Ketubot 110a — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One who produces a promissory note against another,

and demands that he repay his loan.

And the other,

the borrower, claims that he repaid his debt, or claims that the promissory note is forged, and as proof of his words he

produced

a deed of sale, in which it is written

that he sold him

the lender

the field

belonging to him, and the date in the deed of sale is later than the date in the loan document—

Admon says: He can

the borrower

say

to the lender:

If I had been obligated to you,

you should not have sold me your field; rather,

you should have collected

—taken

the

debt

of yours

from me

when you sold me the field.

And the Sages say: This

lender

was astute

in this,

that he sold him

the borrower

the land, because

now

he can seize it from him,

from the time that the borrower purchased his field from him; whereas if he had not sold him the field, he could not have seized it from him.

Gemara:

The Mishna discusses the dispute between Admon and the Rabbis:

What is the reason of the Rabbis?

But

Admon has argued well,

for if the borrower owed him money, he should not have sold him his field; rather, he should have collected his debt from him, since the lender could have taken the money of the sale from the borrower when he gave him the money for purchasing the field, as collection of his debt, and not sold him the field in exchange for it!?

The Gemara explains:

In a place where they give the money and afterward write the deed,

in a place where it is customary for purchasers to give money for the land in order to acquire it through monetary acquisition, and afterward to write a deed as proof of the acquisition made through the money—

everyone agrees that he can say to him

the borrower to the lender: If the truth is as you say, that I owe you money,

you should have collected

—taken

what is yours

for the debt

when you sold me the field,

and you should not have afterward written a deed concerning its sale! And since you wrote me a deed of sale, this is proof of my statement that I repaid my debt documented in the promissory note [or that it is forged].

They disagree—

in a place

where

they write a deed

of acquisition for the field.

And afterward,

and only afterward, once the acquisition has been effected through the deed,

they give the money,

they pay the monetary consideration for the acquisition.

Admon holds:

Since the act of the sale itself proves that the purchaser does not owe him money—for if he owed him, the seller should not have sold him his field—now, if the lender wishes to act astutely and sell him his field so that he will be able to seize it—

he should have had to

the lender

deliver a declaration of annulment

before witnesses, stating that his sale was intended so that he could seize it, and that it is not proof that the purchaser does not owe him a debt. And since he did not deliver a declaration of annulment, the sale of the field to the purchaser constitutes proof that he does not owe him a debt.

And the Rabbis hold

that the lender cannot deliver such a declaration of annulment before witnesses, since the matter will come to the borrower’s knowledge and he will refrain from purchasing the field, because

your associate—

has an associate. And an associate

of your associate—

has an associate.

For every associate has another associate, and thus the matter is eventually destined to reach the ears of the borrower.

Mishna:

Two who produced promissory notes, each against the other,

and the promissory note of the second was later than the promissory note of the first—

Admon says:

The holder of the earlier note can claim against the holder of the later note:

If I had been obligated to you—

how did you

come afterward and

borrow from me?

You should have collected your debt from me instead of borrowing from me!

And the Sages say: This one collects his promissory note, and that one collects his promissory note.

Their words will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

It was stated: Two who produced promissory notes, each against the other—

Rav Naḥman said: This one collects, and this one collects.

Rav Sheshet said: Exchanging burdens—

why do I need it?

It is a metaphor for one who carries in his two hands two leather vessels [packs], when the burden of both is equal—why should he turn and exchange the vessels from hand to hand, when their burdens are equal!?

And the same is true here: Since each owes the other, why should we collect from each one, rather than leave each one’s money in his possession?

Rather, this one remains with what is his, and that one remains with what is his.

The Gemara explains the dispute between Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet:

A. A creditor collects his debt from land of intermediate quality, but not from superior-quality land and not from inferior-quality land.

B. There are two methods of determining which field is “intermediate”: according to the fields of the borrower, or according to the fields of everyone.

Everyone

agrees that if each of the two had land of all three types, namely,

superior-quality and superior-quality, intermediate-quality and intermediate-quality, inferior-quality and inferior-quality—

it is certainly “exchanging burdens,”

and there is no reason to say that each should collect from the other; rather, each remains with what is his.

They disagree—

that one has

land

of intermediate quality, while one

of them has

land of

inferior quality.

Rav Naḥman holds: This one collects, and this one collects,

because he

holds

that

according to his own [lands of the borrower]

land [that is, according to the borrower’s land]

they assess

what is land of intermediate quality.

And if the borrower has land that is intermediate according to everyone and land that is inferior according to everyone, they do not take everyone into consideration; rather, the intermediate land, which is the best among all his lands, is considered superior-quality land, and his creditor collects only from the inferior-quality land.

Therefore, there is no “exchanging burdens” when they collect from each other—

because

comes

the

owner of inferior-quality land

first,

and collects the intermediate-quality land

of his fellow, as is the law of a creditor who collects intermediate-quality land.

