Ketubot 23a (כג.) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge this:

What is different in the first clause

that if she married, she need not leave him,

and what is different in the latter clause

that if she married, she must leave him ?

And we answer:

Abaye said: Explain it

[establish the beraita]

as referring to one witness.

And this is the explanation of the beraita: In the first clause, if

one witness says

“She became betrothed,” and one witness says

“She did not become betrothed,”

since

both of them testify that she was unmarried,

and according to both of them she was unmarried before the betrothal ,

this

witness

who says

“She became betrothed” is

a single witness,

and the statement of one

witness

is not

accepted

in the presence of two.

Therefore, if she married, she need not leave him .

But in the

latter clause

if

one witness says

“She was divorced,” and one witness says

“She was not divorced,”

since

both of them testify that she was a married woman,

and according to both of them she was a married woman before her divorce ,

this

witness

who says

“She was divorced” is

a single witness,

and the statement of one

witness

is not

accepted

in the presence of two.

Therefore, if she married, she must leave him.

The Gemara offers another answer:

Rav Ashi said: Actually

it is possible to establish the beraita as referring to

two pairs of witnesses, and

we can answer the Gemara’s question, what is different in the first clause and what is different in the latter clause, by

reversing it!

[We should reverse the statements of the beraita:] In the first clause we should write: “And if she married, she must leave him,” while in the latter clause: “And if she married, she need not leave him.”

And this is the explanation of the beraita: In the first clause, if

two say

“We saw that she became betrothed,” and two say

“We did not see that she became betrothed,” she may not marry, but if she married,

she must leave him!

This is because we rely on the witnesses who said that she became betrothed. The witnesses opposing them do not contradict them; they merely say that they did not see her become betrothed, and “we did not see” is not evidence.

And we challenge this:

Is it not obvious

that we believe the first witnesses? Since what the second witnesses said—

“We did not see her,” is not evidence.

What, then, does the beraita teach us?

And we answer:

No, it is necessary, for

the beraita is speaking when

the second witnesses lived

the witnesses

in the same courtyard

as the woman.

Lest you say—

were it not for the statement of the beraita—

if it is so that she became betrothed,

then

the matter would have a public reputation,

and certainly her neighbors would have known of it. Therefore, when they say, “We did not see her become betrothed,” this is evidence that she did not become betrothed.

It teaches us

the beraita

that people commonly betroth women in private,

and therefore, when they say, “We did not see her,” this is not evidence that she did not become betrothed. We rely on the first witnesses, who said, “She became betrothed,” and if she then married, she must leave him!

The Gemara continues to explain the beraita according to Rav Ashi: In the

latter clause

of the beraita, if

two say

“We saw that she was divorced,” and two say

“We did not see that she was divorced,” she may not marry, but if she married,

she need not leave him.

This is because what they said, “We did not see her,” is not evidence that she was in fact not divorced; perhaps she was divorced in private, and they did not see it.

And we challenge this:

What does it teach us

in the latter clause? Is it not obvious that “we did not see” is not evidence?

And if you say that the latter clause teaches us

that although the

second witnesses

lived in the same courtyard

as the woman, and we might have thought that if they did not see her divorced, this would be evidence that she was indeed not divorced, the latter clause teaches us that “we did not see” is not evidence—

but this law

is the same

as the one we learned from the first clause. Why did the beraita repeat this law?

And we answer: The beraita taught us this law a second time because

lest you say

specifically

with regard to betrothal it is

that we say “we did not see” is not evidence, since

people commonly betroth women in private. But with regard to divorce, if she was in fact divorced, the matter would have a public reputation,

and if her neighbors had not heard that she was divorced, this would be evidence that she was not divorced.

It teaches us

in the latter clause

that people commonly betroth and divorce women in private,

and the fact that they did not hear about her divorce is not evidence.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And if, after she married, witnesses came

then she

need not leave him,” and so on:

The Gemara was uncertain: To which part of the Mishna does this law refer?

Rabbi Oshaya taught it

with regard to the first clause

of the Mishna: “A woman who says, ‘I was a married woman and I am divorced’ is deemed credible ... but if there are witnesses that she was a married woman ... she is not deemed credible.” And concerning this we say: If, after she married, witnesses came, she need not leave him.

Rabba bar Avin taught it with regard to the latter clause

of the Mishna: “If she said, ‘I was taken captive, and I am pure,’ she is deemed credible ... but if there are witnesses that she was taken captive ... she is not deemed credible.” And concerning this we say: If, after she married, witnesses came, she need not leave him.

The Gemara explains their dispute:

The one who teaches it with regard to the first clause,

namely, Rabbi Oshaya,

all the more so

does he hold that it applies

to the latter clause,

with regard to a captive woman: If witnesses came after she married, she need not leave him, since

the Sages were lenient with regard to a captive woman.

And the one who teaches it with regard to the latter clause,

namely, Rabba bar Avin, holds specifically in the latter clause that if witnesses came after she married, she need not leave him, since the Sages were lenient with regard to a captive woman.

But with regard to the first clause,

where she said, “I was a married woman and I am divorced,”

no!

Even if she married, she must leave him.

And we inquire about this:

Shall we say that Rabbi Oshaya and Rabba

bar Avin

disagree about

the ruling of

Rav Hamnuna,

who said: “A woman who says to her husband, ‘You divorced me,’ is deemed credible,”

and that is the point of their dispute?

For the one who teaches it with regard to the first clause,

and holds that even a woman who says, “I was a married woman and I am divorced,” need not leave him if witnesses came after she married,

holds

the

ruling

of

Rav Hamnuna,

and therefore she is deemed credible when she says that he divorced her, and she need not leave him .

