Ketubot 24a — the Talmud in English

No, say:

he intended to say “and I bought it from him” at the outset, and only after he said, “This field belonged to your father,” and saw that he was losing for himself, did he add and say, “and I bought it from him.” Were it not for the Mishna, I would have said that he is not trustworthy concerning this; therefore the tanna of the Mishna teaches us that he is trustworthy.

And had it taught us these two,

the Mishna of “Rabbi Yehoshua concedes,” and the Mishna of “the witnesses who said, ‘This is our handwriting,’” I would have said that only there do we say, “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,”

because

with regard to

money

they are testifying,

but

the Mishna of “the woman who said,

‘I was a married woman’

and I am divorced,”

since

with regard to

a prohibition

she is testifying—

say no,

she is not believed. It teaches us through the Mishna that even with regard to a prohibition we say, “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

And we raise a difficulty in the Gemara: Still, the Mishna of

“I was taken captive, and I am pure”

(above, 22a),

why do I need it?

For the tanna did not teach us any novel point in this Mishna concerning the law of “the mouth that prohibited.”

And we answer: The reason he taught this Mishna is

because he needed to teach

in the latter clause

“And if witnesses came after she was married, she need not leave.”

And we raise a difficulty: In the Gemara above (23a), Rav Oshaya and Rabba bar Avin disputed whether the final clause of the latter clause—“If witnesses came after she was married, she need not leave”—refers to the beginning of the latter clause—“And if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says, ‘I am pure,’ she is not believed”—or perhaps it refers to the beginning of the Mishna—“The woman who said, ‘I was a married woman and I am divorced,’ is believed,” and concerning this we say that if there are witnesses, she need not leave.

And if so—

this works according to the one who interprets it

as meaning that “And if she married and afterward witnesses came, she need not leave”

refers to the latter clause,

“And if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, she is not believed”—then it is possible to say that this is the novel point of the Mishna.

But according to the one who interprets it

as meaning that “And if she married and afterward witnesses came, she need not leave”

refers to the beginning

of “the woman who said, ‘I was a married woman and I am divorced,’”

what is there to say?

Why did the tanna need to teach us the latter clause, that she is believed to say, “I was taken captive, and I am pure,” for he already taught us the law of “the mouth that prohibited”?

And we answer: He taught us this law of “I was taken captive, and I am pure”—

because he needed to teach

(above, 23b) the Mishna of

“Two women who were taken captive

one says, ‘I was taken captive, and I am pure,’ and the other says, ‘I was taken captive, and I am pure’—they are not believed.”

And we inquire concerning it:

And

this Mishna itself, of

“Two women who were taken captive”—why do I need it?

What novel point did the tanna teach us concerning them? And we answer: He taught us the Mishna of “Two women who were taken captive” because of the latter clause, “And when they testify concerning one another, they are believed”—

lest you say, let us be concerned for collusion,

perhaps they contrived to declare one of their companions pure;

it teaches us that we are not concerned.

And we raise a difficulty: Still, our Mishna—

“And likewise, two men,

this one says, ‘I am a priest,’ and so on”—

why do I need it?

And we answer: He taught this Mishna

because he needed to teach the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis

whether one is elevated to priestly status on the basis of one witness.

The Sages taught

in a beraita:

Two who came to the court, and their lineage was not known to us, and one of them said—

“I am a priest, and my companion is a priest!”

He is trustworthy to feed him teruma

on the basis of his testimony, and the Rabbis maintain that we are not concerned for collusion; the reason will be explained below in our discussion.

But he is not trustworthy to marry him to a woman

of established lineage, for perhaps he is a mamzer; and they adopted a higher standard concerning lineage, so as not to marry a man to a woman until they investigate him to determine that he is not a mamzer.

Until there are three

men, such as Reuven, Shimon, and Levi;

two,

such as Reuven and Shimon,

testify concerning this one,

namely, Levi;

and two,

such as Shimon and Levi,

testify concerning this one,

namely, Reuven.

Rabbi Yehuda says: He is not even trustworthy

—the one witness—

to feed him teruma until there are three

men, as above:

two testify concerning this one, and two testify concerning this one.

And we examine and discuss in order to explain their dispute:

Does this mean

that the reason

of Rabbi Yehuda

is that even with regard to teruma he is not trustworthy except on the basis of two witnesses, because he

is concerned for collusion,

that is, perhaps they contrived among themselves for each one to testify concerning his companion?

And the Rabbis,

who disagree with him and hold that each one is trustworthy to testify concerning his companion—their reason is that they

are not concerned for collusion.

And we reject this:

But

it is impossible to say this, for

the opposite

we learn from them:

the Rabbis are concerned for collusion, while Rabbi Yehuda is not concerned for collusion.

And where do we learn this from them?

For we learned

in tractate Demai:

“The donkey-drivers

[wine sellers]

who entered the city

to sell their wine,

and one of them said: ‘My

wine is

new,

and it has not yet dried completely,

and my companion’s

wine is

old

and has dried completely,

mine is not prepared

[tithed]

and my companion’s is prepared

[tithed]’”—even though he praises his companion’s wine and disparages his own wine,

he is not trustworthy.

Since he is an ignoramus and is suspect concerning tithes, and even though he testifies concerning his own that it is not prepared, and furthermore adds words praising his companion’s wine, he is not trustworthy to establish his companion’s wine as presumed prepared, for we are concerned that perhaps they are scheming—“You say it here, and I will say it elsewhere.”

Rabbi Yehuda says: He is trustworthy

to establish his companion’s wine as presumed tithed, because we are not concerned for collusion.

And if so, there is a difficulty from Rabbi Yehuda against Rabbi Yehuda: in the Mishna he is concerned for collusion, whereas concerning Demai he is not concerned for collusion. And likewise from the Rabbis against the Rabbis: in the Mishna they are not concerned for collusion, whereas concerning Demai they are concerned for collusion.

And we resolve:

Rav Adda bar Ahava said that Rav said—

because of this difficulty we must say that

the position is reversed,

and it is Rabbi Yehuda who is not concerned for collusion, while the Rabbis are concerned for collusion.

But

Abaye said—

in fact, do not reverse

the positions, and in general Rabbi Yehuda is concerned for collusion.

And concerning what is difficult for you—why, regarding Demai, is Rabbi Yehuda not concerned for collusion? Your answer is that

with regard to Demai they were lenient

and were not concerned for collusion because

most ignoramuses tithe,

and because of a remote concern—perhaps he is among the minority who do not tithe, and perhaps they intended collusion—we are not concerned to prohibit the produce.

Rava said

to Abaye: Is it only

Rabbi Yehuda against Rabbi Yehuda

that is difficult

for you, while

the Rabbis against the Rabbis are not difficult

for you, so that you were compelled to explain only Rabbi Yehuda’s words and not the words of the Rabbis?!

Rather, Rabbi Yehuda against Rabbi Yehuda is not difficult, as we answered,

for with regard to Demai they were lenient.

And also,

the Rabbis against the Rabbis are not difficult,

for in fact the Rabbis are not concerned for collusion.

And concerning what is difficult for you—why, with regard to Demai, are the Rabbis concerned for collusion? Your answer is that we are compelled to establish the Mishna

in accordance with what Rabbi Hama bar Ukva said

concerning another matter, that he established a Mishna

with

a craftsman

whose tools of his craft are in his hand,

and below in our discussion it will be explained concerning what Rabbi Hama bar Ukva said this.