Ketubot 15b (טו:) — the Talmud in English

And did we not learn:

regarding a city in which Jews and gentiles reside, if

one finds in it

in that city

an abandoned infant

and it is unknown whether this infant is Jewish or gentile, the law is:

If the majority

of the residents of the city

are gentiles,

he is

a gentile.

If the majority

of the residents of the city

are Jews,

he is

Jewish.

And if there is

an equal number

of Jews

and an equal number

of gentiles, he is

Jewish. (

And later the Gemara will explain what difference there is between a majority of Jews and an equal division, since in both cases the law is that he is treated as Jewish; if so, why did the Mishna divide them into two cases?)

And Rav said

in explanation of this Mishna:

They taught

that when there is a majority of Jews he is treated as Jewish

only

with regard to

sustaining him,

as the court is commanded to provide for him, by virtue of the verse: “And your brother shall live with you” (Leviticus 25).

But with regard to

lineage,

he is not

considered Jewish. If the infant found is a girl, she is forbidden to a kohen, even if there is no concern that she is an abandoned child ( for example, her limbs are properly formed and aligned, since had she been an abandoned child her limbs would not have been properly formed. And similarly in the other circumstances cited in tractate Kiddushin 73b), nevertheless, there is concern that she may be the daughter of a gentile. And according to the one who says that a female convert is disqualified from marrying a kohen, even this minor is forbidden to a kohen; and even when there is a majority of Jews, she is disqualified from marrying a kohen).

And Shmuel said

also with regard to the permission

to clear the debris from atop him

on Shabbat in order to save him, even while violating Shabbat, that when there is a majority of Jews in the city, the infant is considered Jewish.

And if so, it is apparent from Rav’s statement that a single majority is not effective with regard to priestly lineage.

And the Gemara says concerning Rabbi Yirmeya’s objection:

It had escaped

Rabbi Yirmeya’s notice

that Rabbi Yehuda said that Rav said

that

at the

time of

the caravans of Tzippori there was

the

incident

of our Mishna. There were two majorities there, and therefore they ruled there in accordance with the majority.

And we raise an objection:

But according to Rav Hanan bar Rava, who said

in the name of Rav,

it was an emergency ruling,

yet according to Rabbi Yehuda, who said in the name of Rav, there were two majorities there. If so, it follows that for future generations it was ruled that two majorities are not required.

And this is difficult

in light of Rav’s statement, “But with regard to lineage, no,” which implies that two majorities are required for future generations.

And we answer:

The one who transmits this statement

of Rav, who said, “But with regard to lineage, no,”

does not transmit that statement

that Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rav, that the incident occurred at the caravans of Tzippori; he holds that there was only a single majority there, and therefore holds that it was an emergency ruling.

The Gemara returns:

We learned above:

one finds an abandoned infant

in a city.

If the majority

of the residents of the city

are gentiles,

he is

a gentile.

If the majority

of the residents of the city

are Jews,

he is

Jewish.

If the residents of the city are

an equal number

of Jews

and an equal number

of gentiles, he is

Jewish.

Rav said: They taught

that he is considered Jewish

only

with regard to

sustaining him, but with regard to

lineage,

he is not.

And Shmuel said: To clear the debris from atop him.

The Gemara understood his intention to be that even with regard to clearing the debris from atop him on Shabbat, one follows the majority in order to validate him as Jewish.

And we raise an objection:

But did Shmuel say this,

that with regard to saving a life a majority is required in order to consider him Jewish and violate Shabbat for his sake?

But Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: In matters of saving a life, one does not follow the majority!

And in a case of uncertainty whether he is gentile or Jewish, one clears the debris from atop him on Shabbat even if the majority are gentiles.

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that

when Shmuel’s statement was cited, it

was stated with regard to the first clause,

as it is taught in the first clause:

If the majority

of the residents of the city

are gentiles,

he is considered

a gentile.

And concerning this

Shmuel said: “To clear the debris from atop him”

on Shabbat

is not so.

For one does not follow the majority in a case involving possible loss of life, and one clears the debris.

And since Shmuel said that one clears the debris from atop him even when the majority of the city’s residents are gentiles, it is apparent that he is not considered a gentile for all purposes. Therefore, we inquire:

If the majority are gentiles, he is a gentile—

for what halakhic purpose?

With regard to what is he considered a gentile?

Rav Pappa said:

With regard to

feeding him non-kosher meat

by hand, he is considered a gentile; and all the more so he is considered a gentile with regard to not being required to return a lost article to him and not being required to pay him damages .

If the majority are Jews,

he is

Jewish—

for what halakhic purpose

What novel point is there in this halakha?

Rav Pappa said:

It teaches that one must

return a lost article to him.

The novel point is that the article is taken from the Jew who found it and is given to this person. There is an additional novel point: the Sages said in Sanhedrin (76b) that one who returns a lost article to a gentile, concerning him the verse states: “To add the satiated to the thirsty—the Lord will not be willing to forgive him.” Nevertheless, in the case of this person, whose uncertain status is supported by a majority, one must return the lost article to him .

An equal number

of Jews and gentiles, he is

Jewish—

for what halakhic purpose?

Reish Lakish said: With regard to damages,

as we learned in the Mishna in Bava Kamma (37b): An ox belonging to a Jew that gored an ox belonging to a gentile is exempt, while an ox belonging to a gentile that gored an ox belonging to a Jew pays full damages, whether it is innocuous or established as dangerous. And an ox belonging to a Jew that gored an ox belonging to a Jew pays half-damages if it is innocuous, and full damages if it is established as dangerous.

And we inquire:

What are the circumstances?

In what manner is he treated as Jewish with regard to damages?

If you say

it is

that our ox gored his ox

—that our Jewish ox gored his ox, which was the damaged animal, and he is treated as Jewish, so that the owner of the damaging ox must pay him half-damages—

then

let him say to him,

the Jewish owner can say to the injured party:

Bring

your

proof that you are Jewish, and take it!

First bring proof that you are Jewish, and only afterward will you receive payment, since the burden of proof rests upon the claimant. For this is a case in which the infant was found in a city divided equally between Jews and gentiles, and it is uncertain whether he is Jewish.

No, it is necessary

that he is considered Jewish with regard to damages in the case

that his ox gored our ox

—his ox gored the ox of a Jew, and the injured party demands full damages from him for an innocuous ox, as is the law with regard to an ox belonging to a gentile that caused damage.

And the tanna teaches us that

half

of the damages he

pays,

in any event: If the damaging party is a gentile, he is liable for full damages, and if he is Jewish, he is liable for half-damages for an innocuous ox.

And for the other half,

the damaging party

said to them,

the injured parties: Since it is uncertain whether I am a gentile and owe you the additional half of the damages, or whether I am Jewish and exempt from it, therefore

bring

you

proof that I am not Jewish, and I will give it to you.

For the injured party is the claimant, and the burden of proof rests upon the claimant.

We have returned to you, tractate Ketubot, chapter “A Virgin Is Married.”

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