Ketubot 110a (קי.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One who produces a promissory note against another,

and demands that he repay his loan.

And the other,

the borrower, claims that he repaid his debt, or claims that the promissory note is forged; and as proof of his claim he

produced

a deed of sale in which it is written

that he sold him

the lender

the field

belonging to him, and the date on the deed of sale is later than the date on the loan document—

Admon says: He can

the borrower

say

to the lender:

If I owed you,

you should not have sold me your field; rather,

you should have collected

your debt,

the

debt

that is yours

from me

when you sold me the field.

And the Sages say: He

the lender

was astute

in this

when he sold him

the borrower

the land, because

now

he can seize it as collateral,

since the borrower purchased his field from him; whereas had he not sold him the field, he could not have seized it as collateral.

Gemara:

The Mishna discusses the dispute between Admon and the Rabbis:

What is the reason of the Rabbis?

But

Admon has argued well

that if the borrower owed him money, he should not have sold him his field; rather, he should have collected his debt from him, since the lender could have taken the sale proceeds from the borrower when he gave him the money for purchasing the field, as collection of his debt, instead of selling him the field in exchange for that money!

The Gemara explains:

In a place where they give the money and afterward write the deed,

in a place where it is customary for purchasers to pay money for the land, thereby acquiring it through acquisition with money, and afterward to write a deed as evidence of the acquisition effected through the money—

everyone agrees that he can say to him

the borrower to the lender: If it is true, as you claim, that I owe you money,

you should have collected

your debt

that is yours

in payment of the debt

when you sold me the field,

and you should not subsequently have written a deed for its sale! Since you wrote me a deed of sale, this is evidence supporting my claim that I repaid the debt recorded in the promissory note [or that it is forged].

They disagree—

in a place

where

they write the deed,

a deed effecting acquisition of the field.

And afterward,

only afterward, once the acquisition has been effected through the deed,

they give the money,

paying the purchase price in money.

Admon reasoned: Since the sale itself demonstrates that the purchaser does not owe him money—for if he owed him money, the seller would not have sold him his field—if the lender wishes to act astutely and sell him his field so that he can seize it as collateral—

Since the act of sale itself proves that the buyer does not owe him money—for if he owed him money, the seller should not have sold him his field—if the lender wishes to act shrewdly and sell him the field so that he can seize it as collateral—

he should have

the lender

issued a declaration before witnesses

that his sale was intended to enable him to seize the field as collateral, and that it is not evidence that the purchaser owes him no debt. Since he did not issue such a declaration, the sale of the field to the purchaser constitutes evidence that he does not owe him a debt.

And the Rabbis reasoned that the lender cannot issue such a declaration before witnesses, since the matter would become known to the borrower and he would refrain from purchasing the field, because

that the lender cannot give such notice before witnesses, because the information would reach the borrower and he would refrain from purchasing the field, since

your friend—

has a friend. And your friend’s

friend—

has a friend.

Every friend has another friend, and thus the matter will eventually reach the borrower’s ears.

Mishna:

Two people who each produce a promissory note against the other,

and the promissory note of the second is dated later than the promissory note of the first—

Admon says:

The holder of the earlier note can claim to the holder of the later note:

If I owed you—

how did you

come afterward and

borrow from me?

Instead of borrowing from me, you should have collected your debt from me!

And the Sages say: This one collects his promissory note, and that one collects his promissory note.

Their statement will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

It was stated: Two people who each produce a promissory note against the other—

Rav Naḥman said: This one collects, and that one collects.

Rav Sheshet said: Turning the bags—

why do I need it?

This is a proverb concerning one who carries two leather vessels [sacks] in his two hands, when the weight of both is equal: Why should he turn them and exchange them from hand to hand, when their weight is the same?

And the same applies here: Since each owes the other, why should we collect from each one rather than leave each person’s money in his possession?

Rather, this one remains with what is his, and that one remains with what is his.

The Gemara explains the dispute between Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet:

a. A creditor collects his debt from medium-quality land, neither from superior-quality land nor from inferior-quality land.

b. There are two approaches to determining which field is “medium-quality”: according to the borrower’s fields, or according to everyone’s fields.

Everyone

agrees that if each of the two had land of all three types, namely

superior and superior, medium-quality and medium-quality, inferior and inferior—

it is certainly “turning the bags,”

and there is no reason to say that they should collect from one another; rather, each remains with what is his.

They disagree—

when one

of them has

medium-quality land, while one

of them has

inferior-quality land.

inferior quality.

Rav Naḥman reasoned: This one collects and that one collects,

because

he holds

that

according to his own

[the borrower’s land]

they assess

what is medium-quality land.

If the borrower has land that is medium-quality according to everyone and land that is inferior-quality according to everyone, we do not take everyone into consideration. Rather, the medium-quality land, which is the better of all his fields, is considered superior-quality land, and his creditor collects only from the inferior-quality land.

