Ketubot 15a (טו.) — the Talmud in English

In the carriages of Sepphoris,

on market day, when groups and caravans from elsewhere came there,

there was

the

incident

of a young girl who was raped as she descended to the spring, as mentioned in our Mishna.

b.

And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ami. For Rabbi Ami said: This applies when a group of fit men was passing there.

If so, there are “two majorities” to establish her fitness, since it is possible to attribute the rapist’s arrival either to the majority of fit men in the group or to the majority of fit men in the city. [

Later the Gemara will explain the difference between “two majorities” and one majority.]

c.

And this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yannai. For Rabbi Yannai said: A girl raped in the carriages is fit to marry into the priesthood.

And the Gemara explains: Is it conceivable that she was raped

in the carriages,

that is, on the carriage?

Can it enter your mind

that she was raped in that manner?

Rather,

the intention of Rabbi Yannai is to say that she was

raped at the time of the carriages,

when the caravans come to the city, for only then is she

fit to marry into the priesthood,

as Rabbi Ami said: “This applies when a group of fit men was passing there.” They can be added to the uncertainty, and it can be attributed to them; consequently, there are “two majorities” to establish her fitness.

But

if

one of the men of Sepphoris separated himself and had intercourse with her,

so that we know with certainty that the rapist came from the city, although Sepphoris is a city whose majority are fit to marry into the priesthood,

the offspring is a “shetuki,”

because Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri does not establish her fitness on the basis of one majority.

The reason he does not establish her fitness on the basis of one majority is:

Like that incident when Rav Dimi came

from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Zeiri,

who

said

this in the name of

Rabbi Ḥanina.

And some say,

there are those who say that Rav Dimi was not mentioned in this matter; rather,

Zeiri said that Rabbi Ḥanina said: One follows the majority of the city

to establish her fitness,

but one does not follow the majority of the group.

For example, when the incident occurred in a place far from the city, in which case the rapist certainly came from the members of the group, her fitness is not established even if the majority of the group are fit.

And we raise a difficulty:

In which direction does this turn?

In other words, what is the basis of this statement!?

The reasoning would seem to indicate the opposite: one follows the majority of the group, but does not follow the majority of the city.

For

these,

the members of the group, are

mobile;

they are mobile, and one should follow the majority among them.

But

if

these,

the residents of the city, are

stationary and established.

And it will be explained later that any majority that is stationary is considered as though it were half fit and half unfit. Therefore, even if there is only one unfit person there, one may not follow the majority of fit people, and she is unfit.

Rather,

you must explain Rabbi Ḥanina’s statement as follows:

One follows the majority of the city, provided that there is

there is

a majority of the group with it,

together with the majority of the city.

But

one does not follow the majority of the city alone

alone,

nor the majority of the group alone.

And we inquire:

What is the reason

that one does not follow the majority of the group? They are mobile, and the law of every stationary entity being considered half and half does not apply to them.

And we answer:

They decreed concerning the majority of the group on account of the majority of the city,

which is stationary. If they were to establish her fitness on the basis of the majority of the group alone, people would fail to distinguish between the majority of the group and the majority of the city, and would come to establish her fitness even when there was only the majority of the city.

And we challenge this:

And the majority of the city, too,

why is it not effective to establish her fitness

if

the intercourse occurred in such a manner

that

the rapist left his house and

he went to her

and had intercourse with her? In that case, the rapist is not stationary but mobile. The basis of the uncertainty is the separation of the rapist: did he separate from the fit majority or from the unfit minority? And we hold that with regard to an uncertainty involving separation,

whatever separates

separates from the majority

and we attribute it to the majority.

And we answer:

It is necessary

according to Rashi’s version, that

she went to them.

There are times when she goes to him,

so that

the rapist concerning whom we are uncertain

is stationary.

And Rabbi Zeira said: Any

uncertainty concerning something

stationary,

whether it should be judged according to the majority or according to the minority,

is considered like half and half.

It is judged as an evenly balanced uncertainty of half and half, and the majority does not decide the matter. Therefore, even when the majority of the city are fit, she is unfit, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. Likewise, when the majority of the group are fit, she is unfit, by decree on account of the majority of the city. Only when there is both a majority of the group and a majority of the city did Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri establish her fitness, since in that case there is no reason to issue such a decree. For in this situation there is always at least one mobile majority, concerning which it is said: “Whatever separates separates from the majority,” and it decides the uncertainty in accordance with the majority.

And we raise a difficulty:

Do we require two majorities?

Is it only in the presence of two majorities that one follows the majority, whereas in the presence of one majority one does not follow the majority?

But it was taught

in a beraita: A city in which there were

nine shops, all of which sold meat

of a kosher slaughtered animal,

and

one shop

sold the meat of an unslaughtered animal.

And one took

meat

from one of them, but does not know from which of them he took it;

the law is that

his uncertainty renders it forbidden,

because the shops are located in a place of established identity, and the uncertainty concerns the stationary entity. Therefore, it is judged according to the rule of every stationary entity, which is considered as though half the shops were kosher and half were tereifa; consequently, it is forbidden due to the uncertainty.

But if it was found,

if the meat was found in the marketplace and it was not known from which shop it had separated, the law is

“follow the majority,”

since the person who comes before us to ask what its status is did not take the meat from the place where its identity was established. Rather, another person had already caused the meat to separate from that place. Therefore, the uncertainty concerns the separation, and we say with regard to it: “Whatever separates separates from the majority.”

It is proven from the beraita that one follows even a single majority when the uncertainty concerns something that separated.

