Ketubot 27b — the Talmud in English

And the sides of the uncertainty:

do we say

that she is trusted, because

“What do I have to lie?”

for if she were lying, she could have claimed, “I was hidden,” and by the migo that she could have claimed “I was hidden,” let us believe her when she says, “I did not become defiled.”

Or perhaps,

she is not trusted, because

we do not say “

What do I have to lie?” in the claim “I was hidden,” since “we have circumstantial certainty” that every woman who was not hidden in the city was violated; if so, this is a migo in a place of witnesses, and one does not believe a person by a migo where there are witnesses—or even merely “we have circumstantial certainty”—against his claim.

And

we raised the matter:

what is different

in this case

from that incident—

involving a certain man who rented his donkey to another

[he rented a donkey to his fellow] and

said to him

the lessor:

“Do not go by the road of Nehar Peku[d], where there is water; go by the road of Neresh, where there is no water!”

[Do not go by the road of Nehar Pekud, where there is water; go by the road of the city of Neresh, where there is no water].

And he went

[the renter]

by the road of Nehar Pekud, and the donkey died.

And the lessor sued him for the value of the donkey.

He came

the renter

before Rava

and

said to him: “Yes!

Indeed,

I went by the road of Nehar Pekud,

[I went],

but there was no water

in the river at that time, and the donkey died through no fault of mine.”

Rava said:

The renter is trusted, because of

“What do I have to lie?”

for

if he wished

to lie, he could have

said to him—

“I went by the road of Neresh.”

And Abaye said to him

to Rava: He is not trusted, since it is the way of the world that there is water in the river of Nehar Pekud; therefore “we have circumstantial certainty” that there was water in the river of Nehar Pekud even at that time, and if so, this is a “migo in a place of witnesses,” and one does not believe a person’s claim of

“What do I have to lie?” in a place

where there are

witnesses

or “we have circumstantial certainty” against his claim; therefore

we do not say

this migo.

And the Gemara reasoned that even in our case Abaye and Rava would disagree as to whether we say “What do I have to lie?” in a place where there is “we have circumstantial certainty” against her claim.

And we reject this:

How can these be compared

[what is the comparison between them]?! Surely one must distinguish and say that specifically

there,

in the case of the donkey, he is not trusted, because

there are certainly witnesses

[that is, “we have circumstantial certainty”]

that there is water,

but

here,

in the case of the captive woman, and is it

certain

that she

became defiled?!

It is only

a concern! And in a place of a concern we say “What do I have to lie?”

It was taught in the Mishna that

if there are

witnesses

that she did not become defiled,

even a slave and even a maidservant are trusted:

And

we infer from this that the Mishna did not distinguish: for it implies that

even her own maidservant is trusted!

And we raise a contradiction,

for this law contradicts what we learned in the Mishna in tractate Gittin: A dangerously ill man who wrote to his wife, in order to exempt her from chalitza, “This is your bill of divorce from today, if I die,”

she may not seclude herself

his wife

with him except in the presence of witnesses,

lest he die, and she would be unmarried from now, and it is forbidden to seclude oneself with an unmarried woman .

But she is permitted to seclude herself with him in the presence of any witnesses,

even in the presence of a slave and in the presence of a maidservant,

because she is ashamed before them, and we are not concerned that he might have intercourse with her in their presence.

Except for her maidservant,

with whom she is forbidden to seclude herself,

because she is overly familiar with her maidservant,

and we are concerned that she might have intercourse with her in her presence, since she does not fear that the maidservant will report her wrongdoing.

In any event, we see that her maidservant does not report the wrongdoing of her mistress; if so, this is difficult against the Mishna: How did we believe her maidservant that she did not become defiled?

And we answer:

Rav Pappi said—

in the case of a captive woman they were lenient,

to believe even her own maidservant.

But

Rav Pappa said:

In fact, we never believe her maidservant; therefore

this

Mishna, which teaches that she is not believed, is speaking

of her own maidservant,

whereas

this

Mishna of ours, which teaches that the maidservant is believed, is speaking

of his maidservant,

that is, the husband’s maidservant.

And we challenge Rav Pappa:

And

is it true that

her maidservant is not trusted?!

But

it teaches

in our Mishna:

“A person cannot testify about himself,”

and we infer: specifically, a person regarding himself is not trusted;

but her maidservant

is trusted!

Yet it remains difficult from the Mishna in Gittin brought above, which implies that one cannot rely on her maidservant.

