Ketubot 23b — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

Two women

about whom two witnesses testified

that they had been captured

among the idolaters,

this one says: I was captured ,

and I am pure, for I was not possessed by my captor.

And this one says: I was captured, and I am pure—they are not believed,

and they are forbidden to a kohen because of the concern that [they are] a zona, because they imposed stringency with regard to lineage, so that although we have to establish them with the presumption of fitness, that they were not possessed by a gentile, the Sages forbade them.

And when they testify concerning one another

that they were not possessed by their captor,

these are believed,

since with regard to a captive woman they were lenient, permitting her on the basis of one witness, even a slave or a woman. And although there is concern about reciprocal benefit—that is, perhaps they agreed among themselves that each would testify concerning the other—nevertheless, the Mishna teaches us that we do not have this concern.

Gemara:

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

Two women who were captured, and one of them came to the court and said—

I am impure,

for I was possessed by my captor,

and my companion is pure—she is believed

to prohibit herself to a kohen and to permit her companion.

And if she said—

I am pure, and my companion is impure, she is not believed,

either to permit herself to a kohen or to prohibit her companion to a kohen.

She said—

I and my companion are impure; she is believed concerning herself,

to prohibit herself to a kohen,

but she is not believed concerning her companion,

to become forbidden to a kohen on the basis of her word.

And if she said—

I and my companion are pure; she is believed concerning her companion

to permit her to a kohen,

but she is not believed concerning herself,

to permit her to marry a kohen.

The Gemara explains the beraita:

The master said—

“I am pure and my companion is impure—she is not believed.”

What are the circumstances in which she is not believed either to permit herself to a kohen or to prohibit her companion?

If there are no witnesses

that they were captured,

concerning herself,

to permit her to a kohen,

why is she not believed?

But

she said: I was captured, and I am pure,

and she is believed, because the mouth that prohibited—that is, the woman who said “I was captured”—is the mouth that permitted, for she said, “I am pure.”

Rather, it is obvious that

this statement that she is not believed applies only where

there are witnesses

that they were captured, for then there is no “mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” since we know that she was captured on the basis of the witnesses.

The Gemara objects: If it is speaking where there are witnesses that they were captured—

Consider the middle clause

of the beraita—

“I and my companion are impure; she is believed concerning herself but is not believed concerning her companion.” And if

it is speaking

where there are witnesses

that they were captured,

why is she not believed

concerning her companion, to say that she became impure? After all, there are witnesses that she was captured.

Rather, it is obvious that

this statement that she is not believed concerning her companion, to say that she is impure, applies only where

there are no witnesses

that they were captured, for it is impossible to render her companion impure on the basis of her testimony alone.

The Gemara objects: If it is speaking where there are no witnesses that they were captured—

Consider the final clause

of the beraita—

“I and my companion are pure; she is believed concerning her companion but is not believed concerning herself.” And if

it is speaking

where there are no witnesses

that they were captured, to purify

herself, why is she not believed?

For we know that she was captured only on the basis of her word, and the mouth that prohibited and said “I was captured” is the mouth that permitted and said “I am pure.”

Rather, it is obvious that

the final clause of the beraita, in which she is not believed to purify herself, is speaking where

there are witnesses

that they were captured. In that case she is not believed to purify herself because of “the mouth that prohibited,” since we know that she was captured from the testimony of the witnesses.

The Gemara objects:

The first clause and the final clause are where there are witnesses,

whereas

the middle clause is where there are no witnesses?

But it is difficult to establish the beraita in two different circumstances.

Abaye said: Yes!

We must force ourselves to establish the beraita so that

the first clause and the final clause

speak where

there are witnesses

that they were captured, and therefore she is not believed concerning herself;

the middle clause

speaks where

there are no witnesses,

and therefore she is not believed to render her companion impure.

Rav Pappa said:

The entire beraita,

all of it,

speaks where

there are witnesses

that they were captured,

and there is one witness who reverses

what she said.

This is the explanation of the beraita:

The first clause of the first part—

“She said: I am impure and my companion is pure”—

speaks when

one witness came and said to her—

“You are pure and your companion is impure.”

She

is believed in what she said, “I am impure,” even against the witness, since

she made herself a forbidden object.

And even

her companion is permitted

to a kohen

on the basis of her word,

since with regard to a captive woman they were lenient, permitting her even on the basis of a slave or a woman. And although there is one witness who contradicts her, nevertheless, since the Sages believed one witness only to permit, her testimony is considered like the testimony of two witnesses, and the statement of the one witness who contradicts her does not count against testimony that is considered like that of two witnesses. The final clause of the first part—

“I am pure and my companion is impure”

speaks when

one witness came and said to her—

“You are impure and your companion is pure.”

She

who said, “I am pure”—

since there are witnesses

that she was captured,

she has no power

to permit herself, since there is no “mouth that prohibited,” for we know that she was captured on the basis of the witnesses.

But

her companion is permitted on the basis of the word of one witness

who says that she is pure, as was explained above, that with regard to a captive woman they were lenient, permitting her on the basis of one witness, even when the woman contradicts him.

The first clause of the final part—

“I and my companion are impure”

speaks when

one witness came and said to her—

“You and your companion are pure.”

She

who said, “I am impure,”

made herself a forbidden object,

and she is believed, even though there is a witness who purifies her.

But

her companion is permitted on the basis of the word of one witness

who purifies her, as was explained above.

And the Gemara asks—

this

first clause of the final part,

why do I need it further?

