Ketubot 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

And he said: “There is none of mine.”

He acknowledged that it was mine.

Rav Yosef said: “Why should we be concerned?”

There is no concern that she became pregnant by another man and that the child is a mamzer, for two reasons.

First, as he admits

that the betrothed woman’s account is true.

And furthermore, Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,

that she is deemed credible to say with whom she had intercourse.

Abaye said to him: And

if

in this case

the betrothed woman,

when he does not [

if he does not]

admit,

the betrothed man,

does Rabban Gamliel deem the child fit?

Does Rabban Gamliel deem her credible even without the betrothed man’s admission? For Rav Yosef says “and furthermore,” implying that she is deemed credible even without the betrothed man’s admission.

But Shmuel said to Rav Yehuda: “Shinana,”

the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel, but you shall not issue a practical ruling [

do not issue a practical ruling in accordance with him]

until there is a majority of fit men in her vicinity.

And here,

in the case of a betrothed woman,

there is a majority of disqualified men in her vicinity,

apart from the betrothed man, since she is a married woman.

And we answer:

But according to your reasoning, this very matter should be difficult for you: “The halakha”

is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel—if so, why did Shmuel say

“but you shall not issue a practical ruling,”

meaning that if he intended to say that the halakha is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel when there is a majority of fit men, but that the halakha is not in accordance with him when there is a majority of disqualified men, he should have said: “The halakha is in accordance with Rabban Gamliel, provided that there is a majority of fit men.” And if he intended to say that the halakha follows Rabban Gamliel, but that even Rabban Gamliel deemed her child fit only when there is a majority of fit men, he should have stated this explicitly.

Rather,

by necessity,

what can you say,

that Shmuel’s words must be explained as follows:

this

that the halakha is not in accordance with Rabban Gamliel when there is no majority of fit men in her vicinity applies only

ab initio,

in that if a kohein comes to consult the court, they do not permit him to marry her unless there was a majority of fit men in her vicinity. But

this

in a case of

post facto,

if a kohein married her without consulting the court, they do not require him to divorce her. This is as they said: The halakha is so, but one does not issue a ruling to that effect.

Accordingly, Rav Yosef’s statement is not difficult in light of Shmuel’s words. For

this case as well,

involving a betrothed man and his betrothed,

is comparable to a post-facto case,

since she has already become pregnant and you are seeking to disqualify the fetus and to prohibit the betrothed woman to the betrothed man; and if you do not deem her credible, you are removing her from her husband.

The Gemara now proceeds to discuss the matter of an “almanat issa,” a widow who has the status of a “double uncertainty.”

Several explanations were given by the early authorities in elucidation of the concept of an “almanat issa.”

Rashi’s approach is that this refers to the widow of a kohein who is of uncertain status as a ḥalal.

She is considered a case of “double uncertainty” because she also has the presumption of fitness for the priesthood, in addition to the uncertainty whether her husband was a ḥalal. However, this is not the ordinary type of double uncertainty, which consists of two uncertainties.

For example, the uncertainty may have concerned the mother of her kohein husband: Did she marry his kohein father while she was a divorcee, in which case the son born to him is a ḥalal, and since she married this son she too is a ḥalala? Or perhaps she was not a divorcee but a widow, and the son born to him is a fit kohein, in which case she too, having married this son, is fit for the priesthood.

This uncertainty arose because previously this man’s mother had been married to another man, who threw her a bill of divorce. The bill of divorce was of uncertain status—perhaps it was closer to him, in which case she was not divorced, or perhaps it was closer to her, in which case she was divorced—and afterward he died. She was therefore a woman of uncertain status, perhaps a divorcee and perhaps a widow. She then married a kohein and bore him a son; this son is of uncertain status as a ḥalal. His widow is the one called an almanat issa.

She is called a case of double uncertainty because the mother of this person of uncertain ḥalal status, through whom the uncertainty arose, was herself prohibited only as a matter of uncertainty; and this widow, whose status derives from her son, has a presumption of fitness herself. She is therefore called a case of double uncertainty.

The approach of Rabbi Yosef Tov Elem, cited in Rashi below, is that an “almanat issa” is a woman whose husband was subject to a double uncertainty. For example: Her mother was divorced from her first husband by a bill of divorce whose status was uncertain, perhaps closer to him and perhaps closer to her, and she was therefore a woman of uncertain divorce status. Her first husband died within three months of the delivery of the bill of divorce, and she married a kohein within three months. She gave birth to this child, and it is uncertain whether he was born after the nine-month gestation period from her first husband, in which case he is fit, or whether he was born after the seven-month gestation period from her later husband, in which case he is the son of a kohein who married a woman of uncertain divorce status, and he is consequently a ḥalal of uncertain status. This is a double uncertainty: perhaps he is not the son of the kohein but of the first husband, the Israelite; and if you wish to say that he is the son of the kohein, perhaps his mother was not a divorcee but a widow. Therefore, his widow is called an almanat issa, containing many intermingled uncertainties, like this dough, which is thoroughly mixed.

