Ketubot 23b (כג:) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

Two women

concerning whom two witnesses testified

that they had been taken captive

among the gentiles,

this one says: I was taken captive

and I am pure, as I was not violated by my captor.

And this one says: I was taken captive, and I am pure; they are not deemed credible,

and they are forbidden to a priest due to the concern that they are prostitutes. This is because the Sages were stringent with regard to lineage, for although we should establish them with a presumption of fitness, that they were not violated by a gentile, the Sages nevertheless prohibited them.

But when they testify on behalf of one another

that they were not violated by their captor,

these women are deemed credible,

since, with regard to a captive woman, the Sages were lenient and permitted her on the basis of the testimony of even one witness, including a slave or a woman. And although there is concern that they are reciprocating the favor—that perhaps they agreed between themselves that each would testify on behalf of the other—the Mishna teaches us that we do not harbor this concern.

Gemara:

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

Two women were taken captive, and one of them came to the court and said:

I am impure,

as I was violated by my captor,

and my companion is pure; she is deemed credible

to prohibit herself to a priest and to permit her companion to a priest.

And if she said:

I am pure, and my companion is impure, she is not deemed credible,

either to permit herself to a priest or to prohibit her companion to a priest.

If she said:

I and my companion are impure, she is deemed credible with regard to herself,

to prohibit herself to a priest,

but she is not deemed credible with regard to her companion,

to prohibit her companion to a priest on the basis of her statement.

And if she said:

I and my companion are pure, she is deemed credible with regard to her companion

to permit her to a priest,

but she is not deemed credible with regard to herself,

to permit herself to marry a priest.

The Gemara explains the beraita:

The Master said:

“I am pure and my companion is impure; she is not deemed credible.”

What are the circumstances in which she is not deemed credible either to permit herself to a priest or to prohibit her companion?

If there are no witnesses

that they were taken captive,

with regard to herself,

to permit her to a priest,

why is she not deemed credible?

But

she said: I was taken captive, and I am pure,

and she is deemed credible because “the mouth that prohibited”—namely, the woman who said, “I was taken captive”—is the mouth that permitted, since she also said, “I am pure.”

Rather, it is obvious that

the statement that she is not deemed credible applies only where

there are witnesses

that they were taken captive. In that case, “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted” does not apply, since we know that she was taken captive on the basis of the witnesses.

The Gemara raises an objection: If the beraita is speaking where there are witnesses that they were taken captive—

Come and hear the middle clause

of the beraita:

“I and my companion are impure; she is deemed credible with regard to herself but is not deemed credible with regard to her companion.” And if

it is speaking

where there are witnesses

that they were taken captive,

why is she not deemed credible

with regard to her companion, to say that she became impure? After all, there are witnesses that she was taken captive.

Rather, it is obvious that

the statement that she is not deemed credible with regard to her companion, to say that she is impure, applies only where

there are no witnesses

that they were taken captive. It is impossible to declare her companion impure on the basis of her testimony alone.

The Gemara raises an objection: If the beraita is speaking where there are no witnesses that they were taken captive—

Come and hear the latter clause

of the beraita:

“I and my companion are pure; she is deemed credible with regard to her companion but is not deemed credible with regard to herself.” And if

it is speaking

where there are no witnesses

that they were taken captive, to declare

herself pure, why is she not deemed credible?

After all, we know that she was taken captive only on the basis of her statement, and the mouth that prohibited—saying, “I was taken captive”—is the mouth that permitted, saying, “I am pure.”

Rather, it is obvious that

the latter clause of the beraita, which states that she is not deemed credible to declare herself pure, is speaking where

there are witnesses

that they were taken captive. In that case she is not deemed credible to declare herself pure on the basis of “the mouth that prohibited,” since we know that she was taken captive from the testimony of the witnesses.

The Gemara objects:

The first and latter clauses are where there are witnesses,

whereas

the middle clause is where there are no witnesses?

It is difficult to establish the beraita in two different circumstances.

Abaye said: Yes!

