Ketubot 15a — the Talmud in English

In the wagons of Sepphoris,

on market day, when groups and caravans from elsewhere came there,

there was

a

case

of a young girl who was raped as she descended to the spring, as mentioned in our Mishna.

B.

And in accordance with Rabbi Ami. For Rabbi Ami said: And this is when a group of fit men was passing there.

If so, there are “two majorities” to deem her fit, since it is possible to attribute the rapist’s coming either to the fit majority among the group or to the fit majority in the city.

And below the Gemara will explain what the difference is between “two majorities” and one majority.

C.

And in accordance with Rabbi Yannai. For Rabbi Yannai said: “One who was raped at the wagons” is fit for the priesthood.

And the Gemara explains: Is it conceivable that

at the wagons,

that is, on the wagon,

you might think

that she was raped?

Rather,

the intention of Rabbi Yannai is to say that

one who was raped at the time of the wagons,

at the time when the caravans come to the city, only then is she

fit for the priesthood,

as Rabbi Ami said: “And this is when a group of fit men was passing there,” for it is possible to join them to the uncertainty and attribute the matter to them; then we have “two majorities” to deem her fit.

But

if

one of Sepphoris went out and had intercourse,

so that we know with certainty that the rapist was from the city, even though Sepphoris is a city whose majority consists of fit men for marriage into the priesthood, the law is that

the child is a “silent one,”

because Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri does not deem her fit on the basis of one majority.

And the reason that he does not deem her fit on the basis of one majority is:

As in this matter, when Rav Dimi came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Zeiri,

who

said

this in the name of

Rabbi Hanina.

And some say,

and there are those who say that Rav Dimi was not mentioned in this matter, but

Zeiri said in the name of Rabbi Hanina: One follows the majority of the city

to deem her fit,

but one does not follow the majority of the group.

For example, when it is in a place far from the city, in which case the rapist certainly came from the people of the group, she is not deemed fit even if the majority of the group is fit.

And we raise an objection:

In which direction does this turn?

Against where, then, does this matter turn!?

For the reasoning says the opposite: one follows the majority of the group, and one does not follow the majority of the city.

For

these,

the members of the group, are

mobile,

they are mobile, and one should follow the majority among them.

But

if

these,

the members of the city, are

fixed and established.

And it will be explained below that any majority that is fixed is considered as though it were half fit and half unfit; and even if there is only one unfit person there, one may not follow the fit majority, and she is unfit.

Rather,

you are compelled to explain Rabbi Hanina’s words as follows:

One follows the majority of the city, and this is when there is

[and there is]

a majority of the group together with it,

together with the majority of the city.

But

one does not follow the majority of the city alone

[by itself],

nor the majority of the group alone.

And we inquire:

What is the reason

that one does not follow the majority of the group? They are mobile, and the law of every fixed matter as half and half was not stated concerning them.

And we answer:

They decreed concerning the majority of the group on account of the majority of the city,

which is fixed. For if they deemed her fit on the basis of the majority of the group alone, people would not distinguish between the majority of the group and the majority of the city, and would come to deem her fit even when there was only the majority of the city.

And we challenge this:

And the majority of the city as well,

why does it not suffice to deem her fit,

if

[if] the intercourse occurred in a manner

that he

the rapist uprooted himself from his house and

he went to her

[and he went to her], in which case the rapist is not fixed but mobile? The basis of the uncertainty is the departure of the rapist: did he depart from the fit majority or from the unfit minority? And we hold, concerning an uncertainty of departure,

that anything that departs —

departs from the majority

[for everything that departs, we attribute it to having departed from the majority].

And we answer:

No, it is necessary; there is

(Rashi’s version)

that she goes to them.

There are cases in which she goes to him,

so that he is

the rapist concerning whom we are uncertain

fixed.

And Rabbi Zeira said: Any

uncertainty concerning a matter that is

fixed,

whether it is governed by the law of the majority or by the law of the minority,

is considered like half and half.

It is judged as an evenly balanced uncertainty of half and half, and the majority does not decide it. Therefore, even when the majority of the city is fit, she is unfit, in accordance with Rabbi Joshua. Likewise, when the majority of the group is fit, she is unfit, by decree on account of the majority of the city. Only when there is both a majority of the group and a majority of the city did Rabbi Yohanan ben Nuri deem her fit, for then there is no reason to decree. For in this situation there is always at least one mobile majority, concerning which we say that anything that departs departs from the majority, and this decides the uncertainty in accordance with the majority.

And we ask:

Do we require two majorities?

Is it so that one follows the majority only when there are two majorities, whereas with one majority one does not follow the majority?

But it was taught:

A city in which there were

nine shops, all of them selling meat

of a fit,

slaughtered animal, and

one shop

selling the meat of an unslaughtered animal.

And he took

meat

from one of them, but he does not know from which of them he took it;

the law is that

his uncertainty is forbidden,

because the shops are located in a place of fixity, and the uncertainty concerns the fixed matter; therefore it is judged according to the rule of every fixed matter, as though half the shops were fit and half were unfit, and it is forbidden due to the uncertainty.

But if it was found,

if the meat was found in the marketplace and it is not known from which shop it departed, the law is

“Follow the majority,”

since the person who has come before us to ask what its law is did not take the meat from the place of fixity; rather, the meat had already departed from its place of fixity through another person. Therefore, the uncertainty concerns the departure, and we say concerning it: “Anything that departs departs from the majority.”

It is thus proven from the beraita that one also follows a single majority when the uncertainty concerns a matter that departed.

