Ketubot 102a — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara rejects the proof from our Mishna for Rabbi Yohanan—

No!

The Mishna is not speaking of a husband who admitted his undertaking in his own handwriting. Rather, it is dealing

with shtarei pesikta,”

which are documents of “conditions,” in which the matters stipulated between the groom and bride before their marriage are detailed [and in our Mishna it is explained that they stipulated between themselves that the groom would provide for the bride’s daughter for five years], and two witnesses signed the document.

And although it is a complete document, there is a great novelty in the matter,

and in accordance with Rav Giddel.

For Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav:

Two fathers-in-law who spoke with one another concerning their undertakings for the sake of the marriage of their children, and the father of the bride asked the father of the groom:

“How much are you giving your son

for the sake of the marriage?”—and the father of the groom answered him: the sum of

such and such.

And the father of the groom asked the father of the bride:

“And how much are you giving your daughter?”—

and he answered him: the sum of

such and such.

And from these words

they arose and betrothed,

they acquired

the undertaking to fulfill their words.

And

these very matters are acquired through speech,

without the need for any act of acquisition at all!

The undertaking itself takes effect at the time of the betrothal, through speech alone; nevertheless, the witnesses write for both sides a shtar pesikta, in which they detail the undertakings of the parties, and the two witnesses sign it, and it is a complete document.

And the Mishna had to say this, because there is a great novelty in the matter, since the undertaking itself is made through speech alone, without any act of acquisition, as Rav Giddel said. And in the document itself there is no novelty, because the document is only testimony concerning the undertaking created through speech, but it is not the cause of the undertaking itself.

And now the Gemara brings another proof for Rabbi Yohanan’s words, that an admission in a document written in his own handwriting is considered a binding admission, as though he said, “You are my witnesses.”

There is a fundamental difference between a document signed by witnesses, which

testifies to an existing monetary obligation,

but does not create an undertaking through its writing itself, and a document written in his own handwriting, without his signature, which is a document

that creates an undertaking,

through writing the admission in the document.

And even according to Rabbi Yohanan, who holds that even if he did not say at the time he handed over the document, “You are my witnesses,” his admission is considered as though he said this because “the matter of a document is powerful,” this distinction exists, as will be explained below.

Come and hear

from what we learned in a Mishna in tractate Bekhorot [51a]:

One to whom a firstborn son was born, and who is obligated to redeem him with five sela from the kohen, and

wrote to the kohen

a document in his own handwriting, “This document is evidence

that I owe

you five sela”—

he is obligated

he

to give him

to the kohen

five sela,

since he admitted this to him in his own handwriting.

But

however,

his son—

is not redeemed,

when he pays the kohen the five sela that he undertook toward him in the document. For this payment will not be “the redemption of the firstborn,” but will be considered repayment of a debt, for what he admitted and undertook toward him in his own handwriting [without himself signing it] for five sela.

And the Gemara assumed that in this law the Mishna teaches that he is obligated to give the kohen five sela because he admitted this to him in a document, since he undertook toward him through his admission in his own handwriting, without witnesses signing it.

And this law is according to Rabbi Yohanan’s words, that an admission in his own handwriting is considered as though he designated witnesses and said to them, “You are my witnesses,” in which case his admission obligates him.

And this is the novelty of this law: that the ruling follows Rabbi Yohanan, and excludes the words of Reish Lakish.

For if not, but rather it is speaking of his giving the kohen a document signed by two witnesses, stating that he owes him five sela, and it is an ordinary document testifying to an existing debt, and not a document of “admission” in his own handwriting that creates an obligation—why is his son not redeemed when he pays the five sela? Surely payment of the five sela would then not be considered “repayment of a debt” of his undertaking in the document, but fulfillment of the mitzva of redemption of the firstborn. For, as stated, the document he handed to the kohen is not an undertaking document, but a document of testimony, signed by two witnesses, that he owes five sela to the kohen; and indeed this is what he does when he pays the kohen five sela, but he is not then considered one who repays the undertaking through his admission in the document!?

