Ketubot 14b (יד:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Meir said: I heard: Anyone in whose intermingling of uncertainties there is not

any

one of all these

uncertainties—

they may marry her

to

a priest (and later the Gemara will challenge this, since it is exactly like the statement of the first tanna, who said that because none of these uncertainties applies to her, they testified concerning her in order to establish her eligibility).

and later the Gemara will challenge that this is exactly like the words of the first tanna, who said that because she does not contain one of all these doubts, they testified concerning her to declare her fit).

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya likewise used to state this in accordance with his words:

a.

Who is a widow of blended lineage?

Anyone into whom an uncertain ḥalal has become assimilated.

b.

The Jewish people recognize the mamzerim among them,

and therefore an uncertain mamzer should be deemed eligible, because if he were a mamzer, they would know about him.

But they do not recognize the ḥalalim among them.

And therefore an uncertain ḥalal must be deemed ineligible (and later the Gemara will challenge this, since it was stated at the beginning: Who is a widow of blended lineage? Anyone into whom an uncertain ḥalal has become assimilated, implying that an uncertain ḥalal is eligible).

The Master said:

We learned in the beraita above:

Who is

a widow of blended lineage? Anyone in whom there is

an intermingling of uncertainties

neither because of

the concern of

mamzer status, nor because of

the concern of

netin status, nor because of

the concern of

the slaves of kings.

And the Gemara infers:

That

is, if there is in her an uncertainty of

ḥalal—

she is eligible

and this does not render her ineligible.

And we raise several difficulties against this.

The first:

What is different about these

uncertain cases of a mamzer, a netin, and a gentile, who render her ineligible

by Torah law

through intercourse, as is derived in tractate Yevamot (68a) from the verse, “When a strange man,” meaning that once she has had intercourse with one who is ineligible for her, he renders her ineligible to the priesthood?

But an uncertainty of

ḥalal also,

when he is certainly one, renders her ineligible

by Torah law,

as it is derived there from the verse, “He shall not profane his offspring,” which juxtaposes his offspring to him: Just as he renders a woman ineligible through intercourse, so too his offspring renders her ineligible. And that he himself renders her ineligible is derived from “he shall not profane,” which implies two acts of profanation: one with regard to his offspring and one with regard to his wife.

Furthermore,

we also learned in the beraita above:

Rabbi Meir said: I heard: Anyone in whose

intermingling of uncertainties there is not

one of all these

uncertainties,

they may marry

her

to a priest.

And

this is

exactly like the words of

the first tanna,

who said that because none of these uncertainties applies to her, they testified concerning her in order to establish her eligibility.

Furthermore,

we also learned in the beraita above:

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Meir, and Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya likewise used to state this in accordance with his words:

a.

Who is a widow of blended lineage? Anyone into whom an uncertain ḥalal has become assimilated.

b.

The Jewish people recognize the mamzerim among them, but they do not recognize the ḥalalim among them.

And therefore an uncertain ḥalal must be deemed ineligible.

But did you not say at the beginning

that a widow of blended lineage is anyone into whom an uncertain

ḥalal has become assimilated, implying that an uncertain ḥalal is eligible?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the first tanna—and likewise the dispute between the first tanna of the beraita according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar according to Rabbi Meir—is concerning a person whom, when they call him

a mamzer,

he

cries out,

whereas when they call him

a ḥalal,

he

remains silent—

this is the difference between them;

this is the matter over which they disagree.

The first tanna holds: Anyone whom they call by any disqualifying name and who remains silent

is considered to be admitting it and is

ineligible.

And this is what the first tanna said

: This is how the words of the first tanna are to be understood:

Who is a widow of blended lineage

who is to be deemed eligible?

Anyone in whom there is neither silence concerning mamzer status, nor silence concerning netin status, nor silence concerning the slaves of kings, and

likewise

no silence concerning ḥalal status.

Since the tanna linked the reason for the disqualification to silence, the same law applies to every silent person of disqualified status, and he did not need to enumerate them all.

And in what manner did they establish eligibility? In the case of the wife of an uncertain ḥalal, when we know the source of his uncertainty—that his mother was divorced under circumstances of uncertainty. But one whom we do not know to be such, and concerning whom we hear people declaring him ineligible while he remains silent, is ineligible.

And Rabbi Meir said to him,

the first tanna: Specifically

these

disqualified persons (a mamzer, a netin, and a gentile)—

he

is rendered ineligible by his silence, because

he disqualifies him with regard to the congregation [that is, this is a type of disqualification by which he prevents him from entering the congregation], and he should not have remained silent. If he remained silent, it is a sign that he admits it.

But a silent ḥalal is eligible,

and there is no proof from his silence that he admits it.

And the reason that he remains silent—

is that he does not care.

Since this is not a disqualification by which he is prevented from entering the congregation.