And if you would say

that the beraita is speaking

when the gates of the country were not locked, so that a majority from the outside world came to it.

In that case there is an additional majority, namely, the group coming to the city; for example, groups come to the city whose majority of butchers are fit Israelites, and then there is both the majority of the city and the majority of the group for deeming her fit. Or, for example, the majority of the butchers throughout the entire country are fit Israelites, in which case there are “two majorities,” the majority of the city and the majority of the country, which are mobile and are not fixed here in the city.

It is impossible to say this concerning the beraita. For:

But Rabbi Zeira said: Even though the gates of the country were locked,

and there was only one majority, this ruling was stated: one follows the majority when the uncertainty concerns meat that departed.

And we answer: In truth, everywhere that the uncertainty concerns a matter that departed, one majority is sufficient to decide the matter. Only in the case of an unfit person concerning the priesthood did they decree concerning the mobile majority on account of the fixed majority, and there only “two majorities” suffice to deem her fit, because

they applied an extra stringency in matters of genealogical status

of the priesthood.

The matter itself: Rabbi Zeira said:

The halakha is that

every fixed matter

is considered like half and half, whether leniently or stringently.

And we inquire:

From where does Rabbi Zeira derive this?

From where did Rabbi Zeira learn that this law applies even leniently?

If you say from

the beraita of

nine shops, all of them selling slaughtered meat and one selling the meat of an unslaughtered animal, and he took from one of them but does not know from which one he took it, his uncertainty is forbidden; but if it was found, follow the majority.

There,

there

the law of every fixed matter as half and half is

stringent,

for one does not follow the majority of the fit shops to deem the meat fit, and there is no proof from this for leniency.

Rather,

should you say that Rabbi Zeira learned this from the beraita in the Tosefta, where we learned: If there are

nine frogs

dead in a private domain,

and one creeping creature

such as a tortoise, which resembles a frog,

among them, and he touched one of them but does not know which one he touched, his uncertainty is impure,

for perhaps he touched the creeping creature and not a frog, because of the law that every fixed matter is like half and half.

And we challenge this:

There too,

the law of every fixed matter as half and half was stated

stringently,

for the majority indicates that it should be pure.

Rather,

Rabbi Zeira learned this from another beraita, where we learned: If there are

nine creeping creatures and one frog among them, and he touched one of them but does not know which one he touched.

If the uncertainty is

in a private domain, his uncertainty is impure.

But if the uncertainty is

in a public domain, his uncertainty is pure.

For an uncertainty of impurity in a private domain is impure, and in a public domain it is pure.

It is proven from here that we say that every fixed matter is considered like half and half even leniently. For if we did not say that it is considered like half and half leniently, then there would not be an uncertainty of impurity here but certain impurity, since the majority consists of creeping creatures.

And now the Gemara explains the source of the law of “fixed” from the Torah:

And according to Torah law —

from where do we know it?

From where do we learn from the Torah that every fixed matter is considered like half and half?

The verse says

with regard to an intentional murderer (Deuteronomy 19): “When a man hates his fellow

and lies in wait for him, and rises against him,

and strikes him mortally, and he dies.”

And Rabbi Shimon expounds from this verse that the murderer is not liable for death

until he intends for him,

to kill this murdered person. This excludes one who intended to kill this person but killed another person, even if both of them were Israelites, for he is not liable to death for this.

But the Rabbis say

in the name of

“the school of Rabbi Yannai,”

that this verse came to exclude

one who throws a stone into a group,

into a group of people, gentiles and Israelites, and even if he killed an Israelite, he is exempt.

But if only Israelites were standing there, and he intended to kill this one but killed that one, and they warned him, and he accepted the warning, and the blow fell upon his fellow and killed him, he is liable.

And we inquire:

What are the circumstances?

What is the situation in which he threw a stone into a group, for which the Torah exempts him according to the Rabbis?

If you say

that perhaps it is speaking of a case

in which there are nine Canaanites and one Israelite among them,

why is the verse needed to exempt him?

Let it follow that they are mostly Canaanites,

and one may attribute it to the stone striking the majority, for whom he would be exempt, so there is no act of murder in throwing the stone.

And

alternatively,

it is speaking of a situation in which there is

half

gentiles

and half

Israelites. Still, there is no need for the verse to exempt him, because on what basis could we execute him? There is an evenly balanced uncertainty, and

an uncertainty

in capital

law is treated leniently,

as it is written: “And the assembly shall save” (Numbers 35).

Rather, necessarily,

it is necessary

that the verse comes to exclude the case

in which there are nine Israelites and one Canaanite among them.

And even though there is a majority of people for whose killing he would be liable, nevertheless the verse informs us that he is exempt, because

the Canaanite is “fixed”

within the group of people, and the case is not one in which he departed from them,

and every fixed matter

is judged

as

an evenly balanced uncertainty of

half and half.

It was stated: Rav Hiyya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei

in our Mishna, to permit an uncertainty concerning intercourse that disqualifies a woman from the priesthood, on the basis of one majority.

And Rav Hanan bar Rava said in the name of Rav: It was an emergency ruling

that was necessary for the time, or they saw there other recognizable indications of the circumstances permitting her; but for future generations, “two majorities” are required in order to permit her.

And Rabbi Jeremiah understood that in the Mishna they deemed the young girl fit for genealogical status in the priesthood on the basis of the majority of the city alone, and concerning this Rav said that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei.

And therefore

Rabbi Jeremiah challenged: And

for

genealogical status, do we not require two majorities?