And the Gemara rejects the proof:

The case there is different,

the law there, concerning the redemption of the firstborn, is different: writing in his own handwriting in a document is effective even according to Reish Lakish, and no proof may be brought from there concerning the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish in other places, since

he is liened to him,

the father of the son is liened to the kohen, for he is obligated to give the kohen the five sela

by Torah law,

even without the father’s admission.

And since the writing of his admission in the document does not create the obligation, but is only an admission concerning an obligation that already exists, Reish Lakish too agrees with Rabbi Yohanan that his admission in his own handwriting is effective.

And this is not similar to the other places in which Reish Lakish holds that his admission in his own handwriting in a document is no better than his statement, for if he did not designate witnesses for his admission, his admission is not an admission.

And the Gemara asks:

If so,

that in the redemption of the firstborn the father’s admission in his own handwriting is effective according to everyone because he is already liened to this by Torah law, and his written admission does not create the obligation, but is like an ordinary promissory note, then it is difficult—

Why

for what purpose, in general,

did

the father of the son write an admission in a document to the kohen concerning this? Surely even without his admission his lien to the kohen takes effect, and his admission added nothing to his existing obligation!?

And we answer: what the father wrote to the kohen in the document, “I owe you five sela,” he did not write in order to obligate himself toward him, but only

in order to identify for him a particular kohen,

that he undertakes to give the five sela only to him, and not to another kohen.

And we object:

If so,

since you said that, because from the Torah he is subject to him, his admission in his own handwriting is not considered an “admission” that imposes liability, it follows that when he pays the five sela to the priest, he is not repaying a debt arising from his admission in the document, but rather it is a payment for the redemption of the son. If so,

his son—

why

does the Mishna say that he

is not redeemed?

And the Gemara answers: The intention of the Mishna is

as

said by

Ulla.

For Ulla said: By Torah law,

one who wrote to his fellow a promissory note for the five sela, his son is

redeemed—

when he gives

the five sela to the priest.

And for what reason did they say

in the Mishna that

his son is not redeemed

even when he gives [them]?

A decree

the Sages decreed that such a redemption should not be effective,

lest people say

that

one redeems with promissory notes

of debt.

For the Sages were concerned that people might err and say that the redemption through this promissory note itself is effective [and they would not know that the redemption takes effect only afterward, when the father pays the priest], and they would think that redemption is effective through promissory notes that they have against other people [and then they themselves would not pay the sum in the promissory note, but the priest would collect the money in the note from the debtors written in the note], and it would emerge that they would not redeem their sons, since a promissory note that a person has against others was excluded from the redemption of the son [by an exclusion from the verse, in tractate Bekhorot].

And the distinction between his own document of undertaking, which is effective by Torah law when he gives [the money], and a promissory note that he has against others, which is not effective by Torah law even when the priest collects it from the debtors, results from this: in fulfilling his own undertaking, he himself pays the redemption money, but when the priest collects his promissory note from others, it emerges that the father himself did not give the redemption money to the priest; rather, he merely transferred to him the promissory note, while the collection itself is carried out by the priest from the people who are obligated, and not from the father himself.

And the Sages decreed, in order to prevent confusion between the laws of the documents [his document of undertaking and a promissory note that he has against others—that a father who writes for the priest a document stating that he owes him five sela should not have his redemption take effect even when he pays this money to the priest, but should give him five other sela].

Rava said:

The dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish is

in accordance with a dispute among the tannaim,

like the dispute among tannaim who disputed this very matter.

For so we learned in tractate Bava Batra [175b]:

One who guaranteed a debt for which a promissory note was written becomes obligated to repay the debt to the creditor [if the debtor does not repay him], as though he himself had borrowed from him by means of a document, and the guarantor’s property is subject to the repayment of the debt, so that even if the guarantor sells his property, the creditor can still collect from it, even from the purchasers, according to the law of a loan documented in a promissory note.