Therefore, there is no “turning the bags” when they collect from one another—

because

the

holder of the

inferior-quality land

comes

and collects the medium-quality land

of his fellow, in accordance with the law governing a creditor who collects medium-quality land.

After the holder of the inferior-quality land collects the medium-quality land from his fellow, he now has two types of land, inferior and medium-quality,

since he had

the medium-quality land [that he collected from his fellow]

as superior-quality land

of his estate.

And that one comes,

the one from whom they collected his medium-quality field,

and takes inferior-quality land,

rather than the medium-quality land that was collected from him, because his medium-quality land is now considered superior-quality land with regard to him.

And Rav Sheshet said: “Why do I need turning the bags?”

because

he holds

that

according to

the land

of everyone they assess

what is medium-quality.

Therefore, it makes no difference whether they collect from one another or each remains where he is. Even if the holder of the inferior-quality land first collects the medium-quality land from his fellow, the holder of the medium-quality land,

ultimately, when that one comes

from whom they collected the medium-quality land to collect from his fellow, he will take

the medium-quality land of his own

because medium-quality is determined according to everyone’s land and not according to the land currently held by the borrower.

Rather, this presents a difficulty:

And according to Rav Naḥman,

who says that there is no “turning the bags,” since if the holder of the inferior-quality land collects first, the holder of the medium-quality land cannot collect medium-quality land from him, because they assess according to his own property, and he will collect only inferior-quality land—

What did you see,

what basis is there for saying

that the holder of inferior-quality land comes first,

so that he comes first to collect his debt from the holder of medium-quality land?

Why not say the reverse:

Let the holder of medium-quality land come first and collect inferior-quality land, and then return and collect from him!

That is, let the holder of medium-quality land first collect from the holder of inferior-quality land. He would then have two types of land, medium-quality and inferior-quality. Since they assess according to his own property, the medium-quality land in his possession would be considered superior-quality, and his fellow could collect only the inferior-quality land that had belonged to him. Why, then, do I need “turning the bags”?

And we answer:

It is necessary,

there is a practical difference in a case

where

the holder of the inferior-quality land

preceded and sued

the holder of the medium-quality land.

The Gemara rejects the answer, since the value of the lands is not assessed at the time of the lawsuit but at the time of collection. If so,

ultimately, even if the holder of the inferior-quality land precedes and sues the holder of the medium-quality land, the latter will return and sue the holder of the inferior-quality land in court, and

when they come to collect

from the land—

they come together,

since both promissory notes are presented in court at the same time. Why, then, do I need “turning the bags”? [And we should not say that the holder of the inferior-quality land will collect first from the holder of the medium-quality land, since this would cause a loss to the holder of the medium-quality land.]

as both promissory notes are presented in court at the same time. So why is an exchange of containers necessary? [It cannot be said that the owner of the inferior land should collect first from the owner of the intermediate land, because that would cause a loss to the owner of the intermediate land.]

On the strength of this difficulty, the Gemara offers another answer—

Rather, it is necessary:

Their dispute must be established in a case

where one has superior-quality and medium-quality land, while the other has inferior-quality land.

One,

Rav Naḥman,

reasoned: They assess according to his own property,

and therefore, either way, the holder of the inferior-quality land will benefit and will be able to collect medium-quality land, while his fellow will collect only inferior-quality land.

If the holder of the superior-quality and medium-quality land collects first, he collects only the inferior-quality land, which is the only land in the other’s possession. He will then possess land of all three types—superior, medium-quality, and inferior—and his fellow will come and collect medium-quality land from his estate.

And if the holder of the inferior-quality land collects first, he collects the medium-quality land from his fellow. He then has two types of land, medium-quality and inferior-quality, and since they assess according to his own property, the medium-quality land becomes the superior-quality land in his estate, so his fellow can collect only inferior-quality land from him.

And the other,

Rav Sheshet,

reasoned: They assess according to everyone’s property,

and since at the time of collection they both come simultaneously, each will remain with what is his. For if the holder of the inferior-quality land first collects the medium-quality land, it will immediately be collected from him for his debt to his fellow.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Sheshet from our Mishna:

We learned: And the Sages say: This one collects and that one collects!

This proves that, in their view, there is no situation of “turning the bags,” because they assess according to his own property!

Rav Naḥman interpreted

and explained

it according to Rav Sheshet:

Our Mishna is speaking

of a case where this one borrowed for ten

years

and that one for five

years, and therefore they collect from one another.

The Gemara asks how this can be so:

What are the circumstances?

If you say,

if it was that the note of the

first,

the one with the earlier loan date, was

for ten

years,

and the note of the

the note of the

second,

the one with the later loan date, was

for five

years—he came later to the borrower and borrowed from him for five years—

would

in this case one say

that

Admon says, “If I owed you, how did you borrow from me?”

The time for its collection had not arrived!

The time for collection had not yet arrived, and therefore the second, who needed money later, had to borrow from the first for five years.

