Ketubot 27a — the Talmud in English

And

nevertheless

it teaches

in the Mishna that specifically where

she was given as a pledge,

that is, she pledged herself willingly, she requires witnesses that she did not become impure, since when the repayment time passes, she belongs to the gentile, and therefore we are concerned lest she declared herself ownerless and had relations with him.

And we infer: “she was given as a pledge” —

Yes!

But when she was

imprisoned

against her will —

No!

Because the gentile is concerned to treat her as ownerless, lest he lose his money.

And this is difficult for Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak, who said that where the hand of Israel is not dominant, even concerning one imprisoned against her will we are concerned lest she had relations.

And we answer: In truth,

the same law applies even

when she was

imprisoned,

and it is in accordance with Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak, that where the hand of the gentiles is dominant, she is forbidden.

And

what we raised as a difficulty from the Mishna in Eduyot, which used the expression “she was given as a pledge,” and not “she was imprisoned,” is not an inference, because

the incident that occurred was so,

but the same law applies also to one who was imprisoned: witnesses are required to permit her.

There are those who say —

some taught Rava’s statement as support for Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak, and not as a difficulty against him:

Rava said: We too have also learned [a Mishna],

I too found a Mishna in accordance with the words of Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak, for we learned in tractate Eduyot that

Rabbi Yosei the priest and Rabbi Zechariah ben HaKatzav testified concerning an Israelite woman who was given as a pledge

[taken as a pledge for a debt]

in Ashkelon, and her family distanced her

out of concern that she had had relations with her captor,

and

even though those witnesses who testified that she had been pledged were

her witnesses

who

testify concerning her

now

that she was not secluded and that she did not become impure.

And the Sages said to them

to her family:

If you believe

the witnesses

that she was given as a pledge, believe

them also

that she was not secluded and that she did not become impure, and if you do

not

believe

the witnesses

that she was not secluded and that she did not become impure,

likewise

do not believe that she was given as a pledge.

This is the conclusion of the Mishna.

And the Gemara infers:

But

that same incident that occurred in

Ashkelon, which was by means of

[because of a debt]

a monetary debt,

and

nevertheless,

the reason

that the Sages permitted her was because

witnesses testify concerning her; but

if

witnesses do not testify concerning her, no!

And even though she was imprisoned only because of money,

is it not the case that it makes no difference whether she was given as a pledge or whether she was imprisoned

— she is forbidden?! And this is in accordance with Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak, who said that where the hand of Israel is not dominant, she is forbidden even when she was imprisoned because of money.

And we reject this:

No!

In truth, whether in a place where the hand of Israel is dominant or in a place where the hand of Israel is not dominant, if she was imprisoned because of money, she is permitted to her husband. But

being given as a pledge is different,

since if the time for repayment of the debt passes, she belongs to the gentile; we are concerned lest she declared herself ownerless and had relations with him.

There are those who cast it as a difficulty —

some taught the Mishna in Eduyot as a difficulty against our Mishna, and not in connection with Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak:

We learned

in our Mishna: “A woman who was imprisoned by gentiles

because of money is permitted to her husband.”

And we raise a difficulty:

And can one juxtapose it [with another source]?

For we learned in tractate Eduyot:

“Rabbi Yosei testified, etc.”

as above.

And the Gemara infers:

But

that same incident that occurred in

Ashkelon, which was by means of

[because of a debt]

money, and

nevertheless,

it teaches the reason

that the Sages permitted her: because

witnesses testify concerning her; but

if

witnesses do not testify concerning her, no!

And even though she was imprisoned only because of money, whereas in our Mishna we learned that when she was imprisoned because of money she is permitted even without witnesses?

And he answered: Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak said —

It is not difficult! Here

that is, in our Mishna, where we learned that when she was imprisoned because of a monetary debt she is permitted, it is speaking of a case

where the hand of Israel is dominant over the gentiles,

and they fear losing their money if they treat her improperly. And

here

that is, in the Mishna in Eduyot, where we learned that she is never permitted except through witnesses, it is speaking of a case

where the hand of the gentiles is dominant over themselves,

and they do not fear treating her as ownerless, and we are concerned lest she had relations with one of them.

