Ketubot 23a — the Talmud in English

And we object:

What is different in the first clause

that if she married, she does not leave, and

what is different in the final clause

that if she married, she must leave?

And we answer:

Abaye said: Interpret it,

[establish the beraita]

with one witness.

And this is the explanation of the beraita: In the first clause—if

one witness says—

“She became betrothed,” and one witness says—

“She did not become betrothed,”

since

both of them testify concerning an unmarried woman,

and according to both of them she was unmarried before she became betrothed,

and this

witness

who says—

“She became betrothed,” he is

one witness,

and the words of one

witness

are not

heard

in the presence of two.

And therefore, if she married, she does not leave.

But in the

final clause—

if

one witness says—

“She was divorced,” and one witness says—

“She was not divorced,”

since

both of them testify concerning a married woman,

and according to both of them she was a married woman before her divorce,

and this

witness

who says—

“She was divorced,” he is

one witness,

and the words of one

witness

are not

heard

in the presence of two. And therefore, if she married, she must leave.

Therefore, if she married, she must leave him.

The Gemara gave another answer:

Rav Ashi said: It is always possible

to establish the beraita in a case of

two against two, and

we shall answer the Gemara’s question, what is different in the first clause and what is different in the final clause, by saying:

Reverse it!

[Let us reverse the words of the beraita]: In the first clause we shall write, “And if she married, she must leave,” and in the final clause, “And if she married, she does not leave.”

And this is the explanation of the beraita: In the first clause—if

two say—

“We saw that she became betrothed,” and two say—

“We did not see that she became betrothed,” she may not marry, and if she married—

she must leave!

Since we rely on the witnesses who said that she became betrothed, because the witnesses opposite them do not contradict them, but merely say that they did not see her become betrothed; and “we did not see” is not evidence.

And we object:

It is obvious

that we believe the first witnesses! Since what the second witnesses said—

“We did not see her,” is not evidence.

What, then, does the beraita teach us by its words?

And we answer:

It is necessary, for

the beraita is dealing with the case where

the second witnesses dwell

—the second witnesses

in one courtyard

with the woman.

It might have entered your mind—

were it not for the words of the beraita—that

if it is so that she became betrothed,

then

there is public rumor concerning the matter,

and surely her neighbors would know of it; and if they said, “We did not see her become betrothed,” this would be evidence that she did not become betrothed.

It teaches us

the beraita

that people do perform betrothals privately,

and therefore, when they said, “We did not see her,” this is not evidence that she did not become betrothed, and we rely on the first witnesses who said, “She became betrothed”; and if she married afterward, she must leave!

The Gemara continues to explain the beraita according to Rav Ashi: In the

final clause

of the beraita—if

two say—

“We saw that she was divorced,” and two say—

“We did not see that she was divorced,” she may not marry, and if she married—

she does not leave.

Since what they said, “We did not see her,” is not evidence that she was indeed not divorced; perhaps she was divorced privately, and they did not see it.

And we object:

What does it teach us

in the final clause? Surely it is obvious that “we did not see” is not evidence?

And if you say that the final clause teaches us

even though the second witnesses dwell

—the second witnesses

in one courtyard

with the woman, and it might have entered our mind that if they did not see her being divorced, this would be evidence that she indeed was not divorced, the final clause teaches us that “we did not see” is not evidence.

But this law

is the same thing

that we learned in the first clause; why did the beraita return to teach us this law a second time?

And we answer: The beraita taught us this law a second time because

it might have entered your mind

that specifically

with regard to betrothal it is

said that “we did not see” is not evidence, since

people do perform betrothals privately. But with regard to divorce, if it is so that she was divorced, there is public rumor concerning the matter,

and if her neighbors did not hear that she was divorced, this is evidence that she was not divorced.

It teaches us

in the final clause

that people do perform betrothals and divorces privately,

and there is no evidence from the fact that they did not hear about her divorce.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And if, after she married, witnesses came

—she

does not leave,” and so forth:

The Gemara was uncertain: With regard to which part of the Mishna was this law stated?

Rabbi Oshaya teaches it—

with regard to the first clause

of the Mishna: “The woman who said, ‘I am a married woman and I am divorced,’ she is believed ... and if there are witnesses that she was a married woman ... she is not believed”; and concerning this we say that if witnesses came after she married, she does not leave.

Rabba bar Avin teaches it with regard to the final clause

of the Mishna: “She said, ‘I was taken captive, and I am pure,’ she is believed ... and if there are witnesses that she was taken captive ... she is not believed”; and concerning this we say that if witnesses came after she married, she does not leave.

And the Gemara explains their dispute:

The one who teaches it with regard to the first clause,

namely Rabbi Oshaya,

all the more so

holds that it applies also

to the final clause,

with regard to a captive woman, that if witnesses came after she married, she does not leave, since

with regard to a captive woman they were lenient.

And the one who teaches it with regard to the final clause,

namely Rabba bar Avin, holds specifically in the final clause that if witnesses came after she married, she does not leave, since they were lenient with regard to a captive woman.

But with regard to the first clause,

where she said, “I was a married woman and I am divorced,”

no!

And even if she married, she must leave.

And we consider it:

Shall we say that Rabbi Oshaya and Rabba

—Rabbi Oshaya and Rabba—

are disputing

the

law of Rav Hamnuna,

who said, “The woman who says to her husband, ‘You divorced me,’ is believed,”

and they disagree?

For the one who teaches it with regard to the first clause,

and holds that even a woman who says, “I was a married woman and I am divorced,” does not leave if witnesses came after she married,

has

the

law

of

Rav Hamnuna,

and therefore she is believed to say that he divorced her, and she does not leave.