And we answer: In fact, her maidservant is not trusted. And what we challenged from the language of our Mishna, which wrote “A person cannot testify about himself,” but did not also write that her maidservant is not trusted—that is not difficult, because

her maidservant is also considered like herself,

and she is included in the expression “A person cannot testify about himself.”

The Gemara gave another answer:

Rav Ashi said—

both this and that,

both our Mishna and the aforementioned Mishna in Gittin, are speaking

of her maidservant, and

indeed there is room for concern that

a maidservant sees

the wrongdoing of her mistress

and remains silent.

However,

there,

in the Mishna in Gittin,

by

means of

her silence—she

thereby

permits her,

for without her testimony, how would we know that she had been violated?! Therefore

she is not trusted to seclude herself in her presence, since she does not fear that the maidservant will report that she had been violated. But

to permit the woman to be secluded with her, since the slave is not concerned that she will report that the woman had relations. But

here,

in our Mishna,

by

means of

her silence she forbids her,

since a captive woman is forbidden, and her maidservant comes to testify that she was not rendered forbidden;

she is trusted,

since we are not concerned that she will testify falsely; we merely did not rely on her to go and testify on her own initiative in order to forbid her mistress.

And we challenge:

Now also,

in the Mishna concerning a captive woman, let us be concerned lest

she come and lie,

because of her love for her mistress?

And we answer:

Two

[two] lies—both remaining silent about her mistress’s wrongdoing and also giving false testimony—

she would not do!

And the Gemara proves that it is not the way to lie in two matters,

as in the case that

[like that incident that occurred to]

Mari bar Isak, and some say

[and some say it occurred to]

Hana bar Isak,

whose father went to a place called “Bei Ḥoza’a,” and his brother went there with him, and his father died in that place. Mari bar Isak came to inherit his property, and suddenly

a man came to him

who claimed that he was that

brother from Bei Ḥoza’a

who had gone there with his father, and

said to him: “Divide my share in my father’s property with me,”

for I am your brother.

He said to him,

Mari bar Isak:

“I do not know you”

[I do not recognize you; bring proof that you are my brother]!

He came,

that brother,

before Rav Ḥisda,

to demand from Mari bar Isak that he divide his father’s property with him. He claimed before Rav Ḥisda that Mari bar Isak’s claim that he did not recognize him appeared to be a false claim, since it is not common for a brother not to recognize his brother; and if he truly were not his brother, Mari bar Isak should certainly have claimed that he was not his brother, and not merely made a claim of uncertainty.

He said to him,

Rav Ḥisda

said to you correctly

Mari bar Isak, that he does not recognize you,

for

it is

written:

“And Joseph recognized his brothers, but they did not recognize him”—this teaches that he departed

from his brothers

without a beard and came with a beard,

and therefore they did not recognize him. Here too, since you departed from here without a beard and came with a beard, Mari bar Isak therefore did not recognize you.

He added and

said to him

Rav Ḥisda: If, in any event, you wish to divide your father’s property,

go and bring witnesses that you are his brother!

He said to him,

that brother: Indeed,

I have witnesses, but they are afraid of him,

[but they fear Mari] because

he is a violent man

[for he is a violent person] .

He said to him,

Rav Ḥisda

to him—

that is, to Mari bar Isak:

Go and bring them,

the witnesses,

that he is not your brother!

He said to him,

Mari to Rav Ḥisda: And is

the law so

that I must bring witnesses?!

But is it not

the one who takes something from his fellow bears the proof?

He said to him,

Rav Ḥisda to Mari: Indeed, generally the law is that the one who takes something from his fellow bears the proof. But

this is how I judge

[I judged]

you, and all the violent men like you,

[and all your violent companions]: they bear the proof, since their litigants are afraid of them.

And the Gemara examines: But one can still ask, what did Rav Ḥisda accomplish with his enactment? If the witnesses are afraid to testify against Mari bar Isak,

now also,

when he is told to bring witnesses himself, let us be concerned lest

the witnesses come

and

lie,

because of their fear of him?

Rather, it is certainly proven, as we said above, that

two

lies

people do not commit,

and therefore we do not fear that because of their fear of him he will actually cause them to lie; we are only concerned that they will not come to testify.