We must strain to establish the beraita as follows:

The first and latter clauses

apply where

there are witnesses

that they were taken captive, and therefore she is not deemed credible with regard to herself;

the middle clause

applies where

there are no witnesses,

and therefore she is not deemed credible to declare her companion impure.

Rav Pappa said:

The entire beraita,

in its entirety,

applies where

there are witnesses

that they were taken captive,

and there is one witness who contradicts

what she said.

This is the explanation of the beraita:

The first clause of the first part:

“She said: I am impure and my companion is pure,”

and it is speaking where

one witness came and said to her:

You are pure and your companion is impure.

She

is deemed credible in saying, “I am impure,” even against the witness, since

she rendered herself a piece of forbidden matter.

And even

her companion is permitted

to a priest

on the basis of her statement,

since, with regard to a captive woman, the Sages were lenient and permitted her on the basis of even a slave or a woman, and although there is one witness who contradicts her, nevertheless, since the Sages deemed one witness credible only for the purpose of permitting her, her testimony is considered equivalent to that of two witnesses, and the statement of the one witness who contradicts her cannot prevail against testimony considered equivalent to that of two witnesses. The latter clause of the first part:

“I am pure and my companion is impure,”

and it is speaking where

one witness came and said to her:

You are impure and your companion is pure.

She,

who said, “I am pure”—

since there are witnesses

that she was taken captive,

she has no authority

to permit herself, since “the mouth that prohibited” does not apply here, as we know that she was taken captive on the basis of the witnesses.

But

her companion is permitted on the basis of the statement of the

one witness who says that she is pure, as was explained above: with regard to a captive woman, the Sages were lenient and permitted her on the basis of one witness, even when the woman contradicts him.

The first clause of the latter part:

“I and my companion are impure,”

and it is speaking where

one witness came and said to her:

You and your companion are pure.

She,

who said, “I am impure,”

rendered herself a piece of forbidden matter,

and she is deemed credible, even though there is a witness who declares her pure.

But

her companion is permitted on the basis of the statement of the

one witness who declares her pure, as was explained above.

The Gemara asks:

This

first clause of the latter part—

why do I need it again?

After all, the two laws learned from the first clause of the latter part—one, the law that she renders herself a piece of forbidden matter, and two, the law that a woman is permitted on the basis of one witness—

are already taught in the first clause.

From the first clause of the first part we learn the law that she renders herself a piece of forbidden matter, and from the latter clause of the first part we learn the law that a woman is permitted on the basis of one witness.

The Gemara answers:

Lest you say

that without the novelty of the first clause of the latter part, one might have said that when she said, “I and my companion are impure,” in truth

both of them are pure, and the reason she said this

that they became impure is that

she acted according to the verse, ‘Let my soul die with the Philistines,’

and if she later says, “I am pure,” she should be deemed credible, despite having previously rendered herself a piece of forbidden matter, since she provides a rationale for her earlier statement: She said it in order to declare her companion impure. Therefore,

it teaches us

the Mishna that even so she is not deemed credible after rendering herself a piece of forbidden matter.

The Gemara continues to explain the beraita according to Rav Pappa’s opinion—the latter clause of the latter part, where she said

“I and my companion are pure,”

and it is speaking where

one witness came and said to her: You and your companion are impure.

She

is not deemed credible to declare herself pure—

since there are witnesses

that she was taken captive,

she has no authority

to declare herself pure. But

her companion is permitted on the basis of her statement,

since she said that her companion is pure.

The Gemara asks:

This

latter clause of the latter part—

why do I need it again?

After all, this law, which we derive from the latter clause—that a woman is deemed credible to declare her companion pure—

is already taught in the first clause of the first part,

where she is deemed credible to say, “My companion is pure.”

The Gemara answers:

Lest you say

that

when she is deemed credible

to declare her companion pure, this is specifically

when she disqualifies herself

and says, “I am impure,”

but when she validates herself

and says, “I and my companion are pure,”

say that she is not deemed credible,

because we are concerned that they are reciprocating the favor, and perhaps each one wishes to declare the other pure.