And the one who teaches it with regard to the final clause,

but with regard to the first clause holds that even if witnesses came after she married, she must leave,

does not have

the

law

of

Rav Hamnuna,

and since she is not believed to say, “You divorced me,” even if she married, she must leave.

And we reject this:

No! Everyone has

the

law

of

Rav Hamnuna,

that the woman who says to her husband, “You divorced me,” is believed, because a woman does not have the boldness to speak insolently in her husband’s presence.

And here they disagree about this: One

[namely Rabba bar Avin]

holds—

when Rav Hamnuna’s statement was made,

specifically when she said, “You divorced me”

in his presence,

and only then is she believed, since she does not have the boldness to speak insolently in her husband’s presence.

But

in our case, where she says, “You divorced me”

not in his presence, she has the boldness

to lie, and she is not believed. And therefore, even after she married, she must leave!

And one

[namely Rabbi Oshaya]

holds that Rav Hamnuna’s law applies even

that Rav Hamnuna’s law applies even

not in his presence.

Since even not in his presence

she does not have the boldness

to lie. And therefore, if she said, “You divorced me,” she is believed.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And if, after she married, witnesses came,” and so forth:

Shmuel’s father said:

This that we say, “after she married”—

not that she actually married. Rather, once they permitted her to marry, even though she did not marry

in any event, even if witnesses come afterward, she may marry.

And we object:

But it teaches, “she does not leave,”

which implies specifically that when she is married, she does not leave; but if she has not yet married, she may not marry?

And we answer: This that we say

“she does not leave,”

does not specifically mean when she married; rather, the meaning is that she does not leave

her first permission,

and even if she has not yet married and they merely permitted her to marry, she is permitted to marry initially, even if witnesses have now come.

The Sages taught

in a beraita: The woman who

said—

“I was taken captive, and I am pure, and I have witnesses that I am pure.” We do not say—

“Let us wait until the witnesses come

and then permit her”;

rather, they permit her immediately.

And if

they permitted her to marry, and afterward

those

witnesses came and said—

“We did not know,” she does not leave.

And if witnesses of impurity came,

[namely, witnesses that she had intercourse with her captor]—

even

if

she has several sons, she must leave.

There was an incident:

These captive women who came to Nehardea.

[Those captive women who came to Nehardea so that they would redeem them],

Shmuel’s father stationed guards with them,

[Shmuel’s father stationed guards over them so that they would not become impure through their captors until they redeemed them].

Shmuel said to him:

What benefit did your guarding provide,

and

after all,

until now,

before they came to Nehardea,

who guarded them?

Perhaps they had intercourse even earlier?

He said to him,

his father:

“If they had been your daughters, would you have been so contemptuous of them?!”

[If these had been your daughters, would you have been so contemptuous of them], not to do everything within your ability to guard them even for a short time?!

And we say that

it was

[these] the words of Shmuel’s father, who said to his son, “If your daughters had been taken captive”—

like an inadvertent utterance that issues from before the ruler,

[that is, like a curse that issued from the mouth of a righteous man inadvertently, which comes even without cause].

And

as a result,

the daughters of Master Shmuel were taken captive, and they were brought up to the Land of Israel.

[Shmuel’s daughters were taken captive, and they brought them up to the Land of Israel so that they would redeem them].

And when the daughters came to be redeemed,

they stationed their captors outside, and entered the house of study of Rabbi Hanina.

[They stationed their captors outside and entered Rabbi Hanina’s house of study], so that they would know that they had been taken captive only through their own statements, and they would be able to purify themselves and say, “I was taken captive and I am pure,” by the principle of “the mouth that prohibited.”

This one said—

“I was taken captive and I am pure,” and this one said—

“I was taken captive and I am pure,” and he permitted them

Rabbi Hanina, because of “the mouth that prohibited.”

In the

end, the captors entered.

[The captors entered the house of study, and the daughters’ stratagem was revealed].

Rabbi Hanina said: “They are daughters of a master who gives rulings!”

[Surely they are the daughters of a great man, who knew how to perform this stratagem in order to purify themselves].

And indeed,

it became clear that they were the daughters of Master Shmuel.

Rabbi Hanina said to Rav Shemen bar Abba,

who was a koen and was Shmuel’s relative,

“Go and become involved with your relatives!”

[Go and marry one of these daughters, for we have purified them].

He said to him,

Rav Shemen

to Rabbi Hanina:

How can I marry them,

and

after all, there has been a public report that

there are witnesses

that they were taken captive

in the overseas country, and the principle of “the mouth that prohibited” no longer applies; they will be forbidden to marry a koen, and their children will be disqualified?

and the principle that the mouth that prohibited something is the mouth that permits it no longer applies? They would be forbidden to marry a kohein, and their children would have disqualified status.

Rabbi Hanina said to him: Since

at present, at any rate, they are not before us,

there is no concern lest they come afterward; and what,

are witnesses beside the north wind, and she will become forbidden?!

[That is, witnesses are beside the north, and she will become forbidden?! This is an expression meaning that we do not have concern for this].

And we object:

The reason

that Rabbi Hanina permitted him to marry his relatives is

that witnesses have not come

yet;

but

if

witnesses come

that she was taken captive,

she becomes forbidden.

And

after all,

Shmuel’s father said

above that she need not actually marry, but

once they permitted her to marry, even though she did not marry,

she remains with her first permission. Here, after all, we have already permitted Shmuel’s daughters; and if so, even if witnesses come, we should leave them with their permission?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: The inference that if witnesses come the daughters become forbidden was stated

with regard to

witnesses of impurity,

and in this Shmuel’s father agrees that even if she married, she must leave.