Ketubot 27a (כז.) — the Talmud in English

Nevertheless

it

teaches

in the Mishna that specifically where

she was pledged,

meaning, she was taken as security willingly, she requires witnesses that she did not become impure, since once the repayment period passes, she belongs to the gentile, and therefore we are concerned that perhaps she rendered herself ownerless and had relations with him.

And we infer: “She was pledged” —

Yes!

But when she was

imprisoned

against her will —

No!

because the gentile is concerned about treating her as ownerless, lest he lose his money.

This presents a difficulty for Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak, who said that where Jewish authority is not dominant, we are concerned that even a woman imprisoned against her will perhaps had relations.

And we answer:

Actually, the same law applies even

when she was

imprisoned,

and this follows the opinion of Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak: where gentile authority is dominant, she is forbidden.

And

as for our difficulty from the Mishna in Eduyyot, which used the expression “she was pledged” and not “she was imprisoned”: this is not a precise inference, because

that is how the incident occurred,

but the same law applies to a woman who was imprisoned as well: witnesses are required to permit her.

Some say

that there are those who taught Rava’s statement as support for Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak, and not as a difficulty against him:

Rava said: We too have learned this in a Mishna,

meaning, I too found a Mishna in accordance with the words of Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak—for we learned in tractate Eduyyot that

Rabbi Yosei the Priest and Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav testified concerning a Jewish woman who had been pledged

[taken as security for a debt]

in Ashkelon, and her family distanced her

out of concern that she had been violated by her captors,

and

even though the same witnesses who testified that she had been pledged were

her witnesses

who

testified concerning her

now

that she had not been secluded and had not become impure.

And the Sages said to them

to her family:

If you believe

the witnesses

who testified that she was pledged, believe

them as well

that she had not been secluded and had not become impure; but if

you

do not believe

the witnesses

that she had not been secluded and had not become impure,

then likewise

do not believe that she was pledged.

This concludes the Mishna.

And the Gemara infers:

But

that same incident that occurred in

Ashkelon, which was due to

[a debt]

money,

and

nevertheless,

the reason

that the Sages permitted her was since

witnesses testify concerning her; but

if

witnesses do not testify concerning her, no!

And even though she was imprisoned only because of money,

is it not the case that it makes no difference whether she was pledged or whether she was imprisoned

and she is forbidden?! And this is in accordance with Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak, who said that where Jewish authority is not dominant, she is forbidden even when she was imprisoned because of money.

And we reject this:

No!

Actually, both where Jewish authority is dominant and where Jewish authority is not dominant, if she was imprisoned because of money she is permitted to her husband. However,

being pledged is different,

since if the repayment period passes, she belongs to the gentile, and we are concerned that perhaps she rendered herself ownerless and had relations with him.

There is another version that raises it as a difficulty

in which the Mishna in Eduyyot was taught as a difficulty against our Mishna, and not in connection with Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak:

We learned

in our Mishna: “A woman who was imprisoned by gentiles

because of money is permitted to her husband.”

And we raise a contradiction:

But this contradicts what was taught,

for did we not learn in tractate Eduyyot:

“Rabbi Yosei testified, etc.”

as stated above?

And the Gemara infers:

But

that same incident that occurred in

Ashkelon, which was due to

[because of a debt]

money, and

nevertheless,

it teaches the reason

that the Sages permitted her was since

witnesses testify concerning her; but

if

witnesses do not testify concerning her, no!

And even though she was imprisoned only because of money, whereas in our Mishna we learned that when she was imprisoned because of money she is permitted even without witnesses?

And he answered: Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said—

It is not difficult! Here

meaning, in our Mishna, where we learned that when she was imprisoned because of a monetary debt she is permitted, the case is

where Jewish authority is dominant over the gentiles,

and they fear losing their money if they treat her improperly. And

here

meaning, in the Mishna in Eduyyot, where we learned that she is never permitted except through witnesses, the case is

where gentile authority is dominant over itself,

and they do not fear treating her as ownerless; therefore, we are concerned that perhaps she had relations with one of them.