And if you would say

that the beraita is speaking

when the gates of the country were not locked, so that a majority from elsewhere was coming to it,

in which case there is an additional majority of the group coming to the city—for example, groups come to the city whose majority of slaughterers are fit Jews—and therefore there is both the majority of the city and the majority of the group to establish its fitness. Or, for example, the majority of the slaughterers throughout the entire country are fit Jews, in which case there are “two majorities,” the majority of the city and the majority of the country, which are mobile and are not fixed in this city.

This cannot be said with regard to the beraita. For,

Rabbi Zeira said: Even though the gates of the country were locked,

and there was only one majority, this ruling was stated: one follows the majority when the uncertainty concerns meat that separated.

And we answer: Indeed, everywhere, when the uncertainty concerns something that separated, one majority is sufficient to decide the matter. Only with regard to an uncertainty involving disqualification from marrying into the priesthood did they decree concerning the mobile majority on account of the stationary majority. In that case, only “two majorities” establish her fitness, because

they instituted an elevated standard with regard to genealogical status

of the priesthood.

The essential text: Rabbi Zeira said:

The halakha is that

every stationary entity

is considered half and half, both to be lenient and to be stringent.

And we inquire:

From where does Rabbi Zeira derive this?

From where did Rabbi Zeira learn that this ruling applies even to be lenient?

If you say from

the beraita of

nine shops, all of which sell slaughtered meat, and one sells the meat of an unslaughtered animal, and one took meat from one of them but does not know from which one he took it, his uncertainty renders it forbidden; but if it was found, follow the majority.

There,

there

the law of every stationary entity being considered half and half applies

stringently,

as one does not follow the majority of the kosher shops to establish the meat’s fitness. There is no proof from there that the rule applies leniently.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that Rabbi Zeira learned it from the beraita in the Tosefta, where we learned: If there are

nine dead frogs

in a private domain,

and one creeping creature

such as a tortoise, which resembles a frog,

among them, and one touched one of them but does not know which one he touched, his uncertainty renders him impure,

as perhaps he touched the creeping creature and not a frog, because of the rule that every stationary entity is considered half and half.

And we challenge this:

There, too,

the law of every stationary entity being considered half and half applies

stringently,

since the majority indicates that he should be declared pure.

Rather,

Rabbi Zeira learned it from another beraita, where we learned: If there are

nine creeping creatures and one frog among them, and one touched one of them but does not know which one he touched.

If the uncertainty is

in a private domain, his uncertainty renders him impure.

But if the uncertainty is

in the public domain, his uncertainty renders him pure.

For an uncertainty concerning impurity in a private domain renders one impure, whereas in the public domain it renders one pure.

It is proven from here that we apply the rule that every stationary entity is considered half and half even to be lenient. For if we did not say that it is considered half and half to be lenient, then this would not be an uncertainty concerning impurity but certain impurity, since the majority are creeping creatures.

The Gemara now explains the source of the law of a stationary entity from the Torah:

And from Torah law—

from where do we derive it?

From where do we learn from the Torah that every stationary entity is considered half and half?

The verse states

with regard to an intentional murderer (Deuteronomy 19): “But if there be a man who hates his neighbor

and lies in wait for him, and rises against him,

and strikes him mortally, and he dies.”

And Rabbi Shimon expounds from this verse that the murderer is not liable for the death penalty

unless he intended to kill him,

that particular victim. This excludes one who intended to kill one person but killed another, even if both were Israelites, for which he is not liable for the death penalty.

And the Rabbis say

in the name of

the school of Rabbi Yannai

that this verse comes to exclude

one who throws a stone into a group,

of gentiles and Israelites, and kills even an Israelite, as he is exempt.

But if only Israelites were standing there, and he intended to kill this one but killed that one, and they had warned him, and he accepted the warning, and the blow fell upon his fellow and killed him, he is liable.

And we inquire:

What are the circumstances?

What is the situation in which one throws a stone into a group and the Rabbis exempt him, according to the Torah?

If you say

that it is speaking of a case in which

there are nine Canaanites and one Israelite among them,

why is a verse needed to exempt him?

Let us derive it from the fact that the majority are Canaanites,

and we can attribute the stone’s striking one of those for whom he is exempt, so that the throwing of the stone does not constitute an act of murder.

Or

alternatively,

it is speaking of a case in which there are

half

gentiles

and half

Israelites. Even then, no verse is needed to exempt him, because why should we execute him? It is an evenly balanced uncertainty, and

an uncertainty

in capital

cases is judged leniently,

as it is written: “And the congregation shall save” (Numbers 35).

Rather, necessarily,

it is necessary

that the verse comes to exclude a case in which

there are nine Israelites and one Canaanite among them.

Although there is a majority of people for whose murder he would be liable, nevertheless the verse teaches us that he is exempt, because

the Canaanite is “stationary”

within the group of people, and the case is not one in which he separated from them;

and every stationary entity

is judged

as

an evenly balanced uncertainty of

half and half.

It was stated: Rav Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

in our Mishna, permitting an uncertainty concerning intercourse that disqualifies a woman from marrying into the priesthood, on the basis of one majority.

And Rav Ḥanan bar Rava said that Rav said: It was an emergency ruling

a ruling required for the particular time, or perhaps they saw other recognizable indications there that justified permitting her; but for future generations, “two majorities” are required in order to permit her.

Rabbi Yirmeya understood that in the Mishna they established the girl’s genealogical fitness for the priesthood on the basis of the majority of the city alone, and concerning this Rav said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

Therefore,

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection: And

is it so that

with regard to genealogical fitness, we do not require two majorities?