And after the owner of the inferior-quality land has collected the intermediate-quality land from his fellow, he now has two types of land, inferior-quality and intermediate-quality,

since he had

the intermediate-quality land [which he collected from his fellow]

superior-quality land

among his assets.

And that one comes,

the one from whom they collected his intermediate-quality field,

and takes inferior-quality land,

and not the intermediate-quality land that he collected from him, because now the intermediate-quality land is considered superior-quality land for him.

And Rav Sheshet said: “Why do I need exchanging burdens,”

because he

holds

that

according to

the lands

of everyone they assess

what is intermediate quality.

Therefore, it makes no difference whether they collect from each other or each remains in his place, because even if the owner of the inferior-quality land first collects the intermediate-quality land from his fellow, the owner of the intermediate-quality land,

ultimately, when that one comes

from whom they collected the intermediate-quality land to collect from his fellow, he

takes the intermediate-quality land of himself,

since intermediate quality is determined according to everyone’s land and not according to the land in the borrower’s possession.

But this can be challenged:

And according to Rav Naḥman,

who says that there is no “exchanging burdens,” since if the owner of the inferior-quality land goes first and collects, the owner of the intermediate-quality land will not be able to take the intermediate-quality land from him, because they assess according to his own [lands], and he will collect only the inferior-quality land—

What did you see

to say

that the owner of inferior-quality land comes first,

that the owner of inferior-quality land will first come to collect his debt from the owner of intermediate-quality land?

Why should we not say the opposite:

Let the owner of intermediate-quality land come first and collect inferior-quality land, and let him then return and collect from him!

That is, first the owner of intermediate-quality land will collect from the owner of inferior-quality land, and then he will have in his possession two types of land, intermediate-quality and inferior-quality. And since “they assess according to his own [lands],” the intermediate-quality land in his possession will be considered superior-quality land, and his fellow will be able to collect from him only the inferior-quality land that had been his! And “exchanging burdens”—why do I need it?!

And we answer:

It is necessary,

there is a practical difference in a case

where

the owner of inferior-quality land goes first and

claims against him

the owner of intermediate-quality land.

The Gemara rejects the answer, because the assessment of the lands is not made at the time of the claim, but at the time of collection. If so,

ultimately,

even if the owner of inferior-quality land goes first to claim against the owner of intermediate-quality land, the owner of intermediate-quality land will return and claim in court against the owner of inferior-quality land, and

when they come to collect

from the land,

they come together,

since the two promissory notes are presented in court simultaneously. And why do I need “exchanging burdens”! [And we should not say that the owner of inferior-quality land will go first to collect from the owner of intermediate-quality land, because this would cause a loss to the owner of intermediate-quality land.]

And on the strength of this question, the Gemara brings another answer—

Rather, it is necessary,

their dispute must be established in a case

where one has superior-quality and intermediate-quality land, and one has inferior-quality land.

One

Rav Naḥman

holds: They assess according to his own [lands],

and therefore, whichever way one considers it, the owner of inferior-quality land will gain, and he will be able to collect intermediate-quality land, while his fellow will collect only inferior-quality land.

For if the owner of superior-quality and intermediate-quality land goes first to collect, he collects only the inferior-quality land, which is the only land in his possession. Then he will have land of all three types in his possession—superior-quality, intermediate-quality, and inferior-quality—and his fellow will come and collect from him intermediate-quality land among his assets.

And if the owner of inferior-quality land goes first to collect, he collects the intermediate-quality land from his fellow, and from now on he has two types of land, intermediate-quality and inferior-quality; and since they assess according to his own [lands], the intermediate-quality land becomes the superior-quality land among his assets, and his fellow collects from him only inferior-quality land.

And one

Rav Sheshet

holds: They assess according to the land of everyone,

and since at the time of collection they both come together, each will remain with what is his, because if the owner of inferior-quality land first collects the intermediate-quality land, they will immediately collect it from him for his debt to his fellow.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Sheshet from our Mishna:

We learned: And the Sages say: This one collects, and this one collects!

And it is proven that in their view there is no situation of exchanging burdens, because they assess according to his own [lands]!

He explained

—he answered

Rav Naḥman according to Rav Sheshet:

Our Mishna is speaking

of a case where this one borrowed for ten

years

and this one for five

years, and therefore they collect from each other.

The Gemara discusses how this can be possible:

What are the circumstances?

If you say

that the note of the

first

one, whose loan date was earlier, was

for ten

years,

and

the note of the

second

one, whose loan date was later, was

for five

years, since he came later to the borrower and borrowed from him for five years—

would

in this case say

that

Admon: “If I had been obligated to you, how did you borrow from me?”

The time for it had not yet arrived!

The time for collection had not yet arrived, and therefore the second one, who needed money later, was forced to borrow from the first for five years.

Rather,

perhaps you will say that the note of the

first was for five

years,

and

the note of the

second was for ten

years.