And the one who teaches it with regard to the latter clause,

but with regard to the first clause holds that even if witnesses came after she married, she must leave him,

does not hold

the

ruling

of

Rav Hamnuna,

and since she is not deemed credible when she says, “You divorced me,” even if she married, she must leave him.

And we reject this:

No! Everyone holds

the

ruling

of

Rav Hamnuna,

that a woman who says to her husband, “You divorced me,” is deemed credible, because a woman does not have the audacity to make such a claim in her husband’s presence.

And here they disagree about this: One

[namely, Rabba bar Avin]

holds

that when Rav Hamnuna’s ruling was stated,

it was specifically when she said, “You divorced me,”

in his presence,

and only then is she deemed credible, since she does not have the audacity to make such a claim in her husband’s presence.

But

in our case, where she says, “You divorced me,”

not in his presence, she has the audacity

to lie and is not deemed credible. Therefore, even after she married, she must leave him!

And the other

[namely, Rabbi Oshaya]

holds

that Rav Hamnuna’s ruling applies even

when he is not present.

Since he is not present, she

also does not have the audacity

to lie. Therefore, if she says, “You divorced me,” she is deemed credible.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And if, after she married, witnesses came,” and so on:

The father of Shmuel said:

When we say, “after she married,”

it does not mean that she actually married. Rather, once they permitted her to marry, even though she had not married,

in any event, even if witnesses subsequently come, she may marry.

And we challenge this:

But it teaches, “she need not leave him,”

which implies specifically that when she is married, she need not leave him; but if she has not yet married, she may not marry.

And we answer: When we say

“she need not leave him,”

it does not specifically mean that she has married. Rather, the meaning is that she need not leave

her original permitted status,

and even if she has not yet married and they have merely permitted her to marry, she is permitted to marry ab initio, even if witnesses have now come.

The Sages taught

in a beraita: A woman who

said

“I was taken captive, but I am pure, and I have witnesses that I am pure”—we do not say

“Let us wait until the witnesses come

and then permit her.”

Rather, we permit her immediately.

And if

they permitted her to marry, and afterward

those

witnesses came and said

“We do not know,” she need not leave him.

And if witnesses of impurity came,

[that is, witnesses that she had intercourse with her captors]—

even

if

she has several sons, she must leave him.

There was an incident involving

these captive women who came to Nehardea.

[Those captive women who came to Nehardea so that they could be redeemed.]

The father of Shmuel stationed guards with them,

[Shmuel’s father stationed guards over them so that they would not become impure through their captors until they were redeemed.]

Shmuel said to him:

What benefit have you gained through your guarding them,

for

after all,

until now,

before they came to Nehardea,

who guarded them?

Perhaps they had intercourse with their captors before then.

He said to him,

his father:

“If they had been your daughters, would you have been so dismissive of them?!”

[If these had been your daughters, would you have been so dismissive of them, rather than doing everything within your power to guard them, even for a short time?!]

And we say that

the words

[were] of the father of Shmuel, who said to his son, “If they had been your daughters and had been taken captive”—

“like an inadvertent utterance that issues from before the ruler,”

[that is, like a curse that inadvertently issued from the mouth of a righteous person, which comes to pass even though it was uttered gratuitously].

And

as a result,

the daughters of Mar Shmuel were taken captive, and they were brought up to the Land of Israel.

[Shmuel’s daughters were taken captive and brought up to the Land of Israel so that they could be redeemed.]

And when the daughters came to be redeemed,

they left their captors outside and entered the study hall of Rabbi Ḥanina.

[They left their captors outside and entered Rabbi Ḥanina’s study hall, so that it would not be known that they had been taken captive except on their own testimony, and they could establish their purity by saying, “I was taken captive, but I am pure,” based on the principle of “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permits.”]

This one said

“I was taken captive, but I am pure,” and that one said

“I was taken captive, but I am pure,” and he permitted them to marry

Rabbi Ḥanina, based on the principle of “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permits.”

But

in the end, their captors entered.

[The captors entered the study hall, and the women’s stratagem was exposed.]

Rabbi Ḥanina said: “They are daughters of distinguished people!”

[Surely they are the daughters of a great man, since they knew how to employ this stratagem to establish their purity.]

And indeed,

it became known that they were the daughters of Mar Shmuel.

Rabbi Ḥanina said to Rav Shemen bar Abba,

who was a kohen and a relative of Shmuel,

“Go and attend to your relatives!”

[Go and marry one of these daughters, since we have established their purity.]

He said to him,

Rav Shemen

to Rabbi Ḥanina:

How can I marry them,

for

a report has gone out that

there are witnesses

that they were taken captive

in an overseas country,

and the principle of “the mouth that prohibited” no longer applies; they would be forbidden to marry a kohen, and their children would be disqualified ?

Rabbi Ḥanina said to him: Since

at present, at any rate, they are not before us,

there is no need to be concerned that they may come later. What,

are witnesses in the north, and she should become prohibited?!

[That is, are there witnesses somewhere in the north, and should she become prohibited?! This is an expression meaning that we do not take such a possibility into consideration.]

And we challenge this:

The reason

that Rabbi Ḥanina permitted his relatives to marry is

that witnesses have not come

yet;

but

if

witnesses come

that they were taken captive,

they become prohibited.

But

after all,

the father of Shmuel said above that it is not necessary for her actually to marry; rather,

once they permit her to marry, even if she has not married,

she remains in her original permitted status,

and here, they had already permitted Shmuel’s daughters. If so, even if witnesses come, we should be required to leave them in their permitted status.

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said:

The inference that if witnesses come the daughters will become prohibited was stated with regard to

witnesses of impurity,

and in that case the father of Shmuel agrees that even if she has married, she must leave him .