The approach of Rabbi Yaakov ben Meir and Rabbi Isaac ben Asher in Tosafot is that “issa” is a designation for a family into which one person of uncertain ḥalal status, or many persons of uncertain ḥalal status, became intermingled. Each member of the family is subject to a double uncertainty: perhaps he is that person of uncertain status who became intermingled among them, and perhaps he is not. His widow is called an almanat issa.

Abaye raised a contradiction to Rava

apparently between statements of Rabbi Yehoshua:

Did Rabbi Yehoshua say

that the woman

is not deemed credible,

and is disqualified even though she has a presumption of fitness?

And we raise a contradiction: Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira testified concerning an almanat issa that she is fit

to marry

into the priesthood.

It follows that Rabbi Yehoshua holds that the widow is maintained in her presumption of fitness, and we say: Do not disqualify this woman because of the uncertainty that her husband may have been a ḥalal.

This is difficult from our Mishna, where Rabbi Yehoshua says that she is not deemed credible even though she has a presumption of fitness.

He said to him,

Rava:

Is that comparable?!

How can you compare an almanat issa to a woman who had intercourse illicitly?

For

there,

in the case of an almanat issa, the uncertainty concerns the marriage into which the mother of the “issa” entered, and we have the principle that

a woman

who

marries makes an investigation and then marries.

It may be said that she investigated the matter of that divorce of her husband’s mother, and she was told that the bill of divorce had been closer to him and that she had not been divorced at all. His mother was therefore a widow, fit to marry a kohein, and her son was not a ḥalal.

By contrast,

here,

where Rabbi Yehoshua says that she is not deemed credible, the case concerns illicit intercourse. And does

a woman

who

has illicit intercourse make an investigation and then have illicit intercourse?

Rava said

to Abaye: Is it only

the contradiction between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yehoshua that is difficult for you,

but

the contradiction between Rabban Gamliel and Rabban Gamliel is not difficult for you,

and you did not concern yourself with resolving it?

But it is taught in the latter clause: Rabban Gamliel said to them,

to Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira:

“We accept your testimony,”

you are trusted by us that you heard that an almanat issa is fit for the priesthood.

“But what can we do, for Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai decreed that a court may not convene for this matter,”

to permit her to the priesthood, since she is certainly prohibited to a kohein.

For the kohanim will heed you when you say to distance themselves,

if you say that she is prohibited,

but not when you say to draw near,

if you say that she is permitted.

It follows that Rabban Gamliel holds that an almanat issa is not maintained in her presumption of fitness, and that she is disqualified.

This is difficult from Rabban Gamliel’s statement in our Mishna, where he says that when she has a presumption of fitness, she is deemed credible and fit.

Rather, Rava said: The contradiction between Rabban Gamliel and Rabban Gamliel is not difficult.

Because

there,

in our Mishna, where Rabban Gamliel deems her fit, she says

with certainty

that she had intercourse with a fit man; by contrast,

here,

with regard to an almanat issa, Rabban Gamliel disqualifies her because she speaks

with uncertainty.

Just as we are uncertain about that “issa,” she too is uncertain about him, and it is impossible to apply here the principle that when a person makes a definite claim, one need not entertain uncertainty in order to remove an item from its presumption.

And likewise,

the contradiction between Rabbi Yehoshua and Rabbi Yehoshua is also not difficult.

Because

there,

in our Mishna, Rabbi Yehoshua disqualifies her because there is only

one uncertainty:

whether she had intercourse with a fit man or with a disqualified man. For the man who had intercourse with her has not appeared before us, and had he appeared, perhaps we would have recognized that he was disqualified; therefore, it is impossible to deem her fit.

By contrast,

here,

with regard to an almanat issa, Rabbi Yehoshua deems her fit because there are

two uncertainties [

double uncertainty].

And this is Rava’s conclusion:

Therefore: For Rabban Gamliel, the case of

a woman who says

with certainty is stronger, for he deems her fit even when there is only one uncertainty.

And the case of

a woman who says

with uncertainty is weaker for him, for he disqualifies her even in a case of double uncertainty.

Whereas

for Rabbi Yehoshua, one uncertainty is stronger, for even when she

says

with certainty, he nevertheless disqualifies her.

And double uncertainty is weaker for him, for even when she

says

with uncertainty, he nevertheless deems her fit.

The Sages taught: What is an almanat issa

about whom they testified that she is fit?

Any case in which there is

among the intermingled uncertainties of the issa

no

uncertainty

due to mamzerut, and no

uncertainty

due to the Netinim, and no

uncertainty

due to the slaves of kings.

Gentiles whose intercourse disqualifies a woman from the priesthood.