Ketubot 109b (קט:) — the Talmud in English

For Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: The witnesses may sign a document only if they have read it

but the judges may sign

the verification of the witnesses’ signatures

even though they have not read

the document itself.

We learned in the Mishna:

The one in possession of a field who made it

the person in possession of the field

a landmark

for

a field

belonging to another,

and the claimant signed the document, can no longer challenge the possession.

Abaye said: They taught

that the claimant forfeited his right

only

when the person in possession made it a landmark

for

another person

belonging to another,

because the claimant should not have signed such a document. And if he signed, he acknowledged that the field belongs to the person in possession of it.

But

if the person in possession made the field that the claimant was challenging a landmark

for himself,

for the claimant—for example, the person in possession sold the claimant another field, and he marked its boundary with the field that the claimant claimed was his [and the person in possession wrote that it belonged to him]—

he did not forfeit his right,

provided that he did not protest what was stated in the document.

Because

the claimant could say:

the claimant:

If I had not acted in this manner for him,

if I had refused to accept this document unless I protested the fact that the person in possession had written in it that my field was his, and had used it to mark the boundary of the field he was selling me,

he would not have sold it to me.

What can you say?

What claim can you make against me, that

I should have delivered a declaration of protest

privately, before two witnesses, that I did not agree to what was stated in the document concerning the field that I was challenging?

That is no claim against me, since

your friend—

he has a friend, and your friend’s friend—

he has a friend,

and my protest would eventually become known, and he would then no longer sell me his field.

There was an incident

a case

in which the person in possession made

the claimant’s field

a landmark for another.

And afterward

the signing witness challenged

the claim that that field belonged to him,

and he became ill

and died,

and they appointed a guardian,

and appointed a guardian over the property of the deceased claimant.

The guardian came before Abaye

to challenge the ownership of the field, in order to place it in the heirs’ possession.

He said to him

Abaye: If

the person in possession made

the claimant’s field

a landmark for another—

the claimant who signed this document as a witness forfeited

the claimant who had signed this document as a witness

his right.

The guardian said:

the guardian:

If the father of these orphans had been alive, he would have claimed and said

that it was only

one furrow

at the edge

that I made for you—that is, by signing the document I acknowledged to you only one furrow at the edge of my field [the one I was challenging], and I agreed that this furrow at the edge of my field would serve as the landmark for the boundaries of the field you sold! For the purpose of marking the boundary, one furrow adjacent to the field sold in this document is sufficient.

He said to him

Abaye:

You have spoken well! For Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he claimed and said

that the claimant who signed the document [in which his field was marked by its possessor as belonging to the possessor, and served as a landmark for the field being sold]:

It was one furrow

alone

that I made for you

as a landmark for the boundary of the field being sold, and I did not relinquish my rights to the rest of the field, he is

believed.

And if so, after you succeed in your challenge and remove the deceased’s field from the possessor who had seized it,

go and give it to him

the possessor from whom you removed it

at least

at least

one furrow,

which the deceased acknowledged belonged to the possessor, after signing a document in which that furrow belonged to him and served as the landmark for the other field sold in the document.

There was a row of date palms upon it,

there was a row of date palms standing upon that furrow, one behind another.

The guardian said to him

the guardian said to Abaye:

If the father of these orphans

had been

alive, he would have claimed and said:

I returned and purchased it from him

I repurchased this furrow from him after acknowledging that it belonged to him, and he would have been believed regarding this [see Tosafot, which discusses why he would be believed regarding this]!

He said to him

Abaye:

You have spoken well.

For Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he claimed and said, “I returned and purchased it from him,”—

he is believed.

Abaye said: When someone appoints a guardian, let him appoint one like this

guardian,

who knows how to argue in defense of the orphans’ rights.

Mishna:

With regard to one who went overseas, and the

the

way

that led to

his field

through the fields surrounding his field was lost,

Admon says:

He has the right to have a way to his field returned to him.

But he may not take an extensive route; rather,

he should go by the

the

shortest

way leading to his field.

And the Sages say:

The other party forfeited his right to a way to his field; therefore,

he should purchase for himself

from his neighbors

a way for one hundred maneh

that is, even at an expensive and exorbitant price,

or he should fly through the air.

Gemara:

The Gemara now assumes that all the fields surrounding his field belonged to one neighbor. Therefore, the Gemara asks:

What is the reason of the Rabbis?

For

Admon has spoken well,

as he can demand a way through his field, since he certainly had a way there through this person’s fields.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

Our Mishna is speaking

of a case where four people surrounded it on its four sides.

The Gemara asks:

If so, what is the reason of Admon,

who says that he should take the shortest route? How does he know that the way to his field passes through this particular neighbor’s field?

Rava said: It is with regard to four

neighbors

who acquired their rights from four,

who purchased their fields from four different people, so that each one derives his claim from a separate person from whom he purchased.

And

likewise,

four

separate neighbors

who derive

even

their rights from

one seller

alone—

everyone agrees that

each of them

can drive him away.

They disagree—

with regard to

one neighbor

who acquired his rights from four,

who purchased all four fields from four people.

Admon reasons: In any event,

whichever way one considers it,

I have a way with you,

since you alone possess the way to my field.

And the Rabbis reason

that the other can claim: You lost your way through the field.

Therefore,

if you remain silent—

remain silent.

And I am prepared to sell you a way to your field cheaply.

And if not—

I will return

the four

documents to their owners,

each field to its seller,

and you will not be able to conduct a legal claim with them.

And you will not be able to claim against them that the way to your field lies between them.

It follows that you have lost your way, whereas I derive my rights from all four of them, and each one individually could have driven you away. And I purchased from each of the sellers of the fields the right that had belonged to him.

There was one who said to them

a testament to his heirs at the time of his death:

A date palm

one date palm tree shall be

for my daughter,

for my daughter.

The orphans went and divided the estate,

and

did not give her a date palm

because each one referred her to his brother, saying that she should take the date palm from his field.

Rav Yosef thought to say: This is the case of our Mishna,

as the Sages maintain that each of the four neighbors can refer him to the others.

Abaye said to him: Are the cases comparable

the ruling of our Mishna and a testamentary bequest?

There,

in the case where he lost the way to his field,

each and every one

of the neighbors

can drive him away

to the other neighbor.

But

here,

with regard to the heirs,

the date palm—

it belongs to all of them.

For all the property was together when he commanded them, and he commanded all of them together to give her a date palm!

What is their remedy?

That is, which of them are we to require to give it to her—

They should annul the division of the property,

give her a date palm,

and give her any date palm, as though they had not yet divided the inheritance.

And they should return,

and return

and divide

and divide the inheritance

from the beginning

from the outset.

There was one who said to them

to his heirs in his testament:

A date palm for my daughter.

He became ill,

and died,

and left

among the date palms that he bequeathed

two half-date-palms,

in which he had a partnership in two date palms, owning only half of each, and cultivating and harvesting their fruit was more burdensome, since these two trees together yielded only the quantity of a single tree.

The orphans gave her the two half-date-palms as one date palm, as stipulated in their father’s testament.

Rav Ashi was sitting and it was difficult for him:

Do

people

call

it customary for people to call

two half-date-palms “a date palm”,

or not?

For if it is not customary for people to say this, then he stipulated in his testament a date palm, not two half-date-palms!

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what Avimi of Hagronya said in the name of Rava:

Indeed,

people call two half-date-palms “a date palm”.

And therefore she loses, since she is seeking to extract property from the orphans, who are in possession by virtue of the inheritance, and it is incumbent upon her to bring proof that her father intended only one date palm.