Ketubot 16a — the Talmud in English

because

the mouth that prohibited

by saying that it belonged to your father

is the mouth that permitted

by saying, “And I took it from him” .

And if there are witnesses that it belonged to his father, and he says, “I took it from him,” he is not believed,

since we know that it belonged to his father even without his statement.

And therefore he must bring evidence of his acquisition, because concerning land we follow the presumptive ownership of the original owner until the purchaser brings evidence that he purchased it, or until the purchaser has a three-year presumption of possession of the land.

And in the Gemara it will be explained to whom Rabbi Yehoshua agreed.

Gemara:

It is clear from the Mishna that only if there are witnesses that she went out with a bridal canopy and her head uncovered is she believed to say, “I was a virgin,” and that her ketuba is two hundred.

And the Gemara infers:

The reason is that there are witnesses; but

if

there are no witnesses

that she went out with a bridal canopy,

the husband is believed,

and she collects only a ketuba of one hundred, like a widow .

And the Gemara asks: If so,

let us say

that it is stated in our Mishna

an anonymous Mishna not in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,

who said above (page 12b): One who marries a woman and does not find virginity, and the woman claims, “I was raped after you betrothed me, and your field was despoiled, since I was raped while under you, after you had already become obligated to me for a ketuba as a virgin,” while the husband says, “Bring evidence for your words,” because perhaps she was raped before that, and my acquisition was a mistaken transaction—and the claimant must bring evidence.

And Rabban Gamliel said that the woman is believed, because we establish her with the bodily presumption that she was a virgin at the time of betrothal and was penetrated only afterward, and the husband’s field was despoiled. Or because of a migo: she could have said, “I am one whose virginity was broken by wood,” with which claim she does not disqualify herself from the kehuna. And we do not follow the husband’s presumptive ownership of the money.

But according to Rabbi Yehoshua, she is not believed, because the claimant must bring evidence.

And if so, our Mishna, which said that she is believed only through witnesses of the bridal canopy, but without witnesses the husband is believed, and it is clear that we do not establish her with the presumption that she was a virgin at the time of her marriage, is not in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,

for if it were in accordance with Rabban Gamliel, he said that she is believed ,

and here too we should establish her with the presumption of virginity at the time of marriage, and her ketuba should be two hundred .

And we answer:

Even if you say

that our Mishna is like

Rabban Gamliel,

there is no difficulty.

Since

Rabban Gamliel said that only there

she is believed,

but in

a case in which she claims

with certainty

“I was raped after he betrothed me,”

and

he claims

uncertainly,

“Before I betrothed you,” only then do we establish the woman with the presumption of virginity.

But here,

where it is speaking

of

a case in which she claims

with certainty, and

he too claims

with certainty, he did not say

that Rabban Gamliel considers her credible, and he agrees that we establish the money with its presumption .

And

we ask:

“And what did the one who asked it understand—what did he understand by asking it?”

What did the Gemara understand in its question, when it is obvious that this distinction should be made,

“Is this not a case of certain and certain?”

And we answer: In its question, the Gemara understood that

since most women marry as virgins,

her claim is closer to being true than his, and

it is comparable to certain and uncertain,

and I might have said that here too Rabban Gamliel’s position applies, that the woman is believed; it teaches us that here it is different, because in practice he makes a certain claim.

And this too is logically evident

that Rabban Gamliel agrees with our Mishna that the husband is believed.

For it teaches

at the end of the Mishna:

“And Rabbi Yehoshua agrees,”

and we ask: To whom does he agree?

Granted, if you say that it is dealing

at the beginning of the Mishna with a case in which

Rabban Gamliel

also agrees with Rabbi Yehoshua that the husband is believed, then it is possible to say that the Mishna used at its end the expression “And Rabbi Yehoshua agrees” incidentally to its beginning, which also deals

with

a case in which

Rabban Gamliel agrees

with Rabbi Yehoshua, and

the Mishna is properly

explained.

But if you say

that

Rabban Gamliel is not dealing with a case of agreement,

and even in the case of our Mishna he holds that the woman is believed, the end of the Mishna still presents a difficulty: “Rabbi Yehoshua agrees”—

to whom does he agree?