It teaches us

in the latter clause that we do not harbor this concern.

Mishna:

And likewise, two men

who came to a city, and their lineage is not known to us:

this one says: I am a priest

and am entitled to eat teruma,

and that one says: I am a priest; they are not deemed credible

to give them teruma.

But when they testify on behalf of one another,

and each one says, “My companion is a priest”—

they are deemed credible,

and it is permitted to give them teruma, since one elevates a person to priestly status on the basis of one witness with regard to eating teruma.

Rabbi Yehuda says: One does not elevate a person to priestly status

even merely for eating teruma

on the basis of one witness,

and this applies even where there is no concern of reciprocal testimony, such as where the witness is a priest of established lineage and does not require his companion’s testimony; all the more so in our Mishna, where there is concern of reciprocal testimony. His reasoning will be explained in the Gemara.

Rabbi Elazar said: When

is he not deemed credible?

Where there are challengers

—that is, two witnesses who say that he is unfit for the priesthood.

But where there are no challengers

and there is also no concern of reciprocal testimony—for according to the first tanna he is deemed credible even in a case where there is such a concern—

one elevates a person to priestly status on the basis of one witness.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben HaSegan: One elevates a person to priestly status on the basis of one witness,

and the Gemara will explain what difference there is between the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and those of Rabbi Elazar and the first tanna.

Gemara:

From the beginning of this chapter, the tanna taught us in several mishnayot the law of “the mouth that prohibited”:

a. (15b) “Rabbi Yehoshua concedes with regard to one who says to another: ‘This field belonged to your father, and I purchased it from him,’ that he is deemed credible, because the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

b. (18b) “The witnesses who said: ‘This is our handwriting, but we were forced,’ and so forth, are deemed credible.”

c. (22a) “The woman who said: ‘I was a married woman, and I am divorced,’ is deemed credible, because the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

d. “She said: ‘I was taken captive, and I am pure’; she is deemed credible.”

e. (23b) “Two women were taken captive; this one says: ‘I was taken captive, and I am pure,’ and so forth; they are not deemed credible,” because they do not have “the mouth that prohibited.”

f. “And likewise, two men, and so forth; they are not deemed credible,” because they do not have “the mouth that prohibited.”

The Gemara raises an objection:

All these

mishnayot, in which the tanna taught us the laws of “the mouth that prohibited,”

why do I need them?

The Gemara answers:

They are all necessary!

Because

if the tanna had taught

only the Mishna at the beginning of the chapter:

“Rabbi Yehoshua concedes

with regard to one who says to another: ‘This field belonged to your father, and I purchased it from him,’ that he is deemed credible, because the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” I would have said that he is deemed credible specifically there

because there is

a monetary bearing,

that is, a monetary loss for the one making the statement. Therefore, when he began by saying, “This field belonged to your father,” he certainly intended to complete his statement by saying, “and I purchased it from him,” since he does not wish to cause himself a loss.

But with regard to witnesses,

that is, the Mishna stating, “The witnesses who said: ‘This is our handwriting, but we were forced, we were minors, or we were disqualified from bearing witness—these are deemed credible,’” because the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted, had the Mishna not taught this, I would have said that they are not deemed credible because

there is no monetary bearing,

that is, no monetary loss, and

perhaps they did not

intend to complete their statement. When they said, “This is our handwriting,” they did not intend to complete the statement by saying, “but we were forced.” Therefore, once the document had already been validated, they would no longer be deemed credible to invalidate it. The tanna of the Mishna therefore teaches us that they are deemed credible.

And if the tanna had taught

only the Mishna concerning the

witnesses

who said, “This is our handwriting,” I would have said that they are deemed credible specifically there

because they testify on behalf of others,

and therefore they certainly would not have gone back and said, “but we were forced,” unless their intention from the outset had been to testify in this manner.

But he,

that is, the case in the Mishna of “Rabbi Yehoshua concedes,”

testifies on his own behalf,

he testifies for himself,