It is impossible to say this. For

what are the circumstances?

If its time had arrived,

if the time had already arrived for the first note to be collected—

what is the reason of the Rabbis

who hold that he is trustworthy to collect with it? But the second one is correct in his claim: If I had been obligated to you, how did you borrow from me for ten years? You should have collected your debt from me, whose repayment date had arrived, and you should not have borrowed from me [because “a borrower is a servant to the lender”]!?

And if its time had not arrived—

its time had not arrived, so what is the reason of Admon?

He cannot claim against him, “If I owe you, how did you borrow from me?”

Therefore, according to Rav Sheshet, the Gemara establishes the dispute between the Sages and Admon in another manner:

It is necessary;

our Mishna is speaking of a case

where

the second came to borrow from the first

on the very day that five years were completed,

from the day of his loan, and one day remained until repayment of the loan, on the following day; and the lender needed money on that day, and came to borrow money from the one to whom he had lent, and wrote him a note for his loan—

One [the Sages]

the Sages]

holds: A person may borrow for one day.

A person may borrow for one day, even though on the following day he does not need the loan, since he will be able to collect on the following day the debt owed to him.

And one

Admon

holds: A person does not borrow for one day.

Therefore the first borrower can claim against the second borrower that his note was paid or forged, since if it were true that he owed him, the second should have waited until the following day and collected his debt, and he should not have borrowed from him today in order to have the money one day earlier.

Rami bar Ḥama said

to answer so that our Mishna would not present a difficulty to Rav Sheshet:

Here,

our Mishna is speaking of a case where one of the two died, and

with regard to

the collection of

orphans we are dealing, since orphans

only

may be collected from,

from one who borrowed from their father, but

to collect from

the movable property that they inherited from their father

we do not collect from them,

since one collects from the property of orphans only from land that their father bequeathed to them, and here we are dealing with a case where they have no inherited land.

Therefore, we cannot say in our Mishna, “Why do I need exchanging burdens,” and there is no difficulty from it to Rav Sheshet, who holds this.

And the Gemara wonders about his answer:

But “this one collects, and this one collects”—

it teaches

in our Mishna!

And it answers: The intention of the tanney is to say:

This

[the orphans]

collects

in practice.

And this,

the one who remained alive,

is fit to collect, but he cannot

collect, because the orphans have no land, and one does not collect from them movable property that they inherited.

Rava said: There are two answers [two refutations, by which the answer can be rejected,]

two difficulties by which the answer can be rejected]

concerning the matter:

First, it teaches, “This one collects, and this one collects”!

It does not teach, “This one is fit to collect, but he cannot collect.”

And further, let us collect land for the orphans,

let us collect land for the orphans from the one who was obligated to their father,

and let us return

and

collect it

the land

from them

for repayment of their father’s debt,

as Rav Naḥman.

For Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: If orphans collected land in payment of their father’s debt, the creditor returns and collects it from them!

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult!

The Gemara asks that it is possible to establish the Mishna in another manner:

Let us establish it

let us establish our Mishna in a case

where the orphans have

in their father’s inheritance inferior-quality land,

and he has

the one who is obligated to their father

superior-quality and intermediate-quality land. The orphans go

and

collect

from him

intermediate-quality land

as is the law of a creditor,

and they collect from him

from their own land

inferior-quality land,

even though they now have intermediate-quality and inferior-quality land,

for even if they assess according to the land of everyone,

they do not collect from them intermediate-quality land, because

this

is what we learned:

One does not collect from the property of orphans except from inferior-quality land!

Therefore, we do not say in our Mishna, “Why do I need exchanging burdens,” and our Mishna will not present a difficulty to Rav Sheshet.

The Gemara explains that it is not possible to establish it in this way:

For

these words—that we say, “One does not collect from the property of orphans except from inferior-quality land”—

is said

apply where he did not seize

the intermediate-quality land from them.

But where he seized

intermediate-quality land from them—

he seized it.

That is, his seizure was effective! And here, he is already “holding” his intermediate-quality land, which is liened to them, on account of collecting his debt from them [if they come to take it from him]. Therefore, one cannot say that he will immediately release the intermediate-quality land from his possession and then collect inferior-quality land from them.

Mishna:

One who marries a woman in a particular place may not, after the marriage, demand that she move with him to another land, since there is a substantial difference from one land to another, and he cannot compel her to undergo this change.

And in the Land of Israel itself there are

three lands

divided

with regard to

the matter of

marriage: Judea, Transjordan, and the Galilee.

Husbands may not remove their wives from one of these lands to another, even if the change consists only of changing the land, and not of changing the character of the settlement.

Therefore,

they may not remove

[within the Land of Israel] even

from a city

in one land

to a city

similar to it in a second land,

and

likewise they may not remove

from a metropolis

[a large and central city] in one land

to a metropolis

in a second land.

But within the same land—

they may remove her from city to city and from metropolis to metropolis.