We learned in the Mishna that a woman who was imprisoned

because of a capital charge is forbidden

to her husband.

And we are uncertain: In what case are we concerned that she will have relations with her captor? For ordinarily, seemingly, there is no concern that she will have relations, since the government is particular that they not treat the women as ownerless?

Rav said: For example, the wives of thieves,

whose husbands were sentenced to death by hanging, and it is the practice of the government to declare their property and wives ownerless; therefore, we are concerned that they had relations.

And Levi said: For example, the wife of

Elazar

ben Dunai,

who was a murderer. Specifically in such a case it is the practice to declare his wife ownerless, but it is not the practice to declare the wives of thieves ownerless.

Ḥizkiyya said:

Rav and Levi disagree only

when their husbands’ verdict

had been finalized

for execution,

but if their verdicts had not yet been finalized for execution, according to both Rav and Levi it is not the practice to declare them ownerless.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Even though their verdicts had not yet been finalized for execution,

it is the practice to declare their wives ownerless.

Mishna:

A city captured by an army

[that is, it was captured after having previously been besieged], and it is the practice of the soldiers of the conquering army to violate the women of the city they captured; therefore

all

the

women of priestly lineage who were found inside it are disqualified

from the priesthood and are forbidden to their priest husbands, because a woman who was violated is forbidden to a priest.

And if they have witnesses

that they did not become impure,

even

if those witnesses are only

a slave

or

even a maidservant, they are deemed credible.

This is because the Sages were lenient with regard to a captive woman, permitting her even on the basis of disqualified witnesses.

And no person is deemed credible

to permit the captive woman

through himself,

meaning, for his own sake, in order to marry her.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna that if an army captured a city, all the women of priestly lineage within it are forbidden, because we are concerned that they were violated by the conquerors.

And we raise a contradiction:

But this contradicts what was taught,

for did we not learn in tractate Avoda Zara, with regard to wine used for libation, that when an army of

scouts

[called boleshet because they scout and search for hidden treasures; Rashi]

comes to a city,

if they came

in peacetime,

meaning, they are not currently preoccupied with war and have time to do in the city as they please, then

barrels

of wine that were in the city at that time, if

open

they are,

are forbidden!

Perhaps the gentiles touched them and poured libation into them. But if they are

sealed,

then

they are permitted!

For they certainly did not touch them.

But if they came

in wartime,

both these and those

meaning, both open and sealed barrels—

are permitted, since they have no

time

to pour libation.

This concludes the Mishna.

In any event, we learned that in wartime we are not concerned that they poured libation into the wine, since they do not have time to pour libation. And it might have entered our minds that the same law applies, and the gentiles do not have time to have relations during wartime. If so, our Mishna presents a difficulty, as it did not distinguish in this matter and forbade the women even during wartime?

And we answer:

Rav Mari said:

They have time to have relations,

because their inclination overpowers them; therefore, our Mishna forbade all the women who were in the city. However,

to pour libation

during wartime,

they have no time,

and therefore they permitted the wine.

The Gemara offered another resolution:

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Elazar said in the name of Ḥizkiyya:

Here

in the Mishna in Avoda Zara, which deemed the wine fit during wartime, the case is

an army of that same kingdom,

whose soldiers do not wish to destroy the city they have conquered, so that it will pay them a tax. Therefore, they do not declare the property of that city ownerless and do not pour libation into its wine.

But

here

in our Mishna, which forbade all the women of that city, the case is

an army of another kingdom,

whose soldiers are not concerned about harming the city they have conquered; therefore, all the women who were in that city are forbidden.

And we raise a difficulty: Even an army

of the same kingdom as well,

why did we permit their wine? After all,

it is impossible that not one of them escaped

and poured libation into the wine.

And we answer:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

The Mishna in tractate Avoda Zara is speaking

when the guards of each army can see one another,

and they guard against harming the people of the city.

And we raise a difficulty: Still,

it is impossible that one of them did not doze off

[one of the guard units dozed]

a little,

and during that time one of the others escaped and poured libation into the wine? And we answer:

Rabbi Levi said:

For example, when he surrounded the city

[they surrounded the city] with

chains

[chains]

and

with

dogs, and

with

branches and geese

[sticks and splinters that create obstacles], in order to prevent harm to the people of the city; therefore, we deemed the wine fit.

Rabbi Abba bar Zavda said: They disagree about it

with regard to this resolution of the Gemara, “Here, an army of the same kingdom, etc.”—

Rabbi Yehuda Nesi’a and the Sages.

One said:

The Gemara’s resolution is correct:

“Here, an army of the same kingdom; here, an army of another kingdom,” and he found no difficulty in it whatsoever,

meaning, he did not find the difficulty stated above—“It is impossible that not one of them escaped”—because he held that we are not concerned that someone will pour libation or have relations, since the situation is not one of abandonment.

And the other found all these matters difficult,

the difficulties raised above,

and answered

as we answered above:

For example, when he surrounded the city with chains, dogs, branches, and geese.

The Gemara returns to discuss the laws of the Mishna:

Rav Idi bar Avin said that Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Ashian said: If there is

in that city captured by an army

one hiding place

large enough for all the women of that city to hide there, it

saves

all the women of priestly lineage,

even though it is unlikely that all the women managed to hide there; nevertheless, we judge them leniently and permit them.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised

[was uncertain]

a dilemma:

If that hiding place

can accommodate

within it

only

one woman,

what is the law?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say

with regard to

each and every one

of the women that perhaps

this is the one

who hid in that hiding place, and we will therefore permit all the women because of the uncertainty?

Or perhaps we do not say so?

And

we discussed it:

What is different from

what we learned in tractate Tohorot: If there were before a person

two paths, one impure

containing graves

and one pure.

And we do not know which path is the impure one and which is the pure one.

And he walked on one of them,

and he is consequently subject to uncertain ritual impurity.

And

afterward he

prepared ritually pure items

[that is, he touched ritually pure items].

And his fellow came and walked on

the

second path, and prepared

ritually pure items

as well.

And now we are uncertain whether the ritually pure items that they touched became impure.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If this one was asked

in court about his ritually pure items

by himself, and that one by himself, they are pure.

Since each one is maintained in his presumptive status of ritual purity.

But if they came to be questioned in court

both

together,

about their ritually pure items, they are

impure,

because it is impossible to maintain their presumptive status where there are two contradictory presumptions: If the first is pure, the second is certainly impure, and vice versa; therefore, because of the uncertainty, both are rendered impure.

Rabbi Yosei says: In either case,

whether they came together or whether they came one after the other, they are

impure.

And Rava said—and some say,

Rabbi

Yoḥanan

said: Do not interpret the Mishna according to its plain meaning. Rather, this is its interpretation: When they came to be questioned in court about their ritually pure items

simultaneously, everyone agrees

both Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Yehuda—that they are

impure.

And likewise, if they came to be questioned

one after the other, everyone agrees

they are pure.

And

they disagree

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei

only when one comes to ask about himself and about his fellow .

One, namely Rabbi Yosei,

likens it to

their having come to be questioned

simultaneously. And the other,

namely Rabbi Yehuda,

likens

it to their having come one after the other.

This concludes the Mishna in Tohorot and its interpretation.

In any event, the Gemara proves:

Here too,

in our case, where there was a hiding place that could accommodate only one woman,

since

because of that hiding place

they permit all of them

the women who were in that city,

it is like

their having come

simultaneously,

and there are two contradictory presumptions, so it is impossible to permit them , since certainly they were not all in that one hiding place.

And we reject this:

How can you say that now [

that is what you are saying now] ?!

Surely one must distinguish and say that

there

regarding the two paths,

there is certainly impurity

at one of them. Therefore, when they came simultaneously, they cannot be permitted, since that would constitute two contradictory testimonies. But

here

in the case of the captive woman,

who says that she became impure?

Therefore, the Sages were lenient with regard to her.

The Gemara further raised a doubt concerning the law of a captive woman:

Rav Ashi asked—

a city in which there was a hiding place, and

the captive woman said:

“It is true that

I did not hide, and

likewise

I did not become impure.” What is the law—

is she deemed credible or not?