Rather, it is certainly demonstrated as we said: Rabban Gamliel agrees here that the husband is believed.

And we reject this: Rabban Gamliel always disputes the Mishna, and there is no difficulty concerning to whom Rabbi Yehoshua agrees.

For

do you hold

that

Rabbi Yehoshua is standing on

the Mishna of

this chapter,

and concerning this we say, “Rabbi Yehoshua agrees

”? He is standing on the migo! And he is standing on the first chapter!

And the Gemara explains:

To which

does that which we say, “Rabbi Yehoshua agrees,” refer?

If we say,

Rabbi Yehoshua is referring

to this

Mishna that we learned above (page 13): A woman who

was pregnant,

and we do not know by whom she became pregnant.

And they said to her: “What is the nature of this fetus?”

And she said:

“From a certain man, and he is a koen.”

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Elazar say: She is believed,

since we establish her with the presumption of fitness, that she had relations with a fit man.

And

Rabbi Yehoshua says: “We do not live by her mouth!”

Rather, she is presumed to be pregnant by a netin or a mamzer until she brings evidence for her words. This is the Mishna.

And concerning this it says here that Rabbi Yehoshua agrees where he has “the mouth that prohibited,” for we say migo.

It is certainly not the case that Rabbi Yehoshua’s words were said in connection with that Mishna.

For

there—

what migo is there?! Her belly is between her teeth,

and she cannot say, “I did not have relations!”

And the reason she is not believed is not that Rabbi Yehoshua holds that we do not say migo, but because her presumption was weakened when she secluded herself.

Rather,

say that Rabbi Yehoshua’s words were said

concerning this—a woman who

was

seen speaking [the meaning will be explained below]

with one man, and they said to her: “What is the nature of this man?”

с одним человеком, и сказали ей: «Что это за человек?»

And she said:

“A certain man, and he is a koen!”

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is believed,

because of the presumption of fitness.

And

Rabbi Yehoshua says: “We do not live by her mouth!”

Rather, she is presumed to have had relations with a netin or a mamzer until she brings evidence for her words.

And concerning this it says here, “And Rabbi Yehoshua agrees”: where he has credibility because of “the mouth that prohibited,” we say migo even according to Rabbi Yehoshua.

It is certainly not the case that Rabbi Yehoshua’s words were said in connection with that Mishna, for

there, what migo is there?!

This works well according to Zeiri, who said:

What

is the meaning of the expression

“speaking”

that the Mishna stated?

She secluded herself

[with him, but we did not see that she had relations.

Then it is applicable to say that the reason she is believed according to Rabban Gamliel is because of

a migo: had she wished, she could have said, “I did not have relations,” but she says, “I had relations,”

and I had relations with a fit man; therefore

she is believed,

while Rabbi Yehoshua disputes this and says that she is not believed by virtue of a migo. And concerning this we say in the Mishna, “And Rabbi Yehoshua agrees”: where he has “the mouth that prohibited,” he is believed by virtue of a migo even according to Rabbi Yehoshua.

But according to Rav Asi, who said:

“What does ‘speaking’ mean? Having relations! What migo is there?”

They saw that she had relations, and she cannot say, “I did not have relations.”

And if so, the reason for Rabbi Yehoshua is not because he holds that we do not say migo. What relevance is there to saying in our Mishna, “And Rabbi Yehoshua agrees”? After all, Rabbi Yehoshua did not dispute this.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that Rabbi Yehoshua’s words refer

to this

Mishna that we learned above (13a): One who marries a woman and does not find virginity.

She says: “I am one whose virginity was broken by wood,”

before the betrothal,

and he says: “Not so;

rather, you are one penetrated by a man,”

for you had already had relations before the betrothal.

Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is believed!

And Rabbi Yehoshua says: “We do not live by her mouth,”

rather, she is presumed to be one penetrated by a man until she brings evidence for her words.

And concerning this it says that here Rabbi Yehoshua agrees that we say migo.

It is certainly not the case that Rabbi Yehoshua’s words were said in connection with that Mishna, for

there, what migo is there?!

