] And the surroundings of that place are declared pure on the basis of his testimony, since the impurity of a beit haperas is only rabbinic; they trusted him to testify about it.

e.

And

likewise, he is trusted to say—

“Up to here we would come

in our childhood

on Shabbat,”

that this is the Shabbat boundary, and he is trusted because the laws of teḥumin are rabbinic .

But a person is not trusted to say—

I remember from my childhood that

a certain person had a path through this place,

or that there was a place of

standing [a place where those accompanying the deceased stand]

where the people accompanying the dead would stand,

and that a eulogy was held for a certain person in this place,

because testimony concerning monetary matters must be complete testimony, whose beginning and end occurred while the witness was qualified.

Gemara:

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said:

This statement that we said in the Mishna—that a person is trusted to testify as an adult about what he saw as a minor—applies specifically when

there is

another

another adult

witness

with him,

but certainly one witness is not trusted to validate a document .

The Gemara still finds this difficult: What did the tanna teach us by specifying that he is trusted with regard to his father, his teacher, and his brother?

And

we answer:

It is necessary

to teach us all these cases—

for if he had taught us

only that he is trusted to testify about the handwriting of

his father,

I would have said that he is trusted specifically concerning his father

because he is frequently with him,

and is familiar with his handwriting,

but not his teacher.

And if he had taught us

only that he is trusted to testify about the handwriting of

his teacher,

I would have said that he is trusted specifically concerning his teacher

because he is in awe of his teacher,

and when his teacher teaches him, he focuses his eyes on his writing in order to write like him,

but not his father.

And if he had taught us these two,

that is, his father and his teacher, I would have said that specifically

his father, who is frequently with him, and his teacher, of whom he is in awe,

he is trusted to testify about their handwriting,

but with regard to his brother, who is neither frequently with him nor inspires awe in him, I would say no; this teaches us

that he is trusted concerning his brother as well, and the same law applies to any other person ,

since validation of documents

is only

rabbinic;

therefore

the Sages trusted him concerning a rabbinic matter.

We learned in the Mishna: A person is trusted to say—

“I remember a certain woman who went out with a hinuma and her hair uncovered,”

and on his word she takes two hundred zuz as a virgin.

And we ask:

What is the reason

that he is trusted to extract money on the basis of his testimony?

And we answer:

Since most women marry as virgins,

we follow the majority, and she certainly was a virgin; complete testimony is not required, but

it is merely the disclosure of a fact,

and therefore he is trusted.

We learned in the Mishna:

And

likewise, a person is trusted to say, I remember

that a certain man would leave the schoolhouse to immerse and eat teruma,

and that man eats teruma on his word:

And we ask:

Perhaps

the reason he ate teruma was not that he was a kohen, but rather that he

was

the

slave of a kohen,

as slaves of kohanim also eat teruma; but now, after he was emancipated, he is forbidden to eat teruma, and it follows that he is eating teruma unlawfully?

And we answer: Necessarily, we must say that this law

supports Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, who said: It is forbidden for a person to teach his slave Torah,

and therefore, if he remembers him in the schoolhouse, he must necessarily not have been a slave.

And we ask:

Is that so?!

Is it prohibited to teach him?

But

is it not

taught:

A slave

from whom his master borrowed, or whom his master appointed

as a guardian

of his property,