The names of guarantors for a loan documented in a promissory note must appear in the document, so that the witnesses’ signatures on the document will constitute testimony also concerning the guarantors’ agreement to guarantee repayment of the debt in the document.

But if the guarantors’ names do not appear in the document, and they are signed beneath the witnesses’ signatures, then they are guarantors for the debt only according to the law of an oral loan, their property is not subject to the debt, and the creditor can collect from them only from unencumbered property.

A guarantor who appears after the completion of the signatures on the document,

that is, if the guarantor’s name was written beneath the witnesses’ signatures, the witnesses who signed the document do not testify concerning him; rather, the guarantor himself admits that he accepted the guarantee upon himself.

It follows that this guarantor’s guarantee for repayment of the debt is not a guarantee like a loan documented in a promissory note, but rather like a guarantee for an oral loan.

And therefore

the creditor collects

from the guarantor only

from unencumbered property,

and not from the encumbered property in the possession of purchasers who bought from the guarantor.

An incident

involving a guarantor who appeared after the completion of the signatures on the document, who

came before Rabbi Yishmael, and said: The creditor collects

from the guarantor

only from unencumbered property,

as is the law concerning a guarantor for an oral loan, on the basis of the guarantor’s admission, even though his admission was not made before witnesses!

Ben Nannas said

to Rabbi Yishmael:

He collects neither from unencumbered property nor from encumbered property,

since the guarantor did not designate witnesses for his admission concerning his guarantee!

He said to him,

Rabbi Yishmael asked him:

Why

does the creditor not collect from unencumbered property on the basis of the guarantor’s admission?

He said to him,

Ben Nannas [said]:

Suppose the

creditor

was strangling his fellow,

the borrower,

in the marketplace,

so that he would repay his debt to him,

and his fellow found him,

the borrower’s fellow, and saw how the creditor was strangling his fellow, the borrower,

and said to him,

to the creditor:

Leave him

my fellow, the borrower, and do not strangle him,

and I will give you

what is due to you from him as his debt [that is, he admitted to him, not before witnesses, that he was guaranteeing him for repayment of the debt]—

the guarantor is exempt

from paying him, because

it was not on the guarantor’s trust

that the creditor

lent

to the borrower.

That is, because in this case the guarantor did not accept his undertaking before witnesses, for he did not say, “You are my witnesses,” that I accept upon myself repayment of the debt; rather, he merely admitted to him that he accepted the guarantee upon himself for repayment of the debt.

And this is similar to one who admitted to his fellow in a document, in his own handwriting, that he owed him one hundred dinars, without designating witnesses for this, concerning whom Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disputed whether his admission is effective.

And Rava says,

Let us say,

we should say that

Rabbi Yohanan

is the one

who says in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael,

that his admission is effective to impose liability upon him even if he accepted it without designating witnesses,

and Resh Lakish

is the one

who says in accordance with Ben Nannas,

that his admission is not effective, since he did not designate witnesses for it.

And the Gemara accepts part of Rava’s statement, but on the other hand rejects the other part—

According to Ben Nannas—

everyone agrees!

Certainly Rabbi Yohanan cannot hold like him.

Therefore, Rava correctly said that it is impossible to establish the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish in a manner in which both of them would hold like Ben Nannas, since necessarily Rabbi Yohanan does not hold like him but like Rabbi Yishmael, and only Resh Lakish can hold like Ben Nannas.

For if a guarantor, whose law of liability is explicitly [derived] from the Torah [for it is learned from Judah’s guarantee to Jacob our father, “I will guarantee him”], does not take effect through a mere admission according to Ben Nannas, but only if he designates witnesses for it, all the more so one who admits to his fellow that he owes him, whose law of undertaking is not explicit in the Torah, does not become obligated to him without designating witnesses for it, according to Ben Nannas.

And Rava correctly said that Rabbi Yohanan holds only like Rabbi Yishmael, and not like Ben Nannas.