We learned in the Mishna that a woman who was imprisoned

because of capital charges is forbidden

to her husband.

And we are uncertain: in what case are we concerned that she will have relations with her captor? For ordinarily, apparently there is no reason to be concerned that she will be violated, since the government is strict that they not treat them as ownerless?

Rav said: For example, the wives of thieves,

whose husbands were sentenced to death by hanging, and it is the practice of the government to declare their houses and wives ownerless; therefore we are concerned that they had relations.

And Levi said: For example, the wife of

Elazar

ben Dunai,

who was a murderer. Specifically in such a case it is the practice to declare his wife ownerless, but it is not the practice to declare the wives of thieves ownerless.

Hezekiah said:

Rav and Levi disagree only

when their husbands’ judgment was completed

for

execution,

but if their judgment had not yet been completed for execution, according to both Rav and Levi it is not the practice to declare them ownerless.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even though their judgment had not been completed for execution,

it is the practice to declare their wives ownerless.

Mishna:

A city that a siege-camp captured

[that is, it was captured after they had previously laid siege to it] and it is the practice of the soldiers of the conquering army to violate the women of the city they captured; therefore

all

the

women of priestly lineage who were found within it are disqualified

from the priesthood and are forbidden to their priest husbands, because a woman who was violated is forbidden to a priest.

And if they have witnesses

that they did not become impure,

even

if those witnesses are only

a slave

or

even a maidservant, these are trustworthy.

Because with regard to a captive woman, they were lenient, permitting her even through disqualified witnesses .

And no person is trustworthy

to permit the captive woman

by himself,

that is, for his own sake, in order to marry her.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that in a city captured by a siege-camp, all the women of priestly lineage within it are forbidden, because we are concerned that they were violated by the conquerors.

And we raise a difficulty:

And can one juxtapose it [with another source]?

For did we not learn in tractate Avoda Zara, regarding forbidden wine, that a military search party,

a boleshet,

[they are called “boleshet” because they search and investigate after hidden treasures. Rashi],

that came to a city,

if they came

in a time of peace,

that is, they are not presently occupied with war and have leisure to do in the city as they wish, then

barrels

of wine that were in the city at that time, if

open

they are —

forbidden!

Perhaps the gentiles touched them and poured them as libations. But if

sealed

they are —

permitted!

For certainly they did not touch them.

But if they came

in a time of war —

both these and those

that is, both open and sealed —

are permitted! For they have no

leisure

to pour libations.

This is the conclusion of the Mishna.

In any event, we learned that during wartime we are not concerned that they poured the wine as libations, because they do not have leisure to pour libations. And it might enter your mind that the same law applies, that the gentiles have no leisure to violate during wartime; if so, this is difficult from our Mishna, which did not distinguish in the matter and forbade the women even during wartime?

And we answer:

Rav Mari said —

there is leisure to have relations,

because their inclination overpowers them, and therefore our Mishna forbade all the women who were in the city. But

to pour libations

during wartime

there is no leisure,

and therefore they permitted the wine.

The Gemara gave another answer:

Rabbi Yitzchak bar Elazar said in the name of Hezekiah —

here

in the Mishna in Avoda Zara, which declared the wine fit during wartime, it is speaking

of a siege-camp belonging to that kingdom,

which does not wish to destroy the city conquered by it, so that it will be a tribute-paying city for them; therefore they do not declare the property of that city ownerless and do not pour the wine as libations.

But

here

in our Mishna, which forbade all the women of that city, it is speaking

of a siege-camp belonging to another kingdom,

which does not fear harming the city conquered by it; therefore all the women who were in that city are forbidden .

And we raise a difficulty: even

a siege-camp belonging to that kingdom as well,

why did we permit their wine? For

it is impossible that not one of them fled,

and poured the wine as a libation?

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel —

the Mishna of tractate Avoda Zara is speaking

when the guard posts see one another,

and guard that they not harm the people of the city.

