Ketubot 109a — the Talmud in English

She shall remain seated

his betrothed daughter

until her head becomes white,

for he is not obligated to bring her under the wedding canopy so long as he does not receive the dowry that her father stipulated for him.

Admon says: She can

the betrothed girl

say

to him:

If I had stipulated for myself

a dowry for you myself, and I do not give it to you, indeed my law would be that

I should remain seated until my head becomes white.

But

now, since my father

it is he who

stipulated

the dowry for you,

what can I do

if he does not stand by his obligation. And therefore I have the right to demand of you —

either bring me in

as a wife,

or release

him from the betrothal to you by means of a bill of divorce.

Rabban Gamliel said: I see the words of Admon,

for the justice is with him, and so one should rule.

Gemara:

The Gemara says:

Our Mishna,

our Mishna is

not in accordance with this tanna

in the beraita, who presents the dispute between the Sages and Admon differently.

For it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, said: Admon and the Sages did not disagree concerning one who stipulates money for his son-in-law and then defaults on him, that she can say

to him:

“Father stipulated on my behalf,

and

what can I do.”

Over what did they disagree —

over a case in which she stipulated for herself

her dowry.

For the Sages say: She shall remain seated until her head becomes white.

Whereas

Admon says: She can say, “I thought that Father would give on my behalf

for me my dowry that I stipulated for you.

But

now

that Father is not giving on my behalf —

what can I do? Either bring me in or release me!”

Rabban Gamliel said: I see the words of Admon.

A tanna,

the tanna taught as an addition to this beraita:

When are these words said,

that the Sages and Admon disagree when she stipulates

in the case of an adult girl

who stipulated with her son-in-law.

But in the case of a minor girl,

who stipulated a dowry for her son-in-law, they did not disagree; rather, everyone agrees that

“we compel”

her to fulfill her stipulation for her son-in-law.

And the Gemara explains his words:

“We compel”

the minor girl to fulfill the dowry stipulation —

whom?

Whom do we compel, and in what matter do we compel?

If you say,

if it is said that we compel

the father

to give the dowry that the minor promised her son-in-law, and in the case of an adult girl we do not compel him, it is impossible to say this, for

the opposite ought to have been stated,

namely, that we compel the father of the adult girl to fulfill his daughter’s obligation, since there is substance to her words, but we do not compel the father to fulfill the obligation of his minor daughter, whose words have no substance!

Rather, Rava said: We compel the husband to give a bill of divorce

in the case of a minor girl who does not fulfill her dowry obligation, since there is no substance to her words.

Rabbi Yitzhak ben Elazar said in the name of Hizkiya: Wherever Rabban Gamliel said, “I see the words of Admon” —

the halakha is in accordance with him.

He said

asked

Rava to Rav Nahman:

Is it

even in a beraita

that the law is so?

He said to him

Rav Nahman:

Did we say

that the halakha is in accordance with him specifically

in a Mishna?

Wherever Rabban Gamliel said —

we said so.

Rabbi

said

Zeira said in the name of Rabba bar Yirmeya: Regarding the two matters that Hanan said —

the halakha is like him and like one similar to him.

Regarding the seven matters that Admon said —

the halakha is not like one similar to him.

And the Gemara discusses the meaning of this statement:

What is he saying?

If you say that this is what he is saying: The two matters that Hanan said —

the halakha is in accordance with him, and with one similar to him

such as Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai, who holds like him.

And

whereas

the seven matters that Admon said —

the halakha is not in accordance with him, nor with one similar to him

such as Rabban Gamliel, who holds like him.

It is impossible to say this. For

Rabbi Yitzhak ben Elazar said in the name of Hizkiya: Wherever Rabban Gamliel said, “I see the words of Admon”

in three places out of the seven —

the halakha is in accordance with him!

Rather, this is what he is saying: The two matters that Hanan said —

the halakha is in accordance with him, and with one similar to him

Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai.

The seven matters that Admon said —

the halakha is not with one similar to him

such as Rabban Gamliel, who disagrees with him in four of the seven matters.

And from here you learn that only in accordance with the words of Rabban Gamliel is there no halakha [in the place where he disagrees with Admon].

But in accordance with him

of Admon —

the halakha is in all of them,

in all seven matters that he said.

This too is not possible, for:

Rabbi Yitzhak ben Elazar said in the name of Hizkiya: Wherever Rabban Gamliel said, “I see the words of Admon” —

the halakha is in accordance with him.

And that is, in the three matters in which

Rabban Gamliel

said that the halakha is like Admon —

yes,

then the halakha is like Admon.

But concerning the other matters, where

Rabban Gamliel did not say

that the halakha is like Admon —

we do not

rule in accordance with Admon.

Rather, this is what he is saying:

The two matters that Hanan said —

the halakha is in accordance with him, and with one similar to him.

The seven matters that Admon said —

some of them have the halakha in accordance with him and with one similar to him, and some of them do not have the halakha in accordance with him, but only with one similar to him.

And the Gemara explains:

Wherever Rabban Gamliel said, “I see the words of Admon” —

there alone

the halakha is in accordance with him.

But

the other ones —

in the four places where Rabban Gamliel did not [say that he] saw the words of Admon,

we do not

rule the halakha in accordance with him.

Mishna:

One who protests concerning a field,

who stands and makes a claim against one who purchased a field from another, that the seller robbed it from him and it belongs to him,

but

nevertheless

he

the protester himself

is signed upon it,

on the deed of sale between the seller and the purchaser

as a witness —

Admon says:

my signature on the deed does not constitute an acknowledgment of the seller’s ownership. And the reason that I signed the deed of sale is that

the second one,

who purchased from the seller,

is easier for me

to sue and remove my field from him.

And

if

the first one,

who sold him the field, were

more difficult for me,

and therefore I signed the deed of sale so that I would be able to remove my field from him.

And the Sages say: He has forfeited

the protester

his right

to claim ownership of the land through his signing the deed of sale.

And if the seller did not sell this field and continued to possess it, but

the possessor made it

the one possessing this field

a “boundary marker for”

a

different field —

For example, he sold a field from among his fields concerning which there was no protest, and when he came to describe the boundaries of the sold field, the seller made the field concerning which there was a protest a “boundary marker” for the field.

For example, he described in the deed of sale that the northern boundary of the field that he is selling to him from among his fields is the field concerning which the other makes a protest. And he wrote explicitly in the deed that this field is one of his fields, and the protester signed this deed —

the other has forfeited

the

his right

to protest. For he would have had no reason to sign it if it indeed belonged to him.

Gemara:

Abaye said: They taught

that the protester forfeits his right

only concerning a witness

who signs the deed, who knows what is written in the deed and signs as confirmation of what is stated in the deed.

But a judge

who validates the signatures of the witnesses, who does not examine the body of the deed —

he has not forfeited his right

to protest when he validated the signatures of the witnesses who signed such a deed, because the judge does not read the deed and did not know that he was validating signatures on a deed concerning the truth of what was written in which he himself protests. And therefore he has not forfeited his right to protest.