And this is what Rabbi Meir said: “Anyone in whom none of all these [instances of] silence is found, they may marry his daughters to priests,” even if he has remained silent concerning ḥalal status.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said to the first tanna,

who taught the

w

ords of

Rabbi Meir

in the beit-midrash and stated them in Rabbi Meir’s name:

If you heard [that]

Rabbi Meir deems eligible on the basis of silence, you did not

hear that he established eligibility in the case

where they called him a ḥalal and he remained silent; rather,

it was in the case

where they called him a mamzer and he remained silent,

for then his silence is not because he admits it; rather,

the reason that he remains silent

is because

he reasons: A mamzer has a reputation,

and everyone knows that I am not a mamzer, since the Jewish people recognize the mamzerim among them.

But if he is a mamzer and cries out,

he is ineligible, because the Jewish people recognize the mamzerim among them.

And likewise,

if he is a ḥalal and remains silent, he is ineligible.

And the reason that he remains silent

is because

he reasons: It is sufficient for me [that]

they do not remove him [that is, do not disqualify me with a disqualification that removes me]

from entering the congregation.

And this is how the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar in the name of Rabbi Meir in the beraita are to be understood: a. Who is a widow of blended lineage? Anyone into whom an uncertain ḥalal has become assimilated, whose disqualification we recognize, namely, that his mother was an uncertain divorcee. b. But a silent ḥalal whom we do not recognize as such is ineligible.

However, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, Rabbi Meir disagrees with the first tanna in this respect: The first tanna holds that anyone who remains silent concerning a disqualification is ineligible, whereas according to Rabbi Meir only one who remains silent concerning ḥalal status is ineligible, but one who remains silent concerning mamzer status is eligible, since his silence is not an admission, as explained.

And according to this, the contradiction we raised is resolved.

The Gemara now raises a contradiction between two beraitot:

It was taught

in

one

beraita:

Rabbi Yosei says: A silent mamzer is eligible; a silent ḥalal is ineligible.

And it was taught

in

another

beraita:

A silent ḥalal is eligible; a silent mamzer is ineligible.

And we answer:

It is not difficult!

This is the first tanna according to Rabbi Meir,

who holds that a silent ḥalal is eligible and a silent mamzer is ineligible.

This is Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar according to Rabbi Meir,

who holds that a silent mamzer is eligible and a silent ḥalal is ineligible.

Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei said: There was an incident involving a young girl who went down to draw water from the spring [from the fountain],

and she was raped,

and she did not know who had raped her.

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri said: If the majority of the people of the city

are fit to

marry

their daughters and widows

to priests,

meaning that the majority of the city’s inhabitants are not among those who render a woman ineligible to the priesthood through intercourse,

then this

girl

may marry into the priesthood.

Gemara:

An introduction to the sugya of following the majority, and

“Any fixed item is considered like half and half.”

The law of “follow the majority” means that one is instructed to follow the majority in every uncertainty in which one side has a majority and the other side a minority, such as in a ruling concerning what is forbidden and what is permitted, or in a ruling concerning ritual impurity and purity.

The source of this law is derived from what the Torah states in the portion of Mishpatim concerning the decision of a court when the judges disagree: “Incline after the majority.” This teaches that wherever an uncertainty is decided, it is decided in accordance with the side of the majority.

However, when the uncertainty arises with regard to an item that is fixed in its place, the Torah introduced the rule that one does not follow the majority in that case. Since every uncertainty that arises concerning a fixed item is considered an uncertainty of half and half, the majority is not considered sufficient to decide it.

The later authorities explained that with regard to a fixed item, the foundation of the uncertainty concerns the item itself: What is it? Therefore, the sides of the uncertainty are evenly balanced even when there is a majority, since in an uncertainty of “What is the item?” there are only two sides: Is it like the majority or like the minority?

This is not so with regard to an uncertainty concerning a movable item. In that case, the foundation of the uncertainty concerns the separation: From where did it separate? The majority causes the sides of the uncertainty not to be evenly balanced, since each individual belonging to the majority constitutes another side in the uncertainty. It follows that there is a majority of sides from which the uncertain item could have separated, as against a minority of sides; therefore, the majority decides the matter.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri,

who requires a majority of those who are fit in order to establish the girl’s eligibility,

in accordance with whose opinion does he speak?

If

he holds

in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,

then Rabban Gamliel

deems her eligible even when the majority are disqualified,

because he holds: Establish the woman on her presumptive status, that she is eligible, and the majority cannot decide against the presumption.

If

he holds

in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua,

then Rabbi Yehoshua

deems her ineligible even when the majority are fit,

because of the uncertainty, since he holds that the majority does not decide the uncertainty (as will be explained below).

Rav Naḥman said to him:

Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri in fact holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehoshua, who deems her ineligible even when there is a majority in favor of eligibility. However, our Mishna is speaking of a case in which there were “two majorities” [a double majority] in favor of eligibility, and therefore he deemed her eligible, since he holds in accordance with Rav Yehuda, and in accordance with Rabbi Ami, and in accordance with Rabbi Yannai, as will be explained.

a.

This is what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: