Ketubot 26b (כו:) — the Talmud in English

And we raised him [

to the status of a kohen] on the basis of that witness .

And

afterward

two witnesses came and said: “He is the son of a divorced woman or the son of a ḥalutza,” and we demoted him [

we again removed him from the status of a kohen] ,

and

again

one witness came and said: “I know that he is a kohen,”

And according to everyone,

that is, both Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon agree that the last witness who validated him and the first witness who validated him

join together as

a single

testimony,

and therefore there are two witnesses who disqualify him and two witnesses who validate him. We should consequently have left him with his presumption of fitness and validated him for the priesthood.

And here they disagree

about the matter

of concern for the devaluation of the court

—Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon.

The first tanna [

namely, Rabbi Eliezer]

holds: Since we demoted him [

we removed him from the priesthood on the basis of the two witnesses], again

we do not promote him

to the priesthood, because

we are concerned about the devaluation of the court,

meaning, people will come to disparage the court because they see that it has twice retracted its rulings. —Rashi .

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: We demoted him

by means of the first witnesses,

and we promote him

by means of the later witnesses. And although these are two witnesses against two witnesses, we establish him according to his presumption of fitness.

Even though a rumor had emerged about him to disqualify him, nevertheless, since we had already promoted him beyond the force of that rumor by means of one witness, the rumor is no longer considered an objection, and we establish him according to his presumption of fitness. Rashi .

And we are not concerned for the devaluation of the court!

According to this resolution, the meaning of the Mishna’s statement, “Rabbi Elazar said: When is this so? In a place where there are no objectors. But in a place where there are objectors, one does not promote him to the priesthood on the basis of one witness,” is that even if this witness joins with another witness to validate him, he is not believed, because we are concerned for the devaluation of the court.

Rav Ashi challenged

this resolution of the Gemara:

If so,

that they disagree about whether we are concerned for the devaluation of the court,

even

if

two

come initially

and two

come later,

also

their dispute should apply. Why, then, did Rabbi Elazar say that in a place where there are objectors, one does not promote him to the priesthood on the basis of one witness? Surely one should not promote him even on the basis of two witnesses, because we are concerned for the devaluation of the court!

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

Actually, we establish our Mishna as explained above: a rumor emerged about him to disqualify him, one witness testified to validate him, two came and disqualified him, and then one witness came again to validate him. According to everyone, we are not concerned for the devaluation of the court; rather, they disagree

about

the matter of whether the witnesses

join together as testimony.

And in this

they disagree:

Rabbi Elazar holds that the last witness who came to validate him does not join together with the first witness. Therefore, when two witnesses came to disqualify him, he can again ascend to the priesthood only on the basis of two witnesses, even if one witness had already preceded them to validate him, because the last witness and the first witness do not join together.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that their testimony does join together. Therefore, even when two witnesses came to disqualify him, the testimony of the last witness is effective to validate him, because it joins with the testimony of the first witness.

And

this dispute depends

on the dispute of

the following

tannaitic authorities, as it was taught:

in a beraita: Two people who came to testify concerning a monetary liability,

their testimony does not join together until both of them see the loan at the same time,

the lending of the money. But if one says, “In my presence so-and-so lent money to so-and-so,” and the other says, “It is true that I did not see the lending, but in my presence so-and-so admitted that he owed money to so-and-so,” their testimony does not join together to extract money on the basis of their testimony. These are the words of the first tanna.

However,

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa said: Even

if they came to testify

one after the other

and did not see the testimony together, their testimony joins together and money may be extracted on its basis.

And

the tannaitic authorities likewise disagree concerning the time of presenting the testimony. The first tanna holds:

Their testimony is not established in court until both testify together,

but if one came and testified, and afterward another came and testified, their testimony does not join together.

However,

Rabbi Natan says: We hear the words of this one today, and when his fellow comes tomorrow, we hear his words.

And Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yehuda likewise disagree in this dispute. Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the first tanna, and therefore we do not accept the testimony of the last witness until two witnesses come to validate him.

However, Rabbi Yehuda holds in accordance with Rabbi Natan, and therefore their testimony joins together, and he is promoted to the priesthood on the basis of the testimony of the last witness.

Mishna:

A woman who was imprisoned

in a prison

by gentiles because of [

on account of] a monetary debt

is permitted to her husband.

Even if he is a kohen, we are not concerned that she may have submitted to or been raped by one of her captors, since they do not treat her licentiously, so that they will be able to recover their money.

But if she was imprisoned

because of capital charges [

meaning that she was sentenced to death],

she is forbidden to her husband,

even if he is an Israelite, to whom a raped woman is not forbidden. Nevertheless, this woman is forbidden, because they treat her licentiously, and we are concerned that she may have willingly submitted to one of them; and a woman who has intercourse willingly becomes forbidden to her husband .

Gemara:

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said that Rav said:

Regarding what we learned in the Mishna, that a woman imprisoned because of a monetary debt is permitted to her husband,

they taught

that she is permitted

only

when

the hand of Israel is dominant over the gentiles,

and they fear losing their money if they treat her improperly.

But

if

the hand of the gentiles is dominant over themselves, even

when she was imprisoned

because of a monetary debt, she is forbidden to her husband.

Since they do not fear treating her improperly.

Rava raised an objection [

he challenged]

to

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak: Did we not learn in tractate Eduyot that

Rabbi Yosei the kohen and Rabbi Zekharya ben HaKatzav testified concerning an Israelite woman who had been taken as a pledge [

taken as collateral for a debt]

in Ashkelon, and the members of her

family distanced her

out of concern that she had been violated by the captor,

and

even though those witnesses who testified that she had been taken as collateral were

her witnesses

who

were testifying for her

now

that she had not been secluded and had not become impure.

And the Sages said to them,

to the members of her family:

If you believe

the witnesses

who testified that she had been taken as collateral, believe

them as well

that she had not been secluded and had not become impure; and if you do not believe

the witnesses

who testified that she had not been secluded and had not become impure,

likewise

do not believe that she had been taken as collateral .

This concludes the Mishna.

And the Gemara infers:

But Ashkelon—where the hand of the gentiles is dominant over themselves—

for Ashkelon is in the land of the Philistines, and, furthermore, Israel had already been exiled from its land. Rashi.