And we raise a difficulty: still,

it is impossible that none of them doze off

[one of the guard posts dozed]

a little,

and during that time one of them fled and poured the wine as a libation? And we answer:

Rabbi Levi said —

for example, when he surrounds the city

[they surrounded the city] with

chains

[chains]

and

with

a dog, and

with

branches and geese

[sticks and small branches that create obstacles], in order to guard that they not harm the people of the city; therefore we declared the wine fit .

Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said: They disagree about it

concerning this answer of the Gemara, “Here, with a siege-camp belonging to that kingdom, etc.” —

Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’a and the Rabbis.

One said:

like the Gemara’s answer —

“Here, with a siege-camp belonging to that kingdom; here, with a siege-camp belonging to another kingdom,” and it is not difficult for him at all,

that is, it was not difficult for him as above, “It is impossible that not one of them fled,” because he held that we are not concerned that they will pour libations or have relations, since the matter is not ownerless.

And one, all these matters are difficult for him,

the difficulties that we raised above,

and he answered

as we answered above —

for example, when he surrounds the city with chains, a dog, branches, and geese.

The Gemara returns to discuss the laws of the Mishna:

Rabbi Idi bar Avin said in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak bar Ashyan: If there is there

in that city captured by a siege-camp

one hiding place

where all the women of that city can hide

it saves

all the women of priestly lineage,

even though it is not plausible that all the women managed to hide, nevertheless we attribute it to the lenient side and permit them.

He raised a question

[he was uncertain]

Rabbi Yirmeya: if that hiding place

does not

accommodate

within it

anything but

one

woman, what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say

with regard to

each one and one

of the women that perhaps

this is the one

who hid in that hiding place, and we will permit all the women as a matter of uncertainty?

Or perhaps we do not say this?

And

we considered it:

What is different from

that which we learned in tractate Tohorot — behold, there were before him

two paths, one impure

which contained graves,

and one pure.

And it was not known to us which was the impure path and which was the pure one.

And he walked on one of them,

and he is in a state of uncertain impurity.

And

afterward

he made pure items

[that is, he touched pure items].

And his fellow came, and walked on

the

second path, and made

he too

pure items.

And now we are uncertain whether those pure items that they touched became impure .

Rabbi Yehuda says: If this one was asked

in the court concerning his pure items

by himself, and this one by himself, they are pure.

Since each one is maintained in a presumption of purity .

But if they came to be asked in the court

both

together,

concerning their pure items —

impure,

because it is impossible to maintain them in their presumptions where there are two matters that contradict one another, for if the first is pure, the second is certainly impure, and vice versa; therefore, because of the uncertainty, we render both impure .

Rabbi Yosei says: Whether in this manner or in that manner,

whether they came together or whether they came one after the other —

they are impure.

And Rava said, and some say,

said

Rabbi Yohanan:

Do not interpret the Mishna according to its plain meaning; rather, this is its interpretation: when they came to be asked in the court concerning their pure items

at one time, everyone agrees

both Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda —

they are impure.

And likewise, if they came to be asked

one after the other, everyone agrees —

they are pure.

And

they disagreed

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei

only when one came to ask concerning himself and concerning his fellow ;

one, namely Rabbi Yosei,

compares it to

their coming to be asked

at one time. And one,

namely Rabbi Yehuda,

compares

it to their coming one after the other.

This is the Mishna in Tohorot and its explanation.

In any event, the Gemara proves:

And here too

in our case, where there was a hiding place sufficient for only one woman,

since

through the merit of that hiding place

we permit all of them

the women who were in that city,

it is like

their coming

at one time,

and there are two matters that contradict one another, and it is impossible to permit them , for certainly they were not all in that hiding place.

And we reject this:

Can it be so now [

This is what you say now ] ?!

Surely one must distinguish and say that

there,

concerning the two paths,

there is certainly impurity

near one of them; therefore, when they came simultaneously, they may not be permitted, because it constitutes two contradictory matters. But

here,

in the case of the captive woman,

who can say that she became impure?

And therefore the Sages were lenient with her.

The Gemara further raised a doubt concerning the law of a captive woman:

Rav Ashi asked—

a city in which there was a hiding place, and

she said—

the captive woman: “It is true that

I did not hide, and

likewise

I did not become impure. What is the law,

is she trusted or not?