But surely the two laws learned in the first clause of the final part—(a) the law that she makes herself a forbidden object, and (b) the law that a woman is permitted on the basis of one witness—

are the first clause,

for from the first clause of the first part we learn the law that she makes herself a forbidden object, and from the final clause of the first part we learn the law that a woman is permitted on the basis of one witness.

And the Gemara answers:

It might have been said

that without the novelty of the first clause of the final part, one might have said that where she said, “I and my companion are impure,” in truth

both of them are pure, and the reason that she said this

that they became impure is

“Let my soul die with the Philistines”—this is what she was doing,

and if she were to return and say, “I am pure,” she would be believed, despite the fact that previously she had made herself a forbidden object, since she gives an explanation for her words: she said this in order to render her companion impure. Therefore

it teaches us

the Mishna that even so she is not believed after she has made herself a forbidden object.

The Gemara continues to explain the beraita according to Rav Pappa: the final clause of the final part—she said

“I and my companion are pure,”

and it speaks when

one witness came and said to her: “You and your companion are impure.”

She

is not believed to purify herself—

since there are witnesses

that she was captured,

she has no power

to purify herself. But

her companion is permitted on the basis of her word,

for she said that she is pure.

The Gemara asks—

this

final clause of the final part,

why do I need it further?

After all, this law that we learn in the final clause—that a woman is believed to purify her companion—

is the first clause of the first part,

where she is believed to say, “My companion is pure.”

The Gemara answers:

It might have been said

that

when she is believed

to purify her companion, that is specifically

where she disqualifies herself

and says, “I am impure,”

but where she renders herself fit

and says, “I and my companion are pure,”

say that she is not believed,

because we are concerned about reciprocal benefit, lest each one wishes to purify the other;

it teaches us

the final clause that we do not have this concern.

Mishna:

And likewise, two men

who came to a city, and their lineage is not known to us,

this one says: I am a kohen

and am entitled to eat teruma,

and this one says: I am a kohen—they are not believed

to give them teruma .

And when they testify concerning one another,

and each one says, “My companion is a kohen”— \-

these are believed,

and it is permitted to give them teruma, for they raise a person to priestly status on the basis of one witness with regard to eating teruma.

Rabbi Judah says: They do not raise a person to priestly status

even merely for eating teruma

on the basis of one witness,

even where there is no concern about reciprocal benefit, such as where the witness is a priest of established lineage and does not require his companion’s testimony; and all the more so in our Mishna, where there is concern about reciprocal benefit. His reason will be explained in the Gemara.

Rabbi Elazar said: When

he is not believed—

where there are challengers—

that is, two witnesses who say that he is disqualified for the priesthood;

but where there are no challengers

and there is also no concern about reciprocal benefit, whereas according to the first tanna he is believed even in such a case, where there is a concern about reciprocal benefit—

they raise a person to priestly status on the basis of one witness.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Ha-Sagan: They raise a person to priestly status on the basis of one witness,

and in the Gemara it will be explained what difference there is between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, Rabbi Elazar, and the first tanna.

Gemara:

Behold, from the beginning of our chapter the tanna taught us in several Mishnayot the law of “the mouth that prohibited”:

a. (page 15b) “Rabbi Yehoshua concedes concerning one who says to his fellow, ‘This field belonged to your father, and I purchased it from him,’ that he is believed, because the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

b. (page 18b) “The witnesses who said, ‘This is our handwriting, but we were compelled,’ and so forth—these are believed.”

c. (page 22a) “The woman who said, ‘I was a married woman, and I am divorced,’ is believed, because the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

d. “She said, ‘I was captured, and I am pure’—she is believed.”

e. (page 23b) “Two women who were captured: this one says, ‘I was captured, and I am pure,’ and so forth—they are not believed,” because they do not have “the mouth that prohibited.”

f. “And likewise, two men, and so forth—they are not believed,” because they do not have “the mouth that prohibited.”

The Gemara asks—

all these

Mishnayot, in which the tanna taught us the laws of “the mouth that prohibited,”

why do I need them?

The Gemara answers:

They are necessary!

Because

if the tanna taught

only the Mishna at the beginning of our chapter—

“Rabbi Yehoshua concedes

concerning one who says to his fellow, ‘This field belonged to your father, and I purchased it from him,’ that he is believed, because the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted”—I would have said that it is specifically there that he is believed

because there is

a monetary connection,

that is, a monetary loss for the speaker; therefore, when he began to say, “This field belonged to your father,” he certainly intended to complete his statement and say, “And I purchased it from him,” for he does not wish to cause himself a loss.

But witnesses,

that is, the Mishna of “the witnesses who said, ‘This is our handwriting, but we were compelled, we were minors, we were disqualified witnesses’—these are believed,” because the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted—without that Mishna I would have said that they are not believed because

there is no monetary connection,

that is, no monetary loss, and

say that they did not

intend to complete their statement; when they said, “This is our handwriting,” they did not intend to complete it and say, “But we were compelled,” and therefore, after the document has already been validated, they are no longer believed to invalidate it. For this the tanna of the Mishna teaches us that they are believed.

And if the tanna taught

only the Mishna concerning

witnesses

who said, “This is our handwriting,” I would have said that it is specifically there that they are believed

because they testify to others,

and therefore they certainly would not return and say, “But we were compelled,” unless their intention had been to testify this way from the outset;

but he,

that is, the Mishna of “Rabbi Yehoshua concedes,”

concerning himself

he testifies,