Rather,

perhaps the note of the

first was for five

years,

and the note of the

the note of the

second was for ten

years.

This cannot be said. For

what are the circumstances?

If its time had arrived,

if the time had already arrived for the first note to be collected—

what is the reason of the Rabbis,

who hold that he is trusted to collect with it? The second’s claim is valid: If I owed you, how did you borrow from me for ten years? You should have collected your debt from me, since its due date had arrived, and you should not have borrowed from me [because “a borrower is servant to the lender”]!?

And if its time had not arrived—

the time had not arrived, so what is the reason of Admon?

He cannot claim to him, “If I owe you, how did you borrow from me?”

Therefore, according to Rav Sheshet, the Gemara establishes the dispute between the Sages and Admon in a different manner:

It is necessary:

Our Mishna is speaking of a case

where

the second came to borrow from the first

on the very day when five years were completed

from the day of his loan. One day remained until repayment of the loan, on the following day, but the lender needed money that day and came to borrow money from the person to whom he had lent money, writing him a promissory note for the loan—

One

[the Sages]

reasoned: A person may borrow for a single day.

A person may borrow for one day even though he will not need the loan on the following day, since he can collect the debt owed to him on the following day.

And the other,

Admon,

reasoned: A person does not borrow for a single day.

Therefore, the first borrower can claim to the second borrower that his promissory note was paid or forged, since if it were true that he owed him money, the second should have waited until the following day and collected his debt; he should not have borrowed from him that day merely to have the money one day earlier.

Rami bar Ḥama said

to explain why Rav Sheshet is not contradicted by our Mishna:

Here,

our Mishna is speaking of a case where one of the two died, and

with regard to

the collection of

orphans we are dealing,

who

may collect

only from one who borrowed from their father, but

we do not collect

from the orphans from movable property that they inherited from their father,

we do not collect from them,

since one collects from orphans’ estates only from land that their father bequeathed to them, and here we are dealing with a case where they have no inherited land.

Therefore, in our Mishna one cannot say, “Why do I need turning the bags?” and it does not present a difficulty to Rav Sheshet, who maintains this principle.

The Gemara questions his answer:

But “this one collects, and that one collects

it states

in our Mishna!

And it answers: The tanna’s intent is to say:

This

[the orphans]

collects

in practice.

And this,

the one who remains alive,

is fit to collect, but he cannot

collect, because the orphans have no land, and one does not collect from movable property that they inherited.

Rava said: There are two answers

[two objections capable of rejecting the answer]

to the matter:

One: It states, “This one collects and that one collects”!

It does not state, “This one is fit to collect but cannot collect.”

And furthermore, let them collect land for the orphans,

let them collect land from the person who owes their father,

and let them then return

and

collect it

the land

from them

for repayment of their father’s debt,

in accordance with Rav Naḥman.

For Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: With regard to orphans who collected land in payment of their father’s debt, the creditor returns and collects that land from them!

And we conclude: Indeed,

it is difficult!

The Gemara suggests that it may be possible to establish the Mishna in another manner:

Let us establish it

let us establish our Mishna in a case

where the orphans have

inherited from their father inferior-quality land

and he has,

the one who owes their father,

superior-quality and medium-quality land. The orphans go

and

collect

from him

medium-quality land,

as is the law governing a creditor,

and they collect from him

from their own property land that is

inferior-quality,

even though they now possess medium-quality and inferior-quality land,

for even if they assess according to everyone’s property,

they do not collect medium-quality land from them, because

here

we learned that

one collects from orphans’ estates only from inferior-quality land!

Therefore, in our Mishna we do not say, “Why do I need turning the bags?” and our Mishna does not present a difficulty to Rav Sheshet.

The Gemara explains why it cannot be established in this manner:

Because

this applies

when we say, “One collects from orphans’ estates only from inferior-quality land,”

where the creditor did not seize

medium-quality land from them.

But where he seized

medium-quality land from them—

he seized it.

That is, his seizure was effective. Here, he is already “holding” his medium-quality land, which is liened to them, in payment of his debt from them [in the event that they come to take it from him]. Therefore, one cannot say that he will immediately release the medium-quality land from his possession and then collect inferior-quality land from them.

Mishna:

A man who marries a woman in a particular place may not, after the marriage, demand that she move with him to another land, since there is a substantial difference from one land to another, and he cannot obligate her to undergo this change.

And within the Land of Israel itself there are

three lands

that are distinct

with regard to

marriage:

Judea, Transjordan, and the Galilee.

Husbands may not take their wives from one of these lands to another, even if the change consists only of moving from one land to another and not of changing the type of settlement.

Therefore,

they may not take

[within the Land of Israel] even

from a city

in one land

to a city

similar to it in a second land,

and

likewise they may not take her

from a large city

[a large and central city] in one land

to a large city

in a second land.

But within the same land—

they may take her from city to city and from large city to large city.