The Gemara discusses:

Let us say

[it may seemingly be said that] what Rav Pappi and Rav Ashi said above, that her maidservant is trusted, is

according to the tannaim,

that is, it depends on the dispute between tannaim that we will now explain:

For we learned in a beraita in one place that testimony concerning a captive woman

is testimony

for which everyone is fit to testify,

a man and

even

a woman,

or

a boy and a girl, her father, her mother, her brother, and her sister,

but not

may they testify about her—not

her son or her daughter

and

not her male slave or her maidservant.

And it is seemingly explained in this beraita that her maidservant is not trusted to say that she did not become defiled.

And it was taught

in

another

beraita elsewhere that

everyone is trusted to testify

concerning a captive woman,

except for her

[that is, she herself]

and her husband.

And it implies that this beraita holds that her maidservant is trusted to testify concerning her. If so, these beraitot disagree regarding the words of Rav Pappi and Rav Ashi.

And we deliberate and discuss: Indeed,

the

words

of Rav Pappi and of Rav Ashi,

who said that a maidservant is trusted to testify concerning her mistress, are certainly a dispute between the aforementioned

tannaim

indeed,

it is! And they hold in accordance with the second beraita, which held that a maidservant is trusted to testify concerning her mistress.

They hold in accordance with the second beraita, which maintains that a female slave is deemed credible to testify concerning her mistress.

But

the

words

of Rav Pappa,

who said that a maidservant is not trusted—

is it possible

to say that it is a dispute between tannaim?!

[Did he too state his words only in accordance with one tanna?!]

And we say: No! In fact, the words of Rav Pappa, that a maidservant is not trusted to testify concerning her mistress, do not depend on the dispute between the beraitot above.

And what is difficult for you from the second beraita, which implies that a maidservant is trusted?

Rav Pappa can say to you—

when that

beraita states that she is trusted, it is specifically

when she speaks innocently!

And therefore they believed her. But generally they did not believe her maidservant .

And the Gemara brings proof that a person is trusted when speaking innocently concerning testimony about a captive woman:

as in this case, for when Rav Dimi came, he said:

that

Rav Hanan Kartigena,

was

relating

[telling]

an incident,

that

there came before Rabbi Joshua ben Levi—

and some say

[and some said] that

Rabbi Joshua ben Levi

was

relating

[telling] that same

incident,

that

there came before Rabbi—

a certain man who was speaking innocently and said: “My mother and I were taken captive among the gentiles,

and I guarded my mother so carefully that even when

I went out to draw water,

my

attention was upon my mother,

or when I went out

to gather wood,

my

attention was also upon my mother,

so that the gentiles should not defile her,”

and Rabbi permitted her to marry a koen on the testimony of that man,

and from here there is proof that one who speaks innocently is trusted concerning testimony about a captive woman:

Mishna:

There was an incident involving the wife of Rabbi Zechariah ben Ha-Katzav, who was a koen, and who was taken captive together with him at the time of the destruction of the Temple, and

Rabbi Zechariah ben Ha-Katzav said: “By this abode

[this is an expression of an oath]

! Her hand did not move from my hand from the time the gentiles entered Jerusalem until they departed.”

The Sages said to him:

You are not trusted to permit her for yourself, because

a person cannot testify about himself

[that is, on behalf of himself].

Gemara:

A tanna taught

in a beraita concerning this incident of Rabbi Zechariah ben Ha-Katzav:

And nevertheless,

although the Sages forbade her to him, he did not distance her from him; rather

he designated a house for her in his courtyard, and when she went out

from the courtyard, while Rabbi Zechariah was also in the courtyard at that time, she

went out at the head of her sons,

so that she would not seclude herself with him,

and

also

when she entered

the courtyard, she

entered after her sons,

and they did not seclude themselves.

Abaye raised a question: What is the law concerning doing this with a divorced woman,

that he should live with her in the same courtyard and take care not to seclude himself with her?

And the sides of the uncertainty are: Perhaps specifically

there,

in the incident involving Rabbi Zechariah,

it

was that they were lenient to let him live with her in the same courtyard, because

they were lenient in the case of a captive woman, but here

with regard to a divorced woman,

it is not so. Or perhaps it is not different,

and even with a divorced woman it is permitted to live with her in the same courtyard, provided that he does not seclude himself with her.

And we resolve it:

Come

and

hear

what we learned in tractate Semahot:

For it was taught—

an Israelite

who divorces his wife may not marry

and live

in her neighborhood

[that is, within a distance of three houses from him], but while she is still unmarried she may live in his neighborhood.