This works well according to Rabbi Elazar, who said

above in the Gemara that the husband and the woman disputed

one hundred and nothing,

and according to the woman’s claim, when she said, “I was one whose virginity was broken by wood before the betrothal,” he owes her only one hundred, since even according to her words she was not a virgin at the time of betrothal; and Rabbi Elazar held that the ketuba of one whose virginity was broken by wood is one hundred.

And according to the husband’s claim, when he says, “You are one penetrated by a man,” he owes her nothing, because it was a mistaken transaction, for Rabbi Elazar held: “He married her with the presumption of virginity and she was found to have had relations—she has no ketuba.”

Then it is applicable to say that the woman has the credibility of

a migo: had she wished, she could have said,

“I am one whose virginity was broken by wood while under you,” and she would have two hundred. But initially she says—

“I was one whose virginity was broken by wood before the betrothal,”

so that she has only one hundred,

and therefore Rabban Gamliel held that she

is believed.

And Rabbi Yehoshua, who disputed him, held that the migo is not effective.

And if so, it is properly applicable to say here, “Rabbi Yehoshua agrees with regard to ‘the mouth that prohibited,’” that it is effective.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan, who said

above in the Gemara that the husband and the woman disputed

two hundred and one hundred,

and according to the woman’s claim, when she said, “I was one whose virginity was broken by wood before the betrothal,” Rabbi Yohanan held that the ketuba of one whose virginity was broken by wood is two hundred, and therefore she claims two hundred from the husband.

And according to the husband’s claim, when he says, “You are one penetrated by a man,” Rabbi Yohanan held that “he married her with the presumption of virginity and she was found to have had relations—her ketuba is one hundred”; and if so, even the husband admits that she has at least one hundred.

And if so,

what migo is there?

After all, she claims two hundred, and it is not applicable to say migo as above?

Rather,

it is certainly necessary to say that Rabbi Yehoshua’s words refer

to this

Mishna that we learned above (12b):

“One who marries a woman and does not find virginity. She says: ‘I was raped after you betrothed me, and your field was despoiled.’ And he says: ‘Not so; rather,”

you were raped

before I betrothed you.”

“Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say: She is believed. And Rabbi Yehoshua says: ‘We do not live by her mouth,’

rather, she is presumed to have had relations before she was betrothed and to have deceived him, until she brings evidence for her words.

For

there the reason Rabban Gamliel considers her believed is because of

a migo: had she wished, she could have said, “I am one whose virginity was broken by wood while under you,” for she does not disqualify herself from the kehuna. But she says, “I was raped,” by which she disqualifies herself from the kehuna. Therefore Rabban Gamliel says that she

is believed. And Rabbi Yehoshua says to Rabban Gamliel

in our Mishna:

“With this migo here,

namely, “the mouth that prohibited,”

I agree with you

that he is believed. But

with that migo there,

namely, when she says, “I was raped after you betrothed me,” by virtue of the migo of “I am one whose virginity was broken by wood,”

I dispute you.”

And this is the explanation of the Mishna, which said, “And Rabbi Yehoshua agrees.”

And we raise an objection:

Since this migo and that migo,

and if so, still

what is different about this migo

that Rabbi Yehoshua concedes,

from this migo

over which he disagrees?

And we answer:

Here

with regard to the field—

there is no “slaughtered ox before you,”

that is to say: had he not said, “This field was your father’s,” we would not have been in doubt at all to whom this field belongs. And our doubt arose only as a result of his words, and therefore he is believed by the migo that, had he wished, he could have remained silent.

But

there

with regard to “after I was betrothed, I was raped”—

there is “a slaughtered ox before you,”

since even without her claim our doubt arose as to when she had intercourse, and she had to make a claim in order for us to believe her words, there is room for concern lest she did not think of the migo claim, or lest she devised this claim in order that we should believe her through the migo; therefore she is not believed.

And the Gemara returns to explain the words of the Mishna, which said that without witnesses of the hinuma, the husband is believed to say that he married her as one who had had intercourse and that her ketuba is one hundred:

And

we raise an objection: Why is he still believed to say, “You were one who had had intercourse,”

since the majority of women marry as virgins, when the witnesses do not come, what difference does it make?

Ravina said: Because it can be said,

although

the majority of women marry as virgins, and a minority as widows,

on the other hand—

every woman who marries as a virgin has a public reputation,